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Abstract 
 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) has been widely studied in the literature, however 
there remains no consensus among academics whether markets are efficient or not. Although 
it was initially thought to hold, the recent explosion of studies that find that markets are not 
efficient has cast serious doubt on the validity of the EMH.  Furthermore, the vast majority of 
the literature examines the EMH over some predetermined sample period, disregarding the 
fact that the level of efficiency may change over time and a large sample period may not be 
efficient or not for the whole period.  A new theory that tries to accommodate both these 
facets is the Adaptive Market Hypothesis (AMH), proposed by Andrew Lo (2004).  This 
theory enables market efficiency and market inefficiencies to co-exist together and market 
efficiency to evolve over time. 
 
The main objective of this thesis is to examine the AMH and stock return behaviour in major 
stock markets using very long data and determine whether it is a more appropriate model for 
describing stock market behaviour than the EMH.  A five-type classification is proposed to 
distinguish the differing behaviour of stock returns over time.  Daily data is spilt into five-
yearly subsamples and investigated in respect of linear and nonlinear time-series tests, three 
calendar anomalies and the moving average technical rule.  The results suggest that the AMH 
provides a better description of the behaviour of stock returns than the classic EMH.  Linked 
to the AMH is the fact that investors are not rational and investor psychology plays a real role 
in investor’s decision making.  With that in mind, this thesis also examines the level of 
investor sentiment in stock returns during World War Two in Britain.  This is a time period 
that has not been studied in great detail and provides an opportunity to examine investor 
sentiment in extreme circumstances. The empirical results show that there was strong 
negative investor sentiment from major negative events and a strong level of local bias during 
the period known as the Blitz.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. Motivation for Study 
 
The ‘Efficient Market Hypothesis’ (hereafter EMH), coined and formalized in the seminal 
paper of Fama (1970), has gained continual attention from researchers in the field of finance. 
The EMH refers to a market in which new information is quickly and correctly reflected in its 
current price. To this end, no investor can consistently gain returns greater than the market as 
prices react instantaneously and appropriately to new information.  This means that stock 
market returns must be independent and unpredictable.  Although Fama (1970) introduced 
three forms of the EMH which are distinguished by their differing information sets, the weak-
form EMH has been the most widely studied and will be the primary focus of this thesis. The 
weak-form asserts that market prices fully reflect all information contained in the price 
history of the market. Thus the weak-form states that trend analysis is futile. 
 
Hundreds of published articles spanning over 40 years have examined the EMH in great 
detail through a variety of testing procedures.  However, as Lo (2008) notes, there is still no 
consensus among economists on whether financial markets are efficient or not. Many studies 
in the 1960s and 1970s found the EMH to hold, while from the 1980s to the present day, 
there has been an explosion in the number of studies that find markets are not efficient. This 
is due to the voluminous number of papers that have found stock returns not to be 
independent and to the discovery of stock market anomalies that generate significant 
abnormal returns. Further, some of these inefficiencies have been persistent and of a large 
magnitude.   
 
If a market is weakly efficient, stock returns must be independent of each other.  If returns are 
not independent, investors could use this information to make abnormal returns
1
. Testing for 
the independence of stock returns is the traditional way of examining market efficiency and 
there are many testing procedures used.  The traditional and most often used test is the 
autocorrelation test but many other tests have been formulated to examine linear 
independence such as the runs test, variance-ratio test and numerous unit root tests.  More 
recently, there has been explosion in tests examining the nonlinear dependence of returns 
                                                 
1
 Abnormal returns refers to difference between the actual return and the expected return. 
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(since the traditional tests only examined linear dependence) such as the BDS test, Engle LM 
test and McLeod-Li test. 
 
However, the tests for independence may fail to pick up some predictability in the market. 
Predictability refers to anomalies or trading rules that produce abnormal returns.  One popular 
group of anomalies are related to the time of the year and are called calendar anomalies.  
These anomalies find stock returns are systematically higher or lower depending on the day 
of the week, day of the month, or month of the year. Three of the most popular and well-
studied calendar anomalies are the Monday effect, January effect and turn-of-the-month 
effect.  The Monday effect finds that returns that are generated on Mondays are significantly 
negative and lower than other days of the week.  The January effect finds returns in the first 
half of January are significantly greater than the rest of the year, while the turn-of-the-month 
effect finds that returns around the turn-of-the-month are significantly higher than the rest of 
the month.  Another group of market anomalies are related to technical analysis.  Technical 
analysis involves forecasting future prices through the identification and exploitation of 
recurring patterns in past prices.  Thus it aims to identify irregular patterns forced by the 
economic, monetary, political or psychological attitudes of investors. Many technical rules 
have been found but one of the most popular is the simple moving average rule.  A moving 
average is an average of observations of the level of the index or stock over several 
consecutive time periods, with the objective of smoothing out seasonal variations (volatility) 
in the data.  The standard moving average rule, which utilizes the price line and the moving 
average of price, generates buy/sell signals on which the investor trades.  This strategy is 
expressed as buying (or selling) when the short-period moving average rises above (or falls 
below) the long-period moving average. 
 
Overall there appears to be a conflict between the EMH and the recent literature which finds 
returns are not independent and market anomalies do exist. Another issue is that the EMH has 
traditionally been examined in the academic literature over some predetermined sample 
period and the study reports whether that sample period is efficient over not.  However, the 
level of efficiency of a market may change over time, and it is naïve to assert that a large 
sample period is either efficient or not for the whole period. Thus market efficiency may not 
be an all-or-nothing condition and may change over time depending on a number of factors.  
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Andrew Lo (2004) noted these two facts about market efficiency and proposes a new model 
that enables market efficiency and market anomalies to co-exist and allows market efficiency 
to evolve over time. This model is called the ‘Adaptive Market Hypothesis’ (hereafter AMH) 
which asserts that market efficiency is an ever-changing phenomenon which depends on the 
market conditions and market participants.  It states that market efficiency is not a guaranteed 
outcome and that profit opportunities are available from time to time.  This new theory has 
received some attention in the literature since its formulation and will be a focus of this 
thesis. 
 
Thus this thesis investigates whether the AMH is a more appropriate model to explain stock 
return behaviour over long time periods than the traditional EMH. This is done through the 
examination of tests for independence as well as examining well known calendar anomalies 
and technical rules in three long standing stock markets.  Further, a five-type classification of 
the behaviour of stock returns is proposed which depends on the behaviour of stock returns 
over time.  Linked to the AMH is the fact that investors are not rational and investor 
psychology plays a real role in investor’s decision making.  With that in mind, this thesis also 
examines a period of time that has not been examined in great detail Britain in World War 
Two, and whether investor sentiment was present.  This time period gives the opportunity to 
study investor sentiment in extreme circumstances and is examined through event studies and 
regression analysis. 
 
1.2. Objective of Study  
 
The main objective of this thesis is to examine the behaviour of three long-standing stock 
markets and whether the AMH is a better model of explaining their behaviour than the 
traditional EMH model.  More specially, this thesis focuses on the behaviour of the US, UK 
and Japanese stock markets over time utilising; (1) time-series analysis, (2) technical analysis 
and (3) calendar effects.  Thus this thesis provides a detailed examination of behaviour of 
stock markets over long sample periods, adding to the expanding literature in this area. 
Furthermore, this thesis examines the British stock market during WW2 to contribute to the 
literature on investor sentiment and psychology.  
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1.3. Contributions of Study 
 
The main contributions of this study are; 
 
1. An examination of the newly formulated AMH through time-series analysis 
(including nonlinear tests), calendar anomalies and technical analysis to determine 
whether it is a more appropriate model in describing stock market behaviour than 
the traditional EMH. 
 
2. A proposed classification of stock returns behaviour to enable a comparison of 
returns from differing trading strategies over time. 
 
3. To further the knowledge of the behaviour of calendar anomalies and technical 
rules since the publication of the seminal papers in these areas as well as an 
examination of the profitability of these anomalies. 
 
4. To propose two modified versions of the moving average rule that outperform the 
original moving average rule and the buy-and-hold strategy. 
 
5. To further the literature on investor sentiment in extreme circumstances and 
during a period of time which has not been examined in great detail. 
 
 
1.4. Chapter Outline 
 
Chapter 2 provides a synopsis of the EMH, thereby laying the foundation for this thesis.  A 
brief review of the history and the theory of the EMH are provided, as is an introduction to 
various anomalies that are contrary to the EMH. Also included is a brief account of the 
various testing procedures used in the literature to examine the EMH and the major criticisms 
they have faced recently. It is followed by a detailed explanation of the AMH and its 
implications for stock market returns and their behaviour. Also explained is the stock return 
classification proposed in this thesis.  This chapter also examines the three stock markets 
examined in this study and explains the differences between them. 
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Chapter 3 studies the independence of stock returns over time in the three markets through 
linear and nonlinear tests.  The primary purpose of this chapter is to examine whether the 
AMH can explain the behaviour of stock returns through tests for independence.  The linear 
tests utilised are the autocorrelation test, runs test, variance ratio test and unit root tests for 
stationarity.  The returns are then whitened (through an AR and AR-GARCH pre-whitening 
method) to remove all linear correlation and the residuals of this model are then subjected to 
the McLeod Li test, Engle LM test and BDS test.  The behaviour of the returns is analysed 
through five-yearly subsamples since they provide enough observations to accurately 
evaluate the independence of returns while at the same time providing enough results to deem 
how the market has behaved over time.  Also, the behaviour of returns in each case are 
categorized into one of five types previously described. 
 
Chapter 4 investigates the behaviour of stock returns over time through an examination of 
well-known calendar effects.  The purpose of this chapter is to study whether the AMH can 
explain the behaviour of stock returns through calendar anomaly analysis.  The calendar 
anomalies studied are the Monday effect, the January effect and the turn-of-the-week effect. 
The anomalies are studied through regression analysis, break analysis as well as dividing 
them into five-yearly subsamples. Again, the behaviour of returns of each market is 
categorized into one of the five types previously prescribed and the profitability of these 
calendar effects over time are examined through two simple trading strategies. 
 
Chapter 5 examines the behaviour of stock returns over time through an examination of one 
of the most well-known technical analysis rules. Thus the purpose of this chapter is to study 
whether the AMH can explain the behaviour of stock returns through the moving average 
rule. The moving average rule is examined for data after the Brock et al (1992) data to 
determine whether the rule is still successful.  Again a five-yearly subsample analysis is 
conducted and each market is categorized into one of the five types for each of the variations 
of the moving average rule.  Also two modified versions of the moving average are 
examined, namely the perfectly and an imperfectly anticipated moving average rules to study 
whether investors have been predicting the following days signal.  Similar to chapter 4, the 
profitability of the technical rules is examined through two simple trading strategies. 
 
Chapter 6 studies the British stock market during World War Two.  The purpose of this 
chapter is to study a period of time that has not been examined in great detail and which also 
6 
 
presents an opportunity to examine investor sentiment in extreme situations.  Major positive 
and negative events, major naval disasters as well as the Blitz period are examined through 
abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns as well as event studies. 
 
Finally, Chapter 7 summarises the findings of this thesis and indicates areas where future 
research may be fruitful. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review  
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
The idea of stock market efficiency is central to finance since a well-functioning stock market 
is an essential component in a competitive economy. Market efficiency was first used to 
describe a market of which relevant information is fully incorporated into the price of 
financial assets. Fama (1970) explains this, ‘the idea is a market in which prices provide 
accurate signals for resource allocation: that is, a market in which firms can make 
production-investment decisions, and investors can choose among the securities that 
represent ownership of firms’ activities under the assumption that security prices at any time 
fully reflect all available information’ (p383).  Consequently, prices play a key role as 
allocation decisions depend on the prices of traded stocks.   
 
Louis Bachelier laid the theoretical groundwork for the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) 
and Random Walk Theory.  In his PhD Dissertation ‘The Theory of Speculation’ (1900), he 
began studying market prices assuming that the time series would exhibit evident patterns.   
However he soon began to notice that the price changes were actually random. Bachelier 
stated that ‘part, present and even discounted future events are reflected in market price, but 
often show no apparent relation to price changes’, thus concluding that ‘the mathematical 
expectation of the speculator is zero’(p9).  Cowles (1933) also found that there was no 
evidence of any ability to predict the market. 
 
Nonetheless, this idea was mostly overlooked until Maurice Kendall (1953) re-examined this 
proposition.  Kendall examined 22 UK stock and commodity price series and the results 
surprised him.  He found that ‘in series of prices which are observed at fairly close intervals 
the random changes from one term to the next are so large as to swamp any systematic effect 
which may be present’(p11).  The near-zero serial correlation of price changes was an 
observation that appeared inconsistent with the views of economists at the time
2
.  Initially 
economists believed this confirmed the irrationality of the market, however it soon became 
apparent that it was evidence of the random walk model.  If prices wander randomly, then 
market analysts cannot predict the future behaviour of security prices.  Roberts (1959) also 
                                                 
2
 Also, Kendall (1953) was the first to note the time dependence of the empirical variance (nonstationarity).   
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demonstrated that a time series generated from a sequence of random numbers was 
indistinguishable from a record of US stock prices.  Furthermore, Osborne (1959) analysed 
US stock price data and showed that common stock prices have properties analogous to the 
movement of molecules. 
 
Despite evidence on the randomness of stock price changes, there were occasional instances 
where certain series appeared to follow predictable paths.  In 1960 there was a realisation that 
autocorrelation could be induced into returns series as a result of using time-averaged 
security prices.  However Working (1960) and Alexander (1961) found that once return series 
are based on end-of-period prices, returns appear to fluctuate randomly.  The problem of 
time-averaging, identified by Working (1960), was the first work on thin trading and a 
precursor to studies of market microstructure.   
 
The mid-1960s proved to be a turning point in the research on the random character of stock 
prices.  In 1964, Cootner published his collection of papers while Fama (1965) reproduced 
his doctoral dissertation where he concluded ‘it seems to be safe that this paper has presented 
strong and voluminous evidence in favour of the random walk hypothesis’ (p98).  Since then, 
the EMH has been examined extensively in the literature, with many studies finding 
conflicting results.  In the next section the EMH is explained in more detail as is the random 
walk model. 
 
2.2. The Efficient Market Hypothesis  
 
The origins of the EMH can be traced back to Samuelson (1965), whose contribution is 
summarized in his article ‘Proof that Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly’.  
According to his hypothesis, in an informationally efficient market, price changes must be 
unforecastable if they fully reflect the expectations and information of all market participants.  
Since news is announced randomly, prices must fluctuate randomly.  Consequently, it states 
that it is not possible to exploit any information set to predict future price changes (Campbell 
et al. 1997).   
 
Harry Roberts (1967) coined the term the ‘Efficient Markets Hypothesis’ and made the 
distinction between weak and strong form tests, which became the classic taxonomy in Fama 
(1970). Building on Samuelson’s and Roberts’ work, Fama (1970) published the definitive 
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paper on the EMH, which was the first of three review papers.  He reviewed the theory and 
evidence of market efficiency to that date and defined an efficient market as ‘a market in 
which prices always fully reflect available information is called efficient’ (p383).  By 
definition, available information must appear unpredictably and stock price change in 
response to new information must also be unpredictable.  Consequently, the market fails to 
provide any abnormal profits. 
 
The expected return model, according to Fama (1970) can be stated as; 
 
  (         )      [   (         )]  (2.1) 
 
Where, E( ) is the expected value, pi,t is the price of security i at time t, ri,t+1 is the rate of 
returns for security i at time period 1 and φt is the set of information that is fully reflected in 
the price of asset i at period t. The left hand side of equation 2.1 is the expected price of 
security i tomorrow, given all the available information today (φt).  This set of information 
includes past and current events of anything that will impact on the price of security i, such as 
earnings, state of economy and all relevant economic factors.  It also includes anything that is 
known about the relationships amongst the variables (Fama 1970).  Thus the expected price 
of security i tomorrow is a function of the price of security i today and the expected return of 
security i.  However, expected return theory implies that the price tomorrow minus the 
expected price today is zero
3
 as seen by; 
 
                (         )  (2.2) 
 
Thus; 
 
  (         )     (2.3) 
 
An important assumption is that investors are certain about the best models to use in 
forecasting future returns. However when this assumption is relaxed and investors are not 
assumed to know the true forecasting model, then the use of the mathematical expectation 
operator in market efficiency becomes not very attractive, and it becomes meaningful to 
                                                 
3
 However expected stock returns are positive since prices are expected to rise over time. 
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define markets as being efficient locally in time with respect to the information set available 
at the time (Timmermann and Granger 2004).  This approach is useful as a there is a growing 
consensus in the literature that forecasting models may work for some time, and that time-
varying regularity may exist in asset returns, as will be demonstrated later. 
 
2.2.1. Assumptions of Market Efficiency 
 
The theoretical foundations for the EMH rest on the following assumptions (Shleifer 2000); 
 
1. Investor rationality.  Investors are assumed to be rational which means that they value 
securities logically and correctly update their beliefs when new information is available.   
2. Arbitrage.  To the extent that some investors are not rational, rational investors use arbitrage 
to remove these trades, without affecting prices. 
3. Collective rationality. The random errors of investors are cancelled out in the market.  Some 
investors may not be rational but since they trade randomly, they cancel each other out 
without affecting the prices. 
4. Costless information and trades. Information is free and readily available to every investor in 
the market and there are no transaction costs. 
 
These conditions ensure that investors that have access to available information cannot earn 
above-competitive returns.  However, a violation of any of the conditions does not 
immediately imply inefficiency since abnormal returns may still be absent.  The irony of 
efficient markets is that if every investor assumed that markets were efficient, then the market 
would be inefficient as no one would analyse  stocks or trade because no profits could be 
made (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980).  Hence the efficiency of a market depends on market 
participants who believe that the market is inefficient and it is worthwhile trading stocks in 
order to gain substantial profits (Shleifer 2000). 
 
If the EMH is valid in a stock market, it will then reflect that the market prices of stocks are 
reasonable estimates of the underlying worth of the stocks
4
.  This does not mean that the 
errors in prices don not happen, or that they are wrong but it means that the errors in prices 
are randomly disturbed about the true values.  Prices may be high in certain times and low in 
                                                 
4
 However, as Shiller (1984) later points out, prices are not reasonable estimates of the underlying value of 
stocks. 
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others, but it is not possible to detect a trend.  Thus we have a well-functioning stock market.  
If the EMH does not hold, then profitable investment rules may be devised to earn above-
average risk-adjusted returns.  Such a condition may be detrimental to the future development 
of the market while it will also have the effect of moving the market towards efficiency.  
Therefore, market ‘inefficiencies’ suggest that there is a transfer of wealth from naive 
investors to sophisticated and well-informed investors. 
 
2.2.2. Forms of Market Efficiency 
 
Fama
5
 (1970) distinguished three forms of the efficient market hypothesis which each use 
different information sets to determine the stock price;  
 
1. Weak-form efficiency asserts that stock prices already reflect all information that can be 
derived by examining market trading data such as history of past prices, training volume, or 
short interest.  This version of the hypothesis implies that trend and technical analysis is 
futile.  Past stock price data are publicly available and virtually costless to obtain.  If such 
data ever conveyed reliable signs about future performance, all investors would have already 
learned to exploit the signals.  Ultimately, the signals lose their value as they become widely 
known because a buy signal, for instance, would result in an immediate price increase.   
2. Semi-strong-form efficiency states that all publicly available information regarding the 
prospects of a firm are reflected in the stock price, and therefore one cannot use fundamental 
analysis to determine whether a stock is undervalued or overvalued. Such information 
includes, in addition to past prices, fundamental data on the firm’s product line, quality of 
management, balance sheet composition, patents held, earning forecasts, and accounting 
practices.  The semi-strong-form supports the notion that there is no learning lag in the 
distribution of public information.   
3. Strong-form efficiency goes beyond the semi-strong-form to state that stock prices reflect all 
information relevant to the firm, even including information available only to company 
insiders.  This version implies that insiders who are privy to information before it becomes 
known to the rest of the market also cannot earn any excess profits, i.e. insider information is 
of no use.  This form is near impossible to test as insider information is impossible to gauge. 
 
                                                 
5
 Fama (1970) acknowledged that Roberts (1959) originally introduced levels of market efficiency. 
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Semi-strong efficiency implies weak-form efficiency while strong-form efficiency implies 
semi-strong and weak efficiency.  If weak-form efficiency can be rejected, then also the semi-
strong and strong-form efficiency can be rejected. 
 
In an efficient market the current price of a security fully reflects all available information.  
These conditions ensure that investors possessing available information cannot earn above-
normal returns.  A lot of theoretical work in finance has been conducted to understand the 
behaviour of security prices and the efficiency of the market.  An efficient market usually 
means that stock prices and returns are determined as the outcome of the supply and demand 
in a competitive market with rational traders.  Rational traders instantaneously adjust the 
security prices to any relative piece of information.  Thus traders cannot systematically 
generate profits greater than the market through the acquisition of new information once risk 
and transactions costs have been accounted for (Jensen 1978).  There have been a number of 
concepts developed on the way to creating the EMH, namely the Martingale Model and the 
Random Walk models.   
 
2.3. Development of the Martingale and Random Walk 
 
2.3.1. Martingale Model 
 
The oldest and most important theory about asset pricing is the Martingale Model, which was 
established by Bachelier (1900) and Samuelson (1965). This theory postulates that the 
changes in the prices of assets cannot be systematically forecasted.  In other words, the 
returns of any asset are supposed to be a random, independent and identically distributed 
process (i.i.d.).  According to this model, any attempts to predict the future prices of an asset 
will not have a statistically significant explanatory power and are worthless. 
 
Let Pi,t represent an asset’s price at time t, and φt a set of information available at data t, 
where  φt consists of all the past prices of the asset (φt = { Pi,t, Pi,t-1, Pi,t-2 .....}).  The 
martingale hypothesis denotes that tomorrow’s price is expected to be equal to today’s price, 
given the asset’s price history.  That is, if Pi,t is considered as a stochastic variable then Pi,t is 
said to be a martingale when it satisfies the following condition: 
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  [         ]     (2.4) 
 
The crucial features of φt are that is contains only things that are known at time t and that it 
contains the current and all past prices of the asset.  Hence: 
 
  [            ]    (2.5) 
 
This is known as the fair game, which was established by Bachelier, where the expected 
return is zero given the asset’s price history.  Investors must have access to the information 
set (φt) and believe that holding the asset is just like playing a fair game.  Also, non-
overlapping price changes are uncorrelated at all leads and lags, so all linear forecasting for 
the future price changes based on historical prices has no predictive power. 
 
So in an efficient market, the current prices reflect all historical prices and it should not be 
possible to make profit by expectation of future prices from price history.  Hence, the market 
is efficient when price changes are random and unpredictable.  However in finance, there is a 
trade-off between risk and return, and the martingale hypothesis does not involve risk 
considerations in any way.  Some financial models (eg CAPM) determine the equilibrium 
return of the asset according to the risk of the asset, so there is a trade-off between risk and 
expected returns. But the martingale hypothesis puts a restriction on expected return and does 
not take risk into consideration, which means the martingale property is not a sufficient 
condition for rationally determined asset prices. 
 
Nonetheless, the martingale assumption has become a powerful tool in modern theories of 
asset price (Campbell et al 1997).  Theoretically, once asset returns are properly adjusted for 
risk then the martingale property does hold.  For instance, an asset’s risk may imply that it 
must offer some level of positive return to the investor.  Thus the asset’s price change is 
expected to be positive but the actual returns are still unforecastable.  This leads to a random 
walk model of the asset price where one can show that if returns are properly adjusted for 
risk, then the martingale property holds for the adjusted returns.   
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2.3.2. Random Walk 
 
The random walk hypothesis is associated with the weak-form of market efficiency, which 
asserts that price movements will not follow any patterns or trends and that the past history of 
stock prices has no memory and thus cannot be used to make meaningful predictions 
concerning the future price of the stock.  Malkiel (2003) explains the logic of the random 
walk model by arguing that ‘if the flow of information is unimpeded and information is 
immediately reflected in stock prices, then tomorrow’s price changes will reflect only 
tomorrow’s news and will be independent of the price changes today.  But news is by 
definition unpredictable, and, thus, resulting price changes must be unpredictable and 
random’(p59).  Randomly evolving stock prices would be the necessary consequence of 
intelligent, rational investors competing to discover relevant information on which to buy or 
sell stocks before the rest of the market becomes aware of the information.  Therefore, a 
random walk would be the natural result of prices that reflect all current knowledge.  If stock 
price movements were predictable, it would be evidence of stock market inefficiency, 
because the ability to predict prices would indicate that all available information was not 
already reflected in stock prices.  If the random walk hypothesis holds, the weak-form of 
market efficiency must hold, and vice versa.  Thus the random walk model is; 
 
                  (2.6) 
 
This model shows that the asset price at time t+1 is given by the price at the immediately 
previous moment, a term of expected change known as drift plus an unpredictable error 
component. The drift coefficient µ reflects how prices change on average to provide the 
expected rate of returns from holding the asset over time. The random walk model can be 
obtained through the martingale process by restrictions on the error term εt.  The behaviour of 
the error term εt is extremely important, and restrictions on the behaviour of this term 
produces three versions of the Random Walk Model, as stated by Campbell et al (1997).   
 
The strongest version of the random walk model is the one in which increments at price Pt 
given by error term εt, belong to the same distribution (identically distributed) and are 
independent.  In addition the original distribution can be used, in which the most common 
cases is the same as assuming that εt belongs to a normal distribution with zero mean and 
15 
 
constant variance σ2. Random Walk I (RW1) is even more restrictive than the Martingale 
Model, since in the latter model the increments are nonlinearly uncorrelated and any 
nonlinear combination of increments should also be uncorrelated. The runs test can be used to 
test the RW1. 
 
The RW1 model is extremely restrictive, therefore it should not be used in real financial 
series as it rules out the possibility of structural changes in the data generating process, such 
as parameter changes, of which the most relevant are changes in volatility.  A more 
appropriate version, the Random walk 2 (RW2) only requires the increments to be 
independent, but not necessarily to originate from the same distribution.  This maintains the 
characteristic of linear unpredictability and allows for changes in unconditional volatility.  
Filter rules can be used to test the RW2. 
 
The most general form of the random walk model requires only that εt be uncorrelated over 
time and is called the Random Walk 3 model (RW3).  However, the squared increments are 
correlated thus this process is not independent as such.  This version rules out the use of 
linear forecasting techniques such as regression analysis (Campbell et al, 1997).  RW3 is the 
most widely tested form of the random walk, and autocorrelation tests are usually used to test 
it.  Lo and MacKinlay (1988) proposed to limit the generality of RW3 in order to realize the 
dependency feature in RW3.  They allowed for certain types of heteroskedasticity in the noise 
process, which can be achieved through a mixing process. Thus they used the 
heteroskedasticity method of White and Domowitz (1984) and it became useful in expressing 
the type of heterogeneity and the amount of dependency in the noise process. 
 
2.4. Tests for Market Efficiency 
 
Throughout the last 50 years, the EMH has been tested extensively in a wide range of 
markets.  From its beginnings to the early 1970s, the EMH was deemed to be an accepted 
model as empirical evidence against it was extremely rare.  However from the late 1970s to 
the present day, evidence against the EMH has become a lot more common, as Jensen (1978) 
puts it, ‘I believe there is no other proposition in economics which has more solid empirical 
evidence supporting it than the Efficient Market Hypothesis. . . . Yet, in a manner remarkably 
similar to that described by Thomas Kuhn in his book, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, we seem to be entering a stage where widely scattered and as yet in cohesive 
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evidence is arising which seems to be inconsistent with the theory. . . . it is evidence which we 
will not be able to ignore’ (p95). In the following section, the main methods for testing the 
validity of EMH are introduced
6
 as well as the main evidence against the EMH.   
 
2.4.1. Linear Tests 
 
Linear serial correlation tests were the original tools employed to investigate the weak-form 
EMH in the literature.  This statistical process only requires the price changes to be 
uncorrelated hence it is the least restrictive version of the random walk hypothesis, namely 
the Random Walk 3 model.  However, since the seminal work of Lo and MacKinlay (1988), 
the variance-ratio test has been the preferred choice for examining the serially correlation of 
stock returns. The variance ratio test examines whether stock prices follow a random walk by 
comparing the variance of the k-period return to the one period return.  Since its formulation, 
the variance-ratio test has been subjected to numerous developments to improve its power
7
. 
The popular runs test has also be used to a great extent to test for serial correlation in stock 
returns.  The runs test has the advantage of being non-parametric, meaning that the normality 
assumption of distribution can be ignored. The test compares the actual number of runs of a 
series to the expected number of runs, where a run is defined as ‘a succession of identical 
symbols which are followed or preceded by different symbols’ (p15, Siegel, 1956). The unit 
root test is another type of statistical test favoured by researchers in the weak-form EMH 
literature which examines whether the return series is stationary.  Early studies employed a 
conventional unit root tests, particularly the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test.  However 
more sophisticated unit root tests have now been manufactured such as the Phillips and 
Perron (PP) test and the KPSS test.  Although each test has weaknesses, the general 
assumption is that if all of the tests come to same conclusion, the conclusion is accurate. 
 
2.4.2. Non-Linear 
 
The development of new statistical tools capable of uncovering hidden nonlinear structures in 
time series data has led to a huge literature reporting the existence of nonlinear serial 
dependencies across international stock markets.  Early studies used the previously 
mentioned tests which are unable to capture nonlinear dependence in stock returns.  This was 
                                                 
6
 Each following chapters have their own extensive literature review. 
7
 For a survey on the developments, Charles and Darné (2009). 
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highlighted by Hinich and Patterson (1985) who stated that many early examinations 
implicitly assumed the observed time is generated from a Gaussian process and thus ignored 
the possible nonlinear correlations. Furthermore, Amini et al (2010) show that even when no 
linear dependency can be found, a series can still exhibit strong nonlinear correlations.  ` 
 
Many statistical tools have been developed to examine the nonlinear nature of stock returns 
(see McLeod and Li 1983; Hinich and Patterson 1985; Tsay 1989; De Gooijer 1989; 
Scheinkman and LeBaron 1989; Brock et al 1996
8
).  The most popular test is the non-
parametric BDS test (Brock et al 1996), which examines the nonlinear structure in returns on 
the residuals of an ARMA model that account for the linear correlation in returns. It is very 
popular due to its availability
9
 and that it has highest power compared to other nonlinear tests 
when performed under different conditions (Patterson and Ashley 2000). However, the BDS 
test gives no information as to which data generating mechanism would be appropriate to 
model the data, thus other tests are usually also conducted.  
 
2.5. Anomalies 
 
Tests for market efficiency are plentiful and the previous section only provided a short 
introduction to them, which will be added to in the following chapters.  However, they are 
not the only method of detecting inefficiencies in stock markets.  Anomalies are empirical 
results that seem to conflict the traditional theories of asset pricing behaviour.  They indicate 
that profit opportunities are available (indicating market inefficiency) or that the asset-pricing 
model is not an accurate reflection of how prices behave. If profit opportunities are available, 
they should be arbitraged away by the market according to the EMH.  However, evidence has 
shown that many of these anomalies produce profit opportunities for long periods and are 
discussed below. 
 
One strand of market anomalies finds that stock returns are systematically higher or lower 
depending on the day the week, the day of the month, or month of the year.  A persistent 
finding within the literature is the tendency for asset returns to be negative on Mondays, 
which was first documented by market practitioners and then academics. Maberly (1995) 
shows that financial practitioners were aware of the Monday effect as early as the late 1920s, 
                                                 
8
 For a more comprehensive survey see Lim and Brooks (2011).  
9
 Available in Eviews and the Patterson Ashley (2000) toolkit. 
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with the first documented finding by Kelly (1930), who found Monday to be the worse day to 
buy stocks from a three-year statistical study.  The first academic study was conducted by 
Cross (1973), who studied the S&P 500 from 1953 to 1970 and reported that the proportion 
of increases on Friday is significantly higher than the proportion of increases on Mondays. 
Another anomaly found in the literature is that returns in January appear to have higher 
returns than other months of the year. This anomaly is known as the January effect and was 
first documented by Rozeff and Kinney (1976). Rozeff and Kinney (1976) used the NYSE 
for the period 1904 to 1974 and found that the average return for the average return for the 
month of January was 3.48% compared to only 0.42% for the other months.  A relatively 
recent but very strong anomaly is the turn-of-the-month effect, where returns are found to be 
statistically greater on the last day first three days of the month than any other days of the 
month. It was first proposed by Ariel (1987) in the US stock market and found that mean 
daily stock returns are positive at the beginning of the month and continuing through the first 
half of the month.  However, returns after this point are predominantly negative.  Lakonishok 
and Smidt (1988) investigated the DJIA from 1897 to 1986 and discovered that the rate of 
return is especially high for the last trading day of the month and the first three trading days 
of the next month.  More specifically, they find that returns during the turn-of-the-month are 
0.475% compared to 0.061% for non-turn-of-the-month days.  An interesting facet is that the 
DJIA increased by 56% during this sample period, an average increase of 0.349% per month, 
indicating that without the turn-of-the-month returns, the DJIA would have actually fallen 
during this period. Further, McConnell and Xu (2008) extend Lakonishok and Smidt’s (1988) 
study to include data up to 2005 for the DJIA and find that the turn-of-the-month effect is still 
evident.  Even when they extend their sample from 1897 to 2005, they find significance 
evidence of the effect, with all of the positive return to equities occurring during the turn-of-
the-month interval. 
 
Not only are calendar anomalies found in the literature but other anomalies have been 
documented.  One of the most well-known anomalies is the value effect, where portfolios 
constructed from value stocks appear to produce superior investment returns over long 
horizon.  Value stocks are ones which have high earnings, assets or cash flows relative to the 
share price. It was first noted by Basu (1977) who noted that firms with high earnings to price 
ratios earned positive abnormal returns relative to CAPM.  Another popular anomaly 
documented by Banz (1981) is the size effect, which finds that small stocks tend to have 
higher average returns than larger firms. Since small firms include a disproportionate number 
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of companies in financial stress, the higher expected returns may be compensation for 
exposure to the risks associated with these firms. A large area of research has examined the 
momentum and contrarian effects.  Momentum is the phenomenon documented by Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) that portfolios with high returns in the recent past continue to produce 
above-average returns over a 3-12 month horizon and thus past winners (portfolios formed 
due to their high returns) out-perform recent past losers. However, DeBondt and Thaler 
(1985) find a contrarian effect, where past losers (stocks that have low returns in the past 3-5 
years) have higher average returns than past winners (stocks that have high returns in the past 
3-5 years). It is possible that markets take a few weeks to react to new information, but 
having reacted then continue to overshoot until an ultimate correction occurs some years 
down the line. Thus investors initially underreact and then overreact to new information 
(Barberis et al 1998). Further, Fama and French (1996), with their three factor model, suggest 
that three specific factors; the excess return on the market portfolio, the size of the anomaly, 
and the book-to-market anomaly, to a large extent explain empirical return patterns. Many 
other anomalies are found in the literature` but only the most celebrated and examined ones 
are reported. 
 
2.6. Technical Analysis 
 
Technical analysis has a long history of widespread use by participants in speculative 
markets. Park and Irwin (2007) note that its origins date back to the 18
th
 century when the 
Japanese developed a form of technical analysis known as candlestick charting, that was not 
introduced to the West until the 1970s.  Technical analysis involves forecasting future prices 
through the identification and exploration of recurring patterns in past prices.  Thus it aims to 
identify irregular patterns in prices. 
 
The moving average rule is one of the most popular amongst practitioners and has been 
extensively studied in the academic literature.  Moving average systems take different forms 
according to the method used to average past prices in the moving average calculations. For 
example, the simple moving average rule uses equal weighting on each past price, while the 
exponential moving average rule gives more weight to recent prices than not so recent prices.  
A moving average is an average of observations of the level of the index over several 
consecutive time periods.  The objective is to smooth out seasonal variations (volatility) in 
the data.  The standard moving average rule, which utilizes the price line and the moving 
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average of price, generates buy/sell signals on which the investor trades.  This strategy is 
expressed as buying (or selling) when the short-period moving average rises above (or falls 
below) the long-period moving average.    
 
Another popular strand of technical rules are the filter rules, which aim to ‘filter’ out smaller 
price movements by constructing trailing stops for price movements above or beneath the 
current trend. The trailing stops have various forms such as some predetermined amount of 
past extreme prices (Alexander’s Filter Rule) or particular weighted averages of past prices 
(the Parabolic Time/Price system).  The Alexander Filter Rule generates buy (sell) signals 
when today’s price rises (falls) by x% above (below) its recent low (high).  The Parabolic 
Time/Price system uses the trailing stop that works as function of both the direction of the 
price movement and the time over which the movement takes place. 
 
There are many other technical rules documented in the literature and examining all of them 
is not the aim of this thesis.  The moving average rule is examined in this thesis and is studied 
in more detail in Chapter 5 with a detailed review of the literature. 
 
2.7. Problems with Conventional Tests  
 
The traditional tests for the EMH fall into 3 main categories; 
 
1. Tests that investigate the significance of autocorrelations of returns of current returns on past 
returns to test market efficiency. 
 
2. Tests that examine the random walk of security returns through the runs test, variance ratio 
test, unit root tests etc. 
 
3. Tests that examine the predictability of the security returns, such as calendar anomalies or 
technical analysis rules. 
 
Although the previous literature review is not exhaustive, it does demonstrate that these 
testing procedures have one major shortcoming.  That is, that they use statistical tests to 
evaluate whether a market is efficient over some predefined period.  Antoniou et al (1997) 
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argued in favour of examining the evolution of the stock market, rather than simply taking a 
snapshot of the market at a particular point in time.  This is because standard testing 
procedures ensures market efficiency is measured as a steady state over some predefined 
period.  In other words, these tests lead to the inference that a market either is or is not weak-
form efficient for the sample period as a whole meaning examining different subsamples with 
large overlapping sections may produce very different results.  
 
Gu and Finnerty (2002) argue that efficiency should evolve over time since the weak-form 
EMH is based on the random arrival of information, more frequent and accurate information 
would make their “shocks” more random, smaller and less heavy.  Advances in information 
technology (larger quantity, better quality, higher frequency and speed of information at a 
lower cost) would help to increase market efficiency and reduce the arbitrage opportunities in 
the market.  Also, investors’ growing ability to use relevant information in forming their 
trading strategies may also play an important role in the evolution of market efficiency.  If 
investors believe that stock prices follow some random pattern, they would trade based on 
that pattern, so the pattern would disappear or be strengthened.   If they simply buy-and-hold, 
or follow a trend, the market would not be efficient.  As investors become capable of 
promptly and rationally using relevant information for their investments, their trading 
decisions would tend to reflect the random nature of information and the market would tend 
to move towards being efficient.   
 
As conventional tests for market efficiency have failed to take the evolving nature of markets 
into consideration, a number of methodologies to test this have been explored in recent time. 
One such methodology is the Kalman Filter framework which allows for time-varying 
parameters and a GARCH structure for the residuals.  The time-varying autoregressive 
coefficients are used to determine the changing degree of predictability for the stock market.  
If the market does become more efficient over time, the smoothed time varying estimates of 
the autocorrelation coefficient would gradually converge towards zero.  The first study using 
the Kalman Filter framework was by Emerson et al (1997).  Contrary to their hypothesis, they 
found times of efficiency and times of inefficiency, and there are no real movement towards 
efficiency over time.  This framework was formalized by Zalewska-Mitura and Hall (1999) 
as a ‘Test for Evolving Efficiency’ (TEE).  The TEE has been used to test evolving efficiency 
in emerging stock markets from the former communist bloc (Zalewska-Mitura and Hall 
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(2000), Rockinger and Urga (2000, 2001).  It has also been used in China (Li, 2003a, b) and 
Africa (Jefferies and Smith 2005). 
 
Another test is the fixed-length moving sub-sample windows approach to test the evolution of 
market efficiency.  This rolling windows approach computes the relevant test statistic that is 
capable of detecting serial dependence for the first window of a specified length, and then 
rolls the sample one point forward eliminating the first observation and including the next 
one for re-examination. For instance, in a fixed-length rolling windows of 30 observations, 
the first window starts from day 1 and ends on day 30, the second window comprises 
observations running from day 2 through day 31 and so on. Tabak (2003) examined the 
random walk hypothesis using rolling variance tests with a fixed window of 1024 days, and 
concluded that the Brazilian stock market has become increasingly more efficient. 
 
Cajueiro and Tabak (2004) formally proposed the calculation of Hurst exponent over time for 
stock returns using the rolling sample approach as a statistical tool to test the assertion that 
emerging stock markets are becoming more efficient. The authors argue that stock markets 
have presented different levels of efficiency over time mainly due to the variation of the 
effects of speed of information, capital flows and non-synchronous trading. Using 40-year 
time windows and stock data from 11 emerging markets (and the US and Japan), the Hurst 
exponent is found to be time-varying reflecting the evolution of market efficiency over time 
in each market under study. Thus the existence of both short-term and long term-term linear 
dependencies provides evidence against the weak-form market efficiency.  Lim et al (2006) 
used fixed-length sub-samples to detect nonlinear dependences to detect how market 
efficiency has evolved over time.  They found that market efficiency follows an evolutionary 
path, with is consistent with the findings on autocorrelation coefficients and Hurst exponents.  
 
Classical EMH cannot explain why markets go through periods of efficiency and then periods 
of inefficiency.  The EMH states that there are no profit opportunities in the market using 
trend analysis, and that if there are, rational traders trade these profits away quickly.  
However, Lim et al (2006) for example, find Asian stock markets do not present a clear trend 
towards efficiency.  Furthermore, calendar anomalies and technical analysis have shown 
through subsample analysis that profit opportunities vary over time. A new hypothesis that 
aims to bridge the gap between the classic EMH and market inefficiencies, is the Adaptive 
Markets Hypothesis proposed by Andrew Lo (2004). 
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2.8. The Adaptive Markets Hypothesis 
 
To accommodate the changing degree of market efficiency over time, Lo (2004) proposes a 
new version of the EMH derived from evolutionary principles.  Lo argues that valuable 
insights can be derived from the biological perspective and calls for an evolutionary 
alternative to market efficiency.  Thus Lo proposes a new paradigm in which EMH can co-
exist alongside behavioural finance in an intellectually consistent manner.  This paradigm is 
called the Adaptive Market Hypothesis (AMH hereafter), which is an evolutionary idea that 
has been followed up by Farmer and Lo (1999), Lo (2002) and Farmer (2002), before it was 
formalized by Lo in 2004. 
 
Lo (2004) argues that many of the behavioural biases in finance are in fact consistent with an 
evolutionary model of individuals learning and adapting to a changing environment.  It is the 
impact of these evolutionary forces on financial institutions and market participants that 
determines the efficiency of markets, and the performance of investments, businesses and 
industries.  The principles outlining AMH are explained in Lo (2005) as; 
 
1. Individuals act in their own self-interest 
2. Individuals make mistakes 
3. Individuals learn and adapt 
4. Competition drives adaptation and innovation 
5. Natural selection shapes market ecology 
6. Evolution determines market dynamics 
 
Thus these principles imply a number of practical implications within finance.  Firstly, the 
risk premium varies over time due to the stock market environment and demographics of 
investors in that environment.  For example until recently, US markets were populated with 
investors who had never experienced a genuine bear market, which no doubt has shaped their 
aggregated risk preference.  Thus irrespective of whether prices fully reflect all available 
information, the particular path that market prices have taken over the past few years 
influences their current aggregate risk preferences.  The second implication that is contrary to 
the EMH is that arbitrage opportunities do exist from time to time in the market.  Lo (2004) 
cites Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) who observe that without such profit opportunities, there 
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would be no incentive to gather information, and the price discovery aspect of financial 
markets would collapse.  Thus from an evolutionary viewpoint, active liquid financial 
markets imply that profit opportunities must exist.  However as they are exploited, they do 
disappear.  But new opportunities are continually being created as certain species die out and 
rather than move towards a higher efficiency, the AMH implies that complex market 
dynamics such as trend, panics, bubbles and crashes are continually witnessed in natural 
market ecologies.  The third implication is that investment strategies are successful and 
unsuccessful, depending on certain market environment.  Contrary to the EMH, the AMH 
implies that such strategies may decline for a time, and then return to profitability when 
environmental conditions become more conducive to such trades.  An example of this was 
presented in Lo (2005) when he computed the rolling first-order autocorrelation of month 
returns of the S&P Composite Index from January 1871 to April 2003.  Lo found that the 
degree of efficiency varies through time in a cyclical fashion, and there are periods in the 
1950’s when the market was more efficient than in the early 1990s.  Although such cycles are 
not ruled out by the EMH in theory, in practice none of its existing empirical 
implementations have incorporated these dynamics, assuming instead a world in which 
markets move to efficiency. The final implication of the AMH is that characteristics such as 
value and growth may behave like ‘risk factors’ from time to time, that is, stocks with these 
characteristics may yield higher expected returns during periods when those attributes are in 
favour.  For example during the US technology bubble of the late 1990’s, growth stocks 
garnered higher expected returns than value stocks, only to reverse when the bubble burst.  
Although such nonstationarities causes problems for the EMH, the AMH places no 
restrictions on what can be a risk factor.  A consequence of this implication is that market 
efficiency is not an all-or-nothing condition, but is a characteristic that varies continuously 
over time and across markets.  Lo (2005) argues that convergence to equilibrium is neither 
guaranteed nor likely to occur, and that it is incorrect to assume that the market must move 
towards some ideal state of efficiency.  Instead, the AMH relies on more complex market 
dynamics, such as cycles, trends, crashes and bubbles that occur in financial markets. 
 
The AMH has gained increasing attention in the recent academic literature.  Neely et al 
(2007) investigate the AMH, however they investigate how the returns on trading rules have 
declined over time, and examine the rate which they decline.  They implicitly state that if the 
returns decline at a slow enough rate, it shows evidence of AMH.  However, Lo (2005) states 
that in an adaptive market ‘strategies may decline for a time, and then return to profitability 
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when environmental conditions become more conducive to such trades’ (Lo 2005 p25). Thus 
trading rules not only decline, but come back again to produce profits when the market 
conditions are right.  Thus although Neely et al (2007) show the decline of certain trading 
rules, they do not show evidence of an adaptive market as defined by Lo (2005). Lim and 
Brooks (2006) examine the evolving efficiency of developed and developing stock markets 
through the portmanteau bicorrelation test statistic. Using a rolling sample approach, they 
find that the degree of market efficiency varies through time in a cyclical fashion. Todea et al 
(2009) study the profitability of the moving average strategy over windows using linear and 
nonlinear tests from 1997-2008. They report that returns are not constant over time, but rather 
episodic show when sub-periods of linear and non-linear correlation appear. Thus they 
conclude by stating that the degree of market efficiency varies in a cyclical fashion over time 
like postulated by the AMH. Ito and Sugiyama (2009) examine the time-varying 
autocorrelation of monthly S&P500 returns. They show that the degree of market efficiency 
varies over time, with the market being most inefficient during the late 1980s and most 
efficient around the year 2000.  Further, Kim et al (2011) investigate the AMH using the 
return predictability of the daily and weekly DJIA from 1900 to 2009.  They use two 
autocorrelation tests (variance ratio and portmanteau) and a generalised spectral test to obtain 
monthly measures of the degree of stock return predictability by applying a moving-
subsample window. They find strong evidence that return predictability fluctuates over time 
in a similar way to that described by Lo and that the US market has become more efficient 
after 1980. They also utilise regression analysis to determine how the return predictability 
over time is related to changing market and economic conditions.  They find that there is no 
return predictability during market crashes, while economic and political crises are associated 
with a high degree of return predictability.  Smith (2011) investigates the adaptive nature of 
fifteen European emerging stock markets, along with the developed markets of Greece, 
Portugal and the UK. Utilising rolling window variance ratio tests for the period February 
2000 to December 2009 they find that the most efficient markets were the Turkish, UK 
Hungarian and Polish markets, while the least efficient were the Ukrainian, Maltese and 
Estonian. Each of the eighteen markets provides evidence of the time-varying nature of return 
predictability which is consistent with the adaptive markets hypothesis. Lim et al (2013) 
examine the return predictability of the three major US stock indices using two data-driven 
tests, the automatic portmanteau Box-Pierce test and the wild bootstrapped automatic 
variance ratio test.  By using a rolling window from 1969 to 2008, they show patterns in the 
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time variation of return predictability that is consistent with the AMH while most periods 
with significant return autocorrelations can be associated with major exogenous events. 
 
2.9. Classification of the Behaviour of Stock Returns 
 
This thesis aims to examine the behaviour of stock market returns over time to determine 
whether the AMH provides a better description of the behaviour of stock returns than the 
classic EMH.  Five-yearly subsamples are chosen to enable an observation of the behaviour 
of returns over time since this method provides enough observations to gain a clear picture of 
how the market has behaved over time while at the same time providing each test with 
enough observations to generate reliable results. To make the analysis more straightforward, 
a categorization of market behaviour is suggested depending on the 
independence/predictability of each of the subsamples over time. For example, if an 
autocorrelation test is employed to examine the independence of the stock returns over time, 
it is very unlikely that the result will be stable over time.  The market is likely to go through 
periods of independence and periods of dependence.  In analysing the behaviour over time, a 
polynomial trendline is chosen since it will provide a clear smoothing of the behaviour of 
returns over time.  Polynomial trendlines of order 3 are employed in each chapter and the 
trendline is used to distinguish which of the five-types is chosen. When presenting a graph of 
results and plotting a trendline is not appropriate, analysis of the results is sufficient to 
determine which behaviour type the returns behave in. The five-types are; 
 
1) Efficient market.  The market has never been inefficient and the market is perfectly efficient 
throughout the sample.  This means that there is no level of predictability or dependence in 
returns.  This is seen in Figure 1.1 as being on the x-axis throughout the sample i.e. at the 
point where there is no market inefficiency and thus market efficiency. 
 
2) Move towards efficiency. The market has been inefficient, but over time market forces have 
forced the market to become efficient.  This can be seen in Figure 1.1. as above the x-axis 
indicating market inefficiency but then a convergence and permanent resting point at zero. 
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3) Switch to inefficiency. The market has been efficient but over time the market has become 
inefficient.  This can be seen in Figure 1.1. as being on the x-axis (market efficiency) and 
then a move above the x-axis to indicate a level of inefficiency in the market. 
 
4) Adaptive Market Hypothesis. The market has gone through at least three different stages of 
efficiency.  That is, the market has either been efficient, inefficient and then efficient again, 
or inefficient, efficient and inefficient again.  This can be seen in Figure 1.1 with the market 
going from and to the x-axis at least three times.  If the market moves between the two states 
just two times, this indicates either type 2 or type 3. 
 
5) Market inefficiency. The market been inefficient throughout the sample and has never been 
efficient.  In this circumstance the market has a level of predictability or dependence 
throughout the sample and indicates market inefficiency throughout. This is seen in Figure 
1.1. as being continuously above the x-axis and never going to market efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 documents the types of market behaviour graphically over time.  The y-axis is 
characterised as the level of market inefficiency and the x-axis as time.  Thus the further you 
go up the y-axis the more market inefficiency is found and the x-axis itself is zero market 
inefficiency, thus supporting market efficiency.  A market inefficiency level of zero indicates 
market efficiency and this is classified as type 1.  Type 2 is where the market had a level of 
inefficiency but has moved to market efficiency over time, so according to figure 1.1., the 
level of inefficiency was at zero but is now positive.  Type 3 indicates a switch from 
efficiency to inefficiency, while type 4 documents the adaptive nature of returns.  In this type 
Figure 1.1. Classification of the behaviour of stock market returns over time with regards to the polynomial trendline. 
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the market has changed between being efficient and inefficient (or vice versa) at least three 
times.  Finally type 5 documents market inefficiency, so the market has been inefficient 
throughout the sample and is above the x-axis. 
 
Market efficiency is evident with types 1 and 2 while market inefficiency is characterized by 
types 3, 4 and 5.  As you go down the scale from 1 to 5, efficiency decreases, while 
inefficiency increases.  In the classic EMH theory, type 1 is optimal, with type 2 still 
conforming to the EMH as predictability/independence diminish to zero quickly. One 
important note is that type 3 could be early stage type 4.  Type 3 is a switch in the 
predictability/dependence of returns.  But type 4 requires the market to go through at least 
three different stages of predictability/independence, so type 3 may just be two-thirds on the 
way to being type 4 and being an adaptive market.  Type 5 characterises market inefficiency 
since this is when the market has constant predictability/dependence in returns. 
 
This thesis uses this classification in the time-series, calendar anomalies and technical 
analysis chapters to put the behaviour of the stock markets studied into groups. The 
behaviour of the anomalies must lie within one of these groups and it will enable a 
comparison of the behaviour of the stock returns when subjected to various tests.  Chapter 3 
examines the independence of stock returns over time through a battery of tests.  Thus this 
chapter uses the independence of returns to categorize the behaviour of stock returns over 
time. Chapter 4 examines the excess returns of various calendar effects over time.  Thus in 
this instance the calendar anomalies are documented regarding their excess return behaviour 
over time.  Chapter 5 studies the moving average rule over time and thus uses the buy-sell 
differences to document how the technical rule behaves over time. 
 
2.10. Markets Examined in this Study 
 
Three long standing stock indices are examined in this thesis to enable a detailed examination 
of the behaviour of these indices over time.  The DJIA is one of the longest standing market 
in the US, as is the FT30 in the UK.  These two markets are both made up of 30 companies; 
however their composition makeup’s are quite different. The TOPIX is the longest stock 
market index in Japan and will enable a comparison between two well developed economies 
and one developing economy over long sample periods. 
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2.10.1. Dow Jones Industrial Average  
 
The DJIA Industrial Average (DJIA hereafter) was created by Wall Street Journal editor and 
Dow Jones & Company co-founder Charles Dow and one of his business associates, Edward 
Jones.  It was first calculated on May 26
th
 1896 and is the second oldest U.S. index after the 
Dow Jones Transportation Average.  The DJIA is made up 30 large, publically owned 
companies based in the U.S.  The average is price-weighted, and to compensate for the 
effects of stock splits and other adjustments, it is currently a scaled average.  The value of the 
DJIA is not the actual average of the prices, but rather the sum of the component prices 
divided by a divisor, which changes whenever one of the stocks has a stock split or stock 
dividend, so as to generate a consistent value for the index.  The current divisor, after many 
adjustments, is less than one indicating that the index is larger than the sum of the prices of 
the components.  Thus; 
 
       
∑ 
 
 (2.7) 
 
Where p are the prices of the component stocks and d it the Dow Divisor. When the DJIA 
was first calculated in 1896, it represented the average of 12 stocks from leading American 
industries; with only General Electric currently still part of the index. However, the DJIA has 
been subject to criticism.  Some critics argue that is not representation of the overall market 
performance of the U.S. due to the small number of stocks it includes and the way it is 
calculated.  They prefer to cite float-adjusted market-value weights indices such as the S&P 
500 or the Wilshire 5000 as better indicators of the U.S. stock market.  Although the DJIA 
has received criticism, it is still the most cited and most widely recognized of the stock 
indices.
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2.10.2. Financial Times 30  
 
The Financial Times 30 (FT30 hereafter) was devised by Maurice Green and Otto Clarke 
from the Financial News in 1935 and was called the Financial News 30 until the paper 
merged with the Financial Times in 1945. The index was first calculated on the 1
st
 June 1935 
and is the oldest index in the UK.   
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The FT30 is based on the share prices of 30 British companies from a wide range of 
industries. It’s method of calculation has been essentially unchanged since its inception and is 
quite different to most other indices in the UK.  The companies listed in the index are made 
up of those in the Industrial and Commercial sectors and exclude financial sector and 
government stocks.  The price is the equal weighting of the 30 constituents, and the 
constituents only change when a company needs to be removed for some reason, such as a 
merger or failure.  Thus the FT30 is more stable than all FTSE indices, which decide their 
constituents based on market capitalisation and change quarterly.  The index is calculated by; 
 
                         ∑ (
            
                
)
 
    
 (2.8) 
 
Where FT30today is the price of the FT30 today, FT30yesterday is the price of the FT30 
yesterday, Pricei, today is the price of security i today, and Pricei, yesterday is the price of security 
i yesterday. 
 
When a company is removed from the index, a new company is selected based on a number 
of considerations.  Firstly, the constituent reflects the breadth of the UK economy.  Secondly, 
that the shares are actively traded and are not in the hands of a small number a holders.  
Thirdly, that the company is a leader in its field and are UK-based or have UK origins.  
Finally, the shares trade without any undue influence on the price from overseas, although 
this consideration is less relevant today. Company size is not of paramount, although all 
recent additions have been in the FTSE 100 at time of entering the index.  Only two original 
constituents remain in the index from 1935, namely GKN (Guest Keen & Nettlefolds) and 
Tate & Lyle.
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2.10.3. Tokyo Stock Price Index  
 
The Tokyo Stock Price Index (TOPIX hereafter) is a composite index of all common stocks 
listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) which was established after 
World War II in 1949.  The TOPIX is a measure of the changes in aggregate market value of 
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the TSE common stocks and was first measured on 4
th
 January 1951.  The base for the index 
(100 points) is the aggregate market value of its component stocks as of the close on 4
th
 
January 1968.  The aggregate market value is calculated by multiplying the number of listed 
shares of each component stock by its price and totalling the products derived there from.  In 
computing the index, the base market value is used as the denominator of a fraction whose 
numerator represents the current aggregate market value.  The fraction is multiplied by 100 
(the index value on the base date) and is reduced to a decimal figure to the nearest one-
hundredth
12
. Thus;  
 
        
                   
                
           (2.9) 
 
The TOPIX is the longest-standing stock market in Japan and although calculated quite 
differently to the DJIA and FT30, its availability of long-standing data makes it an obvious 
choice. 
 
2.11. Summary 
 
The concept of the EMH asserts that asset returns are unforecastable, and can be traced back 
to the pioneering theoretical contribution of Bachelier (1900) and the empirical work of 
Cowles (1933).  It became a dominate paradigm in financial economics during the mid-1960s 
since the seminal work of Fama (1965; 1970). The empirical examination of the EMH is 
huge, and not surprisingly there is no agreed consensus on its validity. Early research 
supported the EMH, although recently a number of important studies have found 
predictability in stock returns.  Numerous stock market anomalies have been found in the 
data, not all of which are discussed in this thesis.  However, Fama (1997) argues that these 
anomalies are indicative of a need to continue the search for better models of asset pricing 
and that the EMH is still valid.  Also, the importance of the EMH is further demonstrated by 
the fact that profit opportunities found are still referred to as anomalies and that the EMH is 
still a major topic in any text book on financial theory. 
 
The growing strength of anomalies which counter the classic EMH have asked the question 
‘is there a more appropriate model to describe the behaviour of stock prices?’ One model 
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that initially appears to unify the EMH and stock market anomalies is the AMH.  Although 
the AMH is in its infancy, it has been supported by some strong evidence in the literature and 
only a further examination of it will deem whether it is an appropriate model in describing 
stock market return behaviour. Thus this is the aim of this thesis by using tests for 
independence, calendar effects and technical analysis.  Linked to the AMH is the fact that 
investors are not rational and investor’s psychology plays a real role in investor decision 
making.  With that in mind, this thesis examines investor sentiment during World War Two 
in Britain to determine the level of investor sentiment in the most extreme of circumstances. 
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Chapter 3: An Examination of the Independent Behaviour of Stock Returns  
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
An efficient market is a market where available information fails to provide abnormal profit 
to investors.  Thus market efficiency yields a number of testable predictions about the 
behaviour of assets and their returns.  The main two that are examined in this thesis are that 
prices move in an independent manner and that there is no predictability in stock returns.  
The subsequent chapters study the predictability of stock returns while this chapter 
investigates the independence of the stock returns over time. Since this chapter only examines 
the independence of stock returns, if a market has no dependence between its returns, it is 
deemed efficient.  
 
A number of tests for independence are examined in order to fully determine how stock 
returns have behave over time.  The serial correlation test is the most traditional test to 
investigate the correlation between two price changes.  The serial correlation coefficient 
measures the relationship between values of a random variable at time t and its value in the 
previous period.  If the series behaves like a random walk, its price changes are expected to 
have zero autocorrelation coefficients at different lags.  The runs test, which also examines 
the serial correlation in a series, is also utilised due to its non-parametric property. Unlike the 
serial correlation test, it does not require returns to be normally distributed (Poshakwale 
1996).  These two tests are the traditional tests for market efficient but more tests have been 
developed and will be used to enhance the power of the results. 
 
The variance ratio test which was first documented by Lo and MacKinlay (1988) is also 
examined.  This test investigates whether stock returns are serially uncorrelated, like the 
serial correlation and runs test.  However, the major benefit of this test is that the test statistic 
includes a correction for the heteroskedasticity property of stock price returns.  This is an 
important feature since a common characteristic of stock market returns are that they are 
heteroskedastic, which is ignored by the serial correlation.  In section 3.3 the data of the three 
indices is examined and each return series appears heteroskedastic indicating the 
appropriateness of this test statistic given the data examined..  The stationarity of the returns 
series is also tested to determine the randomness of returns.  If a series displays a unit root 
(non-stationary), it implies that the series has no tendency to return to its mean value.  That is, 
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its behaviour is not mean-reverting and independent.  The presence of a unit root (non-
stationarity) in stock prices is only a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the random-
walk process.   
 
The tests introduced so far examine the linear dependency of returns when nonlinear 
dependency could be present and not captured by the linear tests.  Thus in order to examine 
the nonlinear dependence in returns, a pre-whitening procedure is conducted to eliminate any 
linear dependence from the returns through an AR(p) model. These filtered returns will then 
be tested for nonlinearity through the McLeod Li (1983) and the Engle LM (1982) test.  
Furthermore, the BDS test (Brock, Dechert and Scheinkman 1996) is also utilized to examine 
the nonlinearity of returns.  It is a nonparametric test for serial dependence in time series 
analysis, where the series must be stationary, with a null hypothesis that the data generating 
processes are independent and identically distributed.  However, the BDS test gives no 
information about the type of nonlinearity found.  Also, the AR(p) filter does not account for 
the heteroskedasticity in returns.  Thus an AR-GARCH filter is also used and the BDS test is 
conducted on the filtered returns.   
 
Similar to the rest of this thesis, data is divided into five-yearly subsamples to show how the 
stock returns have behaved over time. The results for each period will provide an idea of how 
the markets have behaved during five-yearly periods and over time throughout the full 
sample. The behaviour of each market under each test is also categorised through the 
suggested classification of markets in the previous chapter.   
 
3.2. Literature Review 
 
Early papers found a low degree of serial correlation (for example Working 1934; Kendall 
1943, 1953; Cootner 1962; Osborne 1962; Samuelson 1965; Fama 1965), although Kendall 
(1953) found that stock returns were serially uncorrelated in the case of the Chicago wheat 
weekly series. It was also found that weekly share index prices were serially correlated for 
the British Industrial Index and that New York monthly cotton prices seemed to follow a 
Markov process.  However, this was dismissed by claiming that ‘such serial correlations as 
is present in these series is so weak as to dispose at once of any possibility of being able to 
use them for prediction’ (Kendall 1953 in Cootner 1964, p92).  Moore (1962) supported this 
for the lags of the S&P 500 stock index claiming that the autocorrelations coefficients were 
35 
 
‘uniformly small’ and ‘quite insignificant’.   Cowles and Jones (1937) found significant serial 
correlation in averages time series indices of stock prices.  However Alexander (1961) stated 
that these serial correlations are the result of ‘spurious correlation’.  He showed that Cowles 
and Jones (1937) results were the result of spurious correlation, which is a direct result of 
using the average of a month as the value for that month. Therefore, Cowles (1960) revisited 
his previous work but this time used weekly prices based on Wednesday closing prices. 
However, serial correlations were still present.  Cootner (1962) also presented evidence 
against the random walk hypothesis by demonstrating that a specific decision rule 
outperforms randomly bought stocks.  Alexander (1964) answered the critics of his 1961 
paper and concluded that the S&P Industrials does not follow a random walk.  
 
Although all of these results seem to conform to the EMH, an early rejection of the EMH was 
documented by Niederhoffer and Osborne (1966) on the DJIA during the month October 
1964. The results displayed four non-random properties; (1) a general tendency for price 
reversal between trades, (2) reversals are relatively more concentrated at integers where 
stable slow-moving participants offer to buy and sell, (3) quick moving competitors aware of 
these barriers can take positions at nearby prices, thus making profits and (4) after two 
changes in the same direction, the changes of continuation in that direction are greater than 
after changes in the opposite directions. These results conclusively concluded that the random 
walk hypothesis was rejected for the DJIA and this was the first official rejection of the 
random walk hypothesis. Scholes (1969) indicated that the officers of corporations sometimes 
have monopolistic access to information about their firms, meaning they can take advantage 
of information other investors are not privy to, and so make abnormal profits. 
 
Testing the EMH using serial correlation is still utilised in the literature today, for example 
Laurence et al (1997) who investigated the assumption that emerging markets are not 
efficient, but should become more efficient over time. They tested the four stock markets in 
China from 1993 to 1996 and find that the markets are not efficient, but become more 
efficient throughout the sample period.  Similarly, Kavussanos and Dockery (2001) used a 
cross section of prices of the Athens Stock Exchange in order to test the predictability of its 
prices.  They find that prices are not stationary but returns are stationary, but they are unable 
to confirm that the market is efficient due possibly to the low liquidity and limited 
transparency in the market. Also, Borges (2010) examines six major European stock markets 
for weak-form efficiency through a number of tests, including the serial correlation test. They 
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find that monthly data suggests efficiency for all markets but only four of the six meet most 
of the criteria for a random walk in daily data, probably due to the non-normal nature of the 
daily data. 
 
The early studies examining market efficiency also applied the runs test, with the majority of 
them supporting efficiency.  Fama (1965) studied the DJIA over the period 1957-1962 and 
found little evidence of dependence.  Cooper (1982) studied world stock markets using 
monthly, weekly and daily data for 36 countries and found that the USA and UK supported 
the random walk hypothesis and thus market efficiency.  Worthington and Higgs (2004) 
investigated market efficiency in developed and developing European markets through the 
serial correlation test, runs test and three unit root tests.  They find that only Germany, 
Ireland, Portugal, Sweden and the UK comply with the most stringent criteria for market 
efficiency.  Recent papers have also utilised the runs test, notably Dezelan (2000), Kompa 
and Matuszewska-Janica (2009), Borges (2009; 2010).  Thus although the runs test, along 
with the serial correlation test, are traditional tests for testing market efficiency, they are still 
utilised today. 
 
Since the seminal paper by Lo and MacKinlay (1988), the variance ratio (VR hereafter) test 
has become the standard tool for investigating if stock returns are serially correlated.  The VR 
tests the random walk hypothesis against stationary alternatives, by exploiting the fact that 
the variance of random walk increments is linear in all sampling intervals. It is usual to 
examine various holding periods, with the estimated variance ratio statistics compared to 
unity to determine if the series is non-random.  Lovatt, Boswell and Noor (2007) tested the 
predictability of UK stock returns for the sample period 1
st
 January 1992 to 20
th
 March 1998 
using the autocorrelation test at various lags and the variance ratio test.  They used company 
data from the FTSE All-Share and randomly allocated them into 10 portfolios of size and 
both equally and value-weighted returns were calculated for all portfolios and for the full 
sample.  Both the autocorrelation test and the variance ratio test reject the random hypothesis 
for all portfolios and the full sample, hence providing evidence of predictability in daily UK 
stock returns.  Hung, Lee and Pai (2009) use parametric and nonparametric VR tests to 
examine the weak form of EMH for the large- and small-capitalization stock indices of the 
TOPIX and FTSE. They use the Lo MacKinlay (1988) and Wright (2000) VR tests for the 
sample period 1
st
 January 1993 to 17
th
 October 2005 for the TOPIX and 1
st
 January 1986 to 
17
th
 October 2005.  To enhance the resting power of the nonparametric VR test, the multiple 
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VR test of Chow and Denning (1993) is first extended to Wright’s rank-based and sign-based 
VR tests and the critical values are obtained through the Belaire-French and Contreras (2004) 
method.  They find that the weak-form EMH is supported for large-cap stock indices, but 
rejected for small-cap indices, suggesting that small-cap indices might contain exploitable 
essences of developing profitable trading strategies, predicting the volatility or option prices. 
 
The early studies in market efficiency also generally employ conventional univariate unit root 
tests, in particular the popular augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, Phillip and Perron (PP) 
test and the KPSS test. These tests concluded that stock prices can generally be characterized 
by a random walk process. Al-Loughani and Chappell (1997) test the validity of the weak 
form of the EMH for the FT30, covering the period 30
th
 June 1983 to 16
th
 November 1989.  
They conducted the study during this time period because government economic policy 
towards the financial markets was relatively unchanging, suggesting random walk behaviour 
should be present.  However, using the Dickey-Fuller, Augmented Dickey-Fuller, and serial-
correlation tests, the results found evidence of significant heteroskedasticity (differing 
variances).  The random walk hypothesis was rejected and the series was explained by a 
GARCH M(1,1) model.  This study is an example that even in a period of constant economic 
policy, the random walk hypothesis does not always hold.  Choudhry (1997) demonstrated 
that six Latin American countries, using the ADF test, were conforming to EMH, while 
Kawakatsu and Morey (1999) showed that 16 emerging markets are random using the DF-
GLS and KPSS tests.  Also Chadhuri and Wu (2003) found that 17 emerging markets are 
random using the ADF and PP tests.  Due to the lower power of the ADF unit root test in 
identifying stationarity when the underlying data generating process is characterized by a 
nonlinear process, Caner and Hansen (2001) propose a unit root test built on an unrestricted 
two-regime threshold autoregressive model.  This newly developed threshold unit root test 
has been adopted by Narayan (2006).  The consensus is that stock price indices exhibit 
threshold nonlinearity, with Narayan (2006) reporting unit roots in both regimes.  Koustas et 
al (2008) re-examine the US stock market using a statistical framework in which the null 
hypothesis of a unit root is tested against the alternative of a globally stationary three-regime 
self-exciting threshold autoregressive (SETAR) process.  Their results show the inner regime 
is characterized by a unit root while the two outer regimes are well captured by a stationary 
autoregressive process.  Despite all the methodological advances, Rahman and Saadi (2008) 
state that a unit root is a necessary pre-requisite for the random walk hypothesis but not a 
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sufficient condition, thus the presence of a unit root does not imply a random walk since the 
return series must also be serially uncorrelated or serially independent. 
 
The previous four tests examine the linear nature of returns but as Amini et al (2010) show, 
there may still be some nonlinear dependence in returns not picked up by the linear tests.  
Due to this fact, the number of tests for nonlinearity in stock markets has exploded in recent 
times and a complete review was conducted by Tsay (2005).  The tests can be divided into 
two broad categories.  The first category contains nonlinear tests which do not provide a 
specific nonlinear alternative such as the Brock-Dechert-Scheinkman (BDS) test (Brock et al, 
1996), the bispectrum test (Hinich, 1982), Tsay’s test (Tsay, 1989), the neural network test 
(Lee et al, 1993) and the bicorrelation test (Hinich, 1996).  Although these tests have been 
used substantially in the literature, they fail to provide any information about the type of 
nonlinear dynamics if the null hypothesis is rejected.  The second category involves testing 
linearity of a time series against a well-specified nonlinear model and employing the 
likelihood ratio, LM or Wald test.  Such tests are the SETAR-type nonlinearity (Tsay, 1989), 
smooth transition autoregressive type nonlinearity (Luukkonen et al, 1988) and ARCH 
processes (Engle, 1982).  The majority of the papers that use such tests have found 
overwhelming evidence of nonlinear dependence in stock markets, suggesting that 
nonlinearity is a real phenomenon in international stock markets that has been largely ignored 
until the 1990s.   
 
The first major paper investigating nonlinearity in time series was by Hinich and Patterson 
(1985).  The paper involved estimating the bispectrum of the observed time series.  If the 
process generating rates of return is linear with independent innovations, then the skewness 
of the bispectrum will be constant.  The results show that the daily returns of 15 common 
stocks in the US are not generated by a linear process, but by a nonlinear process.  De Gooijer 
(1989) applied two nonlinear tests on daily data of 27 stock returns traded on five world stock 
exchanges.  He used a diagnostic test and a linear autoregressive time series model against a 
bilinear model as the alternative.  Although most returns appeared to be generated by white 
noise when linear techniques were used, De Gooijer found significant nonlinear dependences.  
Peters (1989) also found results that showed the presence of nonlinearities in the monthly 
returns of the S&P 500 Index.  Furthermore, Peters (1991) was successful in discovering a 
chaotic attractor for the S&P 500 returns.  This finding provided significant evidence that the 
S&P 500 stock returns were driven by deterministic chaos.  Scheinkman and LeBaron (1989) 
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analysed weekly returns of the CRSP and concluded that these returns appeared to be driven 
by a nonlinear deterministic influence and were unpredictable.  Brock et al (1991) examined 
both the S&P 500 and the CRSP values weighted indices’ weekly returns.  They concluded 
that although there was extensive evidence of nonlinearity in the returns which was largely 
due to the lack of stationarity in the series, the source of such nonlinearities could not be 
confirmed as being chaotic determinism.   
 
Abhyankar et al (1995) tested for the presence of nonlinear dependence and chaos on real-
time returns on the FTSE 100 index using a six month sample. They used the Hinich and 
Patterson (1985) bispectrum and BDS test and found nonlinear dependence at all frequencies.  
Opong et al (1999) examined the behaviour of the FTSE100, FTSE250, FTSE350 and FTSE 
All-Share equity indices and covered the period of inception of each index to September 
1997.  In order to test the null hypothesis that the indices are random, independent and an 
identically distributed process, they used the R/S analysis and the BDS test.  They found that 
each series they examined to not be identically distributed and conclude that the FTSE 
indices were not truly random due to some cycle or pattern that showed up more frequently 
than would have been expected in a true random series.  Omran (1997) investigated the 
nonlinear behaviour of the FTSE All-Share for the sample period 4
th
 January 1988 to 28
th
 
February 1994.  They chose this data set as it included the 1987 stock market crash.  They 
first conducted the BDS test and found that the null hypothesis of i.i.d. stock returns should 
be rejected and that the series has nonlinear dependence.  These findings are similar to the 
results of de Lima (1995) who found nonlinear dependence in stock returns of US data after 
the 1987 stock market crash. 
 
Ashley and Patterson (2001) introduced a ‘nonlinearity’ toolkit which uses a selection of the 
best tools for detecting nonlinearity in a time series. The tests included in the toolkit are the 
Engle LM test, Hinich test, Tsay’s test, Hinich bicorrelation test and the BDS test.  
Panagiotidis (2005, 2009) used this toolkit to investigate the weak-form efficiency of the 
Athens Stock Exchange and found strong evidence of nonlinear dependence in both case.  
Alagidede and Panagiotidis (2009) and Lim and Brooks (2009) consistently show that 
nonlinearity is a stylized fact of stock returns.  Further, Hiremath and Kamaiah (2010), 
Alagidede (2011), Caraiani (2012) and Lim and Hooy (2012) all detect nonlinear behaviour 
in stock returns through a variety of testing procedures.  From the explosion in testing 
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nonlinearity in stock returns, it is obvious that nonlinearity is an important issue and any 
testing procedure should include at least one nonlinear detecting test.  
 
3.3. Data  
 
The data used in this study are daily prices of three long-standing stock market indices.  The 
sample period for the DJIA is from 2
nd
 January 1897 to 31
st
 December 2009, the FT30 
sample begins from 1
st
 July 1935 to 31
st
 December 2009 and the TOPIX sample begins from 
4
th
 January 1951 to 31
st
 December 2009
13
.  The starting dates are set by the availability of 
data for these specific stock market indices.  Summary statistics for the three stock indices for 
the full sample and subsamples are presented in Table 3.1.  The daily return for each index is 
calculated by; 
      (  )    (    )  (3.1) 
 
where In(pt) is the natural logarithm of the index at time t. Dividends are omitted from returns 
based on these series’ because dividends will effectively be small and constant due to the 
short-term nature of the predictions. 
                                                 
13
 The DJIA data was obtained from Global Financial Data and Datastream, the FT30 data was obtained from 
the Financial Times and Datastream and the TOPIX data was obtained from Datastream. 
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Sample Period Obs Mean S.D. Max Min Skewness Kurtosis JB 
Panel A: DJIA 
Full Sample 30868 0.00019 0.01091 0.14272 -0.25632 -0.54189 24.23*** 581356.6*** 
1897 1899 895 0.00054 0.01182 0.05498 -0.09129 -0.52850 8.81*** 1302.42*** 
1900 1904 1489 0.00004 0.01078 0.06172 -0.06247 -0.40721 7.01*** 1041.10*** 
1905 1909 1503 0.00024 0.00988 0.06476 -0.08653 -0.49050 9.10*** 2392.61*** 
1910 1914 1385 -0.00021 0.00785 0.04303 -0.07159 -0.77277 11.77*** 4572.70*** 
1915 1919 1491 0.00045 0.01141 0.05324 -0.07516 -0.55783 6.27*** 740.91*** 
1920 1924 1499 0.00008 0.00915 0.04128 -0.04313 -0.32735 4.81*** 232.05*** 
1925 1929 1499 0.00052 0.01283 0.11640 -0.13720 -1.63780*** 28.60*** 41614.83*** 
1930 1934 1499 -0.00052 0.02274 0.14273 -0.08778 0.53568 6.57*** 866.37*** 
1935 1939 1502 0.00025 0.01252 0.07012 -0.08072 -0.33341 7.50*** 1296.28*** 
1940 1944 1503 9.15e-6 0.00742 0.04625 -0.07043 -1.57745*** 19.58*** 17842.86*** 
1945 1949 1503 0.00022 0.00735 0.03517 -0.05716 -1.01232 9.83*** 3177.47*** 
1950 1954 1503 0.00057 0.00586 0.02128 -0.04765 -0.94556 8.50*** 2121.72*** 
1955 1959 1503 0.00055 0.00682 0.04048 -0.06766 -0.84828 11.11*** 4299.66*** 
1960 1964 1503 0.00038 0.00656 0.04579 -0.05882 -0.12630 11.66*** 4700.55*** 
1965 1969 1503 0.00014 0.00604 0.02543 -0.02023 0.00522 3.78*** 38.44*** 
1970 1974 1503 0.00002 0.00946 0.04952 -0.03567 0.27173 5.37*** 371.35*** 
1975 1979 1503 0.00040 0.00787 0.03833 -0.03038 0.12700 3.76*** 40.15*** 
1980 1984 1503 0.00044 0.00905 0.04781 -0.03586 0.37410 4.67*** 213.04*** 
1985 1989 1503 0.00075 0.01229 0.09666 -0.25632 -6.29782*** 135.54*** 1110043.0*** 
1990 1994 1503 0.00042 0.00749 0.04467 -0.04006 -0.10218 6.04*** 579.92*** 
1995 1999 1503 0.00093 0.00925 0.04861 -0.07454 -0.61348 9.51*** 2749.62*** 
2000 2004 1503 0.00017 0.01150 0.06155 -0.07396 -0.07260 6.66*** 837.91*** 
2005 2009 1503 0.00017 0.01288 0.10508 -0.08201 0.01782 15.04*** 9075.15*** 
Panel B: FT30 
Full Sample 19155 0.00015 0.01058 0.10781 -0.12400 -0.19629 12.69*** 75169.29*** 
1935 1939 1142 -0.00025 0.00827 0.08077 -0.05553 0.16549 16.90*** 9195.70*** 
1940 1944 1283 0.00032 0.00512 0.03969 -0.04841 -1.30036*** 25.30*** 26936.71*** 
1945 1949 1268 -0.00005 0.00568 0.04193 -0.04051 -0.90933 12.34*** 4783.23*** 
1950 1954 1274 0.00043 0.00472 0.02410 -0.03523 -0.66272 8.82*** 1891.69*** 
1955 1959 1277 0.00048 0.00805 0.05821 -0.04632 -0.16042 8.58*** 1664.35*** 
1960 1964 1274 -7.39e-6 0.00793 0.05690 -0.06662 -0.40098 9.81*** 2496.28*** 
1965 1969 1269 0.00015 0.00977 0.07981 -0.08750 -0.18110 16.00*** 8941.25*** 
1970 1974 1272 -0.00073 0.01447 0.10781 -0.10255 -0.05320 8.62*** 1675.30*** 
1975 1979 1274 0.00074 0.01662 0.09619 -0.06926 0.34802 5.99*** 500.19*** 
1980 1984 1303 0.00064 0.01146 0.07058 -0.07940 -0.06962 6.07*** 512.28*** 
1985 1989 1301 0.00054 0.01133 0.09119 -0.12400 -1.78312*** 25.70*** 28619.23*** 
1990 1994 1304 0.00016 0.00905 0.05940 -0.04032 0.41396 5.63*** 716.10*** 
1995 1999 1305 0.00043 0.00882 0.04021 -0.03853 -0.09253 5.39*** 311.86*** 
2000 2004 1305 -0.00057 0.01308 0.06215 -0.06447 -0.24797 5.65*** 395.10*** 
2005 2009 1304 -0.00002 0.01496 0.08589 -0.09136 -0.26207 8.76*** 1814.80*** 
Panel C: TOPIX 
Full Sample 15390 0.00028 0.01024 0.12864 -0.15810 -0.48570 16.00*** 109082.1*** 
1951 1954 1041 0.00092 0.01102 0.06196 -0.09159 -0.69953 11.92*** 3539.39*** 
1955 1959 1304 0.00075 0.00667 0.02999 -0.05899 -0.94250 10.99*** 3659.71*** 
1960 1964 1305 0.00010 0.00867 0.03868 -0.04429 -0.12324 5.24*** 276.99*** 
1965 1969 1304 0.00052 0.00702 0.03553 -0.04130 -0.46381 6.85*** 852.87*** 
1970 1974 1304 0.00035 0.00929 0.04078 -0.07762 -1.62075*** 14.41*** 7645.81*** 
1975 1979 1304 0.00038 0.00498 0.02424 -0.02078 0.07372 5.09*** 238.57*** 
1980 1984 1305 0.00053 0.00599 0.03369 -0.04448 -0.15591 7.84*** 1277.75*** 
1985 1989 1304 0.00088 0.01015 0.08978 -0.15810 -2.46289*** 56.06*** 154305.4*** 
1990 1994 1305 -0.00047 0.01301 0.09116 -0.07365 0.38753 8.97*** 1973.35*** 
1995 1999 1305 0.00008 0.01169 0.06599 -0.05248 0.15823 5.90*** 463.24*** 
2000 2004 1305 -0.00031 0.01293 0.06127 -0.06574 -0.22637 4.84*** 195.05*** 
2005 2009 1304 -0.00018 0.01573 0.12865 -0.10007 -0.25222 10.83*** 3341.92*** 
 
Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics of Daily Returns.  Significance tests are only applied to the skewness, 
kurtosis and Jarque-Bera statistics.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Of the three indices full samples, the TOPIX has the highest mean return of 0.000283, while 
the FT30 has the lowest daily average return of 0.000154.  In the case of the standard 
deviation of stock returns, all three indices have very similar fluctuations, suggesting that 
there may be some relationship between the volatility of these three stock returns.  When 
subsamples are considered, it can be seen that the DJIA mean generally increases over time, 
albeit a huge drop in the 1930-1934 period and during the 2000s (possibly due to recessions).  
However, the standard deviation tends to stay relative similar over time except the 1930-1934 
period, again where the standard deviation is exceptionally high.  There is also quite high 
standard deviation during the 2000s, possibly due to the dot com crash and the recession.  
These results for the 1930-1934 period are probably the result of the early 1930s crash and 
subsequent recession.  Subsample analysis for the FT30 shows that the mean varies 
considerably over time, while the standard deviation tends to increase over time.  However, 
the TOPIX shows that the mean decreases consistently over time, while the standard 
deviation increases over time, with both measures moving in opposite direction. 
 
Kurtosis is a measure of whether the data is flat or peaked, relative to a normal distribution.  
Series with a low kurtosis tend to have a flat top near the mean, rather than a sharp peak, 
while a series with a high kurtosis have a distinct peak near the mean and have heavy tails.  
The kurtosis is calculated by; 
 
 
  
 
 
∑ (    ̅)
  
   
  
 
(3.2) 
 
Where  ̅ is the mean,   is the standard deviation, and T is the number of observations. A 
normal distribution has a kurtosis of 3, with a positive kurtosis indicating a peaked 
distribution, while a negative kurtosis indicating a flat distribution. If the distribution has 
thicker tails than does the normal distribution, its kurtosis will be greater than three. The 
kurtosis coefficient of all three indices exceeds 3, indicating a leptokurtic distribution, with 
the DJIA return series having the greatest leptokurtic distribution and the FT30 the smallest. 
 
Skewness is a measure of symmetry within the return series, that is, if it looks the same to the 
left as it does to the right of the centre point.  The formula for the skewness is; 
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(3.3) 
 
Where  ̅ is the mean,   is the standard deviation, and T is the number of observations.  
Positive values for skewness indicate data that is skewed right, while negative values signify 
data skewed to the left.  Thus a positive skewed data set will have a right tail that is heavier 
than the left tail, and vice-versa.  The skewness coefficient for all is negative, which is 
common to what is found in most data (for example Premaratne and Bera, 2001; Jasic and 
Wood, 2004).  Thus, the skewness and kurtosis values for the three indices deviate from the 
normal distribution, indicating that the distributions of indices return series’ are not normal.  
 
To investigate the extent of the non-normality in the distributions of the indices return series, 
the Jarque-Bera statistic is used to test whether each series is normally distributed.  The test 
statistic measures the difference of the skewness and kurtosis of the series with those from a 
normal distribution.  The Jarque-Bera statistic should be distributed as Χ2 with 2 degrees of 
freedom under the null hypothesis of a normal distribution.  The reported probability is the 
probability that the statistic exceeds the observed value under the null hypothesis, where a 
small probability value leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis of a normal distribution.  
The formula for the Jarque-Bera is; 
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(3.4) 
 
Where T is the number of observations, k is zero for an ordinary series and the number of 
regressors when examining residuals to regression equation, S is skewness and K is kurtosis 
(Bera, 1981).  As shown by Table 3.1, all indices have a probability associated the JB test of 
less than 0.0001, which is statistically significant at 1% level and confirms that the 
distribution of the daily returns of the three markets are not normal. 
 
Although the basic assumption of the random walk model is that the distribution of the return 
series should be normal, it can be seen from Table 3.1 that the frequency distribution of the 
returns for each index is not normal, as a normal distribution has a kurtosis of 3 and a 
skewness coefficient of zero.  However, most (if not all) financial series’ tend to be non-
normal in nature and although it isn’t of great surprise, it is worth noting. 
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3.4. Linear Methodology 
 
The linear tests that are initially conducted are the autocorrelation test, the runs test, the 
variance ratio test and three unit root tests. 
 
3.4.1. Autocorrelation 
 
The autocorrelation test is a reliable tool for investigating the independence of random 
variable in a series.  If autocorrelations are found, returns are not independent.  However if 
autocorrelations are not found, it does not necessarily imply independence of the series.  It 
only implies that there are no linear autocorrelation dependences in the series.  There could 
be nonlinear dependences in the series which are not picked up
14
, as discussed by Amini et al 
(2010).  Autocorrelations occur when the covariances and correlations between different 
disturbances are not all non-zero (i.e. Cov(εi, εj) = σij for all i ≠ j, where εt is the value of the 
disturbance in the i
th
 observation). 
 
    
  
  
 (3.5) 
 
Where γ1 is the covariance at lag k and γ0 is the variance.  The first order autoregressive 
process contains values of εt lagged by just one period, indicating that the disturbance in 
period t is influenced by the disturbance in the previous period, εt-1.  A second order process 
contains values of εt lagged two periods, indicating that the disturbance in period t is 
influenced by the disturbance in the past two periods, i.e. εt-1, εt-2.  
 
Three cases can be distinguished concerning parameter ρ: 
 
1) Positive autocorrelation.  In this case ρ>0, which means that positive values of εt-1 
tend to be followed by positive values of εt, and negative values of εt-1 tend to be 
followed by negative values of εt.  There is a tendency for random disturbances to 
spill over from one time period to the next. 
2) Negative autocorrelation.  In this case ρ<0, which means that positive values of εt-1 
tend to be followed by negative values of εt, and negative values of εt-1 tend to be 
                                                 
14
 This is discussed in more detail later. 
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followed by positive values of εt.  There is a tendency for successive disturbances to 
alternate sign over time, a contrarian effect. 
3) No autocorrelation.  In this case ρ=0, which means that εt=ut.  There is no 
relationship between εt and εt-1 and successive disturbances have no relationship at all. 
 
The autocorrelation test examines whether the correlation coefficients are significantly 
difference from zero.  The null hypothesis is that ρ=0 and this would imply a random walk 
process.  The autocorrelation coefficient is significant if its t-statistic is outside a [±1.64/√T], 
[±1.96 /√T] or [±2.58 /√T] band for 10%, 5% and 1% significance respectively, where T is 
the total number of observations. Since market efficiency states that returns must be 
independent, this study focuses on the first order autocorrelations even though up to 7 lags 
are reported. 
 
3.3.2. Runs Test 
 
The runs test is a non-parametric test which also investigates the randomness of the series in 
share price movements. However unlike the autocorrelation test it does not require returns to 
be normally distributed (Poshakwale 1996).  The test examines whether the value of one 
observation influences the values taken by later observations.  If there is no influence, the 
sequence is considered random.   
 
The runs test makes no assumptions of the magnitude of share price changes so ignores huge 
price falls such as the crash in October 1987.  If an uninterrupted series of data is random in 
the runs test, the actual number of runs in the series should be close to the expected number 
of runs, irrespective of signs.  A run can be defined as ‘a succession of identical symbols 
which are followed or preceded by different symbols or by no symbols at all’ (Siegel, 1956), 
so a run is a sequencing of the same value or category of a variable.  There are three possible 
types of stock price change: increase, decrease or no change, and therefore three possible 
types of run.  If stock returns increase sequentially five times (+ + + + +) it counts as one run.  
A new run count begins when this sequence is broken with a decrease or no change.  
Therefore, the runs test can reveal the cutting point (mean or median), the number of runs 
below the mean/median, the number of runs above or equal to the mean/median (Poshakwale, 
1996). 
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The number of positive runs is denoted by P, while the number of negative runs is denoted by 
N.  The formula to calculate the expected number of runs is; 
 
  ( )  
   (   )
(   )
   (3.6) 
 
 
The variance of runs is calculated by; 
 
    
   (       )
(   ) (     )
 (3.7) 
 
 
If the z-value is greater than the critical values, we reject the null hypothesis of independence 
of the series. Otherwise, we conclude that the returns are independent.  Furthermore, the 
sample will not be independent if it consists of too many or too few runs.  Hence, the 
independence of returns can be assessed by analysing the distribution of the duration of 
specific runs. If the actual number of runs exceeds (falls below) expected runs, a positive 
(negative) z-value is obtained.  A positive (negative) z-value indicates negative (positive) 
serial correlation in the return series.  Thus the z-statistic is calculated by; 
 
   
   ̂
              
 (3.8) 
 
Where R is the observed number of runs,  ̂ is the expected number of runs and SR is the 
standard deviation of the total number of runs. 
 
3.4.2. Variance-Ratio Test 
 
Since the seminal work of Lo and MacKinlay (1988), the variance ratio test emerged as a 
primary tool in examining whether stock returns are serially uncorrelated, with Hoque et al 
(2007) stating that it has become the most commonly used econometric tool for testing the 
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random walk hypothesis.  However the variance ratio test has been subjected to a number of 
developments in recent years
15
. 
 
The variance ratio test is based on the statistical property that if the stock price follows a 
random walk, then the variance of the k-period return is equal to k times the variance of the 
one period return.  That is, the variance of its 10-day returns is equal to 10 times the variance 
of its daily return.  Lo and MacKinlay (1988) provide a single test for this hypothesis using 
the single variance ratio, denoted by VR(k).  Let rt denote an asset return at time t, where t = 
1,2,3….T.  Then the variance ratio for rt, with holding period k is; 
 
   ( )     
    ⁄  (3.9) 
 
Where   
  = Variance(rt + rt-1 +….+ rt-k+1) is the variance of k-period return.  It can be 
rewritten as; 
 
   ( )     ∑(  
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 (3.10) 
 
Where  ( )is the autocorrelation of rt of order j.  That is, the variance ratio is one plus t a 
weighted sum of autocorrelation coefficients for the asset returns with positive and declining 
weights.  The VR tests the null hypothesis that the variance ratio equals 1 for all k’s since 
returns are serially uncorrelated with  ( ) = 0.  Alternatively, values for VR(k) greater than 1 
imply positive serial correlations while values less than 1 imply negative serial correlations or 
mean reversions.   
 
Lo and MacKinlay (1988) proposed the asymptotic distribution of VR(x; k) by assuming that 
k is fixed when T → ∞.  They showed that if xt is i.i.d., i.e. under the assumption of 
homoskedasticity, then under the null hypothesis that V(k)  = 1, the test statistic M1(k) is 
given by; 
 
   ( )  
  (   )   
 ( )  ⁄
 (3.11) 
                                                 
15
 For a survey on the developments of the variance ratio test look at Charles and Darné (2009). 
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which follows the standard normal distribution asymptotically.  The asymptotic variance, 
 ( ), is given by; 
 
  ( )  
 (    )(   )
  
 (3.12) 
 
To accommodate the returns exhibiting conditional heteroskedasticity, Lo and MacKinlay 
(1988) proposed the heteroskedasticity robust test statistic M2(k); 
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 (3.13) 
 
which follows the standard normal distribution asymptotically under the null hypothesis that 
V(k) = 1, where; 
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The M2(k) test is applicable to returns of a price series and the usual decision rule for the 
standard normal distribution is applied.  This study utilises M2(k) due to the heteroskedastic 
property of the returns series’ studied, as revealed in Table 3.1.  In estimating VR(k), a choice 
must be made for the value of the holding periods k.  In the literature a popular choice for 
daily returns is 2, 4, 8 and 16.  Even though these are arbitrary and made with little or no 
justification, we shall use these as they are the standard values used
16
. 
 
The variance ratio test allows for the use of overlapping stock returns and thus increases the 
number of observations used to construct the test statistic.  The methodology also includes a 
                                                 
16
 An alternative automatic method for choosing k is suggested by Choi (1999). 
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correction for the test statistic to allow for the heteroskedasticity property of stock returns.  
These features increase the efficiency and the power of the test compared to standard serial 
correlation tests
17
. However, if a stock return is purely random, thus neither positively nor 
negatively correlations, the variance test looks at individual variance ratios for a specific 
aggregation interval, which requires VRs of all intervals to equal 1, which is an obvious flaw 
of the variance ratio test (Buguk and Brorsen 2003).  Since the stock returns exhibit 
conditional heteroskedasticity, we do not consider the Lo MacKinlay M1(k), and only apply 
the Lo MacKinlay M2(k) test.  The holding periods (k) considered are (2, 4, 8, 16) which is 
consistent with the majority of the previous literature. 
 
3.4.4. Unit Roots 
 
One strand of tests for efficiency is to determine whether the series is stationary or non-
stationary.  A series is stationary if its mean and variance are constant over time and the value 
of the covariance between the two time periods depended only on the distance or gap or lag 
between the two time periods and not the actual time at which the covariance is computed 
(Gujarati 2009). If Yt is a stochastic time series with the following properties, it is a stationary 
process with; 
 
 
            (  )    
                  (  )   (    )
     
                      [(    )(      )] 
(3.16) 
 
Where γk, the covariance at lag k is the covariance between the values of Yt and Yt+k.  Thus in 
a stationary process no matter at what point we measure them, its mean, variance and 
autocovariance remain the same, i.e. they are time invariant.  A nonstationary process 
however, has a time-varying mean and/or a time-varying variance.  Stationarity is important 
since if the series is nonstationary, we can only study its behaviour for the time period under 
consideration.  Thus we cannot generalize it to other time periods and forecasting such 
nonstationary time series may be of little practical value. 
 
                                                 
17
 Lo and MacKinlay (1989) show that the variance-ratio test is more powerful that either the Box-Pierce or the 
Dickey Fuller test for several common time-series process such as an AR(1) process. 
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The classic nonstationary example is the random walk model (RWM).We can distinguish 
between three types of random walk models: (1) pure random walk model, (2) the random 
walk model with drift, (3) the random walk model with drift and a deterministic trend. 
 
Pure Random Walk Model 
Suppose ut is a white noise error term with mean 0 and variance σ
2
.  Then the series is said to 
be random walk if; 
 
            (3.17) 
 
Where Yt is the value of stock at time t, which depends on the prior period’s value plus a 
stochastic error term. This implies that the price today is the best indicator of the price 
tomorrow, i.e. tomorrow’s price is today’s price plus a random error.  Hence no abnormal 
gains can be made and the series is nonstationary.  But if we take the first difference of the 
equation (i.e. take Yt-1 from each side), it becomes stationary; 
 
     (       )     (3.18) 
 
This equation is the pure random walk model differenced stationary.  
 
Random Walk Model with Drift 
In this model, a drift term is introduced to equation (3.16) to form; 
 
              (3.19) 
 
Where δ is the drift term and equation (3.18) is a random walk model with drift, which is 
nonstationary.  If we take the first difference of equation (3.18), we produce; 
 
     (       )       (3.20) 
 
Which shows that as Yt drifts upwards or downwards, depending on δ being positive or 
negative. Such a trend is called a stochastic trend.  Equation (3.19) is a difference stationary 
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process because the nonstationarity in Yt can be eliminated by taking first differences of the 
time series. 
 
Random Walk Model with Drift and Deterministic Trend 
In this model, a deterministic trend is added to equation (3.18) to form; 
 
                 (3.21) 
 
Where βt is a deterministic trend and equation (3.20) is a random walk model with drift and 
deterministic trend, which is nonstationary.  It is also called a trend stationary process. 
Although the mean of Yt is βt + δ, which is not constant.  Once the values of βt + δ are 
known, the mean can be forecast perfectly.  Therefore if we subtract the mean of Yt from Yt, 
the resulting series will be stationary, hence the name trend stationary.  If we take the first 
difference of equation (3.20) we form; 
  
             (3.22) 
 
Which means that Yt is nonstationary.  To test for stationarity, the widely used test in the 
literature has been the unit root test. Below I will first explain what a unit root is, then I will 
describe the various tests that can be used to find one and finally I will discuss the limitations 
of the tests. 
 
The pure random walk model can be written as; 
 
             (3.23) 
 
If ρ = 1, we face the unit root problem, which is the situation of nonstationarity.  If however, 
|ρ| ≤ 1, then it can be shown that the time series Yt is stationary. Thus in order to determine 
the stationarity of a series, we can test whether it possesses a unit root.  If we manipulate 
equation (3.22) by subtracting Yt-1 from both sides we obtain; 
 
 
                      
 (   )        
(3.24) 
52 
 
 
Which can be alternatively written as; 
 
              (3.25) 
 
Where δ = (ρ – 1) and Δ is the first difference operator.  Thus in practice, we estimate 
equation (3.24) and test the null hypothesis that δ = 0.  If δ = 0, then ρ =1, that is, we have a 
unit root, meaning the time series under consideration is nonstationary. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis is that δ = 0 (which means φ = 1 and the series is nonstationary) and the 
alternative hypothesis being δ < 0 (the series being stationary).  Dickey and Fuller (1979) 
showed that under the null hypothesis, the estimated t-values of δ follow the τ statistic of 
Monte Carlo Simulation.  This has been known as the Dickey-Fuller (DF hereafter) test.  To 
calculate the DF, estimate the random walk model with and without trend by OLS, divide the 
estimated coefficient of Yt-1 in each case by its standard error to compute the τ statistic, which 
is then referred to the DF tables.  If the computed τ statistic exceeds the absolute DF statistic, 
we reject the null hypothesis that δ = 0, in which case the time series is stationary.  On the 
other hand, if the computed τ statistic does not exceed the absolute critical value, we do not 
reject the null hypothesis, in which case the time series is nonstationary.  However, the DF 
test assumes that the white noise term was uncorrelated.  However, a more sophisticated 
version of this test, called the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, was proposed by Said and 
Dickey (1984), and this test will be conducted instead of the original DF test. 
 
Under the former DF test, the error term was assumed to be uncorrelated.  However, it is 
possibly the case that the error term is correlated.  This test accounts for this and is conducted 
by adding the lagged values of the dependent variable ∆Yt.  The pure random walk becomes: 
 
           ∑  
 
   
         (3.26) 
 
Where    is a pure white noise error term and where     (         ).  The number of 
lagged difference terms to include is often determined empirically, with the idea being to 
include enough terms so that the error term is serially uncorrelated.  In our testing this will be 
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determined by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The AIC imposes a penalty for adding 
regressors to the model.  It is written as; 
 
            ⁄      (
   
 ⁄ ) (3.27) 
 
Where InAIC is the natural log of AIC and 2k/n is the penalty factor.  The lag length with the 
lowest AIC is preferred and this test has the advantage of being useful for in-sample as well 
as out-of-sample forecasting.  The ADF test follows the same asymptotic distribution as the 
DF test, so the same critical values can be used.  Hence the two hypotheses are; 
 
H0: δ = 0 (i.e. there is a unit root and the time series is nonstationary) 
 
H1: δ < 0 (i.e. the time series is stationary) 
 
Again, the null hypothesis is rejected if the τ statistic is larger than the critical value, and the 
null cannot be rejected if the τ statistic is less than the critical value. 
 
The Phillips and Perron (1988) proposed an alternative non-parametric approach to test for 
unit roots.  The PP test differs from the ADF test mainly in how they deal with serial 
correlation and heteroskedasticity in the errors.  Where the ADF test uses a parametric 
autoregressive to approximate the structure of the errors in the test regression, the PP test 
ignores any serial correlation in the test regression.  The test regression for the PP test is; 
 
                   (3.28) 
 
Where ut is I(0) and may be heteroskedastic.  The PP test corrects for any serial correlation 
and heteroskedasticity in the errors of ut of the test regression by directly modifying the test 
statistics.  This gives the PP test the advantage over the ADF test in that it is robust in general 
forms of heteroskedasticity in the error term,   .  Another advantage is that you do not have 
to specify a lag length for the test regression, which is helpful as different lag criteria tests 
often provide different recommended lags.  Under the PP test, the null hypothesis is the same 
as with the ADF test, and the critical values are the same ones used by the ADF test.  Hence, 
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a test statistic larger than the critical value rejects the null hypothesis, and the series is 
deemed to be nonstationary.  
 
There have been a number of criticisms of both the ADF and PP unit root tests.  One such 
criticism is that it they have low power, which means they tend to accept the null of a unit 
root more frequently than is warranted, i.e. these tests may find a unit root even when none 
exists.  Another criticism is that they have poor size properties, meaning that there is a good 
probability of the tests committing a Type I error, which means they may reject the null 
hypothesis when in fact, it is true.  Also, with these type tests, the underlying data generating 
process has large negative moving average components.  This is of great concern to 
modellers because many macroeconomic time series contain moving average terms (Gujarati 
and Porter 2009).  The power of the ADF test is also reduced by too large a number of lagged 
differences.  On the other hand, too small a number of lags has the effect that the test is no 
longer correctly applicable due to the autocorrelation of the estimated residuals.  To avoid the 
problem of overly rejecting the null hypothesis, the KPSS test will also be used. 
 
The KPSS test was developed by Kwiatkowski et al (1992) and is an alternative unit root test 
to the ADF and PP tests. While the ADF and PP tests have the null hypothesis that a series is 
nonstationary, the KPSS test has the null hypothesis that the series is stationary.  This is 
beneficial to our testing as one of the main faults of the ADF and PP test is that they overly 
reject the null hypothesis when it is true.  The test is derived from the model; 
 
 
          
                 (   
 ) 
(3.29) 
 
 
Where     contains deterministic components, ut is I(0) and may be heteroskedastic.  Also, 
the    is a pure random walk with variance.  The null hypothesis that Yt is I(0) is formulated 
as H0: σ
2  , which implies that    is constant.  This null hypothesis implies a unit root is 
present in the series, stating the series is nonstationary. The critical values for the test statistic 
are available from Kwiatkowski et al (1992 Table 1, p166).   Kwiatkowski et al (1992) state 
that the ADF test and the way it is carried out ensures the null is accepted unless there is 
strong evidence to the contrary, emphasizing that it is not powerful against relative 
55 
 
alternatives.  The ADF test concentrates on the null hypothesis of being non-stationary, and if 
this is rejected, it assumes the series is stationary, even when there is no evidence of the 
series being stationary (Kwiatkowski et al, 1992).   
 
So far, the tests for independence have been linear as they only detect linear relationships in 
the returns. However, returns may exhibit nonlinear properties which are ignored by these 
tests.  Thus we examine each series using a battery of nonlinear tests. 
 
 
3.5. Nonlinear Methodology 
 
The previous section outlined the linear testing procedure that is conducted. However, there 
may also be nonlinear dependence in returns and as Amini et al (2010) show, the absence of 
linear dependency does not necessarily mean there is no nonlinear dependency in the returns.  
Nonlinear dependence in stock returns has gained much attention in recent times as it 
indicates possible dependence when linear tests indicate independence (Alagidede 2011; 
Caraiani 2012; Lim and Hooy 2012). The early studies which examined the EMH largely 
used conventional tests such as autocorrelation, variance ratio, and the runs test which are not 
capable of capturing nonlinear patterns in returns series.  The use of linear models in such 
conditions may give the wrong inference about the unpredictability of returns, as the presence 
of nonlinearity in stock returns contradicts the EMH. 
 
Many statistical tests for non-linear dependence have been proposed in the literature in recent 
times.  Instead of only using a single statistical test, a battery of nonlinear tests are employed 
to examine the nonlinear structure in stock returns that will enable a deeper and more detailed 
insight into the series while minimising the probability of missing something and thus 
drawing the wrong conclusions. For example, the BDS test is deemed the most sophisticated 
in the literature, however it gives no information about which data generating mechanism 
would be appropriate to model the data. If the battery of tests display a unanimous consensus 
in favour of a specific result, this result will be deemed correct.   
 
The linear structure in the returns is removed from the data through a pre-whitening model. 
An AR(p) model is fitted to the data with the optimal length determined when the 
standardised residuals are no longer correlated through the Ljung-Box Q-statistic up to 20 
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lags
18
.  The AR(p) model in which the Q-statistic at 20 lags is not significant at the 10%  
level of significance will be chosen. The serially uncorrelated residuals of this model are then 
tested for nonlinear independence using each of the tests below.  Other specifications such as 
the ARMA or GARCH could have been utilised as an alternative pre-whitening model, but 
the GARCH model cannot be used unless the linearity assumption has been rejected 
(Panagiotidis 2002).  
 
The Ljung-Box Q-statistic for serial correlation is given by; 
 
      (   )∑(  
  (   ))
 
   
 (3.30) 
 
Where ρj is the j
th
 autocorrelation and n is the number of observations.  For a large sample, 
the Ljung-Box statistic follows a chi-square distribution with m degrees of freedom.  The 
Ljung-Box statistic can be used to test the hypothesis that all the autocorrelations are zero, 
and thus the series is white noise (Box and Pierce, 1970). Thus the Q-statistic on the residuals 
will reveal any linear dependencies still evident in the data. The Q-statistics are documented 
in Table 3.8 and are consistent with the previous autocorrelation results.  The residuals of the 
pre-whitening model will be tested through a battery of nonlinear tests, namely the McLeod 
and Li test (1983), Engle LM test (1982) and BDS (1996) test. 
 
3.5.1. McLeod Li Test  
 
The McLeod and Li test (McLeod and Li 1983) is a portmanteau test of nonlinearity.  To test 
for nonlinear effects in the time series, they propose the following statistic; 
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(3.31) 
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              (3.32) 
                                                 
18 Similar to Hsieh (1989) approach except this study looks at up to 20 lags to ensure that the linear autocorrelation has been removed. 
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Where ra the autocorrelations of the squared residuals, et
2
, obtained from fitting a model to 
the data.  If the series et is independently and identically distributed then the asymptotic 
distribution of Q(m) is χ2 with m degrees of freedom. The null hypothesis is independence of 
returns. If the null hypothesis is rejected, it indicates the presence of ARCH/GARCH effects 
in the data and nonlinear dependence. 
 
3.5.2. Engle LM Test 
 
The Engle LM test is also utilised, which was suggested by Engle (1982) to detect ARCH 
disturbances. The residuals of the AR(p) model are tested for heteroskedasticity.  The Engle 
LM statistic is computed from an auxiliary test regression, which is; 
 
  ̂ 
     ∑  
 
   
 ̂   
     (3.33) 
 
Where e is the residual from the pre-whitening AR(p) model.   The test statistic is the usual 
F-statistic for the regression on the squared residuals, such that; 
 
              
         
    
 
   
 
 (3.34) 
 
 
Where URSS is the residual some of squares from the unrestricted regression, RRSS is the 
residual sum of squares from the restricted regression, m is the number of restrictions, T is the 
number of observations and k is the number of repressors in the unrestricted regression.  
Under the null hypothesis of a linear generating mechanism for et, NR
2
 for this regression is 
asymptotically χ2(p). If the null hypothesis is rejected, there is evidence of ARCH/GARCH 
effects in the data. 
 
3.5.3. BDS Test  
 
The BDS test is a powerful and frequently used (Chen and Yeh 2002) non-parametric test for 
serial dependence (or alternatively a nonlinear structure) in time series analysis, which was 
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set out by Brock, Dechert and Scheinkman (1987) although the version used here is based on 
Brock et al (1996).  Patterson and Ashley (2000) conducted a simulation study of the powers 
of various nonlinear dependency tests and found the BDS test performed better under 
different conditions.  However, the BDS test gives no information to which data generating 
mechanism would be appropriate to model the data, thus the previous tests were also 
conducted. 
 
The null hypothesis is that the data generating processes are independent and identically 
distributed (i.i.d.), while the alternative hypothesis is ‘an indication that the model is 
misspecified’ (Brock et al 1996).  The failure to accept the null hypothesis dismisses the idea 
of market efficiency as the test is a measure of nonlinear predictability of the sample (once 
the linear dependence of returns have been filtered out).  One of the main benefits of this test 
is that it does not require returns to be normal distributed (nearly all returns are non-normal), 
as the BDS test does not require higher moments to exist. 
 
The correlation integral is the probability that any two points are within a certain length ‘e’ 
apart in phase space.  As we increase ‘e’, the probability scales according to the fractional 
dimension of the phase space.  The correlation integrals are calculated according to; 
 
   ( )  (  
 ⁄ )  ∑  (         )    
 
     
 (3.35) 
 
Where Z(e) = 1 if [e – |Xi-Xj| > 0], 0 otherwise; T = the number of observations, e = distance, 
Cm = correlation integral for dimension m, X = the index series. 
 
The m dimension is a point in m-dimensional space where m is the embedding dimension 
given by; 
   
      
      (3.36) 
 
      
  (       )  (3.37) 
 
      
  (        (   ))  (3.38) 
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The function z counts the number of points within a distance e of one another.  The 
correlation integral calculates the probability that two points that are part of two trajectories 
in phase space are ‘e’ units apart.  Brock et al. demonstrated that; 
 
    (   )    (   )
   √  (3.39) 
 
Is normally distributed with a mean of 0.  The BDS statistic, W, that follows is normally 
distributed and given by; 
 
   (   )     (   )    (   )
   √
 
  (   )
  (3.40) 
 
Where SN(e, T) = the standard deviation of the correlation integrals. 
 
Brock et al. demonstrate that the BDS statistic, W, has a limiting normal distribution under 
the null hypothesis of i.i.d. when the data series consists of more than five hundred 
observations.  Hsieh (1991) points out that, structural changes in the data series can cause a 
rejection of the null hypothesis of IID on the basis of the BDS test.  Thus there is a rational of 
breaking up the sample period and examining subsamples separately.  A problem with the 
BDS test is the choice of ‘e’ which represents the maximum distance for the pair (Xi, Xj).  A 
large value of ‘e’ will retain all pairs, and the value of the correlation integral will equal unity 
where a small value will lead to no retention of any pair, and will result in a value of zero for 
the correlation integral.  Brock et al. (1991), Hsieh (1991) and Sewell et al. (1993) use ‘e’ 
equal to 0.5σ, 1σ, 1.5σ and 2σ.  The value of σ represents the standard deviation of the data.  
As for the choice of the relevant embedding dimension m, Hsieh (1989) suggests 
consideration of a broad range of values form 2 to 10 for this parameter.  Under the null 
hypothesis that the index series under study is random, the null hypothesis can be rejected 
with 95% confidence when W exceeds 2.0.  Also the null can be rejected with 99% 
confidence when W exceeds 3.0. 
 
The test is two sided and the null hypothesis is that the residuals are i.i.d.  In small samples 
the distribution of the test statistic is not normal, however with a sample over 250 
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observations it is not seen as a problem.  Thus the normal distribution is assumed with critical 
values of 2.57 for 1%, 1.96 for 5% and 1.64 for 10%.   There is a consensus in the literature 
that the BDS test is a powerful one, however Brooks and Henry (2000) reveal that the BDS 
test can sometimes confuse different types of nonlinear structure (such as threshold 
autoregressive and GARCH models) and has small power in detecting neglected asymmetries 
in conditional variance models.  Nevertheless, both problems are present when a GARCH 
filter is used thus it and an AR model are utilised. 
 
Nevertheless, if nonlinearity is detected and it can be accounted fully by conditional 
heteroskedasticity, it does not imply a violation of the EMH.  As highlighted by Hong and 
Lee (2005), the EMH has implications on and only on the conditional mean, but it does not 
impose a restriction on the dynamics in conditional variance and other higher-order 
conditional moments.  To address this, AR-generalized autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (GARCH)-filtered returns are examined. A rejection of the null hypothesis 
implies that the detected nonlinearity most likely entered the series through the mean of the 
return generating process, and hence contrary to the EMH. 
 
It is generally postulated that most of the nonlinear dependence in financial time series occurs 
due to neglected conditional heteroskedasticity that could be captured through 
ARCH/GARCH models. This is not surprising since the BDS test has high power against 
ARCH/GARCH models where nonlinearity has entered through the conditional variance. The 
approach suggested is to fit an AR-GARCH model to the returns and its standardized 
residuals are then tested for i.i.d. using the BDS test (Hsieh 1989, 1991; Opong et al 1999; 
Poshakwale 2002; Saadi et al 2006). A further rejection of i.i.d. would suggest that the 
conditional heteroskedasticity is not the main source of nonlinearity.  Instead the nonlinear 
dependence is of an unknown form in the data after volatility clustering is removed. 
 
Unlike the case of linear models, the Monte Carlo simulations presented by Brock et al 
(1991) find that the nuisance parameter-free result does not hold when the BDS test is applied 
to the standardized residuals of ARCH and GARCH models.  They suggest bootstrapping the 
null distribution to obtain the critical values for the BDS statistic when applying the test to 
standardized residuals from these nonlinear models.  However, de Lima (1998) later 
establishes that the asymptotic distribution of the BDS is still normal when the test is applied 
to the natural logarithm of the squared standardized residuals from ARCH/GARCH models. 
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Thus to determine whether there still exists any remaining nonlinear predictability after 
accounting for volatility clustering, we filter the original returns with an AR(p)-GARCH(1,1) 
model such as; 
 
 
      ∑         
 
   
 
    (    ) 
(3.41) 
 
 
                   
  
 
(3.42) 
 
Where rt is the returns series, εt is the residual of the mean equation and ht is the conditional 
variance of the residual.  The natural logarithm of the squared standardized residuals, In(ζt
2
) 
where ζt = εt / √ht are then subjected to the BDS
19
 test. A GARCH(1,1) model is used since it 
is the model that has best described stock returns in the literature. 
 
3.6. Empirical Results 
 
3.6.1. Linear Empirical Results 
 
The results for the linear and nonlinear tests explained above are presented and discussed in 
this section. Table 3.2 reports the autocorrelation coefficients for the DJIA, FT30 and 
TOPIX.  The full sample of all three indices possess a first order autocorrelation that is 
significant and positive, indicating that stock returns are indeed to an extent predictable on 
the basis of the past price history.  Table 3.2 also documents the autocorrelation coefficient 
for the subsamples in the DJIA.  The results show that during the first five subsamples there 
is very little or no significant autocorrelation in any of the lags.  However, the 1920-1924 and 
1925-1929 subsamples have significant first order autocorrelation, with the 1925-1929 
subsample possessing many lags that are significant.  Nevertheless, the next two subsamples 
possess no significant autocorrelation, indicating that during the 1930s the stock market was 
                                                 
19 The McLeod-Li Test and Engle LM Test are not conducted on the AR-GARCH residuals since the BDS should capture all of the 
nonlinearity if present. 
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independent
20
.  The subsamples for the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s and 1970s all possess first order 
significant autocorrelations, with many of the other lags being significant too.  Thus during 
these years, the stock market appears to be predictable.  However the next five subsamples, 
covering the 1980s, 1990s and first half of the 2000s, shows little or no autocorrelations 
suggesting independence in the stock market returns.  Finally the last subsample (2004-2009) 
shows that the first 2 lags of the autocorrelation coefficient to be significant and negative, 
with the third coefficient being positive and significant, indicating that DJIA returns had 
some predictive power during the late 2000s.  These results suggest that DJIA returns have 
gone through periods of being independent and through periods being dependent.  Thus the 
behaviour of returns appear to follow the AMH and can be categorized by type 4. The FT30s 
autocorrelation results show that the first six subsamples are not independent, with a 
significant first lag autocorrelation coefficient in each case.  However, the next two 
subsamples (1965-1969 and 1970-1974) have no significant autocorrelation coefficient in the 
first six lags, suggesting that returns during this period were independent.  Again the first 
order autocorrelation coefficient is positive and significant for the 1975-1979 period, but 
again there is no significance in the coefficient for the 1980-1984 period.  The next three 
subsamples (1985-1989, 1990-1994 and 1995-1999) possess first order significant 
autocorrelation in returns, indicating the returns were predictable during these sample 
periods.  However, the two sample periods in the 2000s possess very little significant 
autocorrelation suggesting that returns were independent during these periods.  These results 
suggest that FT30 returns have fluctuated during periods of dependence and independence 
indicating the AMH and type 4 behaviour.  TOPIX subsample analysis of the autocorrelation 
coefficient show that most of the subsamples contain at least a significant first order 
correlation coefficient, with only the 1965-1969, 1995-1999 and 2005-2009 subsamples 
providing independence.  Again this indicates that the independence of returns in this market 
fluctuate over time, confirming the AMH and categorized by type 4.   
 
Figure 3.1 depicts the first order autocorrelation coefficient of each market plotted over time.  
The blotted points are autocorrelation coefficients that are statistically significant at 5%.  It is 
clear from all three graphs that each markets independence fluctuates over time, with the 
market going through periods of independence and dependence supporting the AMH and type 
4 of the previously described classification. 
                                                 
20 Possibly due to the 1930s stock market crash. 
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Sub Periods Autocorrelation - Lags 
Start Year End Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Panel A: DJIA 
Full Sample 0.0268*** -0.0358*** 0.0118*** 0.0327*** 0.0182*** -0.0181*** -0.0269*** 
1897 1899 -0.0075 0.0068 0.0439 0.1327*** -0.0127 -0.0305 0.0177 
1900 1904 0.0128 -0.0573** 0.0508** 0.0425* 0.0730*** -0.0344 -0.0822 
1905 1909 0.0114 -0.0110 0.0435* 0.1035*** 0.0697*** -0.0101 -0.1105*** 
1910 1914 -0.0064 -0.0181 0.0334 -0.0024 0.0263 -0.0189 -0.0387 
1915 1919 -0.0047 0.0045 -0.0162 -0.0042 0.0593 0.0068 -0.0374 
1920 1924 0.0522** -0.0166 0.0395 0.0178 -0.0001 0.0760*** -0.0075 
1925 1929 0.0842*** -0.2124*** -0.0188 0.2198*** 0.0956*** -0.0935*** -0.0664** 
1930 1934 -0.0215 0.0131 -0.0112 0.0270 -0.0036 -0.0191 -0.0171 
1935 1939 0.0348 -0.0142 0.0415 0.0294 0.0500* -0.0632** -0.0401 
1940 1944 0.1440*** -0.0147 0.1214*** 0.0211 -0.0402 0.0910*** -0.0008 
1945 1949 0.1626*** -0.1086*** -0.0297 0.0428 0.0222 -0.0703 0.0275 
1950 1954 0.1473*** -0.0783*** 0.0093 -0.0089 -0.0115 -0.0132 0.0039 
1955 1959 0.0926*** -0.0986*** -0.0146 0.0577** 0.0493* -0.0095 -0.0385 
1960 1964 0.0983*** -0.0111 0.0573** 0.0370 -0.0019 -0.0320 0.0260 
1965 1969 0.2312*** 0.0355 0.0240 0.0630** 0.0447 0.0174 0.0149 
1970 1974 0.2255*** -0.0244 -0.0257 -0.0144 -0.0559** -0.0380 0.0119 
1975 1979 0.1787*** -0.0408 0.0159 -0.0123 -0.0212 -0.0558** -0.0194 
1980 1984 0.0503* 0.0436 -0.0275 -0.0449 0.0035 0.0098 -0.0222 
1985 1989 0.0016 -0.1064 -0.0109 -0.0547* 0.0808*** 0.0065 0.0259 
1990 1994 0.0507* 0.0015 -0.0321 -0.0071 0.0054 -0.0582** -0.0686** 
1995 1999 0.0152 -0.0324 -0.0588** -0.0132 -0.0290 0.0276 -0.0354 
2000 2004 -0.0204 -0.0320 0.0091 0.0323 -0.0417 -0.0137 -0.0286 
2005 2009 -0.1341*** -0.0937*** 0.0911*** -0.0167 -0.0172 -0.0170 -0.0468* 
Panel B: FT30 
Full Sample 0.0737*** 0.0016 -0.0058 0.0328 -0.0020 -0.0217*** -0.0050 
1935 1939 0.2537*** 0.0625** -0.0371 -0.0577* -0.0320 0.0075 -0.0110 
1940 1944 0.4096*** 0.3836*** 0.1541*** 0.1206*** 0.1179*** 0.0468* 0.0179 
1945 1949 0.4161*** 0.2491*** 0.1125*** -0.0201 -0.0341 -0.0581** -0.0362 
1950 1954 0.4072*** 0.2111*** 0.0651** -0.0093 -0.0224 0.0011 0.0049 
1955 1959 0.2680*** 0.0488* -0.0398 -0.0182 0.0076 0.0164 0.0093 
1960 1964 0.1944*** -0.0349 -0.1057*** -0.0625** -0.0290 -0.0220 0.0098 
1965 1969 0.0459 -0.0283 0.0094 -0.0111 -0.0517* -0.0370 -0.0220 
1970 1974 0.0259 -0.0344 0.0040 -0.0222 0.0275 -0.0009 -0.0570** 
1975 1979 0.0700** -0.0335 0.0314 0.0457 0.0198 -0.0697 0.0156 
1980 1984 -0.0403 0.0397 0.0201 -0.0272 0.0417 0.0245 -0.0690 
1985 1989 0.0577** 0.0022 0.0136 0.0901*** 0.0023 0.0240 0.0512* 
1990 1994 0.0607** 0.0308 0.0183 0.0734*** -0.0198 -0.0094 -0.0905*** 
1995 1999 0.0714*** -0.0340 -0.0514* 0.0177 0.0153 -0.0538* -0.0320 
2000 2004 -0.0055 0.0049 -0.0632** 0.0612** -0.0344 -0.0284 0.0265 
2005 2009 0.0069 -0.0600** -0.0475 0.1111*** -0.0520* -0.0570** 0.0347 
Panel C:TOPIX 
Full Sample 0.0849*** -0.0187** 0.0011 0.0288*** -0.0001 -0.0344*** 0.0007 
1951 1954 0.1976*** 0.0128 0.0239 0.0618** 0.0392 -0.0445 0.0246 
1955 1959 0.0763*** 0.0871*** 0.0660** 0.0050 0.0305 -0.0022 0.0484* 
1960 1964 0.1700*** 0.0516* 0.0277 0.0650** 0.0407 0.0121 -0.0181 
1965 1969 0.0512* 0.0267 0.0596** 0.0094 -0.0097 0.0089 0.0056 
1970 1974 0.1336*** 0.0994*** 0.0791*** 0.0544** 0.0201 -0.0126 -0.0091 
1975 1979 0.1772*** 0.0926*** 0.0176 -0.0444 -0.0338 -0.0596** -0.0077 
1980 1984 0.1310*** 0.0000 0.0308 0.0038 -0.0339 0.0011 -0.0130 
1985 1989 0.0540** -0.0623*** 0.0168 0.0508* -0.0216 -0.0498* 0.0059 
1990 1994 0.1436*** -0.0784*** -0.0106 0.0542** -0.0161 -0.0163 -0.0117 
1995 1999 0.0303 -0.0374 -0.0123 -0.0079 -0.0401 -0.0650** 0.0086 
2000 2004 0.0608** -0.0167 -0.0413 -0.0307 -0.0181 -0.0475* 0.0256 
2005 2009 0.0010 -0.0764*** -0.0436 0.0415 0.0157 -0.0556** -0.0293 
 
Table 3.2. Test results for 5-yearly autocorrelation test.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10%. 
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Figure 3.1: The five-yearly first lag autocorrelations plotted for the three markets.  The end year of the 
subsample is on the x-axis and the autocorrelation coefficient is on the y-axis.  The blotted points are the 
autocorrelation coefficients that are statistically significant at 5%. 
65 
 
Table 3.3 presents the runs test results for the DJIA, FT30 and TOPIX.  Panel A reports that 
the full sample for the DJIA, along with the sample periods 1900-1904 and 1920-1929 are all 
significant at 5%, indicating that these subsamples are not independent.  Also, from the 
subsample period 1940-1944 to 1970-1974, they are all negative and significant, indicating 
that the observed number of runs is significantly fewer than the expected number of runs.  
Therefore for all of these sample periods, the null hypothesis that the return series follows a 
random walk can be rejected.  However, from the subsample period 1975-1979 to 1995-1999, 
the returns are independent as the z-values are insignificant.  Nevertheless, the series returns 
becomes dependent again for the last two subsample periods, indicating that the DJIA returns 
have fluctuated between being dependent and independent, suggesting type 4 behaviour and 
the AMH.  The FT30 results from Table 3.3 report that returns were dependent at the 
beginning of the sample until the 1975-1979 subsample period, with each z-value being 
negative and significant.  However from this point to the end of the sample, the z-value are 
mostly negative and insignificant, indicating that the returns are now independent, although 
the actual number of runs is fewer than the expected number of runs.  Thus the runs test for 
the FT30 suggests that returns have reversed from being dependent to being independent 
around the early 1970s mark and can be categorized by type 3.  The TOPIX results from 
Table 3.3 suggest that the TOPIX is generally dependent.  Only three subsample periods are 
not negative and significant (1965-1969, 1995-1999 and 2005-2009), suggesting that the 
TOPIX is generally dependent and the observed number of runs is significantly fewer than 
the expected number of runs. Therefore the TOPIX conforms to the AMH and type 4 
behaviour. 
 
Although the empirical results for the runs test give an insight into the behaviour of stock 
price returns, the test is not considered a sophisticated method for identifying movements, 
since the termination of the movement is simply predicted when the price level has 
temporarily changed direction, regardless of the size of the price change that caused the 
change in sign.  However, it is robust as it does not make any assumptions about the nature of 
the underlying returns.  The results are generally consistent with the serial correlation test in 
the previous section. 
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Table 3.3: Test results for 5-yearly runs test.  The first two columns are the sample periods chosen, the third column indicating 
the number of observations examined, the fourth column documenting the median, while the fifth and sixth columns indicate the 
number of observations greater than and less than the median.  The seventh column shows that expected number of runs, with 
column eight showing the actual number of runs found, while the ninth and tenth columns indicate the z-statistic and the p-value 
respectively.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%.  
Sample Periods Runs Test 
Start Year End Year Cases Mean Cases < Mean Cases > Mean Expected Number 
of runs 
Actual Number 
of Runs 
z-Statistic p-value 
Panel A: DJIA 
Full Sample 30868 0.000190 15000 15868 15422.80 14733 -7.86*** 0.00 
1897 1899 895 0.000540 435 460 448.15 426 -1.48 0.07 
1900 1904 1488 0.000014 723 765 744.41 691 -2.77*** 0.00 
1905 1909 1502 0.000227 723 779 750.96 737 -0.72 0.24 
1910 1914 1384 -0.000201 664 720 691.87 696 0.22 0.59 
1915 1919 1490 0.000453 729 761 745.66 725 -1.07 0.14 
1920 1924 1498 0.000068 710 788 747.97 691 -2.95*** 0.00 
1925 1929 1486 0.000483 666 820 736.02 695 -2.15** 0.02 
1930 1934 1485 -0.000575 745 740 743.49 767 1.22 0.89 
1935 1939 1501 0.000242 727 774 750.76 767 0.84 0.80 
1940 1944 1502 0.000004 703 799 748.93 677 -3.73*** 0.00 
1945 1949 1414 0.000192 685 729 707.32 624 -4.44*** 0.00 
1950 1954 1337 0.000531 643 694 668.53 581 -4.80*** 0.00 
1955 1959 1259 0.000403 599 660 629.02 554 -4.24*** 0.00 
1960 1964 1257 0.000201 614 643 629.17 555 -4.19*** 0.00 
1965 1969 1230 -0.000068 604 626 615.80 515 -5.57*** 0.00 
1970 1974 1262 -0.000216 642 620 631.81 519 -6.36*** 0.00 
1975 1979 1262 0.000224 635 627 631.97 600 -1.80* 0.04 
1980 1984 1264 0.000304 648 616 632.59 608 -1.39 0.08 
1985 1989 1263 0.000658 616 647 632.12 656 1.35 0.91 
1990 1994 1264 0.000246 625 639 632.92 654 1.19 0.88 
1995 1999 1263 0.000869 627 636 632.47 621 -0.65 0.26 
2000 2004 1256 0.000041 618 638 628.84 667 2.15** 0.98 
2005 2009 1286 0.000022 591 695 639.79 681 2.31** 0.99 
Panel B: FT30 
Full Sample 19155 0.000154 9635 9520 9578.15 8284 -18.70*** 0.00 
1935 1939 1142 -0.000248 523 619 567.96 418 -8.94*** 0.00 
1940 1944 1284 0.000312 650 634 642.90 461 -10.16*** 0.00 
1945 1949 1367 -0.000047 4686 781 600.16 373 -13.50*** 0.00 
1950 1954 1275 0.000460 627 648 638.33 446 -10.78*** 0.00 
1955 1959 1278 0.000477 603 675 637.97 458 -10.10*** 0.00 
1960 1964 1273 -0.000009 604 669 635.84 500 -7.64*** 0.00 
1965 1969 1267 0.000159 622 645 634.29 517 -6.60*** 0.00 
1970 1974 1271 -0.000737 642 629 636.43 575 -3.45*** 0.00 
1975 1979 1273 0.000795 681 592 634.39 605 -1.66* 0.05 
1980 1984 1302 0.000639 667 635 651.61 638 -0.75 0.23 
1985 1989 1300 0.000548 624 676 649.96 621 -1.61 0.05 
1990 1994 1303 0.000160 682 621 651.07 655 0.22 0.59 
1995 1999 1304 0.000434 650 654 652.99 631 -1.22 0.11 
2000 2004 1304 -0.000570 591 713 647.29 636 -0.63 0.26 
2005 2009 1303 -0.000028 590 713 646.69 650 0.18 0.57 
Panel C: TOPIX 
Full Sample 15390 0.000283 7482 7908 7690.10 6912 -12.55*** 0.00 
1951 1954 1041 0.000923 551 490 519.71 400 -7.45*** 0.00 
1955 1959 1303 0.000746 664 639 652.26 526 -7.00*** 0.00 
1960 1964 1305 0.000096 673 632 652.86 562 -5.04*** 0.00 
1965 1969 1304 0.000517 669 635 652.56 642 -0.59 0.28 
1970 1974 1305 0.000345 621 684 651.98 560 -5.11*** 0.00 
1975 1979 1303 0.000384 666 637 652.18 601 -2.84*** 0.00 
1980 1984 1304 0.000527 693 611 650.42 579 -3.97*** 0.00 
1985 1989 1303 0.000882 676 627 651.58 576 -4.20*** 0.00 
1990 1994 1304 -0.000471 626 678 651.96 589 -3.49*** 0.00 
1995 1999 1304 0.000076 704 600 648.85 619 -1.66* 0.05 
2000 2004 1304 -0.000310 622 682 651.62 592 -3.31*** 0.00 
2005 2009 1304 -0.000181 586 718 646.32 632 -0.80 0.21 
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The results of the variance ratio test for the three stock markets are documented in Table 3.4.  
The DJIA results for the full sample show that there is negative correlation between returns 
for all four tested k’s, which are statistically significant at 1%.  The results for the subsample 
analysis show that only the period 1940-1944 has significant positive correlation for all four 
k’s tested.  However, some subsamples have certain k’s which provide significant negative 
autocorrelation, namely the 1950-1954, 1955-1959, 1970-1974, 1975-1979 and 1980-1984 
subsamples.  All other subsamples do not have any k’s that are significant, indicating that 
returns may have some correlation, but they are not statistically significant.  Some of the 
subsamples have test statistics that are equal to unity, which indicates independence, but due 
to the lack of significance associated with the results, independence of returns is not accepted.  
Thus the DJIA variance ratio test results indicate that returns do conform to the AMH and 
type 4 behaviour. 
 
In contrast to the DJIA full sample results, FT30 full sample results are positively serially 
correlated, also significant at 1% confidence.  From 1935 to 1959 every subsample’s k 
produces a test statistic that is significant which provides strong evidence of positive serial 
correlation.  The subsamples 1960-1964, 1985-1989, 1990-1994 and 1995-1999 all have at 
least one k that is greater than one and at least 5% statistically significant.  All but eleven of 
the test statistics are greater than one, suggesting that the FT30 has more positive serial 
correlation than negative serial correlation.  Also, of the last two subsamples, 6 out of the 8 
test statistics are less than one, suggesting that the FT30 is moving towards negative 
correlation from positive (although none of them are statistically significant).  Thus, the FT30 
results suggest that returns independence vary over time, indicating type 4 behaviour. 
 
The TOPIX full sample results show that at each k, the test statistic is greater than one and 
significant at 1% confidence, indicating positive serial correlation, similar to the FT30.  For 
the subsample analysis, all test statistics are greater than one from 1950-1984, with only two 
k’s being not statistically significant at at least 10%. Similar to the FT30, towards the end of 
the sample the test statistics gradually fall in value with a number of them being less than 
one, suggesting that the correlation in returns has shifted from being positive to negative, 
although none of the negative correlations are statistically significant.  Hence TOPIX returns 
have followed a random walk since 1995, but before that returns were non-random, 
suggesting a switch in the market and type 3 behaviour. 
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 DJIA FT30 TOPIX 
M2(k) M2(k) M2(k) 
Sample Period k = 2 k = 4 k= 8 k = 16 k = 2 k = 4 k= 8 k = 16 k = 2 k = 4 k= 8 k = 16 
Full Sample 0.684589*** 
(0.00) 
0.673678*** 
(0.00) 
0.692712*** 
(0.00) 
0.716636*** 
(0.00) 
1.073792*** 
(0.00) 
1.109575*** 
(0.00) 
1.144081*** 
(0.00) 
1.243455*** 
(0.00) 
1.084973*** 
(0.00) 
1.108995*** 
(0.00) 
1.133461*** 
(0.01) 
1.168451*** 
(0.02) 
1897 1899 0.994230 
(0.92) 
1.021715 
(0.83) 
1.147899 
(0.34) 
1.254912 
(0.24) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1900 1904 1.016626 
(0.69) 
0.993955 
(0.94) 
1.072156 
(0.52) 
1.099786 
(0.52) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1905 1909 1.012951 
(0.82) 
1.032401 
(0.73) 
1.192731 
(0.14) 
1.273946 
(0.12) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1910 1914 0.995024 
(0.95) 
0.991873 
(0.94) 
0.992468 
 (0.96) 
0.964140 
(0.85) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1915 1919 0.995379 
(0.90) 
0.991604 
(0.90) 
1.016143 
(0.88) 
1.077825 
(0.60) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1920 1924 1.050363 
(0.09) 
1.083919 
(0.14) 
1.176911 
(0.05) 
1.275510 
(0.04) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1925 1929 0.991605 
(0.84) 
0.911414 
(0.21) 
0.920090 
(0.42) 
0.818240 
(0.19) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1930 1934 0.674493 
(0.30) 
0.523346 
(0.32) 
0.446612 
(0.32) 
0.421558 
(0.33) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1935 1939 1.036021 
(0.28) 
1.062555 
(0.34) 
1.126747 
(0.24) 
1.118624 
(0.45) 
1.255541*** 
(0.00) 
1.431245*** 
(0.00) 
1.425801** 
(0.02) 
1.477059** 
(0.04) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1940 1944 1.144205*** 
(0.01) 
1.263774 
(0.01) 
1.428811*** 
(0.01) 
1.554797 
(0.01) 
1.410043*** 
(0.00) 
2.078909*** 
(0.00) 
2.746558*** 
(0.00) 
3.019325*** 
(0.00) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1945 1949 1.059450*** 
(0.00) 
1.024481 
(0.53) 
0.994057 
(0.92) 
1.010260 
(0.91) 
1.418311*** 
(0.00) 
1.938310*** 
(0.00) 
2.180219*** 
(0.00) 
2.504156*** 
(0.00) 
n/a n/a n/a n/a 
1950 1954 0.993791 
(0.60) 
0.974151 
(0.19) 
0.948745* 
(0.09) 
0.923526* 
(0.07) 
1.409275*** 
(0.00) 
1.860840*** 
(0.00) 
2.099350*** 
(0.00) 
2.350732*** 
(0.00) 
1.199467*** 
(0.00) 
1.321500*** 
(0.00) 
1.473516*** 
(0.00) 
1.705784*** 
(0.00) 
1955 1959 0.989097 
(0.27) 
0.965735** 
(0.04) 
0.944478** 
(0.02) 
0.913959 
(0.01) 
1.269764*** 
(0.00) 
1.435966*** 
(0.00) 
1.485091*** 
(0.00) 
1.675342*** 
(0.00) 
1.076937* 
(0.10) 
1.234167 
(0.00) 
1.377949*** 
(0.00) 
1.528571*** 
(0.00) 
1960 1964 0.986831 
(0.19) 
1.096526 
(0.45) 
1.135281 
(0.48) 
1.125105 
(0.58) 
1.194617*** 
(0.00) 
1.206016 
(0.04) 
1.066675 
(0.62) 
1.201328 
(0.24) 
1.171532*** 
(0.00) 
1.325455*** 
(0.00) 
1.514718*** 
(0.00) 
1.676319*** 
(0.00) 
1965 1969 0.990912 
(0.36) 
1.102208 
(0.42) 
1.141692 
(0.46) 
1.131125 
(0.56) 
1.047208 
(0.53) 
1.049410 
(0.68) 
0.980449 
(0.90) 
1.030725 
(0.87) 
1.052563 
(0.12) 
1.127648** 
(0.05) 
1.189105* 
(0.07) 
1.218258 
(0.14) 
1970 1974 0.984562 
(0.95) 
0.985388 
(0.53) 
0.944569* 
(0.10) 
0.893321** 
(0.02) 
1.026836 
(0.62) 
1.010505 
(0.91) 
0.992595 
(0.95) 
1.068224 
(0.69) 
1.135292*** 
(0.01) 
1.342320*** 
(0.00) 
1.556449*** 
(0.00) 
1.654739*** 
(0.00) 
1975 1979 0.999720 
(0.97) 
0.988161 
(0.37) 
0.964114 
(0.08) 
0.933269 
(0.02) 
1.072206 
(0.12) 
1.090415 
(0.28) 
1.158771 
(0.22) 
1.308131 
(0.10) 
1.179027*** 
(0.00) 
1.369131*** 
(0.00) 
1.364329*** 
(0.00) 
1.449376*** 
(0.00) 
1980 1984 0.997251 
(0.67) 
0.988297 
(0.31) 
0.969207 
(0.08) 
0.937803 
(0.03) 
0.959975 
(0.37) 
0.990864 
(0.90) 
1.019782 
(0.86) 
0.980367 
(0.90) 
1.132762*** 
(0.00) 
1.216885*** 
(0.00) 
1.253216** 
(0.04) 
1.289979* 
(0.08) 
1985 1989 1.314322 
(0.32) 
1.453087 
(0.34) 
1.507450 
(0.36) 
1.540973 
(0.36) 
1.057573 
(0.58) 
1.099132 
(0.57) 
1.248095 
(0.30) 
1.519403* 
(0.08) 
1.055624 
(0.63) 
1.031912 
(0.86) 
1.043641 
(0.86) 
1.029188 
(0.92) 
1990 1994 1.000944 
(0.69) 
0.997748 
(0.68) 
0.985324 
(0.14) 
0.971119 
(0.06) 
1.061952* 
(0.10) 
1.133186 
(0.05) 
1.216885** 
(0.04) 
1.317986** 
(0.03) 
1.145287*** 
(0.00) 
1.136779* 
(0.07) 
1.162416 
(0.18) 
1.209481 
(0.23) 
1995 1999 1.000092 
(0.97) 
1.333250 
(0.32) 
1.492277 
(0.33) 
1.567792 
(0.33) 
1.073062** 
(0.04) 
1.050262 
(0.47) 
1.012018 
(0.91) 
1.036337 
(0.83) 
1.031930 
(0.37) 
1.006300 
(0.93) 
0.918095 
(0.44) 
0.969532 
(0.84) 
2000 2004 0.998531 
(0.54) 
1.327317 
(0.33) 
1.481169 
(0.34) 
1.534799 
(0.36) 
0.994142 
(0.88) 
0.965178 
(0.64) 
0.952392 
(0.69) 
1.038857 
(0.82) 
1.062423 
(0.02) 
1.051508 
(0.35) 
0.966719 
(0.71) 
0.847924 
(0.26) 
2005 2009 0.997784 
(0.57) 
0.994511 
(0.39) 
0.993143 
(0.42) 
0.984551 
(0.24) 
1.008282 
(0.85) 
0.930749 
(0.41) 
0.924512 
(0.59) 
0.922240 
(0.71) 
1.002568 
(0.96) 
0.907377 
(0.36) 
0.859886 
(0.40) 
0.808715 
(0.44) 
 
Table 3.4. Test results for the 5-yearly Lo MacKinlay Variance Ratio test. The columns show variance ratios for number k of heteroskedastic test statistics.  The p-values 
based on the empirical distribution are in parentheses.  A p-value less than 0.05 means that the null hypothesis that an equity price index follows a random walk can be 
rejected at the 5% level, in favour of the alternative hypothesis that the returns are positively serially correlated.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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These results differ somewhat from the autocorrelation results for each market. For example, 
the DJIA found significant positive serial correlation from 1920-1929, 1940-1979 and from 
2005-2009, whereas the variance ratio test found significant positive serial correlation from 
1940-1959 and only very rarely in any other subsample. However, the results of the FT30 and 
TOPIX for the variance ratio test are quite similar to their results for the autocorrelation test. 
This may suggest that the serial correlation results are affected more by the heteroskedastic 
property of their returns in the DJIA market than the FT30 and TOPIX markets. To 
investigate the series further, we conduct three of the most common unit root tests to 
overcome the potential problems associated with each one. 
 
Tables 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7 document the results for the ADF, PP and KPSS tests for the DJIA, 
FT30 and TOPIX respectively.  The ADF and PP test have nonstationarity as their null 
hypothesis, with the alternative hypothesis being stationarity.  To avoid an over rejection of 
the null hypothesis, the KPSS test was also conducted, which has stationarity as its null 
hypothesis and nonstationarity as its alternative hypothesis.  The results for each tests full 
sample show that the price level for the DJIA is nonstationary, but when the first difference is 
taken (returns), the series becomes stationary at 1% significance.  In each case the pure 
random walk, the random with drift and the random walk with drift and deterministic trend 
are all significant at 1%, indicating that the DJIA returns are trend stationary with a drift.  
The subsample analysis for the DJIA shows that all samples price level are nonstationary 
except the random walk with drift of the 1910-1914 subsample, which rejects the null at 5% 
significance indicating stationarity. All of the returns reject the null hypothesis at 1%, 
suggesting that returns are stationary at 1% significance.  These results for the ADF test are 
supported by the PP test, which deliver very similar results.  Again the only price level that 
does not accept the null hypothesis is the random walk with drift 1910-1914 subsample, 
which is stationary with 5% significance.  As with the ADF test, all returns for the PP test 
reject the null hypothesis of nonstationary at 1%, indicating stationarity of returns. The KPSS 
test results show that each subsample for the price level reject the null hypothesis of 
stationarity at 5% significance, except the 1945-1949 subsample of random walk with drift.  
However, the same subsamples random walk with drift and deterministic trend rejects the 
null hypothesis at 1%, indicating that that subsample price level, and all subsamples, are 
nonstationary with drift and deterministic trend.  The returns show that the 1900-1904, 1905-
1909, 1915-1919, 1975-1979 and 2005-2009 subsamples are only stationary with drift and 
stay nonstationary when a deterministic trend is included.  The 1960-1964 subsample is only 
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stationary with a drift and deterministic trend, while the remaining subsample are stationary 
with a drift, and with a drift and deterministic trend.  The results show that in some 
subsamples, we may have over rejected the null in the ADF and PP test.  These results show 
that the price level of the DJIA appear to be nonstationary in every subsample for all three 
tests for the random walk with drift and deterministic trend, and for the majority of 
subsamples tested for the pure random walk and random walk with drift.  Thus, since 
nonstationarity suggests the randomness of a series, we can conclude that the DJIA appears to 
be random and generally integrated at order one and type 1 behaviour. 
  
Table 3.6 indicates those results for the ADF, PP and KPSS test for the FT30 for the full 
sample 1935-2009 and 5 yearly subsamples. The results for the full sample show that each 
form the random walk is nonstationary in the price series, and stationary at returns.  This 
indicates that the FT30 is integrated of order one and is trend stationary with drift in returns.  
However, the subsample analysis reveals that the subsample 1975-1979 is stationary at the 
price level for a random walk with drift, while the subsample 2000-2004 is stationary for a 
pure random walk.  This indicates that these forms of the random walk model are not 
appropriate for the FT30 price series.  However, within these subsamples and all other 
subsamples, the other forms the random walk model are nonstationary, indicating the 
randomness of these prices.  The results for the returns are all stationary at 1% significance, 
indicating that returns are non random.  However, the result for the KPSS test indicates that 
each subsample price series is nonstationary, indicating randomness in the price series.  The 
returns are all stationary in some form of the random walk model except the 1955-1959 and 
1970-1974 subsamples, in which both forms of the random walk model are nonstationary.  
Thus the FT30 can be categorized as type 1 behaviour. 
 
Table 3.7 shows the results for the unit roots on the TOPIX price level and returns series.  
The results for the full sample show that the price level is nonstationary for all three unit root 
tests, while the returns are stationary in all forms of the random walk model for the ADF and 
PP test, but only for the random walk with drift and deterministic trend for the KPSS test.  
The results for the subsample analysis indicate that the price level is nonstationary in some 
form of the random walk model for all subsamples.  However, the pure random walk model 
and random walk with drift are both stationary for the subsample 1990-1994, suggesting that 
the drift parameter is key to this subsample.  All returns for the subsample are significant at 
1%, thus rejecting the null hypothesis of nonstationarity, indicating stationarity in the returns 
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series.  The Phillips-Perron test results are similar to the ADF test results example the 
subsample 1975-1979 is stationary at the price level for the random walk with drift and 
deterministic trend. The KPSS test results show that price level of all subsamples reject the 
null hypothesis at either random walk model, indicating the nonstationary property of the 
TOPIX price series.  Also, all subsamples accept the null hypothesis at either random walk 
model for returns, indicating the stationarity of returns.  Thus the TOPIX can be categorized 
as type 1 behaviour. 
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Table 3.5. Test results for the 5-yearly three unit roots for the DJIA.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller 
Price Level Returns 
Pure RW RW with 
drift 
RW with drift and 
deterministic trend 
Pure RW RW with drift RW with drift and 
deterministic trend 
Panel A: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
Full Sample 1.888828* 1.183362 -0.420786 -61.40087*** -61.47964*** -61.48303*** 
1897 1899 0.757129 -1.250840 -2.513381 -12.39789*** -12.45324*** -12.45283*** 
1900 1904 0.017754 -1.463485 -1.243179 -14.80109*** -14.79695*** -14.82058*** 
1905 1909 0.714676 -1.316827 -1.330840 -14.49493*** -14.51716*** -14.51244*** 
1910 1914 -1.171000* -2.990866** -3.052543 -37.41312*** -37.42416*** -37.41348*** 
1915 1919 0.953188 -1.979496 -1.967810 -10.59890*** -10.69248*** -10.72007*** 
1920 1924 0.295896 -0.827012 -2.249046 -14.06855*** -14.06700*** -14.22521*** 
1925 1929 -0.271953 -1.357811 -0.244870 -8.287003*** -8.431824*** -8.443545*** 
1930 1934 -1.931172* -1.913718 -0.785701 -39.48365*** -39.49081*** -39.54951*** 
1935 1939 0.317006 -2.003444 -1.917154 -15.50673*** -15.51923*** -15.54182*** 
1940 1944 -0.009768 -1.469074 -2.063017 -7.800954*** -7.798851*** -7.968146*** 
1945 1949 -0.238139 -2.651305 -2.789411 -8.887249*** -8.932844*** -8.929751*** 
1950 1954 -0.584301 -2.050699 -1.817720 -27.82957*** -28.17176*** -28.20823*** 
1955 1959 -0.795122 -0.804316 -1.150814 -28.60468*** -28.85701*** -28.91403*** 
1960 1964 -1.021617 -0.735645 -1.194260 -34.48288*** -34.57686*** -34.71189*** 
1965 1969 -1.099789 -0.155007 -1.386617 -30.46090*** -30.46559*** -30.47845*** 
1970 1974 -1.159246 0.677285 -0.655086 -26.06512*** -26.05650*** -26.04795*** 
1975 1979 -0.762349 0.012646 -1.770965 -26.73131*** -26.80228*** -26.79922*** 
1980 1984 -0.866030 -0.595659 -1.090702 -36.45770*** -36.53195*** -36.53579*** 
1985 1989 -0.800086 -1.023154 -1.320096 -30.15568*** -30.32872*** -30.31862*** 
1990 1994 -0.963533 -0.725877 -1.248424 -36.33351*** -36.42013*** -36.44956*** 
1995 1999 -0.868935 -1.226452 -1.282364 -37.45529*** -37.80773*** -37.79571*** 
2000 2004 -1.220223 -1.090068 -2.160921 -39.22190*** -39.21840*** -39.28983*** 
2005 2009 -1.037844 -0.429282 -1.642883 -32.46945*** -32.47066*** -32.47569*** 
Panel B: Phillips-Perron Test 
Full Sample 1.525504 0.862592 -0.657531 -171.1806*** -171.1841*** -171.1721*** 
1897 1899 0.846614 -1.209000 -2.176155 -30.18914*** -30.22128*** -30.21342*** 
1900 1904 -0.139995 -1.517013 -1.147607 -38.19024*** -38.17769*** -38.19187*** 
1905 1909 0.703253 -1.277678 -1.295205 -38.29643*** -38.30507*** -38.29251*** 
1910 1914 -1.161448 -2.983614** -3.045337 -37.41290*** -37.42344*** -37.41282*** 
1915 1919 1.040096 -2.124418 -2.069566 -38.68309*** -38.73120*** -38.74263*** 
1920 1924 0.225591 -0.864301 -2.327379 -36.87555*** -36.86515*** -36.90406*** 
1925 1929 -0.410023 -1.279714 0.123488 -35.34284*** -35.37686*** -35.36794*** 
1930 1934 -1.803337* -1.840559 -1.083545 -39.47748*** -39.48376*** -39.54337*** 
1935 1939 0.327492 -2.000521 -1.907560 -37.44457*** -37.44407*** -37.44210*** 
1940 1944 -0.151741 -1.532639 -2.132456 -33.93756*** -33.92713*** -33.92010*** 
1945 1949 -0.218601 -2.734483* -2.860751 -32.55505*** -32.56043*** -32.54870*** 
1950 1954 -0.578112 -2.047983 -1.804358 -32.96047*** -33.17512*** -33.18732*** 
1955 1959 -0.794262 -0.804316 -1.127349 -34.70304*** -34.76574*** -34.81379*** 
1960 1964 -1.025062 -0.463283 -0.955769 -34.61723*** -34.65327*** -34.74442*** 
1965 1969 -1.109876 0.116292 -1.195480 -30.77268*** -30.70015*** -30.70154*** 
1970 1974 -1.144304 0.650708 -0.662742 -30.21489*** -30.20351*** -30.19189*** 
1975 1979 -0.762240 0.002934 -1.762520 -31.91106*** -31.94510*** -31.93903*** 
1980 1984 -0.866065 -0.597960 -1.090053 -36.45778*** -36.54556*** -36.51751*** 
1985 1989 -0.810348 -1.046572 -1.327671 -38.38256*** -38.57213*** -38.55812*** 
1990 1994 -0.963409 -0.729047 -1.248248 -36.28471*** -36.35689*** -36.38711*** 
1995 1999 -0.868955 -1.227626 -1.271167 -37.44165*** -37.92171*** -37.90877*** 
2000 2004 -1.246377 -0.762479 -1.785409 -39.26664*** -39.26540*** -39.36683*** 
2005 2009 -1.037183 -0.383662 -1.606787 -44.35994*** -44.37062*** -44.39134*** 
Panel C: KPSS Test 
Full Sample n/a 11.52930*** 3.580821*** n/a 0.095310 0.035739 
1897 1899 n/a 3.221466*** 0.309500*** n/a 0.082853 0.069613 
1900 1904 n/a 1.725739*** 0.449456*** n/a 0.187107 0.152068** 
1905 1909 n/a 0.534384** 0.567147*** n/a 0.198162 0.196765** 
1910 1914 n/a 0.818568*** 0.263598*** n/a 0.088202 0.081091 
1915 1919 n/a 0.986386*** 0.489070*** n/a 0.263886 0.185508** 
1920 1924 n/a 1.778395*** 0.441549*** n/a 0.448126* 0.100507 
1925 1929 n/a 3.821838*** 0.462245*** n/a 0.084670 0.080382 
1930 1934 n/a 2.973070*** 1.115141*** n/a 0.421042* 0.085806 
1935 1939 n/a 0.658274** 0.667894*** n/a 0.190189 0.097391 
1940 1944 n/a 1.295774*** 0.888829*** n/a 0.339982 0.050612 
1945 1949 n/a 0.368754* 0.282760*** n/a 0.113880 0.113512 
1950 1954 n/a 0.747601*** 0.391852*** n/a 0.313011 0.144324* 
1955 1959 n/a 0.629757** 0.530588*** n/a 0.390934* 0.128828* 
1960 1964 n/a 0.950429*** 0.604035*** n/a 0.583236** 0.054595 
1965 1969 n/a 2.264755*** 0.775720*** n/a 0.151878 0.073382 
1970 1974 n/a 2.217979*** 1.060092*** n/a 0.106196 0.097203 
1975 1979 n/a 2.315612*** 0.752140*** n/a 0.311778 0.294715*** 
1980 1984 n/a 0.928141*** 0.702866*** n/a 0.140334 0.058993 
1985 1989 n/a 0.833299*** 0.748173*** n/a 0.079913 0.079946 
1990 1994 n/a 1.130751*** 0.759803*** n/a 0.162166 0.038234 
1995 1999 n/a 0.718301** 0.731104*** n/a 0.038754 0.036090 
2000 2004 n/a 2.288977*** 0.541512*** n/a 0.411900* 0.032345 
2005 2009 n/a 2.503277*** 0.914885*** n/a 0.229374 0.193117** 
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Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller 
Price Level Returns 
Pure RW RW with drift RW with drift and 
deterministic trend 
Pure RW RW with drift RW with drift and 
deterministic trend 
Panel A: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
Full Sample -0.199795 -1.011472 -1.946400 -128.5212*** -128.5432*** -128.5402*** 
1935 1939 -0.822753 -0.525238 -2.310060 -26.02075*** -26.02743*** -26.04819*** 
1940 1944 1.358081 -0.031280 -3.320783* -15.02071*** -15.06257*** -15.09280*** 
1945 1949 -0.336526 -2.221749 -2.539891 -17.52021*** -17.51448*** -17.52458*** 
1950 1954 2.408924 1.320414 0.052184 -23.00862*** -23.13576*** -23.19367*** 
1955 1959 2.362030 2.674910* 1.411499 -27.05596*** -27.11993*** -27.24773*** 
1960 1964 -0.104567 -1.789117 -2.056188 -21.94188*** -21.93311*** -21.94007*** 
1965 1969 0.341775 -1.218256 -1.383360 -33.97388*** -33.96905*** -33.95695*** 
1970 1974 -1.208843 0.488109 -0.049079 -34.64228*** -34.71636*** -34.87196*** 
1975 1979 0.562057 -3.512188*** -2.929558 -33.40985*** -33.46900*** -33.66500*** 
1980 1984 2.011152 -0.011683 -2.538514 -37.42870*** -37.53543*** -37.52379*** 
1985 1989 1.273801 -1.133449 -2.092576 -33.94805*** -34.01019*** -33.99965*** 
1990 1994 0.544275 -0.999326 -2.685833 -33.94609*** -33.94305*** -33.93355*** 
1995 1999 1.404390 -0.777032 -3.064158 -33.52926*** -33.59207*** -33.57930*** 
2000 2004 -2.564457** -2.200776 -1.126301 -36.22793*** -36.28321*** -36.33033*** 
2005 2009 -0.288744 -1.087193 -1.672565 -17.16047*** -17.15403*** -17.17673*** 
Panel B: Phillips-Perron Test 
Full Sample -0.252218 -1.053472 -2.022467 -129.8838*** -129.8325*** -129.8291*** 
1935 1939 -0.884167 -0.388169 -2.198731 -25.70709*** -25.70380*** -25.70558*** 
1940 1944 1.526249 -0.017957 -2.953604 -24.67473*** -24.65303*** -24.63438*** 
1945 1949 -0.322714 -1.851104 -2.192184 -23.21089*** -23.20137*** -23.18811*** 
1950 1954 2.741506 1.769603 0.396928 -23.12826*** -23.15527*** -23.15940*** 
1955 1959 2.537800 3.198641 1.841775 -27.05596*** -27.12888*** -26.97154*** 
1960 1964 -0.194850 -1.968061 -2.265235 -28.83970*** -28.82698*** -28.81968*** 
1965 1969 0.336993 -1.232572 -1.414470 -33.94146*** -33.93551*** -33.92273*** 
1970 1974 -1.231443 0.578317 0.020267 -34.63176*** -34.70451*** -34.86576*** 
1975 1979 0.550993 -3.506863*** -2.949894 -33.43732*** -33.46829*** -33.66760*** 
1980 1984 2.098317 0.045571 -2.536736 -37.42870*** -37.51017*** -37.49881*** 
1985 1989 1.001148 -1.304239 -2.473518 -34.62084*** -34.62051*** -34.60935*** 
1990 1994 0.472039 -1.124721 -2.894165 -34.05719*** -34.05120*** -34.04047*** 
1995 1999 1.514396 -0.703448 -2.895597 -33.45566*** -33.51092*** -33.49749*** 
2000 2004 -2.583975*** -2.208165 -1.110686 -36.22776*** -36.28692*** -36.33902*** 
2005 2009 -0.274621 -0.998787 -1.611873 -35.86139*** -35.84711*** -35.86512*** 
Panel C: KPSS Test 
Full Sample n/a 14.07482*** 2.276614*** n/a 0.077827 0.075991 
1935 1939 n/a 3.266916*** 0.705774*** n/a 0.223610 0.078220 
1940 1944 n/a 4.039336*** 0.357038*** n/a 0.143140 0.083932 
1945 1949 n/a 1.017553*** 0.663613*** n/a 0.112544 0.030531 
1950 1954 n/a 2.121500*** 0.654171*** n/a 0.416310* 0.184495** 
1955 1959 n/a 1.619971*** 0.724566*** n/a 0.670881** 0.146034** 
1960 1964 n/a 1.004949*** 0.736382*** n/a 0.108889 0.047919 
1965 1969 n/a 2.487326*** 0.395123*** n/a 0.125870 0.123383* 
1970 1974 n/a 1.128031*** 0.948967*** n/a 0.886872*** 0.194677** 
1975 1979 n/a 3.126845*** 0.354881*** n/a 0.628478** 0.110845 
1980 1984 n/a 4.108682*** 0.726596*** n/a 0.032020 0.019758 
1985 1989 n/a 3.157311*** 0.315526*** n/a 0.053736 0.045947 
1990 1994 n/a 3.496829*** 0.236431*** n/a 0.070387 0.059586 
1995 1999 n/a 3.886727*** 0.136511* n/a 0.029087 0.028769 
2000 2004 n/a 3.740270*** 0.812946*** n/a 0.320683 0.095354 
2005 2009 n/a 1.526930*** 0.904140*** n/a 0.261958 0.129586* 
 
Table 3.6. Test results for the 50yearly three unit roots for the FT30.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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3.6.2. Nonlinear Empirical Results  
 
The nonlinear empirical results are documented below, but first the linear dependence in 
returns has to be removed.  Table 3.8 documents the Ljung-Box statistics for the returns of 
the three indices studied.  If the stock returns are autocorrelated, nonlinearities cannot be 
detected reliably by testing the original data.  Significant autocorrelation structures of returns 
are found in all subsamples except the 1910-1914, 1930-1934, 1980-1984 and 2000-2004 
subsamples for the DJIA, and 1965-1969 subsample for the TOPIX. Thus on the basis of the 
Ljung-Box portmanteau test we can conclude that the stock returns are characterized by 
temporal linear relationships.  Therefore to examine the nonlinear dependence in returns, the 
removal of linear dependence must be conducted. 
 
Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller 
Price Level Returns 
Pure RW RW with drift RW with drift and 
deterministic trend 
Pure RW RW with drift RW with drift and 
deterministic trend 
Panel A:Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
Full Sample -0.473954 -1.341092 -1.327914 -86.06534*** -86.14092*** -86.24064*** 
1951 1954 0.873096 -1.634896 -1.063586 -26.24696*** -26.38350*** -26.49948*** 
1955 1959 3.592861 0.577303 -0.922387 -22.25197*** -22.58978*** -22.58181*** 
1960 1964 0.070864 -2.376163 -2.641035 30.40048*** -30.39200*** -30.45803*** 
1965 1969 3.126206 1.710080 -0.144446 -34.10496*** -34.26729*** -34.30299*** 
1970 1974 0.596059 -1.008078 -0.345710 -21.79966*** -21.82752*** -21.84046*** 
1975 1979 2.125458 -1.284012 -3.242004* -30.01444*** -30.15427*** -30.16206*** 
1980 1984 2.914465 1.114934 -1.035117 -31.42558*** -31.62773*** -31.65356*** 
1985 1989 2.720033 -0.078113 -2.494436 -33.93954*** -34.16882*** -34.15969*** 
1990 1994 -2.264240** -3.668070*** -2.967096 -26.07695*** -26.11249*** -26.18530*** 
1995 1999 0.141094 -1.1281264 -0.734404 -35.01634*** -35.00435*** -35.04338*** 
2000 2004 -1.405522 -2.351487 -1.695192 -33.94672*** -33.95206*** -34.00515*** 
2005 2009 -0.518679 -0.712071 -1.846270 -27.50367*** -27.49898*** -27.55113*** 
Panel B:Phillips-Perron Test 
Full Sample -0.512777 -1.374546 -1.417186 -114.3118*** -114.2376*** -114.2194*** 
1951 1954 0.915923 -1.654613 -1.016178 -26.20044*** -26.38350*** -26.45519*** 
1955 1959 2.905748 0.286469 -1.203663 -34.18511*** -34.07062*** -34.06410*** 
1960 1964 0.024259 -2.456287 -2.679230 -30.75334*** -30.74432*** -30.75091*** 
1965 1969 2.8652352 1.489869 -0.357172 -34.31130*** -34.40335*** -34.42509*** 
1970 1974 0.519579 -1.034308 -0.487708 -32.12525*** -32.13102*** -32.13059*** 
1975 1979 2.221472 -1.269143 -3.157363*** -30.09244*** -30.18346*** -30.19080*** 
1980 1984 3.040723 1.214912 -0.955551 -31.42558*** -31.61591*** -31.63429*** 
1985 1989 2.655340 -0.101630 -2.543604 -33.93954*** -34.12793*** -34.11822*** 
1990 1994 -2.221639** -3.618126*** -2.928534 -31.01211*** -31.02045*** -31.06505*** 
1995 1999 0.138095 -1.193975 -0.744944 -35.00089*** -34.98854*** -35.02771*** 
2000 2004 -1.625455* -2.383526 -1.425126 -33.92046*** -33.94822*** -34.06429*** 
2005 2009 -0.522101 -0.617543 -1.798371 -36.24422*** -36.23919*** -36.33694*** 
 Panel C: KPSS Test 
Full Sample n/a 11.50985*** 1.199753*** n/a 0.967950*** 0.064139 
1951 1954 n/a 2.989382*** 0.767879*** n/a 0.558945** 0.079800 
1955 1959 n/a 3.402697*** 0.570546*** n/a 0.123993 0.122495* 
1960 1964 n/a 0.426555* 0.303027*** n/a 0.281121 0.071285 
1965 1969 n/a 3.394122*** 0.616349*** n/a 0.238148 0.095447 
1970 1974 n/a 3.258121*** 0.583725*** n/a 0.358987* 0.275312*** 
1975 1979 n/a 4.126023*** 0.136623* n/a 0.091789 0.039138 
1980 1984 n/a 3.680787*** 0.767629*** n/a 0.223310 0.062599 
1985 1989 n/a 4.124859*** 0.256217*** n/a 0.080172 0.055043 
1990 1994 n/a 2.294063*** 0.762936*** n/a 0.328445 0.052732 
1995 1999 n/a 1.049832*** 0.420969*** n/a 0.280670 0.139635* 
2000 2004 n/a 2.536764*** 0.987941*** n/a 0.374551* 0.040517 
2005 2009 n/a 2.063366*** 0.888522*** n/a 0.399697* 0.110272 
 
Table 3.7. Test results for the 5-yearly three unit roots for the TOPIX.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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 Ljung-Box Test Statistics 
Qrr(5) Qrr(10) Qrr(15) Qrr(20) 
Panel A: DJIA 
Full Sample 109.40*** 162.38*** 170.73*** 178.37*** 
1897 1899 17.85*** 25.97*** 34.98*** 37.69*** 
1900 1904 19.67*** 33.23*** 37.90*** 47.52*** 
1905 1909 26.74*** 51.19*** 54.27*** 58.94*** 
1910 1914 3.04 7.57 12.43 15.10 
1915 1919 5.75 19.99** 28.50** 34.60** 
1920 1924 7.33 17.09** 25.49** 34.49** 
1925 1929 164.15*** 218.72*** 233.46*** 245.92*** 
1930 1934 2.23 6.85 11.60 19.91 
1935 1939 8.90* 20.76** 25.55** 31.62** 
1940 1944 56.87*** 75.04*** 75.93*** 93.94*** 
1945 1949 58.77*** 80.64*** 101.13*** 110.91*** 
1950 1954 37.72*** 49.25*** 54.64*** 58.12*** 
1955 1959 30.66*** 38.73*** 40.97*** 55.69*** 
1960 1964 18.22*** 23.45*** 29.78** 54.96*** 
1965 1969 75.65*** 82.50*** 92.05*** 98.46*** 
1970 1974 70.22*** 82.31*** 86.43*** 89.92*** 
1975 1979 43.62*** 53.94*** 60.33*** 62.32*** 
1980 1984 9.16 10.28 12.90 16.11 
1985 1989 26.59*** 58.45*** 32.75*** 41.42*** 
1990 1994 4.67 17.41* 28.62** 35.79** 
1995 1999 7.29 19.24** 29.24** 45.32*** 
2000 2004 5.44 8.53 17.50 28.31 
2005 2009 45.99*** 59.62*** 73.00*** 94.36*** 
Panel B:FT30 
Full Sample 125.32*** 190.79*** 215.44*** 224.97*** 
1935 1939 84.74*** 88.50*** 95.99*** 99.95*** 
1940 1944 472.31*** 509.85*** 547.20*** 659.32*** 
1945 1949 317.12*** 339.79*** 352.64*** 372.41*** 
1950 1954 274.85*** 282.63*** 288.21*** 288.67*** 
1955 1959 97.50*** 103.80*** 115.08*** 118.50*** 
1960 1964 70.16*** 94.91*** 107.67*** 116.22*** 
1965 1969 7.37 15.77 20.29 33.29** 
1970 1974 3.98 14.81 28.63** 31.87** 
1975 1979 12.12** 44.43*** 61.70*** 29.22*** 
1980 1984 7.96 16.16* 17.69 24.00 
1985 1989 15.21*** 27.44*** 41.80*** 44.16*** 
1990 1994 14.06** 30.32*** 38.881*** 44.32*** 
1995 1999 12.36** 23.16*** 30.74*** 3.48** 
2000 2004 11.77** 27.55*** 34.71*** 46.10*** 
2005 2009 27.45*** 35.34*** 40.86*** 49.53*** 
Panel C: TOPIX 
Full Sample 128.99*** 150.68*** 167.96*** 192.36*** 
1951 1954 47.14*** 56.58*** 69.02*** 77.69*** 
1955 1959 24.48*** 32.36*** 37.73*** 41.45*** 
1960 1964 49.99*** 50.90*** 59.37*** 65.90*** 
1965 1969 9.25 11.69 17.77 23.93 
1970 1974 48.84*** 52.23*** 63.00*** 81.72*** 
1975 1979 46.76*** 74.62*** 76.55*** 84.33*** 
1980 1984 25.23*** 27.31*** 34.18*** 37.39*** 
1985 1989 13.25** 22.79** 330.06** 43.40*** 
1990 1994 39.35*** 44.69*** 47.25*** 53.51*** 
1995 1999 5.42 20.92** 25.69** 33.76** 
2000 2004 9.10 14.47 16.90 20.32 
2005 2009 12.71** 20.06** 29.11** 34.55** 
 
Table 3.8. Ljung-Box statistics for the daily returns. ***, **, * 
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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The pre-whitening AR model enabled the examination of the existence of nonlinear structures 
in the stock market returns.  The AR models serve as a filter for removing any linear 
relationships, enabling an examination of just the nonlinear returns.  The AR models 
identified and estimated are presented in Table 3.9, with the model diagnostics showing that 
the elimination of a linear structure has succeeded. However, the lack of significant 
autocorrelations in the AR residuals does not imply that they behave purely randomly.  Three 
tests for nonlinearity are conducted on the residuals. The McLeod-Li statistics (Qrr(k)) of the 
squared AR residuals reveal that all subsamples of the three indices are highly significant, 
which indicates a high level of nonlinear dependence in the returns. Table 3.9 also reveals the 
Engle LM test statistics, which also examines the nonlinear dependence in the filtered 
returns.  For up to lags 2, 4 and 6 there is nonlinear dependence in each subsample at 5% 
significance.  To enhance the power of our testing, the BDS test statistics are also calculated.  
Table 3.10 shows significant values of the BDS test statistics for nearly all of the dimensions 
for the subsamples. Every subsample has the majority of different dimensions indicating 
nonlinear dependence in the returns. Since linear dependence has been eliminated in advance, 
the BDS test brings forth clear evidence of the existence of nonlinear dependence in the stock 
returns.  
 
The results from Table 3.9 and Table 3.10 indicate significant nonlinear dependence in stock 
market returns even when linear dependence has been filtered out through an AR(p)  model.   
Unlike the linear dependence which was found to fluctuate over time, the nonlinear 
dependence appears to be consistent throughout the sample periods. Thus the nonlinear 
dependence of each return series is strong and can be categorized by type 5. 
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  Ljung-Box Test Statistics McLeod-Li Test Statistics Engle LM Test Statistics 
 AR Qr(5) Qr(10) Qr(15) Qr(20) Qrr(5) Qrr(10) Qrr(15) Qrr(20) Lag 2 Lag 4 Lag 6 
Panel A: DJIA 
Full Sample 11 0.0058 0.0235 5.68 11.55 4424.4*** 6429.2*** 7576.5*** 8420.8*** 2122.18*** 2361.35*** 2814.80*** 
1897 1899 4 0.0969 4.96 12.81 15.02 138.30*** 193.57*** 204.30*** 207.90*** 59.83*** 98.85*** 102.61*** 
1900 1904 7 0.0916 0.7982 5.08 11.76 211.05*** 240.67*** 249.10*** 269.02*** 121.74*** 149.24*** 155.80*** 
1905 1909 7 0.0675 2.94 8.96 14.02 355.53*** 479.96*** 505.74*** 508.30*** 297.15*** 300.87*** 307.84*** 
1910 1914 0 3.04 7.57 12.43 15.10 286.30*** 293.05*** 295.27*** 296.02*** 186.44*** 195.75*** 196.72*** 
1915 1919 13 0.0419 0.0944 1.22 9.58 134.56*** 178.43*** 195.49*** 202.34*** 81.18*** 84.09*** 103.19*** 
1920 1924 9 0.0631 1.02 10.22 20.02 59.94*** 113.27*** 131.86*** 152.96*** 36.67*** 38.60*** 54.20*** 
1925 1929 15 0.0769 0.1694 0.8072 5.91 722.62*** 1012.0*** 1135.2*** 1195.8*** 395.47*** 139.65*** 449.17*** 
1930 1934 0 2.23 6.85 11.60 19.91 94.11*** 155.34*** 192.16*** 210.18*** 56.00*** 60.99*** 83.27*** 
1935 1939 6 0.0550 5.34 10.08 15.85 203.13*** 420.19*** 562.18*** 652.88*** 59.98*** 109.92*** 169.73*** 
1940 1944 6 0.1297 5.85 7.78 24.98 274.03*** 424.32*** 434.06*** 506.19*** 143.08*** 223.10*** 283.18*** 
1945 1949 15 0.0228 0.1265 0.2683 2.95 165.62*** 183.41*** 214.84*** 233.74*** 58.70*** 118.99*** 119.06*** 
1950 1954 2 2.80 10.43 16.73 20.60 155.50*** 190.05*** 261.53*** 270.87*** 10.52*** 134.82*** 145.19*** 
1955 1959 10 0.0348 0.1917 3.06 14.59 35.39*** 46.54*** 47.31*** 50.98*** 24.54*** 24.97*** 34.23*** 
1960 1964 18 0.1170 0.5050 1.17 5.98 258.78*** 303.45*** 349.81*** 386.24*** 193.21*** 220.76*** 221.34*** 
1965 1969 8 0.0666 1.18 8.34 13.24 77.82*** 124.98*** 144.25*** 158.51*** 34.37*** 47.55*** 52.93*** 
1970 1974 9 0.0065 0.2339 2.80 7.34 229.58*** 401.32*** 564.56*** 721.86*** 86.84*** 127.80*** 150.17*** 
1975 1979 8 0.0999 2.71 7.62 11.11 29.02*** 50.18*** 76.76*** 118.80*** 8.14** 21.95*** 23.71*** 
1980 1984 0 9.16 10.28 12.90 16.11 48.61*** 74.45*** 115.79*** 151.72*** 6.32** 29.76*** 40.68*** 
1985 1989 5 0.1207 3.69 10.17 19.52 22.35*** 26.36*** 26.76*** 27.07*** 13.21*** 15.15*** 19.25*** 
1990 1994 7 0.0931 2.34 10.93 16.52 42.53*** 68.27*** 101.80*** 120.70*** 15.36*** 24.15*** 36.36*** 
1995 1999 14 0.1329 0.2892 0.4926 13.02 137.77*** 174.58*** 184.13*** 214.67*** 81.70*** 82.18*** 103.59*** 
2000 2004 0 5.44 8.53 17.50 28.31 202.27*** 305.62*** 364.92*** 403.26*** 45.44*** 138.42*** 146.76*** 
2005 2009 17 0.0962 0.2722 0.3695 4.85 670.33*** 1235.9*** 1817.0*** 2242.4*** 262.17*** 289.15*** 392.90*** 
Panel B: FT30 
Full Sample 19 0.0108 0.0577 0.0919 0.5531 5798.6*** 8221.5*** 10290*** 11873*** 2768.4*** 3167.8*** 3305.0*** 
1935 1939 18 0.0612 0.2460 0.3065 1.50 150.81*** 171.72*** 178.76*** 179.75*** 54.43*** 115.17*** 118.19*** 
1940 1944 20 0.4645 0.6530 1.16 1.86 708.85*** 1395.6*** 1786.4*** 2150.5*** 212.67*** 297.28*** 373.24*** 
1945 1949 19 0.0534 0.1444 0.2908 3.63 197.90*** 145.39*** 158.23*** 160.41*** 87.94*** 95.04*** 95.52*** 
1950 1954 2 5.16 9.93 12.73 15.64 59.77*** 61.64*** 63.00*** 63.89*** 33.65*** 36.35*** 48.70*** 
1955 1959 15 0.0223 0.0829 0.4064 5.07 100.06*** 108.41*** 109.28*** 111.25*** 82.15*** 84.56*** 84.58*** 
1960 1964 12 0.1898 0.2632 2.20 4.48 308.04*** 310.48*** 311.93*** 319.21*** 323.46*** 326.82*** 329.04*** 
1965 1969 5 0.0244 7.56 11.41 22.56 244.61*** 245.51*** 246.24*** 246.74*** 287.15*** 205.36*** 308.71*** 
1970 1974 13 0.0339 0.1861 4.63 6.68 197.17*** 214.29*** 222.91*** 237.65*** 175.49*** 181.74*** 184.58*** 
1975 1979 20 0.5665 3.43 6.14 7.46 296.56*** 490.29*** 637.79*** 765.37*** 101.50*** 150.98*** 173.12*** 
1980 1984 1 5.62 13.29 14.85 20.60 152.06*** 163.36*** 166.41*** 170.29*** 128.51*** 133.26*** 134.97*** 
1985 1989 11 0.1457 0.3821 5.42 8.88 545.29*** 568.82*** 571.03*** 576.12*** 421.25*** 423.67*** 423.10*** 
1990 1994 10 0.0497 0.0852 7.76 12.04 63.88*** 87.68*** 144.38*** 150.53*** 43.49*** 48.11*** 48.54*** 
1995 1999 2 3.67 12.58 20.73 25.77 282.77*** 565.53*** 845.38*** 1082.4*** 73.98*** 119.36*** 179.28*** 
2000 2004 10 0.0219 0.1152 7.30 16.39 338.91*** 617.60*** 784.04*** 873.09*** 127.15*** 177.91*** 198.25*** 
2005 2009 5 0.1339 6.35 12.24 22.20 430.70*** 741.24*** 1058.1*** 1299.5*** 76.08*** 202.32*** 258.81*** 
Panel C: TOPIX 
Full Sample 18 0.0115 0.0376 0.0554 2.37 3177.5*** 4835.8*** 5738.9*** 6670.4*** 1533.5*** 1820.0*** 1937.3*** 
1951 1954 10 0.0643 0.2602 10.23 18.85 121.40*** 132.86*** 197.78*** 378.16*** 116.18*** 117.76*** 117.75*** 
1955 1959 2 4.86 14.04 19.55 23.40 117.32*** 131.06*** 133.33*** 134.06*** 76.28*** 84.46*** 94.92*** 
1960 1964 1 6.04 7.00 13.43 25.09 131.00*** 226.41*** 259.01*** 292.02*** 53.91*** 82.26*** 95.87*** 
1965 1969 0 9.25 11.69 17.77 23.93 68.23*** 84.36*** 87.75*** 93.56*** 37.00*** 55.06*** 56.57*** 
1970 1974 3 1.09 4.66 14.07 23.27 167.46*** 170.63*** 172.53*** 175.77*** 109.63*** 110.48*** 113.52*** 
1975 1979 10 0.0763 0.2240 2.84 14.36 69.92*** 98.21*** 102.00*** 125.74*** 36.34*** 50.02*** 54.93*** 
1980 1984 1 3.60 6.66 13.08 16.53 192.43*** 199.74*** 230.11*** 240.67*** 129.00*** 131.48*** 138.33*** 
1985 1989 8 0.0642 1.26 8.22 18.75 158.09*** 160.79*** 164.61*** 175.39*** 156.37*** 168.75*** 168.53*** 
1990 1994 2 4.62 8.24 10.03 17.72 147.57*** 192.36*** 202.80*** 212.58*** 48.38*** 75.91*** 95.72*** 
1995 1999 9 0.0408 0.1012 5.28 12.23 104.98*** 166.24*** 199.91*** 269.79*** 58.95*** 76.89*** 99.66*** 
2000 2004 1 3.60 9.02 11.10 14.82 44.64*** 82.46*** 89.06*** 95.25*** 11.70*** 37.92*** 49.80*** 
2005 2009 4 0.1184 7.56 15.77 21.19 738.65*** 1394.8*** 1685.2*** 1892.2*** 344.08*** 422.61*** 440.02*** 
 
Table 3.9. Test results for the nonlinear dependence on the AR filtered stock returns.  Qss(k) is McLeod-Li statistic which tests the null hypothesis that the increments are iid. 
The Tsay statistics tests that all coefficients are zero and are calculated at lags 4 and 6. The Engle LM statistics are calculated up to lags 2, 4 and 6. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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Table 3.10. Test results for the BDS test on the AR filtered stock returns.  The first row reports the dimension while the second row documents the embedding 
dimension by values of the standard deviation of the sample.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significantly. 
Dimension  2 6 10 
Embedding Dimension AR 
model 
0.5σ 1σ 1.5σ 2σ 0.5σ 1σ 1.5σ 2σ 0.5σ 1σ 1.5σ 2σ 
Panel A: DJIA 
Full Sample 11 0.011341*** 0.022363*** 0.020713*** 0.014555*** 0.003761*** 0.052932*** 0.105876*** 0.106638*** 0.000425*** 0.032963*** 0.126685*** 0.172350*** 
1897 1899 4 0.009313*** 0.021436*** 0.021148*** 0.014260*** 0.000993*** 0.023239*** 0.069076*** 0.078347*** 3e-5*** 0.007537*** 0.063583*** 0.113733*** 
1900 1904 7 0.006527*** 0.014273*** 0.014139*** 0.010459*** 0.001637*** 0.026440*** 0.063911*** 0.071392*** 0.000113*** 0.013497*** 0.069534*** 0.111681*** 
1905 1909 7 0.005627*** 0.013923*** 0.014408*** 0.011539*** 0.000983*** 0.021837*** 0.058593*** 0.073724*** 7e-5*** 0.008676*** 0.054794*** 0.105371*** 
1910 1914 0 0.002272* 0.004487* 0.006268*** 0.007528*** 0.001054*** 0.020184*** 0.050790*** 0.061215*** 3e-5*** 0.008783*** 0.053374*** 0.095219*** 
1915 1919 13 0.004629*** 0.011931*** 0.014519*** 0.011149*** 0.000710*** 0.018094*** 0.056699*** 0.071558*** 3e-5*** 0.006770*** 0.051260*** 0.098073*** 
1920 1924 9 0.002796*** 0.008027*** 0.008764*** 0.005863*** 0.000318*** 0.010960*** 0.038804*** 0.047602*** 2e-5*** 0.003517*** 0.036100*** 0.073260*** 
1925 1929 15 0.012074*** 0.022730*** 0.020302*** 0.013440*** 0.003262*** 0.051485*** 0.100915*** 0.094222*** 0.000286*** 0.030281*** 0.121511*** 0.151102*** 
1930 1934 0 0.005259*** 0.011114*** 0.010663*** 0.006933*** 0.002609*** 0.035112*** 0.070434*** 0.065186*** 0.000371*** 0.023066*** 0.088118*** 0.113684*** 
1935 1939 6 0.008503*** 0.017749*** 0.014963*** 0.008939*** 0.002002*** 0.037574*** 0.084162*** 0.082490*** 0.000146*** 0.017370*** 0.091941*** 0.137942*** 
1940 1944 6 0.008068*** 0.014639*** 0.014963*** 0.011141*** 0.001539*** 0.026298*** 0.061553*** 0.067083*** 8e-5*** 0.014318*** 0.074436*** 0.110391*** 
1945 1949 15 0.007163*** 0.015708*** 0.016527*** 0.012627*** 0.000933*** 0.017878*** 0.047314*** 0.061481*** 5e-5*** 0.007901*** 0.044083*** 0.081389*** 
1950 1954 2 0.004596*** 0.011280*** 0.012073*** 0.008181*** 0.000450*** 0.012118*** 0.033199*** 0.037890*** 3e-5*** 0.004701*** 0.032191*** 0.061264*** 
1955 1959 10 0.003956*** 0.010477*** 0.011084*** 0.008378*** 0.000539*** 0.014147*** 0.041590*** 0.050519*** 4e-6*** 0.004673*** 0.037038*** 0.072731*** 
1960 1964 18 0.009266*** 0.020807*** 0.019427*** 0.013251*** 0.001533*** 0.032089*** 0.079252*** 0.085526*** 8e-5*** 0.012783*** 0.076763*** 0.129337*** 
1965 1969 8 0.002774*** 0.007270*** 0.008394*** 0.006216*** 0.000381*** 0.010366*** 0.033892*** 0.041772*** 5e-6*** 0.002987*** 0.027310*** 0.056149*** 
1970 1974 9 0.006786*** 0.015161*** 0.013200*** 0.006744*** 0.001052*** 0.026674*** 0.077771*** 0.083571*** 4e-5*** 0.011878*** 0.085152*** 0.141519*** 
1975 1979 8 0.001034 0.002759 0.003428* 0.002649** 0.000112*** 0.003806*** 0.015060*** 0.023403*** 4e-6*** 0.001256*** 0.013580*** 0.036663*** 
1980 1984 0 0.000125 0.000668 0.002475 0.003185** 7e-5 0.001991 0.013156*** 0.025616*** -2e-6** 0.000564** 0.010591*** 0.035165*** 
1985 1989 5 0.004550** 0.011938*** 0.012650*** 0.009415*** 0.001811*** 0.033659*** 0.068725*** 0.068136*** 0.000214*** 0.022752*** 0.093653*** 0.125464*** 
1990 1994 7 0.002563** 0.006923*** 0.007338*** 0.005344*** 0.000507*** 0.013097*** 0.037534*** 0.046599*** 8e-6*** 0.005170*** 0.035511*** 0.069154*** 
1995 1999 14 0.003209*** 0.007847*** 0.009729*** 0.008459*** 0.000772*** 0.016086*** 0.042996*** 0.050212*** 5e-5*** 0.008306*** 0.049657*** 0.079879*** 
2000 2004 0 0.003700*** 0.010344*** 0.011709*** 0.008287*** 0.001015*** 0.024204*** 0.069543*** 0.081229*** 6e-5*** 0.011837*** 0.074096*** 0.127121*** 
2005 2009 17 0.016633*** 0.029796*** 0.025036*** 0.018571*** 0.010047*** 0.093948*** 0.146221*** 0.134258*** 0.001728*** 0.071699*** 0.187616*** 0.221311*** 
Panel B: FT30 
Full Sample 19 0.023688*** 0.032843*** 0.026017*** 0.017239*** 0.015853*** 0.086188*** 0.130196*** 0.119307*** 0.005986*** 0.065117*** 0.157846*** 0.188625*** 
1935 1939 18 0.018738*** 0.034131*** 0.027992*** 0.019447*** 0.005890*** 0.066835*** 0.115812*** 0.116303*** 0.000502*** 0.036834*** 0.119660*** 0.1660880*** 
1940 1944 20 0.028285*** 0.044571*** 0.039270*** 0.028065*** 0.017061*** 0.113684*** 0.170017*** 0.158044*** 0.004049*** 0.088937*** 0.204032*** 0.238344*** 
1945 1949 19 0.025265*** 0.041716*** 0.033991*** 0.022275*** 0.011720*** 0.093437*** 0.139665*** 0.122296*** 0.002386*** 0.066866*** 0.157418*** 0.173312*** 
1950 1954 2 0.010993*** 0.021609*** 0.019293*** 0.011976*** 0.002552*** 0.038999*** 0.080707*** 0.074821*** 0.000181*** 0.018952*** 0.076345*** 0.097000*** 
1955 1959 15 0.014287*** 0.027426*** 0.024839*** 0.016812*** 0.002561*** 0.039037*** 0.077000*** 0.076786*** 0.000146*** 0.018704*** 0.080664*** 0.109492*** 
1960 1964 12 0.012618*** 0.025549*** 0.022805*** 0.014510*** 0.002139*** 0.036684*** 0.078405*** 0.076073*** 0.000204*** 0.017724*** 0.082194*** 0.114418*** 
1965 1969 5 0.008756*** 0.018686*** 0.016711*** 0.011030*** 0.002066*** 0.031707*** 0.063022*** 0.055962*** 0.000120*** 0.014938*** 0.063606*** 0.082145*** 
1970 1974 13 0.006889*** 0.017905*** 0.019587*** 0.013754*** 0.001524*** 0.033112*** 0.086306*** 0.094828*** 8e-5*** 0.013717*** 0.088288*** 0.145024*** 
1975 1979 20 0.004638*** 0.013331*** 0.017230*** 0.015349*** 0.000569*** 0.018379*** 0.064115*** 0.091622*** 2e-5*** 0.006494*** 0.060132*** 0.134745*** 
1980 1984 7 0.003509*** 0.007311*** 0.007124*** 0.005464*** 0.000341*** 0.008914*** 0.028408*** 0.037029*** 8e-6*** 0.002718*** 0.024556*** 0.054388*** 
1985 1989 11 0.004755*** 0.010554*** 0.010587*** 0.008202*** 0.000910*** 0.018861*** 0.051706*** 0.058558*** 5e-5*** 0.007979*** 0.053844*** 0.090902*** 
1990 1994 10 0.000841 0.002546 0.003804** 0.004322*** 0.000273*** 0.006921*** 0.023405*** 0.034460*** 1e-5*** 0.002401*** 0.022529*** 0.053086*** 
1995 1999 2 0.006469*** 0.016360*** 0.017718*** 0.011686*** 0.000764*** 0.022047*** 0.069835*** 0.084012*** 3e-5*** 0.007681*** 0.066723*** 0.126092*** 
2000 2004 10 0.010648*** 0.021963*** 0.019744*** 0.012991*** 0.002451*** 0.040957*** 0.095763*** 0.103858*** 0.000230*** 0.019788** 0.100604*** 0.160400*** 
2005 2009 5 0.020899*** 0.029864*** 0.021330*** 0.012104*** 0.013647*** 0.105562*** 0.139713*** 0.120541*** 0.002572*** 0.087416*** 0.179419*** 0.200589*** 
Panel C:TOPIX 
Full Sample 18 0.014543*** 0.025267*** 0.021256*** 0.014170*** 0.006122*** 0.065629*** 0.111738*** 0.101775*** 0.000928*** 0.043295*** 0.134499*** 0.165379*** 
1951 1954 10 0.006601*** 0.013867*** 0.014111*** 0.012172*** 0.001154*** 0.021017*** 0.046883*** 0.052479*** 8e-5*** 0.009049*** 0.047113*** 0.077780*** 
1955 1959 2 0.005944*** 0.012702*** 0.012530*** 0.008606*** 0.001150*** 0.023344*** 0.056688*** 0.057071*** 5e-5*** 0.008279*** 0.047922*** 0.069761*** 
1960 1964 1 0.004806*** 0.010810*** 0.010026*** 0.006601*** 0.000860*** 0.020437*** 0.059652*** 0.068275*** 5e-5*** 0.007706*** 0.055460*** 0.100073*** 
1965 1969 0 0.008269*** 0.016693*** 0.014582*** 0.007788*** 0.001123*** 0.023129*** 0.058400*** 0.059990*** 4e-5*** 0.008645*** 0.053410*** 0.085792*** 
1970 1974 3 0.016038*** 0.030174*** 0.025780*** 0.016964*** 0.003985*** 0.061978*** 0.118828*** 0.113429*** 0.000289*** 0.032001*** 0.130293*** 0.166118*** 
1975 1979 10 0.004516*** 0.008530*** 0.008585*** 0.005570*** 0.000736*** 0.015047*** 0.035696*** 0.037482*** 3e-5*** 0.006153*** 0.033375*** 0.054838*** 
1980 1984 1 0.008061*** 0.013983*** 0.012440*** 0.009095*** 0.002939 0.033790*** 0.064802*** 0.071362*** 0.000274*** 0.017372*** 0.063917*** 0.098577*** 
1985 1989 8 0.011029*** 0.020736*** 0.017002*** 0.010720*** 0.005345*** 0.069031*** 0.109926*** 0.086340*** 0.000614*** 0.047956*** 0.145561*** 0.145533*** 
1990 1994 2 0.012726*** 0.026729*** 0.024640*** 0.014986*** 0.003383 0.052359*** 0.104531*** 0.096386*** 0.000257*** 0.026911*** 0.116600*** 0.150592*** 
1995 1999 9 0.002026* 0.007832*** 0.01121*** 0.009896*** 0.000302*** 0.011633*** 0.041839*** 0.058630*** 1e-5*** 0.004567*** 0.038276*** 0.086633*** 
2000 2004 1 0.000798 0.000984 0.001204 0.001113 0.000235*** 0.006214*** 0.023045*** 0.030155*** 4e-6*** 0.001954*** 0.023851*** 0.052417*** 
2005 2009 4 0.010858*** 0.021301*** 0.020367*** 0.014103*** 0.004876*** 0.054811*** 0.103934*** 0.106862*** 0.000713*** 0.035824*** 0.123898*** 0.170582*** 
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Dimension  2 6 10 
Embedding Dimension AR-GARCH 
model 
0.5σ 1σ 1.5σ 2σ 0.5σ 1σ 1.5σ 2σ 0.5σ 1σ 1.5σ 2σ 
Panel A: DJIA 
Full Sample 11 -0.000277 -0.000544 -0.000304 5.68e-5 -1.00e-5 -0.000272 -0.000212 0.000796 -2.78e-7 -0.000107 -0.000415 0.000878 
1897 1899 4 -0.001384 -0.003467 -0.003776 -0.002495 5.17e-5 0.000334 -0.003856 -0.006199 -2.78e-6 0.000266 -0.001649 -0.005304 
1900 1904 7 -0.001404 -0.002356 -0.001626 -0.000317 7.61e-5 0.001041 0.003155 0.004924 7.05e-7 9.15e-5 0.001845 0.005867 
1905 1909 7 -0.000442 4.24e-5 0.001067 0.001342 -3.36e-5 0.001649 0.005049 0.004513 -8.23e-8 0.000119 0.001600 0.001146 
1910 1914 0 0.000493 0.000915 0.001026 0.000872 -6.80e-5 -0.000101 0.003005 0.007573 -6.08-6 -0.000313 0.000305 0.005866 
1915 1919 13 -0.000337 -0.000626 8.94e-5 0.000275 4.11e-5 -0.000141 0.000190 0.000230 -3.73e-6 -0.000504 -0.002702 -0.004920 
1920 1924 9 -0.000646 -0.001159 -0.001014 8.60e-6 -9.74e-5* -0.001519 -0.001628 0.001856 -4.97e-6*** -0.000410 -0.002039 0.000623 
1925 1929 15 -0.002285** -0.005650*** -0.004799** -0.002401 -0.000184** -0.004698*** -0.013259*** -0.011423* -3.17e-6 -0.000863* -0.007417* -0.009351 
1930 1934 0 2.91e-6 0.000289 -0.000471 -0.000813 5.51e-5 0.000505 0.000676 0.001130 1.13e-5*** 0.000248 0.001268 0.002811 
1935 1939 6 -0.001444* -0.002677 -0.001881 -0.000616 -0.000158** -0.001731 -0.005607 -0.006263 3.16e-7 -0.000454 -0.003837 -0.005844 
1940 1944 6 -0.000170 0.000385 0.000576 0.000449 8.80e-6 0.000245 0.001459 0.004737 -3.98e-6*** 0.000129 0.000381 0.005629 
1945 1949 15 -0.002149** -0.004144** -0.003154 -0.002016 -0.000108 -0.003981** -0.009188* -0.009745 -2.20e-6 -0.000672 -0.004080 -0.005683 
1950 1954 2 0.002126* 0.004301* 0.003729* 0.002535 2.22e-5 0.002793 0.003939 0.002623 -2.41e-6 0.001215* 0.003980 0.000214 
1955 1959 10 0.000187 -0.000831 -0.000484 0.000125 0.000156 0.002688 0.008707 0.011824* 3.74e-6 0.000788 0.008118** 0.018402** 
1960 1964 18 0.000412 0.000194 -0.001058 -0.001764 -5.49e-6 0.001088 0.001450 -0.004091 -6.11e-6 0.000751 0.002146 -0.009141 
1965 1969 8 0.002291* 0.001924 0.000941 0.000848 0.000290** 0.001025 3.88e-6 0.001211 2.15e-5*** 0.000867 0.002155 0.005691 
1970 1974 9 5.69e-5 5.33e-5 -0.000521 -0.001086 -0.000128 -0.001207 -0.001662 -0.001124 -6.45e-6*** -0.000352 -0.002133 -0.004407 
1975 1979 8 -0.001143 -0.001374 -0.002079 -0.002325 -6.48e-5 -0.002208 -0.004170 -0.002760 -1.99e-6 -0.000495 -0.002339 -0.001828 
1980 1984 0 -0.001690* -0.003692* -0.003064 -0.0011394 -6.38e-5 -0.001794 -0.007338 -0.007381 -5.11e-6*** -0.000373 -0.00595* -0.012165 
1985 1989 5 0.001333* 0.003297* 0.003233 0.002322 4.58e-5 0.000483 0.001962 0.003225 1.57e-7 0.000120 0.001171 0.003214 
1990 1994 7 -0.000738 -0.002449 -0.002373 -0.001183 -3.95e-5 -0.001630 -0.002610 -0.000281 -4.24e-6 -0.000611 -0.002921 -0.002674 
1995 1999 14 0.000600 -0.000810 -0.001281 -0.000714 5.94e-5 -0.000798 -0.001726 -0.002650 7.25e-6** -0.000247 -0.002907 -0.005793 
2000 2004 0 0.000560 0.001075 0.001829 0.001356 -9.09e-5 -0.000742 0.001593 0.004344 -9.24e-6*** -0.000313 0.001282 0.006942 
2005 2009 17 0.00134 -0.000739 -0.001082 -0.000781 -5.05e-5 -0.000652 -0.002805 -0.002226 5.90e-6*** -0.000369 -0.003384 -0.004652 
Panel B: FT30 
Full Sample 19 0.000692*** 0.001480*** 0.001104** 0.000531 2.77e-5 0.000654 0.001253 0.000620 9.32e-7 0.000174 0.000739 0.000127 
1935 1939 18 -0.001570 -0.003299 -0.002522 -0.001806 -7.41e-5 -0.000997 0.001953 0.004372 -1.79e-7 -0.000301 0.002219 0.008132 
1940 1944 20 -0.000710 -0.001147 -6.65e-5 0.000436 -0.000141 -0.002832 -0.004956 -0.003879 -9.06e-6*** -0.000487 -0.001923 -0.003220 
1945 1949 19 -0.000374 -0.000718 -0.001460 -0.001201 0.000118 0.001383 0.002555 0.001019 -5.42e-6*** 0.000152 0.000872 0.002334 
1950 1954 2 0.000351 0.000182 -0.001586 -0.001952 0.000228** 0.00228 -0.001188 -0.005898 -5.21e-6 0.000623 -0.001109 -0.007955 
1955 1959 15 0.001157 0.002747 0.002053 0.000964 8.97e-5 0.003393 0.004460 -0.001330 -5.22e-6 0.000979 0.002641 0.000448 
1960 1964 12 -1.83e-7 -0.000802 -0.002090 -0.002578 0.000151 0.001497 -0.000442 -0.005411 4.19e-6* 0.000519 1.49e-5 -0.004141 
1965 1969 5 -0.001437 -0.003044 -0.002513 -0.001536 -8.41e-5 0.000137 0.000767 0.000963 -6.75e-7 -4.31e-5 0.000333 -0.000439 
1970 1974 13 -0.002743** -0.004902** -0.004588* -0.002013 -0.000176 -0.004063 -0.007762 -0.001698 5.40e-6 -0.001038 -0.005142 -0.000769 
1975 1979 20 0.000494 0.001863 0.002729 0.002196 -7.07e-5 -0.000301 0.003158 0.006689 -1.38e*5*** -0.000491 0.000152 0.006692 
1980 1984 7 0.001511 0.004320** 0.003653* 0.001778 -6.97e-5 0.000482 0.000555 -0.002449 1.10e-5 0.000535 0.000124 -0.003216 
1985 1989 11 0.001018 0.002100 0.001326 -0.000238 -2.24e-5 0.000479 0.000772 -0.001171 5.34e-6 0.000889 0.002211 -7.05e-5 
1990 1994 10 0.001587 0.002920 0.001634 -0.001096 0.000186 0.006082** 0.013477** 0.008068 -5.65e-6 0.001888** 0.013252*** 0.019506** 
1995 1999 2 0.002267** 0.005960*** 0.005480*** 0.002775* -0.000148 -0.001774 -0.003043 -0.002011 -9.04e-6*** -0.000754 -0.004498 -0.005383 
2000 2004 10 -0.000137 0.000922 0.001157 -0.000458 -4.55e-5 0.001027 0.002836 -0.003427 -8.51e-6*** -0.000212 -0.001767 -0.008825 
2005 2009 5 -0.000586 0.000748 0.002058 0.001116 -0.000185 -0.000338 0.002613 0.004774 -7.38e-6** 0.000245 0.003403 0.008073 
Panel C:TOPIX 
Full Sample 18 0.001191*** 0.003190*** 0.003303*** 0.001851*** 0.000128*** 0.003201*** 0.009468*** 0.009568*** 3.11e-6*** 0.000793*** 0.006512*** 0.011353*** 
1951 1954 10 -0.000802 -0.001003 -0.000795 -0.000335 -0.000159 -0.002458 -0.004505 -0.004431 -6.81e-6* -0.000854 -0.006218 -0.013936 
1955 1959 2 -0.001353 -0.001996 -0.002429 -0.001811 -6.84e-5 -0.002877 -0.005276 -0.001709 -3.67e-6 -0.000941* -0.004736 -0.001326 
1960 1964 1 -1.55e-5 0.002190 0.003697 0.002269 8.10e-5 0.001743 0.005695 0.006667 -6.68e-6* 0.000241 0.001318 0.003283 
1965 1969 0 0.000127 0.001404 0.001956 0.001149 0.000172* 0.004399** 0.009050* 0.006447 1.52e-6 0.000874* 0.004649 0.005581 
1970 1974 3 -0.000658 -0.002716 -0.002869 -0.001529 -5.61e-5 -0.002155 -0.006409 -0.008156 -2.56e-7 -0.000490 -0.002997 -0.008060 
1975 1979 10 0.002910*** 0.007167*** 0.006734*** 0.004029** 0.000178** 0.004952*** 0.014437*** 0.015684** -4.42e-6** 0.000841* 0.007222* 0.013634* 
1980 1984 1 0.001369 0.002169 0.001692 0.000170 0.000229*** 0.002289 0.002281 -0.003501 -1.00e-6 0.000113 -0.000561 -0.008512 
1985 1989 8 -0.001305 -0.004502** -0.005450*** -0.003869*** 0.000208** 0.002865 0.007515 0.007482 7.93e-6*** 0.001202** 0.008596* 0.013596 
1990 1994 2 0.003193*** 0.005597** 0.005967*** 0.005629*** 6.80e-7 0.000283 0.004238 0.009317 -1.10e-5** -0.000342 -0.000579 0.002362 
1995 1999 9 8.77e-5 0.001939 0.003096 0.001901 0.000150 0.003925 0.016609*** 0.0199277*** -2.70e-6 0.001013 0.015003*** 0.031567*** 
2000 2004 1 0.002774** 0.008645*** 0.012179*** 0.010326*** 0.000287** 0.005546*** 0.020467*** 0.026649*** 3.86e-6 0.001557** 0.014658*** 0.030353*** 
2005 2009 4 0.002180* 0.008045*** 0.009845*** 0.005551*** 1.89e-5 0.003438* 0.015055*** 0.014780** 6.47e-7 0.001034* 0.010161*** 0.016735** 
 
Table 3.11. Test results for the BDS test on the AR-GARCH filtered stock returns.  The first row reports the dimension while the second row documents the embedding 
dimension by values of the standard deviation of the sample.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significantly. 
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Table 3.11 reports the BDS statistics for the AR-GARCH filtered returns over the full sample 
period and the subsample periods.  It is obvious that the pre-filtering procedure has reduced 
the magnitude of the BDS statistics substantially.  However, there are still periods in which 
the null of i.i.d. is rejected indicating that there remains nonlinear dependence in the returns 
even when heteroskedasticity is removed.  Nevertheless, the majority of subsamples cannot 
reject the null of i.i.d. indicating that conditional heteroskedasticity is the main source of 
nonlinear dependence in the three series.  As Hong and Lee (2005) state, the EMH has only 
implications on the conditional mean, indicating that the nonlinear predictability detected 
previously in Table 3.10 that disappears after the AR-GARCH filtering in Table 3.11 does 
not imply violation of the EMH.  Thus Table 3.11 shows that each series has done through 
periods of dependence and independence indicating evidence of the AMH. 
 
 
3.7. Conclusion  
 
Market efficiency was well accepted in the finance literature up to the mid-1970s as the 
majority of empirical studies supported the proposition.  However since then, a number of 
studies have found significant inefficiencies in many different stock markets.  This chapter 
has examined tests for independence of stock returns since the independence of returns is a 
prerequisite for an efficient market. The contribution to the literature of this chapter is the 
examination of how the independence of stock returns have behaved over time through a 
battery of linear and nonlinear tests, as well as classifying the behaviour of each into the 
classification suggested in chapter two. Table 3.12 provides a summary of the results 
reported, where the key conclusion are; 
 
(i) The linear autocorrelation, runs and variance ratio tests suggest that the DJIA is an 
adaptive market, while the FT30 is an adaptive market according to the 
autocorrelation and variance ratio tests. Further, the autocorrelation and runs test both 
suggest the TOPIX is an adaptive market, indicating that the AMH is a more 
appropriate model in describing how stock returns have behaved over time. 
(ii) The three unit root tests suggest that all three markets are efficient over time due to 
the constant stationarity found in each sub-sample. 
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(iii) Once the returns were filtered through an AR model to remove all linear correlations, 
all three markets provide evidence of significant dependence in stock returns through 
the nonlinear McLeod-Li, Engle LM and BDS tests. 
(iv) Since the AR-filter can ignore heteroskedasticity in stock returns, an AR-GARCH 
filter is also used and the filtered returns are subjected to the same nonlinear tests. The 
results show that each market has gone through periods of independence and 
dependence indicating the adaptive nature of returns. 
 
The AMH is found to best describe the behaviour of stock returns over time through the 
linear tests since the majority of results suggest an adaptive nature of behaviour.  Some could 
argue that this is expected since five-yearly subsamples were taken and the chance of each of 
the subsamples producing thethe same results is very small, making the AMH the likely 
outcome.  However, the EMH states that there should be no dependence in stock returns and 
if there are, they should disappear quickly as investors take advantage of them.  This is 
clearly not found in any of the markets under any of the linear tests as each market goes 
through periods of dependence and independence.  The fact that the three unit roots tests 
suggest that returns are stationary in each subsample is not surprising since the majority of all 
stock market returns are found to be stationary.  The fact that this suggests that the markets 
are efficient should not be taken with much credibility and will not be relied on for the 
analysis. 
 
To examine the nonlinear dependence in stock returns, an AR-filter was applied to the stock 
returns to eliminate all linear correlation in returns.  The residuals of this AR model are then 
subjected to the Mc-Leod Li, Engle LM and BDS test to examine the nonlinear dependence 
of the returns.  The results for each subsample indicate strong dependence for all three tests 
indicating strong evidence of market inefficiency. However as Lim and Hooy (2012) note, 
the AR filter may have eliminated to linear dependence but there may still be 
heteroskedasticity in the returns.  Thus an AR-GARCH model is chosen to eliminate the 
heteroskedasticity in returns and finds that these filtered returns each go through periods of 
dependence and independence according to the BDS test, indicating the adaptive nature of the 
market.  In summary, the evidence in this chapter seems to be very supportive of the AMH 
but tests for predictability in stock returns need to be assessed before coming to a complete 
conclusion about each market’s returns behaviour over time. 
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Table 3.12: Summary and classification of test results. I stands for the independence of returns while D stands for the 
dependence of returns. 
   AR  AR-GARCH  
Sample Period Autocorrelation Runs Variance Ratio McLeod Li LM Engle BDS Test BDS Test 
Panel A: DJIA 
Full Sample D D D D D D I 
1897 1899 I I I D D D I 
1900 1904 I D I D D D I 
1905 1909 I I I D D D I 
1910 1914 I I I D D D I 
1915 1919 I I I D D D I 
1920 1924 D D I D D D I 
1925 1929 D D I D D D D 
1930 1934 I I I D D D I 
1935 1939 I I I D D D I 
1940 1944 D D D D D D I 
1945 1949 D D I D D D D 
1950 1954 D D I D D D I 
1955 1959 D D D D D D D 
1960 1964 D D I D D D I 
1965 1969 D D I D D D D 
1970 1974 D D I D D D I 
1975 1979 D I I D D D I 
1980 1984 I I I D D D I 
1985 1989 I I I D D D I 
1990 1994 I I I D D D I 
1995 1999 I I I D D D I 
2000 2004 I D I D D D I 
2005 2009 D D I D D D I 
Classification AMH AMH AMH Inefficient Inefficient Inefficient AMH 
Panel B: FT30 
Full Sample D D D D D D D 
1935 1939 D D D D D D I 
1940 1944 D D D D D D I 
1945 1949 D D D D D D I 
1950 1954 D D D D D D I 
1955 1959 D D D D D D I 
1960 1964 D D I D D D I 
1965 1969 I D I D D D I 
1970 1974 I D I D D D D 
1975 1979 D D I D D D I 
1980 1984 I I I D D D I 
1985 1989 D I I D D D I 
1990 1994 D I D D D D D 
1995 1999 D I I D D D D 
2000 2004 I I I D D D I 
2005 2009 I I I D D D I 
Classification AMH Switch to Efficiency AMH Inefficient Inefficient Inefficient AMH 
Panel C: TOPIX 
Full Sample D D D D D D D 
1950 1954 D D D D D D I 
1955 1959 D D I D D D I 
1960 1964 D D D D D D I 
1965 1969 I I I D D D I 
1970 1974 D D D D D D I 
1975 1979 D D D D D D D 
1980 1984 D D D D D D I 
1985 1989 D D I D D D D 
1990 1994 D D I D D D D 
1995 1999 I I I D D D D 
2000 2004 D D I D D D D 
2005 2009 I I I D D D D 
Classification AMH AMH AMH Inefficient Inefficient Inefficient AMH 
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Chapter 4 – The Behaviour of Calendar Effects 
 
4.1. Introduction  
 
Market efficiency states that stock market returns must be independent and unpredictable. 
However, a number of market anomalies have been found to have significant predictive 
ability.  One strand of market anomalies finds that stock returns are systematically higher or 
lower depending on the day of the week, the day of the month, or month of the year. These 
anomalies are called calendar anomalies and will be the focus of this chapter. 
 
The three calendar anomalies examined in this chapter are the day-of-the-week effect, month-
of-the-year effect and the turn-of-the-month effect. The day-of-the-week effect is where 
average returns are significantly higher on some days of the week than others.  This chapter 
focuses on the most popular and accepted day-of-of-the-week anomaly, the Monday effect.  
The Monday effect states that returns on Mondays are significantly less than other days of the 
week. The Monday effect can be traced back to Kelly (1930) in his book on investing, who 
found Monday to be the worse day to buy stocks from a three-year statistical study.  The first 
academic paper to document the effect was Cross (1973), who found that from 1953 to 1970, 
the S&P500 advanced only 39.5% of the time on Mondays while the mean was -0.18%.  The 
month-of-the-year anomaly is also examined in this chapter. This anomaly states that stock 
returns are higher in the month of January, especially during the first half of the month, than 
other trading months. This anomaly was first documented by Rozeff and Kinney (1976) for 
the NYSE where they studied the period 1904 to 1974 and found the average return in 
January to be 3.48% compared to only 0.42% in other months. The third and final calendar 
anomaly examined in this chapter is the relatively newly found turn-of-the-month effect.  
This anomaly states that stock returns are significantly higher during the last trading day and 
the first three trading days of a month compared to the rest of the month. It was first 
documented by Ariel (1987) in the NYSE from 1963 to 1981 where it was found that returns 
during the turn-of-the-month period was 0.47%, whereas the average returns during any other 
four day period was of 0.061%.   
 
Nevertheless, calendar anomalies have failed to yield consistent returns over and above a 
simple buy-and-hold strategy.  Mills and Coutts (1995), Draper and Paudyal (1997) and 
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Brooks and Persand (2001) argue that these anomalies are not profitable after taking account 
of transaction and illiquidity costs.  It has also been argued that even if no calendar anomalies 
exist, an extensive search for anomalies in any data set will provide some anomaly in the data 
(Burton 2003). Thus anomalies may be the result of data mining.  All of the anomalies 
studied in this chapter have however, been documented in many markets and over long time 
periods and therefore are unlikely to be due to data mining.  Also, transaction costs can be 
small for large investment firms who invest millions of dollars so the effect of them may be 
small
21
. Hence the calendar effects studied in this chapter are of great interest to academics 
and practitioners alike.  
 
This chapter is organised in the following manner. Section 4.2 describes the literature while 
Section 4.3 outlines the methodology.  Section 4.4 presents the data while section 4.5 reports 
the empirical results.  Section 4.6 analyses and concludes the chapter. 
 
4.2. Literature Review 
 
4.2.1. Monday effect 
 
An extensive literature documents that weekday returns vary with the day of the week (day-
of-the-week-effect).  A persistent finding within the literature is the tendency for asset returns 
to be negative on Mondays which was first documented by market practitioners and then 
academics.  Maberly (1995) shows that financial practitioners were aware of the Monday 
effect as early as the late 1920s, with the first documented finding by Kelly (1930) who found 
Monday to be the worse day to buy stocks from a three-year statistical study.  Also Merrill 
(1966) examined the period 1952 to 1965 for the DJIA and found that prices only increased 
on 43% of Mondays, compared to 50% for non-Mondays. The first academic to document the 
Monday effect was Cross (1973), who studied the S&P 500 from 1953 to 1970. Over this 
period, the index advanced on 62% of the Fridays and had a mean on Friday of 0.12%.  On 
Mondays however, the index advanced only 39.5% of the time, and the mean was -0.18%.  
Cross also found that the performance on Monday was dependent on the pervious Friday’s 
performance.  French (1980) studied the S&P 500 from 1953 to 1977 and found day-of-the-
week evidence in US stocks, including negative and statistically significant Monday returns.  
                                                 
21
 In addition although returns net of trading costs may be small, anomalies are often used for timing trades to 
maximise returns. 
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Gibbons and Hess (1981) also documented similar results when studying the S&P 500 and 
CRSP value- and equally-weighted indexes from NYSE and AMEX securities from 1962-
1978, as did Keim (1987) for US indexes from 1963 to 1985.  Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) 
extend the sample size by conducting a ninety-year study on weekday returns for the DIJA.  
They report negative Monday returns for the entire sample (1897-1986) and for each of their 
selected subsamples, with average Monday returns being significantly less than zero for all 
but two of the subsample periods.  Furthermore, Schwert (1990) documented the weekend 
effect in the US from 1802 to 1987 and Siegel (1998) furthered these findings by examined 
the Monday effect over the period 1885 to 1997.  He concludes that if Monday returns had 
been equal to the average of non-Mondays over this entire sample period, the DJIA would be 
almost twice its level it was at the end of 1997.   
 
The evidence of the weekday effect has also been found in the UK and Japan.  Theobald and 
Price (1984) document a negative return on Monday from 1975 to 1981 for the FT30 and 
FTSE All-Share, while Jaffe and Westerfield (1985) find negative Monday returns for the 
FT30 from 1950 to 1983.  Mills and Coutts (1995) find significant negative returns on 
Mondays for the FTSE250 and 350 indices and negative but not significant returns for the 
FTSE100.  Dubois and Louvet (1996) find low Monday returns in the FTSE All-Share and 
Arsad and Coutts (1997) document a negative Monday effect in the FT30 from 1935 to 1994.  
Tong (2000) also find pervasive weekday effects in the US, UK and Japan, with the US and 
UK exhibiting a significant Monday effect at 5% significance. He also finds that in the UK 
and Japan’s bad Fridays are responsible for 70% of the Monday effect.  Doyle and Chen 
(2009) show that the FTSE100 and NSADAQ Monday returns are negative and do not 
diminish over time during the period 1993 to 2007.  They also indicate that the weekday 
effect is not conditional on the average returns in the previous week. 
 
The Monday effect was one of the first calendar anomalies to be discovered and the previous 
evidence suggests that it has been quite strong.  However a number of studies have found that 
it has diminished and in some cases even reversed over time.  Connolly (1989) finds that 
Monday returns were significantly different from non-Monday returns before 1974, but were 
not significantly different after 1974, although they remained negative.  These results were 
confirmed by Chang et al (1993). Kamara (1997) reports that the Monday effect has 
diminished significantly since the introduction of the S&P500 futures contract in 1982.  
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Marquering et al (2006) studied the DJIA from 1960-2003 and found that the Monday effect 
has declined in recent years. 
 
While some studies find the weekend effect diminishing, a number have seen a complete 
reversal in returns. Brusa and Pu (2000) discover that Monday returns for large US stocks 
were positive and the largest of any day of the week during the 1990s.  Mehdian and Perry 
(2001) confirm this ‘reversal’ in returns for large US stocks from November 1987 to August 
1998, although they did find a persistent negative Monday return for small stocks.  Brusa and 
Liu (2004) document that this reversal in returns is concentrated on positive returns in the 
first and third weeks of each month, while Brusa et al (2005) find that the positive weekend 
returns are correlated with the previous Friday’s return, suggesting that the positive Monday 
returns are likely to be observed after a positive Friday return.  Boudreaux et al (2010) study 
the Monday effect in the DJIA, S&P500 and the NASDAQ during the sample 1976-2002.  
By breaking their samples in bear and non-bear market periods, they find evidence of a 
weekend effect with weekend returns being greater than non-weekend returns only in non-
bear markets.  They attribute this finding to a wealth effect where as stock prices rise, 
investors gain confidence and are more likely to act upon broker recommendations during the 
week. 
 
4.2.2. January Effect 
 
The January effect is one of the most accepted and tested seasonal anomalies in finance.  This 
anomaly states that returns in January appear to be higher than in other months of the year.  It 
was first documented by Rozeff and Kinney (1976) and has gained much attention from 
academics and practitioners. Rozeff and Kinney (1976) study the NYSE for the period 1904 
to 1974 and find that the average return for the month of January was 3.48% compared to 
only 0.42% for the other months.  Keim (1983) also employ the NYSE from 1963 to 1979 
and found that nearly 50% of the average magnitude of the risk-adjusted premium of small 
firms relative to large firms is due to January abnormal returns.  He also found that 50% of 
the January premium is due to abnormal returns during the first week of trading in the year. 
Roll (1983) and Reinganum (1983) support these findings for small firms, and particularly for 
small firms with low share prices (Branch and Chang 1990).  However, if this given this 
result, one reasonable suggestion would be that the January effect should be weaker for larger 
firms.  Kohers and Kohli (1991) however, provide evidence that the January effect is not 
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related to the small firm effect.  Nevertheless, high returns are not found in an index that is 
composed of only large firms, like the DJIA.  Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) find no evidence 
of the January effect in the DJIA for the whole of January, and only find mild support for 
rates of return being larger in the first half of the month than in the last half. 
 
Gultekin and Gultekin (1983) use data from some 17 countries including the UK and Japan 
for the sample period 1959 to 1970 using the Capital International Perspective (CIP). This is 
an index that provides monthly stock market returns based on 1,110 share prices and counts 
for approximately 60% of the total value of all shares traded in the countries examined. They 
find that returns in January and April are significantly high for the UK but just in January in 
Japan.  The January effect is evident for all countries and they attribute the abnormal returns 
to be due to the turn of the tax year.  Kato and Shallheim (1985) examined excess returns in 
January for the Tokyo Stock Exchange.  They find excess returns in January and a strong 
relationship between return and size, with the smallest firms returning 8% and the largest 7%.  
Also Mills and Coutts (1995) study the January effect for the FTSE100, Mid 250 and 350 
Indices from January 1986 to October 1992.  They find evidence supporting the January 
effect, with daily returns being positive and significant for January and February in the 
FTSE100 and for January in the Mid250. 
 
Although there has been strong empirical evidence in favour of the January effect, recent 
research has argued that the magnitude of the anomaly has declined.  Riepe (1998) states that 
during the 1980s and 1990s there was an increase in general knowledge about the January 
effect and the emergence of futures contracts.  This has resulted in a low-cost alternative for 
investors to profit from the effect.  Consistent with this, Mehdian and Perry (2002) suggest 
that the January effect has disappeared in the US.  They study the DJIA, NYSE and S&P500 
and find that from 1964 to 1987 January returns are positive and significant for all three stock 
markets.  However after 1987, January returns are positive but not significant, thus indicating 
that the anomaly has disappeared.  Also, Gu (2003) uses a power ratio of the mean returns in 
January compared to the mean return of the year.  The results show that both large and small 
firm stock indices have declined since 1988 and it has disappeared for the Russell indices.  
The declining trend is also evident in the Dow 30 since 1930.  However, these two studies 
use monthly returns while using daily returns may give a more accurate picture of the 
evolution of stock prices.  Marquering et al (2006) also find that since the January effect was 
discovered in 1976, it has diminished and seems to have disappeared at the start of the 21
st
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century. Moller and Zilca (2008) examine daily data of the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ 
from 1927 to 2004 and conclude that the magnitude of the January effect has not declined.  
However, they do find higher abnormal returns in the first part of January and lower 
abnormal returns in the second part of January in the subsample 1995 to 2004. These returns 
offset each other, thus the overall magnitude of the January effect appears similar to its 
magnitude in the previous 1965-1994 period. 
 
4.2.3. Turn-of-the-month Effect 
 
The turn-of-the-month effect on stock returns was first found by Ariel (1987) in the US stock 
market.  Ariel used equally-weighted and value-weighted daily stocks from the NYSE during 
the period 1963 to 1981.  The study finds that mean daily stock returns are positive at the 
beginning of the month and continuing through the first half of the month.  However, returns 
after this point are predominantly negative.  Ariel defines a trading month as the last day of 
the previous month to the last trading day of the following trading month.  The first half of 
the month consist of nine trading days, and the rest of the month are considered the second 
half of the month.  He reports that the mean daily return on the first half of the trading month 
is significantly higher than the mean daily return from the last half for both indices.  This 
intra-month effect is also present in all four five-year subperiods that Ariel investigates.  This 
phenomenon has been called the turn-of-the-month effect.  Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) 
investigate the DJIA from 1897 to 1986 and discovered that the rate of return is especially 
high for the last trading day of the month and the first three trading days of the next month.  
More specifically, they find that returns during the turn-of-the-month are 0.475% compared 
to 0.061% for non-turn-of-the-month days.  An interesting facet is that the DJIA increased by 
56% during this sample period, an average increase of 0.349% per month, indicating that 
without the turn-of-the-month returns, the DJIA would have actually fallen during this period.  
McConnell and Xu (2008) extend Lakonishok and Smidt’s (1988) study to include data up to 
2005 for the DJIA and find that the turn-of-the-month effect is still evident.  Even when they 
extend their sample from 1897 to 2005, they find significance evidence of the effect, with all 
of the positive return to equities occurring during the turn-of-the-month interval.  Thus on 
average, during the other trading days of the month, investors received no reward for the risk 
they took.  They find that it is not due to the concentration of buying shares at the turn-of-the-
month, or just confined to the US.  Thus their results suggest no explanation for this 
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profitable calendar effect. They also report that the turn-of-the-month effect is evident in 31 
of the 35 countries examined. 
 
The turn-of-the-month anomaly has also been examined in the UK and Japanese markes with 
Ziemba (1991) finding the turn-of-the-month effect using days -5 to +2 for each month using 
data for the NSA and TOPIX indices in Japan for the period 1949-1988.  These results were 
supported by Cadsby and Ratner (1992) who used days -1 to +3, and find excess significant 
returns in the Financial Times 500 Share Index using data from 1983 to 1988.  However, they 
find no evidence of the effect in Japan using data from 1979-1988 in the Nikkei.  Hensel et al 
(1994) test the S&P500 and value-line small-cap indices for the period May 1982 to April 
1992 and find that two-thirds of a month’s gains occur on trading days -1 to +4 and rest of the 
gains occur during trading days +5 to +9, suggesting that returns in the second half of the 
month were, at best, noise.  Agrawal and Tandon (1994) use turn-of-the-month days -1 to +3 
to test the effect in 18 countries from 1970 to 1987.  They find evidence of the effect in 14 of 
these countries, including the USA (DJIA), the UK (FT30) and Japan (Nikkei).  Hensel and 
Ziemba (1996) examined investing in the S&P 500 Index on turn-of-the-month days and in t-
bills over the other days.  They report that the turn-of-the-month strategy outperformed a 
baseline strategy by 0.63% per year over the period 1928-1993.  Kunkel et al (2003) tested 
the turn-of-the-month effect in 19 countries and found the effect present in 15 of them, 
including the US (S&P500), the UK (FTSE100) and Japan (Nikkei225) for the period 1988 to 
2000.  He also documents that in the 15 countries where the effect is present, it accounts for 
87% of the monthly returns.   
 
Even though the turn-of-the-month effect is a relatively new anomaly, it has also been 
examined to determine if it is as strong as it once was.  Marquering et al (2006) find that the 
turn-of-the-month effect is slightly weaker than pre-1987 data for the DJIA, with the linear 
trendline downward sloping.  However, the results do not suggest the anomaly has 
disappeared, and suggest a possible reason for the weakening of the anomaly being due to 
transaction costs being too high to profit from this anomaly, so investors cannot exploit this 
pattern.  Dzhabarov and Ziemba (2010) used daily returns for the Russell 2000 and S&P500 
futures market and through subperiod analysis find that the turn-of-the-month effect still 
exists, but with a bit of anticipation. Also, Hudson and Atanasova (2009) find evidence of the 
turn-of-the-month effect for the FT30 using -1 to +3 days for the period July 1935 to March 
2009.  They also find that the effect has not declined since the publication of Lakonishok and 
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Smidt (1988) but has actually increased in strength, with excess mean returns increasing by 
0.07% between the subsamples 1935-1969 and 1987-2009.  Thus the literature suggests that 
the turn-of-the-month effect is still evident in stock returns. 
 
4.3. Methodology 
 
The three calendar anomalies examined in this chapter are the Monday effect, January effect 
and the turn-of-the-month effect.  The Monday effect states that returns on Monday should be 
significantly less than other days of the week.  The January effect reports that returns in 
January are significantly higher than other months of the year.  Since most studies find that 
this anomaly is only present in the first half of January, only the first 15 trading days in 
January are studied.  The turn-of-the-month effect states that returns on the last day of each 
month and the first three days of the next month are significantly higher than any other four 
day period.  These are the days of the anomaly chosen to examine. 
 
To examine the behaviour of these calendar anomalies, the excess returns of the anomalies is 
calculated before and after the first academic publication date of a paper relating to that 
anomaly.  This is to determine whether the publication of the seminal paper caused a change 
in the return behaviour of that anomaly. The Monday effect was first published in the 
academic literature by Cross (1973), the January effect was first observed by Rozeff and 
Kinney (1976) and the turn-of-the-month was first examined by Ariel (1987).  Thus these 
dates determine the subsamples chosen for each anomaly.  Excess returns are calculated by; 
 
             (4.1) 
 
Where Rt is the return on a stock index, Dt is the calendar dummy and εt is the error term.  D1t  
= 1 if day t is Monday and zero otherwise; D2t = 1 if day t is a Tuesday and zero otherwise, 
and so forth.  This approach enables the analysis of returns of the given anomaly compared to 
the returns on non-anomaly days.  For example if the dummy variable for Monday is 
included, α captures the mean of daily return of non-Mondays, and β is the excess return on 
Mondays, relative to non-Mondays.  The t-test of β tells us if the excess returns on Monday 
are significant.  This regression is similar to performing a two-group comparison test between 
the mean daily return of a specific day and the mean daily return of all other days.   
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Nevertheless the year of the first academic publication of each anomaly may not be the 
turning point in the return behaviour of the anomalies.  The success of the anomaly may be 
declining well before or after the anomaly was first published in the academic field.  To 
investigate this two structural break tests are conducted on the data.  A structural break occurs 
when the estimated parameters in the model are unstable over time, i.e. there is a significant 
difference between the residual variance from one part of the data to another. To determine 
the breakpoint in our sample we perform two tests for structural breaks, the Chow Test for a 
known structural breaks and the Quandt-Andrews Test for an unknown breakpoint. 
 
Both of these tests require time-series data and we calculate the yearly excess mean returns to 
create a proxy for yearly data. Daily and monthly excess returns cannot be calculated for all 
three anomalies since the January effect only creates excess returns in the month of January.  
Thus yearly excess returns are calculated for each anomaly in market for consistency. For the 
January effect in year t, the excess mean returns are calculated by;  
 
                            {                       } (4.2) 
 
Where µJanuaryt is the mean return in January in the year t and µnon-Januaryt is the mean return in 
non-January days in the year t. 
 
The Chow (1960) test investigates a known structural break.  In this test the date of the break 
must be chosen prior to conducting the test.  We specify the exact breakpoint by choosing the 
year that the first academic article was published identifying that anomaly to see if this was 
the defining point where the behaviour of the anomaly changed.  The test performs three 
regressions where the first two regressions separate the sample period, while the last covers 
the entire period. Thus; 
 
 
( )                                  
( )                                     
( )                           
(4.3) 
 
In (a) and (b) we assume that the intercept and the slope of the coefficients are different.  In 
regression (c) we assume that both the intercept and slope coefficient remain the same over 
92 
 
the entire period.  That is α1 = ω1 = γ1 and α2 = ω2 = γ2.  If there is no structural change in the 
time series, the aggregated residual sum of squares (RSSR) from regression (a) and (b) should 
equal the residual sum of squares (RSSUR) obtained from regression (c) (Gujarati 2009).  
Thus Chow (1960) defines this relationship formally as; 
 
   
(          )
 
(     )
(       )
 (4.4) 
 
Since the null hypothesis is parameter stability, an F-statistic greater than its critical value 
from the F-table will reject the null hypothesis and indicate a break in the data.  The main 
limitation of the Chow test is that the breakdate must be known a priori. Although the 
breakdates chosen in this study are not chosen arbitrarily and chosen with reasonable logic, 
this test can be misleading as the breakdate is exogenous and the test is likely to falsely 
indicate a break when none actually exists. This can lead to different researchers reaching 
distinctly difference conclusions from the same data.  
 
Therefore to avoid the bias of the Chow (1960) test, we also utilise a break test that treats the 
breakdate as unknown.  The Quandt-Andrews break test calculates a single Chow breakpoint 
test at every observation between two dates.  From each individual Chow test two statistics 
are retained, the Likelihood Ratio F-statistic and the Wald F-statistic.  The Likelihood Ratio 
F-statistic is based on the comparison of the restricted and unrestricted sum of squared 
residuals.  The Wald F-statistics are computed from a standard Wald test of the restriction 
that the coefficients on the equation parameters are the same in all subsamples.  However, 
these statistics do not follow a standard distribution and when Quandt proposed its use in 
1960, all the critical values were unknown.  Andrews (1993) proposed critical values for the 
Quandt test and thus it is now referred to as the Quandt-Andrews test.  The test is not 
conducted on the full sample as the test statistic becomes degenerate at both ends of the 
sample.  Andrews (1993) suggests a 15% trimming to obtain a reliable statistical inference.  
However, the ideal trimming percentage may vary with sample size and nature of the data. 
Thus we use trimming percentages of 5% and 15% to avoid any bias.  Therefore to be more 
precise, the null hypothesis indicates no breakpoints within the trimmed observations.   
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Nevertheless, the finding of the breakpoints in the previous analysis give little indication of 
the behaviour of the anomalies over time.  Thus similarly to the previous chapter, five-yearly 
subsamples of excess returns are calculated in the same way as equation 4.1 but over five-
year periods and plotted over time.  Five-yearly subsamples are chosen to provide enough 
observations to gain reliable results and enough data points to understand how the anomalies 
have behaved over time. A polynomial trendline is included to smooth the picture of how the 
anomalies have behaved over time.  Again, the suggested classification of return behaviour is 
used to categorize the anomalies through the behaviour of the polynomial trendline as in the 
previous chapter. 
 
An important question to ask when dealing with any stock market anomaly is whether 
investors can use these calendar anomalies to gain returns greater than the market. In this 
section, the degree to which investors can earn profits that beat the buy-and-hold strategy 
using two simple trading strategies are analysed.  This section considers two simple trading 
strategies, which are also used for the technical trading rules in Chapter 5. 
 
This study prefers simple trading strategies to complicated strategies since calendar 
anomalies are straightforward to understand and thus it should be relatively simple to make 
profits from them.  Many studies use a trading strategy that invests in the risk-free asset if 
they are not in the market.  Even though this may give an equivalent risk to the buy-and-hold 
strategy since the investor is always in some market, investing in the risk-free rate may be 
costly and time consuming since investors may only be out of the market for one or two days.  
Since this thesis uses data from the US since 1897, from the UK since 1935 and from Japan 
since 1951, risk-free rate data was not available for the full sample and so is ignored in these 
trading strategies.  Since the investor does not invest in risk-free assets when they are out of 
the market in either of the trading strategies examined, the overall returns for the trading 
strategy will be less than if the investor had invested in the risk-free asset, making it more 
difficult for these rules to gain returns greater than the buy-and-hold strategy than if 
investment in the risk-free asset was conducted for every sell signal, thus the figures 
generated are conservative.  Nevertheless, a “double to out” trading strategy, which has 
broadly the same risk as the buy-and-hold strategy is studied, as well as a simple trading 
strategy which does not have comparable risk.  
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The first trading strategy adopted is similar to Fifield et al (2005; 2008) and is as follows.  
The investor is initially assumed to hold a buy position and upon the first buy signal, the 
trader buys and holds until a sell signal is generated.  Upon this sell signal, the trader sells 
and goes short until the next buy signal.  Upon the last sell signal, it is assumed that the 
investor liquidates his position.  At the end of the sample period, the profit from the different 
trading rules are calculated and compared with the profit from the naïve buy-and-hold 
strategy.  A buy signal is generated for the Monday effect every day of the week except 
Monday, when a sell signal is generated.  A buy signal is generated on the first 15 days of 
January for the January effect and on the last day and first three days of the month for the 
turn-of-the-month effect.  The profits from this strategies are calculated net of transaction 
costs (transaction costs taken from Ratner and Leal 1999 for the US and Japan, and Hudson 
et al 1996 for the UK
22
).  The trading strategy evaluated here differs from those in the 
majority of the previous papers.  For example, this rule assumes that the investor has a 
limited amount of wealth that is invested in full at each buy (sell) transaction.  That is, this 
rule assumes that the investor can only sell after a buy transaction (and buy only after a sell 
transaction) whereas other studies assume that the investor has an unlimited amount of wealth 
and can implement multiple buys or sells after each price change.  The strategy examined 
here can therefore be characterised as prudent, and as satisfying the risk-averse nature of 
many investors (Fifield et al 2005). 
 
The second trading strategy examined follows the “double or out” rule suggested by 
Bessembinder and Chan (1998).  An investor who conducts the previous simple trading 
strategy faces a lot less risk than an investor who conducted the buy-and-hold strategy.  This 
is because they are out of the market for a considerable period of time and avoid the risk 
associated with being in the market all of the time.  This is shown in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 where 
the trading strategies standard deviation is substantially less than the buy-and-hold strategy.  
Acknowledging this fact, a slightly modified version of the “double or out” trading strategy 
suggested by Bessembinder and Chan (1998) is applied to the various moving average rules 
previously examined. If a neutral signal
23
 is generated there is an investment in the index.  If 
a buy day is indicated the investment in the index is doubled whereas, if a sell day is 
                                                 
22
 Although these transaction costs are accurate for the period they were calculated from, they do not correspond 
to the costs faced in the total sample examined in this thesis.  Nevertheless with no data available for the full 
sample, these transaction costs are employed. 
23
 Neutral signals are never generated in this trading strategy since the calendar anomalies only generate buy or 
sell signals.  
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indicated, the funds are invested in cash thus giving broadly similar risk to a buy-and-hold 
strategy (the exact standard deviations are reported in Tables 4.7 and 4.8).  Bessembinder and 
Chan (1998) invest in the daily risk-free rate when a sell signal is generated but since no risk-
free rates are available for long periods of the data examined, the investor invests in cash with 
no return when a sell signal is generated.  The profits from this strategy are also calculated 
net of transaction costs (transaction costs taken from Ratner and Leal 1999 for the US and 
Japan, and Hudson et al 1996 for the UK).  These two trading strategies are conducted to 
determine if simple trading on the calendar anomalies can beat the buy-and-gold strategy for 
each index. 
 
Finally this chapter studies the influence of the turn-of-the-month effect.  The turn-of-the-
month effect has produced some extraordinary results in the recent literature with McConnell 
and Xu (2008) reporting that the turn-of-the-month accounts for all of the positive return in 
the DJIA, while Hudson and Atanasova (2009) confirm this result for the FT30.  To 
determine whether the turn-of-the-month anomaly is driving the excess returns in the January 
effect, regression (4.1) is repeated but with the turn-of-the-month days excluded. Thus if the 
turn-of-the-month effect is driving the January effect, the excess returns in January should 
decrease or even disappear after the turn-of-the-month days are excluded. 
 
4.4. Data 
 
For all indexes, daily returns are calculated as: 
    [(    )  (      )]      (4.5) 
 
Where rt is the daily return of the stock market index and Pt is the stock index at date t. 
Summary statistics are given in Table 4.1 for the full sample of each index, as well as after 
the seminal paper was published for each calendar anomaly.   
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The mean and standard deviations of the three indices for the various sample periods were 
calculated for the anomaly days and the non-anomaly days and are reported in Table 4.1.  The 
t-test for the difference in the means is also reported in Table 4.1, the calculations assume that 
the returns in the two samples are independent and that the return generating process has been 
constant over the period of the sample. 
 
Examining the full sample results first, the Monday mean for the DJIA and the TOPIX are 
negative compared to a positive mean for non-Mondays. The corresponding t-statistic shows 
that the difference is highly significant for the DJIA, but only at 10% for the TOPIX. The 
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Calendar Anomalies.  ***, **, *` indicate significance at 
1%, 5% and 10%. 
 Full Sample Post Seminal Paper 
DJIA FT30 TOPIX DJIA FT30 TOPIX 
All Days 
Mean 0.01885 0.01537 0.02834 - - - 
Standard Deviation 1.09616 1.05851 1.02429 - - - 
No. of Days 31050 19154 15390 - - - 
Fraction of positive return days 0.52200 0.4988 0.50052 - - - 
Monday Days 
Monday Mean -0.09925 0.06139 -0.00007 0.00269 0.09346 -0.03262 
Standard Deviation 1.22873 1.00086 1.17486 1.32995 1.20862 1.22323 
No. of Mondays Days 5523 3731 3078 1789 1904 1931 
Fraction of positive Monday return days 0.47384 0.55030 0.49578 0.51537 0.52521 0.47126 
Non-Monday Mean 0.04440 0.00614 0.03544 0.03004 -0.00572 0.01871 
Non-Monday Standard Deviation 1.06361 1.07255 0.98297 1.04630 1.29107 1.08685 
t-statistic for difference of means -8.84*** 2.79*** -1.72* -0.94 3.04*** -1.81* 
January Days 
January Mean 0.03664 0.06650 0.11618 0.04453 0.05614 0.04304 
Standard Deviation 0.96872 1.10842 1.05183 1.07124 1.16459 1.18560 
No. of  January Days 2635 1607 641 718 746 753 
Fraction of positive January return days 0.52182 0.50840 0.49156 0.51950 0.50134 0.44356 
Non-January Mean 0.01719 0.01069 0.02021 0.02768 0.01487 0.00878 
Non-January Standard Deviation 1.10724 1.05373 1.02136 1.09810 1.18651 1.13097 
t-statistic for difference of means 0.87 2.02** 3.24*** 0.39 0.91 0.79 
Turn-of-the-month Days 
TOTM Mean 0.11758 0.09413 0.09508 0.10242 0.12630 0.09241 
Standard Deviation 1.05439 1.06376 0.99753 1.08639 1.13448 1.26418 
No. of TOTM Days 5437 3573 2831 1104 1104 1104 
Fraction of positive TOTM return days 0.42818 0.52393 0.49912 0.53623 0.52717 0.47645 
Non-TOTM Standard Deviation 1.10371 1.06998 1.02967 1.21121 1.18951 1.32897 
Non-TOTM Mean -0.00211 0.00454 0.01330 0.01215 -0.02088 -0.03193 
t-statistic for difference of means 7.31*** 4.52*** 3.84*** 2.27** 4.46*** 2.83*** 
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results supports the idea that there is no Monday effect in the FT30, with Mondays actually 
producing a positive mean compared to non-Mondays generating a negative mean.  All three 
markets reveal that the mean in January is higher than the mean in non-January days with the 
FT30 and TOPIX being statistically significant.  Each of the three markets produce 
significantly higher means during turn-of-the-month days, indicating that the turn-of-the-
month effect has been generating higher means than non-turn-of-the-month days for the full 
sample.   
 
Focussing on the subsample results after the seminal paper of each anomaly was published 
shows similar results to that of the full sample for the Monday effect.  Again means are 
greater on Mondays only for the FT30, with the t-statistic difference being significant at 1%.  
However, the Monday return in the DJIA is no longer negative, with the t-statistic for the 
difference in the means being no longer significant. This suggests that the Monday effect has 
disappeared in the DJIA.  The means on January days are all still greater than the means on 
non-January days for all three series, but the difference is not as great.  None of the t-statistics 
for the difference in means are significant, again suggesting that the January effect is 
disappearing/has disappeared since the publication of Rozeff and Kinney’s paper in 1976. 
The turn-of-the-month anomaly seems to still exist in all three markets, with the t-statistic for 
the difference in means being significant in each market.  However, this is partly due to the 
fact that the mean on non-turn-of-the-month days in the FT30 and TOPIX are now negative.  
The mean on turn-of-the-month days in the DJIA for both subsamples is very similar, with 
the huge drop in the t-statistic due to the now positive mean on non-turn-of-the-month days.  
This indicates that the turn-of-the-month effect is still strong in each market, but not as strong 
as during the full sample.  These results show that the means of some of the anomalies have 
decreased since the seminal paper on the effect was published.  
 
4.5. Empirical Results 
 
4.5.1. Regression Analysis 
 
Table 4.2 documents the excess return on the anomalies, relative to non-anomaly days for the 
full sample, and before and after the year of initial publication of a given anomaly for the 
DJIA.  Moreover, the t-statistics are calculated to test whether the coefficient corresponding 
to the anomaly is zero and this enables an examination of the strength of the anomaly over 
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time. These initial results show that the Monday effect has decreased quite considerably in 
value over time for the DJIA.  Over the entire sample (1897-2009) the excess returns on 
Mondays compared to non-Mondays was -0.14%. The difference between the excess returns 
on Mondays before and after the publication of Cross’s 1973 paper is 0.17%, which is quite 
considerable given the whole sample excess returns was of a magnitude of 0.14%.  As 
suggested in the literature, there is little evidence of the Monday effect in the FT30, with each 
subsample producing positive excess returns.  The Monday effect in the TOPIX appears to be 
getting stronger, with the magnitude of negative excess returns larger after 1973 than before.  
The regression analysis in Table 4.2 for the January effect shows that returns have diminished 
over time, with excess returns falling by 0.003 between the period before and after Rozeff 
and Kinney’s (1976) paper for the DJIA. The FT30 January effect results report than the 
excess returns have decreased since 1976, with the excess returns being significant at 5% 
before 1976 and not significant after.  A similar result is found in the TOPIX, with excess 
returns significant at 1% before 1976, but not significant after 1976. These results suggest 
that the January effect is not as strong as it was before 1976.  The turn-of-the-month effect for 
the DJIA shows that returns have also diminished over time, but only by a small amount 
(0.03% after the 1987 paper by Ariel 1987).  Even though returns have fallen, the excess 
returns post 1987 are significant at 5%, indicating that this rule is still profitable in the DJIA.  
The FT30 and TOPIX results both document a increase in the magnitude of excess returns 
since 1987, indicating that the turn-of-the-month effect is getting stronger in each market. 
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Anomaly Market Entire Sample Before Paper  After Paper  
 
 
The Monday Effect 
(Cross 1973) 
DJIA -0.1436463*** 
 (-8.84) 
-0.1969739*** 
 (-10.08) 
-0.0271977 
 (-0.94) 
FT30 0.0556057*** 
(2.88) 
0.018350 
(0.89) 
0.0934588*** 
(2.83) 
TOPIX -0.0355162* 
(-1.72) 
-0.0088766 
(-0.32) 
-0.0513341* 
(-1.81) 
 
 
January Effect 
(Rozeff and Kinney 
1976) 
DJIA 0.0194491 
(0.87) 
0.0205262 
(0.78) 
0.0168533 
(0.39) 
FT30 0.0558152** 
(2.02) 
0.0683766** 
(2.05) 
0.0412701 
(0.91) 
TOPIX 0.0959742*** 
(3.24) 
0.1803914*** 
(4.78) 
0.0342558 
(0.79) 
 
 
Turn-of-the-Month 
(Ariel 1987) 
DJIA 0.1204146*** 
(7.36) 
0.1252654*** 
(7.01) 
0.0902722** 
(2.27) 
FT30 0.0968266*** 
(4.93) 
0.074116*** 
(3.33) 
0.1471778*** 
(3.74) 
TOPIX 0.0817814*** 
(3.84) 
0.0545856*** 
(2.63) 
0.1243334*** 
(2.83) 
 
Table 4.2: The excess returns before and after the publication of the anomalies.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10%. 
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4.5.2. Breakpoint Analysis 
 
The Chow (1960) test examines whether a break is found in the data at a pre-selected date.  
The results in Table 4.3 reveal that the Monday effect breakpoint in 1973 can be accepted for 
the DJIA and the FT30, with the F-statistic being significant at 5%.  However the Monday 
effect does not produce a significant breakpoint in 1973 for the TOPIX, indicating that 
returns did not immediately change when the seminal paper was published.  Nevertheless, for 
the January effect the breakpoint in 1976 is rejected for the DJIA and FT30, but accepted for 
the TOPIX.  This result is the reverse of the Monday effect results, dismissing the idea that 
the calendar anomalies may have been recognised later in the TOPIX than the DJIA and the 
FT30.  The results for the turn-of-the-month effect reveal that only the DJIA accepts a 
breakpoint in 1987 at 5% significance.  The FT30 does accept the breakpoint, but only at 7% 
significance, while the TOPIX rejects the breakpoint.  This suggest that the turn-of-the-month 
effect returns have changed significantly since 1987 for the DJIA, but not the FT30 and 
TOPIX. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Quandt-Andrews (Andrews 1993) test results for an unknown break point are 
documented in Table 4.4.  The Monday effect is found to have a significant breakpoint in 
1988 for the DJIA which is much later than the seminal paper in 1973.  The FT30 and TOPIX 
however both produce breakdates that are insignificant, indicating no real breakdate in the 
data.  There are no significant breakpoints for the DJIA or FT30 for the January effect 
suggesting there has been no real change in the behaviour of the anomaly over time.  
Calendar Effect Chosen breakpoint F-statistic F Prob Log Likelihood Ratio Wald Statistic 
Panel A: DJIA 
Monday Effect 1973 15.34415 0.00 14.63116 15.34415 
January Effect 1976 0.045878 0.83 0.046695 0.045878 
TOTM Effect 1987 4.321454 0.04 4.315841 4.321454 
Panel B: FT30 
Monday Effect 1973 5.718111 0.02 5.644963 5.718111 
January Effect 1976 0.163835 0.69 0.168195 0.163835 
TOTM Effect 1987 3.457021 0.07 3.470200 3.457021 
Panel C: TOPIX 
Monday Effect 1973 0.684182 0.41 0.703972 0.684182 
January Effect 1976 5.831264 0.02 5.746689 5.831264 
TOTM Effect 1987 1.602095 0.21 1.635431 1.602095 
 
 
Table 4.3: Test results for the Chow (1960) known structural break test on the calendar anomalies.  The first 
column documents the calendar effect examined, the second column shows the chosen breakpoint, while the 
third column reports the F-statistic.  The fourth column reports the probably of the F statistic, while the fifth 
column documents the log-likelihood ratio.  Finally the sixth column reports the Wald statistic. 
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However, the TOPIX produces significant breakpoints in 1954 for 5% trimming and 1995 for 
15% trimming, demonstrating no clear breakpoint near the publication date of the January 
effect in 1976. The turn-of the-month effect does produce significant breakdates for the DJIA 
in 1973 and in the FT30 in 1999 for 5% trimming and 1998 for 15% trimming, indicating a 
change in the behaviour of the anomalies.  However, the TOPIX reveals no significant 
breakdate for the turn-of-the-month effect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Trimming Percentage Break Point Year  LR F-statistic p-value 
Panel A: DJIA  
 
Monday Effect 
5% 1988 Max F 25.7095 0.00 
Exp F 8.9944 0.00 
15% 1988 Max F 25.709 0.00 
Exp F 9.2351 0.00 
 
January Effect 
5% 2000 Max F 4.7908 0.39 
Exp F 0.5288 0.47 
15% 1990 Max F 2.0349 0.78 
Exp F 0.1331 0.94 
 
TOTM Effect 
5% 1973 Max F 12.5539 0.01 
Exp F 3.8383 0.00 
15% 1973 Max F 12.5539 0.01 
Exp F 4.0482 0.00 
Panel B: FT30 
 
Monday Effect 
5% 1972 Max F 6.4439 0.20 
Exp F 1.0908 0.18 
15% 1972 Max F 6.4439 0.13 
Exp F 1.2444 0.14 
 
January Effect 
5% 1995 Max F 7.1153 0.15 
Exp F 1.7498 0.07 
15% 1995 Max F 7.1153 0.10 
Exp F 1.6883 0.09 
 
TOTM Effect 
5% 1999 Max F 11.4450 0.02 
Exp F 2.8990 0.02 
15% 1998 Max F 8.9443 0.04 
Exp F 2.2299 0.04 
Panel C: TOPIX 
 
Monday Effect 
5% 1987 Max F 6.9532 0.16 
Exp F 0.9886 0.22 
15% 1987 Max F 6.9532 0.11 
Exp F 1.1302 0.16 
 
January Effect 
5% 1954 Max F 12.8389 0.01 
Exp F 3.4045 0.00 
15% 1995 Max F 8.5489 0.05 
Exp F 3.0428 0.01 
 
TOTM Effect 
5% 1954 Max F 6.0280 0.24 
Exp F 1.0554 0.19 
15% 1960 Max F 4.6660 0.28 
Exp F 0.9067 0.23 
 
Table 4.4: Test results for the Quandt-Andrews (1993) unknown structural break test on the calendar 
anomalies.  The first column documents the calendar effect examined, the second column shows the 
trimming percentage while the third column reports the breakdate year.  The fifth column documents 
the LR F-statistic and the sixth column shows the associated p-value. 
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The results for the breakpoint analysis are inconclusive. One cannot say for certain when the 
anomalies ceased producing significant returns. The Chow test tends to over accept the 
breakpoint, and the breakpoint tested may not be the determining break in the returns.  The 
Quandt-Andrews results have however only revealed a single breakpoint where many may be 
present in our data.  It may report the biggest breakpoint in the data but it may be due to other 
factors and not actually due to knowledge of the anomaly. However, given the Chow test 
accepts a breakpoint in 1973 for the Monday effect in the DJIA, and the Quandt-Andrews test 
find one in 1972, there is strong evidence of a change in behaviour around these two years.   
 
4.5.3. Five-Yearly Behaviour Analysis 
 
The above analysis is inconclusive and to examine the behaviour of the calendar anomalies in 
more detail, the five-yearly excess returns of each anomaly are calculated.  The results for 
each year of our sample for each market are documented in Table 4.5 and Figures 4.1-4.3. 
The blotted points indicate which excess returns are statistically significant at 5% or more.  
 
The results for the Monday effect for the three markets are documented in Figure 4.1.  The 
dotted line is the polynomial trendline which documents how the excess returns of each 
anomaly behave over time.   The results for the Monday effect in the DJIA reveal that the 
excess returns were negative throughout the sample until 1993 when excess returns turned 
positive.  Thus the Monday effect appears to behave in a switching way in the DJIA and is 
type 3.  The FT30 results suggest that the Monday effect has barely existed in the FT30.  The 
only time the trendline is negative is between 1950-1955, albeit at a very low magnitude.  
Thus excess returns have been positive, then negative and then positive again in the FT30 so 
the effect can be deemed adaptive and type 4.  The TOPIX results for the Monday effect 
indicate that excess returns are negative throughout the sample, even though the trendline 
gets quite close to the x-axis. Thus the TOPIX Monday effect can be deemed type 5 and the 
market inefficient through the sample. 
 
The returns for the January effect for the three markets are documented in Figure 4.2.  The 
excess returns for the DJIA do not produce any significant coefficients and appear to 
fluctuate around zero for the full sample, with the polynomial trendline starting above the x-
axis and then turning below the x-axis, and then above and below it again.  Thus excess 
returns appear fluctuate consistently over time and so can be deemed to be an efficient market 
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type 4.  The FT30 results for the January effect are quite similar to the results for the DJIA, 
with none of the five-yearly subsamples generating significant coefficients and the 
polynomial trendline crossing the x-axis three times.  Also, it should be noted that since 1985 
excess returns have been on a downward trend, indicating the fall in successfulness of the 
January effect in the FT30. This indicates that the behaviour can be deemed adaptive and type 
4.  The TOPIX results for the January effect reveal that only two of the subsamples generate 
positive significant coefficients and that the polynomial trendline is downward sloping 
throughout the sample. This indicates that excess returns in the TOPIX have decreased 
consistently over time and turn negative from 1992, suggesting a switching of behaviour and 
thus type 3. 
 
Figure 4.3 depicts the turn-of-the-month regression analysis for the three markets studied.  
The DJIA shows that up to 1970, the majority of subsamples were positive and statistically 
significant, indicating the strong success of this anomaly. However since 1970, no subsample 
is significant and there is a downward trend, even though excess returns are still positive. 
Thus the DJIA turn-of-the-month effect has produced positive returns throughout the sample 
period can be classified as type 5. The FT30 results show that excess returns have remained 
positive over time, with the polynomial trendline being u-shaped indicating the greater 
strength of the anomaly over the last few subsamples.  This again indicates the turn-of-the-
month effect can be classified as type 5 since the trendline is always above the x-axis. The 
turn-of-the-month in the TOPIX has produced positive returns in nearly all of the subsamples, 
with only two subsamples generating slightly negative excess returns. Nevertheless, the 
polynomial trendline is positive throughout and similar to the FT30 results, is a u-shape 
indicating that this anomaly has not decreased but actually increased in successfulness in 
recent years.  Thus similarly to the other two markets for the turn-of-the-month effect, the 
TOPIX can be classified as type 5. 
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Figure 4.1: The five-yearly Monday effect plotted over time.  Blotted points indicate significance at 5%. 
104 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: The five-yearly January effect plotted over time.  Blotted points indicate significance at 5%. 
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Figure 4.3: The five-yearly turn-of-the-month effect plotted over time.  Blotted points indicate significance at 5%. 
 
106 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sample 
Period 
Monday Effect January Effect Turn-of-the-Month Effect 
Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat Coefficient t-stat 
Panel A: DJIA 
Full Sample -0.1436463*** (-8.84) 0.0011808 (0.04) 0.1196936*** (7.32) 
1897 1899 -0.0962094 (-0.89) 0.1605907 (0.89) 0.2523137** (2.35) 
1900 1904 -0.0972839 (-1.30) -0.1867101 (-1.46) 0.0528698 (0.70) 
1905 1909 0.0539459 (0.79) 0.1691734 (1.45) 0.1533437** (2.21) 
1910 1914 -0.1074781* (-1.89) -0.0332134 (-0.36) -0.0469102 (-0.82) 
1915 1919 -0.0725844 (-0.91) 0.0017688 (0.01) 0.0621466 (0.77) 
1920 1924 -0.2677891*** (-4.20) 0.0382623 (0.35) 0.1581739** (2.46) 
1925 1929 -0.4510391*** (-5.06) -0.0949021 (-0.62) 0.1323803 (1.46) 
1930 1934 -0.4095476*** (-2.56) 0.1682412 (0.62) 0.1564666 (0.97) 
1935 1939 -0.3037017*** (-3.48) 0.0455367 (0.31) 0.2243837** (2.55) 
1940 1944 -0.0520022 (-1.01) -0.0291069 (-0.33) 0.1701749*** (3.27) 
1945 1949 -0.1788807*** (-3.40) 0.0399885 (0.45) 0.1401455*** (2.64) 
1950 1954 -0.1777845*** (-4.20) 0.0506099 (0.71) 0.1522015*** (3.57) 
1955 1959 -0.2792317*** (-5.62) -0.1542201* (-1.82) 0.2164325*** (4.27) 
1960 1964 -0.2240496*** (-4.67) -0.0129235 (-0.16) 0.155438*** (3.19) 
1965 1969 -0.2359355*** (-5.34) 0.1062986 (1.43) 0.1118256** (2.50) 
1970 1974 -0.3056002*** (-4.29) 0.0802189 (0.67) 0.1126327 (1.56) 
1975 1979 -0.0331369 (-0.56) 0.0891224 (0.90) 0.1151561* (1.93) 
1980 1984 -0.1218893* (-1.77) -0.0770569 (-0.67) 0.0630192 (0.91) 
1985 1989 -0.1901199** (-2.01) 0.1263909 (0.80) 0.125295 (1.32) 
1990 1994 0.155704*** (2.77) -0.046688 (-0.50) 0.0456211 (0.81) 
1995 1999 0.0905212 (1.28) -0.0009082 (-0.01) 0.0736912 (1.04) 
2000 2004 0.0854678 (0.96) -0.0960494 (-0.65) 0.1427204 (1.61) 
2005 2009 -0.0279791 (-0.29) -0.2633858 (-1.61) -0.0156384 (-0.16) 
Panel B: FT30 
Full Sample 0.0556057*** (2.88) 0.043834 (1.34) 0.0966365*** (4.93) 
1935 1939 0.0501924 (0.80) 0.0110033 (0.10) 0.1804805*** (2.89) 
1940 1944 0.043528 (1.20) 0.1131309* (1.86) 0.1000202*** (2.73) 
1945 1949 0.1023155** (2.53) 0.0325857 (0.48) -0.0039382 (-0.10) 
1950 1954 0.0161634 (0.48) -0.0723777 (-1.29) 0.0204363 (0.60) 
1955 1959 -0.0402313 (-0.71) -0.0525068 (-0.55) 0.0694119 (1.20) 
1960 1964 -0.0471577 (-0.83) -0.0511600 (-0.54) 0.1209588** (2.13) 
1965 1969 -0.0763483 (-1.09) 0.1320798 (1.14) 0.0899777 (1.28) 
1970 1974 0.1242139 (1.21) 0.2614230 (1.52) 0.0258442 (0.25) 
1975 1979 0.2358764** (1.99) 0.2372067 (1.20) 0.0050104 (0.04) 
1980 1984 0.0948711 (1.20) 0.2348724* (1.72) 0.089784 (1.10) 
1985 1989 0.1873412** (2.39) 0.1895239 (1.41) 0.0826692 (1.02) 
1990 1994 -0.0084414 (-0.13) 0.0567928 (0.53) 0.110396* (1.71) 
1995 1999 -0.0197367 (-0.32) -0.0367500 (-0.35) 0.0716294 (1.14) 
2000 2004 0.1124656 (1.24) -0.0838486 (-0.54) 0.2750433*** (2.95) 
2005 2009 0.0516633 (0.50) -0.3237070* (-1.82) 0.2200307** (2.06) 
Panel C: TOPIX 
Full Sample -0.355162* (-1.72) 0.0682586* (1.92) 0.0817814*** (3.84) 
1950 1954 0.0374024 (0.44) 0.2641706* (1.81) 0.1304841 (1.48) 
1955 1959 -0.0363902 (-0.79) 0.1871801** (2.36) 0.1844637*** (3.89) 
1960 1964 -0.0965355 (-1.61) 0.3860291*** (3.76) 0.032221 (0.52) 
1965 1969 0.0344429 (0.71) 0.1488196* (1.78) 0.103005** (2.06) 
1970 1974 -0.208634 (-0.32) 0.1313940 (1.19) -0.0475438 (-0.72) 
1975 1979 0.0460524 (1.34) 0.0884990 (1.50) 0.036248 (1.02) 
1980 1984 0.0953626** (2.31) 0.0549853 (0.77) 0.0391911 (0.92) 
1985 1989 -0.0875416 (-1.25) 0.1141278 (0.95) -0.0249972 (-0.34) 
1990 1994 -0.2294963*** (-2.56) -0.1156417 (-0.75) 0.1878847** (2.02) 
1995 1999 -0.0674739 (-0.83) -0.1117756 (-0.80) 0.0303416 (0.36) 
2000 2004 -0.0735377 (-0.82) 0.0171561 (0.11) 0.1833172** (1.99) 
2005 2009 -0.0126936 (-0.12) -0.3068274* (-1.64) 0.1367207 (1.22) 
 
Table 4.5: Test results for regression 4.2 calendar effects on the DJIA, FT30 and 
TOPIX.  Panel A documents the results for the DJIA, Panel B documents the results 
for the FT30 while Panel C documents the results for the TOPIX.  ***, **, * 
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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The above analysis shows that the excess returns of various calendar anomalies in three well 
established markets has fluctuated over time, with the behaviour of the excess returns 
differing in each case.  In order to classify the behaviour of calendar anomalies, we use the 
classification of return behaviour suggested in the previous chapter. We use a polynomial 
trendline to distinguish between the five types of anomaly behaviour.  The five possible types 
are perfectly efficient, a move towards efficiency, a switch to efficiency/inefficiency, an 
adaptive market, or market efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.6 shows that the Monday effect in the DJIA has behaved in a switching manner (type 
3), while in the FT30 the Monday effect behaved in an adaptive manner (type 4). The TOPIX 
reports a strong Monday effect, with excess returns negative throughout the full sample (type 
5).  The January results show that the DJIA and the FT30 exhibit an adaptive behaviour (type 
4), while excess returns appear to have reversed in the TOPIX (type 3), with positive excess 
returns followed by negative excess returns. The turn-of-the-month results indicate that the 
DJIA excess returns have switched (type 3), with the trendline turning negative at the end of 
the sample.  The DJIA, FT30 and TOPIX all exhibit strong positive excess returns throughout 
the full sample (type 5), indicating that this anomaly in these markets is still evident. 
 
These results show that the AMH can explain three of the behaviours of the anomalies in the 
three markets studied.  They also show that there little evidence of the Monday effect in the 
FT30, which is supported by the literature.  The newest anomaly, the turn-of-the-month 
effect, is the strongest of the three, since it can be described by type 5 in all three markets.  
Also the newest market, the TOPIX, also seems the most inefficient since two of the 
anomalies are earning excess returns and the other one has reversed.  This is consistent with 
 
Market Anomaly Type 
 
Monday Effect 
DJIA 3 
FT30 4 
TOPIX 5 
 
January Effect 
DJIA 4 
FT30 4 
TOPIX 3 
 
Turn-of-the-month Effect 
DJIA 5 
FT30 5 
TOPIX 5 
 
Table 4.6: Classification of the calendar test results. Key: Type 1 perfectly efficient, Type 2 move 
towards efficiency, Type 3 anomaly switches, Type 4 adaptive behaviour and Type 5 market inefficiency. 
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Lo (2012) who stated that ‘a relatively new market is likely to be less efficient than a market 
that has been in existence for decades
24’.  There are no examples of type 1 or type 2 
anomalies so there is no support for the EMH as set out by Fama.  The EMH states that 
investors should not be able to earn above-average returns, since all information is reflected 
in the stock price.  So if an anomaly is found to produce excess returns in a market, it should 
disappear quickly due to market forces.  However, this is unlikely to be observed in this data 
given that this paper investigates well known anomalies, which have been found to produce 
excess returns in the literature.   
 
4.5.4. Trading Strategy Analysis 
 
The results from the simple trading strategy described earlier on the calendar anomalies are 
documented in Table 4.7 for the full sample and in Table 4.8 for the post publication samples.  
Table 4.7 reports that using a simple trading strategy over the full sample on the Monday 
effect does outperform the buy-and-hold strategy for the DJIA, however it cannot outperform 
the buy-and-hold strategy for the FT30 and TOPIX.  Specially, the DJIA outperforms the 
buy-and-hold strategy by 0.81% per annum.  The risk of the trading strategy and the buy-and-
hold strategy are broadly similar for the Monday effect.  The January anomaly results show 
that the buy-and-hold strategy outperforms the trading strategy for each market, even though 
the risk associated with the January effect is substantially less than the risk of the buy-and-
hold strategy because the strategy is out of the market most of the time.  This shows that the 
January effect could not be traded on using this simple trading strategy throughout the full 
sample in each market to gain returns greater than a buy-and-hold strategy.  The TOTM 
anomaly results show that the DJIA and FT30 can outperform the buy-and-hold strategy 
using this trading strategy, but only by 0.07% and 0.18% per annum respectively.  The 
TOPIX cannot outperform the buy-and-hold strategy for the TOTM, with returns 0.67% per 
annum less than the buy-and-hold strategy.  The previous analysis suggested that the TOTM 
anomaly was quite strong in all three markets, however these results show that trading on the 
anomaly is not as successful.  The risk of trading on the TOTM is substantially less than the 
buy-and-hold strategy because the strategy is out of the market most of the time, and may 
contribute to the success of the anomaly in the DJIA and FT30 markets. 
 
                                                 
24
 Although the TOPIX has been in existence for a number of decades, it is relatively new compared to the DJIA 
which was formed in 1896. 
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Table 4.8 presents the results for the simple trading rule since the first publication of each 
anomaly
25
.  The simple trading rule does not outperform the buy-and-hold strategy for the 
Monday effect on the DJIA and FT30.  The returns are less than the buy-and-hold strategy by 
0.08% and 0.04% per annum respectively. This shows that the Monday effect has become 
less successful since the publication of the anomaly compared to the full sample.  However 
the TOPIX does outperform the buy-and-hold strategy by 0.02% per annum.  This shows that 
since 1973, trading on the Monday effect in the TOPIX has been successful but over the full 
sample it has been unsuccessful.  Thus the Monday effect in the TOPIX has become a lot 
more successful since the publication of the seminal paper by Cross in 1973.  The January 
results show the simple trading rule did not outperform the buy-and-hold strategy since 1976 
for each market with the returns from the trading strategy being 3.13%, 0.03% and 0.03% per 
annum less than the buy-and-hold strategy.  Further, the risk associated with the January 
effect from the simple trading rule is substantially less than that of the buy-and-hold strategy, 
further indicating the unsuccessfulness of trading on the January anomaly.  The TOTM 
results show that the implementing this simple trading strategy after 1987 does not 
outperform the buy-and-hold strategy in the DJIA.  However, the FT30 and TOPIX do 
outperform the buy-and-hold strategy by 0.12% and 0.13% per annum espectively.  This 
shows that since 1987 the TOTM could have gained substantial returns, but over the full 
sample it generated negative returns.  However, the risk associated with the TOTM effect is 
considerably less than the buy-and-hold strategy.  Because of this, the “double or out” trading 
strategy is also conducted so make the risk of each trading rule fairly similar. 
 
The results from Tables 4.9 and 4.10 document the “double or out” trading strategy to try to 
form a trading strategy that has comparable risk to that of the buy-and-hold strategy. It clear 
that the risk of the “double or out” trading strategy is double that of the simple trading 
strategy, and that the profit achieved from the rule is double that of the simple trading 
strategy.  This is because there are no neutral signals generated so the investor is either out of 
the market or in the market by double the original amount. The results indicate that the risk of 
the “double or out” strategy for the Monday effect is now greater than the buy-and-hold 
strategy showing that the returns from this strategy are not just the result of a strategy with 
less risk.  Even though the risk of the TOTM anomaly is still less than that of the buy-and-
hold strategy, they are broadly comparable.  However, the January standard deviations from 
                                                 
25
 1973 for the Monday effect, 1976 for the January effect and 1987 for the turn-of-the-month effect. 
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the “double or out” trading strategy are still substantially less than that of the buy-and-hold 
strategy.  Thus a “quadruple or out” strategy is now considered for the January anomaly in 
Table 4.11 to generate comparable risks between a trading strategy and the buy-and-hold 
strategy. The strategy is similar to the “double or out” strategy but the investor goes in the 
market with leverage of four times when a buy signal is generated.  The strategy generates 
similar risks to the buy-and-hold strategy for the January anomaly and shows that none of the 
markets can outperform the buy-and-hold strategy. 
 
The profitability of the three calendar anomalies previously examined through a simple 
trading strategy and a “double or out” trading strategy. The results show that using the simple 
trading strategy only the Monday effect in the DJIA, and the TOTM effect in the DJIA and 
FT30 can outperform the buy-and-hold strategy over the full sample.  Further, studying the 
data after the seminal publication of that anomaly, the results show only Monday anomaly in 
the TOPIX and the TOTM anomaly in the FT30 and TOPIX can outperform the buy-and-
hold strategy. All of the other anomalies cannot beat the buy-and-hold strategy, indicating 
that although these calendar anomalies are found in the market, they cannot be used to gain 
returns greater than the market using the simple trading strategy.  The results from the 
“double or out” strategy are similar to the simple trading strategy but only the rule profits 
have doubled as have the standard deviations of the rules. Finally a “quadruple or out” 
trading strategy is also conducted for the January anomaly to enable the risk of the trading 
strategy to the comparable to that of the buy-and-hold strategy. The results show that the 
trading strategy cannot outperform the buy-and-hold strategy for all three markets.  These 
results show that even though the earlier analysis shows that the calendar anomalies are 
strong and evident in the markets, it does not always guarantee that the anomaly will generate 
returns greater than the market. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anomaly No. Buys No. Sells SD Rule SD B&H Rule Profit B&H Profit Difference Annualised % Difference 
 Panel A: DJIA 
Monday Effect 5522 5522 0.96 1.10 1124.00 585.14 538.87 0.81% 
January Effect 113 113 0.23 1.10 33.81 585.14 -551.33 -0.83% 
TOTM Effect 1360 1659 0.44 1.10 634.04 585.14 48.90 0.07% 
 Panel B: FT30 
Monday Effect 3731 3731 0.95 1.06 69.44 294.40 -224.96 -1.01% 
January Effect 74 74 0.25 1.06 62.39 294.40 -232.01 -1.05% 
TOTM Effect 894 893 0.46 1.06 333.65 294.40 39.25 0.18% 
 Panel C: TOPIX 
Monday Effect 3078 3078 0.87 1.02 432.80 436.15 -3.35 -0.01% 
January Effect 59 59 0.25 1.02 82.22 436.15 -353.93 -1.40% 
TOTM Effect 709 708 0.43 1.02 266.96 436.15 -169.76 -0.67% 
 
Table 4.7: Test results for the calendar anomalies using the simple trading strategy on the full sample of each market.  The number of trades 
(No. of buy/sell) are shown as well as the standard deviations associated with the trading rule and the buy-and-hold strategy.  The profits from 
trading on the rule (Rule Profit) as well as the buy-and-hold strategy are shown.  Further, the annualised difference between the rule returns 
and the buy-and-hold returns are also shown. 
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Table 4.9: Test results for the calendar anomalies using the “double or out” trading strategy on the full sample data.  The number of trades 
(No. of buy/sell) are shown as well as the standard deviations associated with the trading rule and the buy-and-hold strategy.  The profits 
from trading on the rule (Rule Profit) as well as the buy-and-hold strategy are shown.  Further, the annualised difference between the rule 
returns and the buy-and-hold returns are also shown. 
 
Table 4.8: Test results for the calendar anomalies using the simple trading strategy on the post publication data.  The number of trades (No. of 
buy/sell) are shown as well as the standard deviations associated with the trading rule and the buy-and-hold strategy.  The profits from trading on 
the rule (Rule Profit) as well as the buy-and-hold strategy are shown.  Further, the annualised difference between the rule returns and the buy-and-
hold returns are also shown. 
 Anomaly No. Buys No. Sells SD Rule SD B&H Rule Profit B&H Profit Difference Annualised % Difference 
 Panel A: DJIA 
Monday Effect 1788 1788 0.93 1.11 225.78 232.47 -6.68 -0.08% 
January Effect 34 34 0.26 1.10 -7.85 250.42 -258.27 -3.13% 
TOTM Effect 276 276 0.47 1.19 112.15 170.48 -58.33 -1.56% 
 Panel B: FT30 
Monday Effect 1904 1904 1.15 1.28 -43.67 133.92 -177.59 -0.04% 
January Effect 34 34 0.27 1.18 24.39 162.28 -137.89 -0.03% 
TOTM Effect 276 276 0.49 1.18 138.32 138.32 101.07 0.12% 
 Panel C: TOPIX 
Monday Effect 1931 1931 0.96 1.12 143.32 81.51 61.81 0.02% 
January Effect 34 34 0.27 1.14 -10.77 103.68 -114.46 -0.03% 
TOTM Effect 276 276 0.54 1.32 101.18 -54.33 155.51 0.13% 
 
Anomaly No. Buys No. Sells SD Rule SD B&H Rule Profit B&H Profit Difference Annualised % Difference 
 Panel A: DJIA 
Monday Effect 5522 5522 1.91 1.10 2248.00 585.14 1662.87 2.49% 
January Effect 113 113 0.46 1.10 67.62 585.14 -517.52 -0.78% 
TOTM Effect 1360 1659 0.88 1.10 1268.08 585.14 682.94 1.02% 
 Panel B: FT30 
Monday Effect 3731 3731 1.90 1.06 138.89 294.40 -155.52 -0.70% 
January Effect 74 74 0.50 1.06 294.40 294.40 -169.61 -0.77% 
TOTM Effect 894 894 0.91 1.06 667.61 294.40 372.90 1.69% 
 Panel C: TOPIX 
Monday Effect 3078 3078 1.74 1.02 865.60 436.15 429.44 1.70% 
January Effect 59 59 0.49 1.02 164.44 436.15 -271.72 -1.07% 
TOTM Effect 709 708 0.85 1.02 533.91 436.15 97.76 0.39% 
 
 
Table 4.10: Test results for the calendar anomalies using the “double or out” trading strategy on the post publication data.  The number of 
trades (No. of buy/sell) are shown as well as the standard deviations associated with the trading rule and the buy-and-hold strategy.  The 
profits from trading on the rule (Rule Profit) as well as the buy-and-hold strategy are shown.  Further, the annualised difference between the 
rule returns and the buy-and-hold returns are also shown. 
 Anomaly No. Buys No. Sells SD Rule SD B&H Rule Profit B&H Profit Difference Annualised % Difference 
 Panel A: DJIA 
Monday Effect 1788 1788 1.87 1.11 451.57 232.47 219.10 2.62% 
January Effect 34 34 0.53 1.10 -15.70 250.42 -266.12 3.22% 
TOTM Effect 276 276 0.94 1.19 224.29 170.48 53.81 1.44% 
 Panel B: FT30 
Monday Effect 1904 1904 1.90 1.06 138.89 133.92 -155.52 -1.47% 
January Effect 34 34 0.54 1.19 48.77 162.28 -113.51 -2.12% 
TOTM Effect 276 276 0.97 1.18 276.64 138.32 239.39 29.21% 
 Panel C: TOPIX 
Monday Effect 1931 1931 1.93 1.12 286.64 81.51 205.13 6.99% 
January Effect 34 34 0.53 1.14 -21.55 103.68 -125.23 -3.66% 
TOTM Effect 276 276 1.08 1.32 202.36 -54.33 256.69 21.48% 
 
Anomaly No. Buys No. Sells SD Rule SD B&H Rule Profit B&H Profit Difference Annualised % Difference 
 Panel A: Full Sample 
DJIA 113 113 0.93 1.10 135.23 585.14 -449.91 -0.67% 
FT30 74 74 1.01 1.06 249.58 294.40 -44.83 -0.20% 
TOPIX 59 59 0.98 1.02 328.87 436.15 -107.28 -0.42% 
 Panel B: Post Publication Data 
DJIA 34 34 1.06 1.10 -31.39 250.42 -281.81 -3.41% 
FT30 34 34 1.07 1.18 97.55 162.28 -64.73 -1.21% 
TOPIX 34 34 1.06 1.14 -43.10 103.68 -146.78 -4.29% 
 
Table 4.11: Test results for the “quadruple or out” trading strategy on the January anomaly.  The number of trades (No. of buy/sell) are 
shown as well as the standard deviations associated with the trading rule and the buy-and-hold strategy.  The profits from trading on the 
rule (Rule Profit) as well as the buy-and-hold strategy are shown.  Further, the annualised difference between the rule returns and the buy-
and-hold returns are also shown. 
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4.5.5. January Anomaly Analysis Excluding TOTM Anomaly 
 
Finally Table 4.12 reports the means and excess returns for the January anomaly with the 
turn-of-the-month days.  The mean of January days without the turn-of-the-month days for 
the DJIA turns negative to -0.01961, compared to 0.03664 with the turn-of-the-month days 
included. The excess returns are also negative, indicating that the turn-of-the-month was 
driving the January returns.  The results for the FT30 show that January’s mean decreased by 
more than a half when the turn-of-the-month days are excluded. Although excess returns are 
still positive, they are no longer statistically significant. The TOPIX mean for January days 
excluding the turn-of-the-month days is also less than before, with the excess returns now 
only significant at the 10% level.  These results show that the turn-of-the-month effect was 
driving the January anomaly in the DJIA, and contributed significantly to the January 
anomaly in the FT30 and TOPIX.  Thus the January effect may not be as strong as first 
thought and that the turn-of-the-month effect may be the driving force behind the high returns 
documented in the first half of January. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.6. Conclusion 
 
Calendar anomalies are accepted in stock markets throughout the world due to the 
voluminous literature supporting them.  However, recent evidence has suggested that these 
Table 4.12: Summary statistics for the January effect excluding turn-of-the-month days.  
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 Full Sample 
DJIA FT30 TOPIX 
January Anomaly 
January Mean 0.03664 0.06650 0.11618 
Standard Deviation 0.96872 1.10842 1.05183 
No. of  January Days 2635 1607 641 
Fraction of positive January return days 0.52182 0.50840 0.49156 
Non-January Mean 0.01719 0.01069 0.02021 
Non-January Standard Deviation 1.10724 1.05373 1.02136 
t-statistic for difference of means 0.87 2.02** 3.24*** 
January – TOTM Anomaly 
January Mean -0.01961 0.03076 0.09967 
Standard Deviation 0.95507 1.01099 1.09523 
No. of  January Days 1347 888 708 
Fraction of positive January return days 0.50 0.50 0.52 
Non-January Mean 0.02059 0.01462 0.02490 
Non-January Standard Deviation 1.10211 1.06078 1.02066 
t-statistic for difference of means -1.32 0.44 1.90* 
Excess Returns -0.04007 
(-1.32) 
0.01614 
(0.44) 
0.07477 
(1.90)* 
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anomalies have diminished, or even reversed over time.  In this chapter three of the most 
accepted calendar anomalies, the Monday effect, the January effect and the turn-of-the-month 
effect are examined. This chapter contributes to the literature by examining how the returns 
from these anomalies have behaved over time, whether they can be exploited to earn excess 
returns by using a simple trading strategy and whether the turn-of-the-month effect drives the 
January effect. 
 
The key conclusions are; 
(i) There is strong evidence of the Monday effect in the DJIA and TOPIX, but little evidence of 
it in the FT30. Since the publication of the seminal paper, the returns on the Monday effect 
have reversed in the DJIA but got stronger in the TOPIX. 
(ii) The January effect is strong in the FT30 and TOPIX, but not so strong in the DJIA.  Further, 
the January effect has decreased in magnitude since the publication of the seminal paper by 
Ariel in 1976. 
(iii) The TOTM effect is strong in all three markets, although it has fallen in magnitude since the 
publication of the seminal paper in 1987. 
(iv) The behaviour of the anomalies over time can be categorized into 5 types, with the DJIA 
presenting evidence of the AMH through the January effect, while evidence of the AMH is 
found through the January and Monday effect in the FT30.  All of the other anomalies in the 
markets are characterized by a switch to efficiency or constant inefficiency indicating that 
market efficiency is not present. 
(v) Using a simple trading strategy, only the Monday effect in the DJIA, and the TOTM effect in 
the DJIA and FT30 outperform the buy-and-hold strategy over the full sample.  Further, 
studying the data after the seminal publication of each anomaly, only the Monday anomaly in 
the TOPIX as well as the TOTM anomaly in the FT30 and TOPIX outperforms the buy-and-
hold strategy. All of the other anomalies do not beat the buy-and-hold strategy. “Double or 
out” and “quadruple or out” trading strategies are also conducted with results being very 
similar to the simple trading strategy but larger in magnitude. 
(vi) The January anomaly excess returns can be accounted for by the turn-of-the-month effect in 
the DJIA, where January returns are not negative.  In the FT30 and TOPIX, the January 
returns fall significantly when the turn-of-the-month days are excluded. 
 
The fact that returns from some these calendar anomalies have decreased over time indicates 
the possibly these anomalies are not stylized facts about the stock market.  It could be that 
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investors caused these abnormal returns through irrational trades, but once they realized they 
were present, traded them away. This is consistent with the new AMH where profit 
opportunities go through cyclical fashions according to market conditions and investors learn 
these profit opportunities and take advantage of them.  Simple investment strategies are able 
to generate returns greater than the market be exploiting these calendar effects over the full 
sample for only a few on the anomalies studied.  This indicates that although these anomalies 
are evident in the data, they cannot be used consistently over time to generate excess returns.  
One explanation is that the trading strategies suggested is not sophisticated enough to take 
advantage of the anomalies.  Another explanation is that the calendar anomalies may only 
work under certain market conditions, such as in booms, or bull markets.  The turn-of-the-
month effect appears to be responsible for the excess returns of the January anomaly in the 
DJIA.  This is consistent with the findings of Xu and McConnell (2008) that the turn-of-the-
month anomaly accounts for all the increases in the market.  It also appears to have a 
significant impact on the excess returns of the January effect in the FT30 and TOPIX, with 
the FT30’s excess returns turning insignificant and the TOPIX’s decreasing to 10% 
significance. It may be that the turn-of-the-month effect may decrease over time, but since it 
is a relatively newly discovered anomaly it is still generating significant excess returns.  
However, it may also be the case that it is a stylized fact about the market and that it isn’t a 
calendar anomaly after all.  Future analysis of the returns of the turn-of-the-month effect will 
provide answers to this question.   
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Chapter 5: The Behaviour of the Moving Average Rule 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Technical analysis involves forecasting future prices through the identification and 
exploitation of recurring patterns in past prices.  Thus it aims to identify patterns forced by 
economic, monetary, political factors or the psychological attitudes of investors. One of the 
most important and celebrated technical rule is the moving average rule, which is the focus of 
this chapter. 
 
Technical analysis has a long history of widespread use by participants in financial markets. 
Park and Irwin (2007) note that its origins date back to the 18
th
 century when the Japanese 
developed a form of technical analysis known as candlestick charting, that was not introduced 
to the west until the 1970s. Smidt (1965b) surveyed amateur traders in the US commodity 
futures markets and found that over half used charts exclusively to identify trends, while 
Billingsley and Chance (1996) also find that about 60% of commodity trading advisors 
(CTAs) rely heavily on computer-guided technical trading systems.  More recently, 
Menkhoff (2010) finds that the vast majority of fund managers use technical analysis and it is 
preferred to fundamental analysis.   
 
Academic interest in technical analysis can be traced back to Cowles (1933), who undertook 
an examination of stock price forecasting methods which included looking at technical 
trading and William Hamilton’s use of the Dow Theory (Hamilton 1922). Dow Theory was 
developed by Charles Dow, the editor of the Wall Street, in the late 1800s.  He believed that 
markets moved in trends, with major and minor trends being able to move in opposite 
directions to the main trend.  There is an ‘accumulation phase’, where investors traded 
against the market at the start of the main trend, and sold towards the end of the main trend in 
a ‘distribution phase’.  In the distribution phase, investors were taking profits as new and less 
informed individuals bought too late.  Dow also stated that the market quickly included new 
information into its stock price, which is consistent with the later proposed EMH.  Dow 
himself was not interested in proposing profitable trading strategies, but later, editors of the 
Wall Street Journal developed his work and coined the expression Dow Theory (Lo and 
Hasanhodiz 2010). Cowles (1933) however found that investors who pursued these early 
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theories were not very successful while Hamilton (1922) also found the results were 
insufficient to comprise a profitable trading strategy. 
 
Academics however, tend to be sceptical about the use of technical analysis. This scepticism 
can be linked to acceptance of the EMH, which implies that trend analysis is futile in an 
attempt to make profits by exploiting currently available information such as past prices.  
This scepticism can also be linked to the early negative empirical findings regarding the 
profitability of technical analysis in stock markets, for example Fama and Blume (1966), Van 
Horne and Parker (1967), Van Horne and Parker (1968) and Jensen and Benington (1970). 
 
The early rejection of the usefulness of technical analysis led to numerous studies 
investigating its validity since many traders used it in their trading strategies.  These studies 
investigated various trading rules in a variety of markets, with the aim to uncover profitable 
trading rules or to confirm market efficiency.  Due to the strong positive findings of technical 
analysis rules in the 1980s
26
, there has been an explosion in the literature on technical 
analysis since the mid-1990s, with Park and Irwin (2007) noting that half of all empirical 
studies conducted after 1960 were published during the period 1995-2004. 
 
This chapter examines the behaviour of one of the most celebrated and studied technical 
rules, the moving average rule and this chapter is organised in the following manner. Section 
5.2 describes the literature while Section 5.3 outlines the methodology used. Section 5.4 
presents the data while Section 5.5 reports the empirical results. Section 5.6 analyses and 
concludes the chapter. 
 
5.2. Literature Review 
 
The moving average rule is one of the most popular technical rules amongst practitioners and 
has been extensively studied in the academic literature.  One of the first papers to investigate 
the moving average rule was by Cootner (1962).  Cootner argued that Alexander’s (1961) 
study of another technical rule, the filter rule, was not as effective when used on individual 
common stocks. So Cootner (1962) examined the average weekly change in 45 individual 
stocks from the NYSE from 1956 and tested the 200-day moving average against the buy-
                                                 
26
 For example, Brock et al (1992). 
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and-hold strategy. He found that it was much more successful than a simple buy-and-hold 
strategy if only gross profits are considered.  However due to the high frequency of trading, 
the rule is much inferior after allowing for transaction costs.  To avoid the excessive 
movements between a long and short position, he introduced percentage bands which meant 
stocks were only bought if their price rose above the moving average by more than 5%.  The 
results show a gross gain of 17% more than the simple buy-and-hold strategy, although the 
net gain is still negative. Thus the moving average rule was deemed not to be profitable.  
These results were further supported by Van Horne and Parker (1967), who investigated 30 
industrial stocks on the NYSE between January 1960 and June 1966.  They tested the 200-
day, 150-day and 100-day rules with 0%, 2%, 5%, 10% and 15% bands.  The results 
concluded that the various rules could not generate returns greater than a simple buy-and-
hold strategy.  Profits were considerably less after transaction costs were incurred and prices 
tended to move in a random nature.  Van Horne and Parker (1968) furthered their work by 
employing a weighted moving average rule to account for the fact that investors tended to 
place more emphasis on the recent past, so more significance is placed on recent prices and 
less on historical data.  They used various weightings with the 200-day rule and found that is 
it not possible to produce consistent profits by trading securities this way.  They also showed 
that data from the recent past does not have more predictive power than price data from the 
more distant past.  Further, James (1968) found similar results when investigating the moving 
average rule using monthly share price data for the period 1926-1960.  By enabling investors 
to sell their securities near the peak price and repurchase when the security is near the lowest 
price, it was found that investors would be significantly worse off than if they had invested in 
the simple buy-and-hold strategy and thus the rule had no predictive power. Dale and 
Workman (1980) found similar results using US Treasury bill futures. 
 
The study by Brock et al (1992) (BLL hereafter) is one of the most influential works on 
technical trading rules.  The influence is due to the findings of strong, consistent and positive 
results about the forecasting power of technical trading rules, the use of a long price history 
(90 years of the DJIA) and the application for the first time of the model-based bootstrap 
method. BLL applied the model-based bootstrap approach to overcome the weaknesses of 
conventional t-tests when financial returns have distributions known to be leptokurtic, 
autocorrelated, conditionally heteroskedastic, and time varying (non-normal).  In this 
approach, returns conditional on buy (or sell) signals from the original series are compared to 
conditional returns from simulated returns generated by widely used models for stock prices. 
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BLL applied the moving average rule to the DJIA data over the 1897-1986 period and the 
results indicate that buy (sell) signals from the moving average rule generates positive 
(negative) returns across all 26 rules and four sub-period tested.  Thus all the buy-sell 
differences are positive and outperform buy-and-hold returns.  All the buy-sell spreads are 
also positive with an annual return of 19%, which compares favourably with buy-and-hold 
returns of 5%.  Moreover buy signals generate higher average returns than sell signals and 
have a lower standard deviation than sell signals.  This implies that technical trading returns 
cannot be explained by risk.  Hence BLL conclude ‘the returns-generating process of stocks 
is probably more complicated than suggested by the various studies using linear models.  It is 
quite possible that technical rules pick up some of the hidden patterns.’  However, the 
authors only report the gross returns of each trading rule without an adjustment for 
transaction costs, so their results are not sufficient to prove that the moving average rules 
generate returns greater than the simple buy-and-hold strategy. 
 
The results from BLL have been subject to consider scrutiny with Bessembinder and Chan 
(1998) examining the same trading rules as BLL for dividend-adjusted DJIA data over the 
sample period 1926-1991. Incorporating these dividends tends to reduce the returns on short 
sales and thus decreases the technical trading returns.  To avoid data snooping, they test the 
profitability and significance of the returns of the trading rules on portfolios as well as returns 
on individual stocks. The results show that the average buy-sell difference across all rules is 
4.4% per year, with non-synchronous trading with a 1-day lag reducing the difference to 
3.2%.  Nevertheless as break-even transaction costs decline over time, they find that the 
transaction costs outweigh the returns.  Thus it is unlikely that investors could have earned 
profits after transaction costs.  Further, Sullivan et al (1999) examine the results of BLL by 
applying a bootstrap reality check for the same sample period. They use 8000 trading rules 
from five various technical trading systems (filter, moving average, channel break-outs, 
support and resistance and on balance volume averages).  They find that the best rule is the 5-
day moving average rule and that the results is not due to data snooping.  However the out-of-
sample results are not so successful.  Using the 10-year out-of-sample period, the best rule is 
again the 5-day moving average rule although it does not continue to generate significant 
returns in the subsequent period.  Thus Sullivan et al (1999) conclude that market efficiency 
has improved in recent years due to the inferior performance of the out-of-sample tests, 
relative to in-sample performance. Ready (2002) studies BLL results by comparing their 
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moving average rules to technical trading rules formed by genetic programming.  They find 
that the BLL best trading rule for the 1963-1986 sample period produces significantly higher 
excess returns than the average of the trading rules recognized by the genetic programming.  
However, the BLL moving average rule is less successful than the genetically generated rules 
over the 1957-1962 period.  Thus Ready argues that investors would have been unlikely to 
choose the BLL moving average rule at the end of 1962 given its relatively poor performance 
and the results are just the result of data snooping.  Furthermore, Day and Wang (2002) re-
examine BLL findings by adjusting for both dividends and the interest earned on the proceeds 
from short sales. They show that adjusting for transaction costs and the impact of 
nonsynchronous prices on the reported closing levels of the DJIA eliminates the profits, 
reducing both the differential returns following buy and sell signals, and that the risk-adjusted 
excess profits are not statistically significant.  Also, Atanasova and Hudson (2010) conducted 
an updated version of the BLL paper to include data from the DJIA from 1897 to 2009.  They 
find that moving average rules to be highly predictive on the adjusted data to remove 
calendar effects and conclude that the removal of calendar effects does not make the rules 
insignificant.  Thus while some rules exploit calendar effects, they are primarily being driven 
by other factors. 
 
BLL results have been examined in great detail in the DJIA, but the moving average rule has 
also been examined in many markets, including the UK and Japan.  Hudson et al (1996) 
examine BLL’s methodology on the FT30 from 1935 to 1994.  Although they confirm that 
these rules have predictive power, they do not generate excess returns after taking account of 
transaction costs of 1% per round trip.  Mills (1997) investigate the FT30 from 1935 to 1994 
and find that the first forty years of their sample are consistent with returns much higher than 
buy-and-hold returns.  Goodarce et al (1999) also examine the UK market by utilising 
technical analysis methods such as relative strength, moving averages and the cumulative 
volume Relative Strength Moving Average ruler rule.  Using the FTSE 350 index over 1988 
to 1996, they find strong evidence that these trading rules are not predictive and the index 
moves randomly. Fifield et al (2005) study the moving average rule in 11 European stock 
markets (including the UK) from 1991 to 2000 and find that none of the rules examined 
outperformed the simple buy-and-hold strategy, suggesting deterioration in the profitability 
of the moving average rule.  Also, Fifield et al (2008) examine the predictive power and 
profitability of the moving average rule in 15 emerging and 3 established markets (US, UK 
and Japan) from 1989 to 2003.  They find that the moving average rule in developed markets 
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is less profitable than that in developing markets.  Further, Metghalchi et al (2012) examine 
the profitability of the moving average rule in 16 European stock markets (including the UK) 
from 1990 to 2006. They find that the simple moving average rule does have predictive 
power in all of the countries and that the two trading strategies studied do beat the buy-and-
hold strategy. 
 
Evidence from Japan has been sparse and mixed.  Bessembinder and Chan (1995) assess the 
moving average rules and trade-breakout rules for five Asian stock market indices.  They find 
that the rules have explanatory power in all five markets, with the three emerging markets 
(Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan) generating more explanatory power than more developed 
markets (Hong Kong and Japan).  However when transaction costs are considered, any gains 
from these trading strategies are eliminated.  They also find that signals emitted by technical 
rules in the US contain forecast power for returns in the Asian markets.  Ito (1999) also 
investigates the trading rules used by BLL data on the national equity indices of six Pacific-
Basin countries.  The results show that although the rules have predictive power in Japan, 
Canada, Indonesia, Mexico and Taiwan, the trading rules do not have any significant 
forecasting power in the US.  Furthermore, the rules have stronger forecast power in 
emerging markets than developed markets.  Jasic and Wood (2004) examine the profitability 
of the moving average rule based on univariate neural networks using untransformed data 
inputs to provide short-term predictions of stock market returns.  The profitability of trading 
rule signals for the S&P 500, DAX, TOPIX and FTSE All-Share were evaluated over the 
period 1965-1999 using out-of-sample short-term predictions.  The results suggest that each 
index produces returns above a simple buy-and-hold strategy even when transaction costs are 
accounted for.  Chong and Chan (2008) study the Nikkei 225 from 1985 to 2006 and also 
split the whole subsample into two using the year 2000 as the cut-off year. They find the 
moving average rule has no predictive power in any of the samples thus indicating the 
efficiency of the Japanese stock market in this respect.  Chen et al (2009) examine various 
technical trading rules from 1975 to 2006 in eight Asian markets (including the TOPIX) and 
find that the short term moving average rules are the most profitable for all markets when no 
transaction costs are implemented. However when transaction costs are taken into account, 
the most profitable rules are the long-run moving average rules, although there is a 
substantial decline in trading profits. 
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5.3. Methodology 
 
The technical rule examined in this chapter is the popular and well documented moving 
average rule.  A moving average is an average of observations of the level of the index over 
several consecutive time periods.  The objective is to smooth out seasonal variations 
(volatility) in the data.  The standard moving average rule, which utilizes the price line and 
the moving average of price, generates buy/sell signals on which the investor trades.  This 
strategy is expressed as buying (or selling) when the short-period moving average rises above 
(or falls below) the long-period moving average. Thus buy and sell signals are generated by 
crossovers of a long moving average (calculated over L days) by a short moving average (S 
days, S < L).  The buy signal is generated when the short-period moving average moves 
higher than the long-period moving average: 
 
 [∑   (   )
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 ⁄ ]                 (5.1) 
 
Where Pt is the price at time t and λ is the length of the moving average.  Sell signals are 
generated when the inequality is reversed: 
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A x% band is included to reduce the number of signals by eliminating “whiplash” signals 
when the short and long period moving averages are close
27
. The most popular moving 
average rule in the literature is the (1,200), where the short period is one day and the long 
period is 200 days. However for completeness, the three most popular variations of the rule 
are used: (1,50), (1,150) and (1,200).  The shorter the size of the moving average, the closer it 
follows the market, and the longer the size of the moving average, the more it smoothes 
market fluctuations.  Thus a rule with S = 1 is very responsive, that is, whenever the actual 
returns rises above (below) the moving average, the signal is to buy (sell).   
 
                                                 
27
 Generally a 1% band is used in the literature. 
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The moving average rule is examined over the full sample for each market to examine if the 
rule has been successful over the full period
28
 and these results are compared to the results of 
seminal paper by BLL to determine whether the returns of the rules have decreased since 
their examination of them.  To investigate further how returns have fared since the BLL 
publication, the moving average rule is examined since 1987 (the end of BLL’s sample 
period) for all markets.  Also to examine how the moving average rules have behaved over 
time, five yearly subsamples of buy-sell returns are calculated and plotted over time as 
before.  Similar to previous chapters, a dotted polynomial trendline is included to smooth the 
picture of how the anomalies have behaved over time.  Again, the suggested classification of 
return behaviour in Chapter Two is used to categorize the trading rules behaviour as in the 
previous chapters. 
 
The fact that the moving average rule has been successful for such a long period of time 
suggests that the rule is picking up some intrinsic property of the market. This property was 
unknown to investors in general before the publication of the BLL paper but since its 
publication, investors may have known about the success of the rule and may have begun to 
implement the rule into their investment strategy.  If many investors follow the moving 
average rule, it will force more buying (selling) pressure on the price when a buy (sell) signal 
is generated.  Thus prices will go up (down) more (less) than they would have done before 
the publication of BLL due to the increased volume of trading caused by this rule. This 
means that the stock will become overvalued (undervalued) relative to what it would previous 
have been due to the high (low) buying pressure at the start of the buy period (which is 
beyond what was causing the phenomenon on the first place) which may result in the rule not 
doing so well in the future and explain why the rule after the BLL publication is not very 
successful.   
 
Figure 5.1 presents the effect of investors knowing about the success of the moving average 
and trading on it.   Initially it is assumed that the value of the stock before the rule is known 
to investors is zero for simplicity reasons (along the x-axis).  However when investors begin 
trading on the moving average rule and a buy signal is generated, the increased volume of 
buying causes the stock’s value to increase to X1 beyond what it should be.  The same can be 
said when a sell signal is generated and the increased volume of selling causes the stock’s 
                                                 
28
 Atanasova and Hudson (2010) examined the DJIA up to March 2009 while this study investigates up to 
December 2009. 
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value to fall to X
2 
less than it should be.  Thus it is clear to see from Figure 5.1 that if many 
investors trade on the moving average rule, the value of the stock when a signal is created is 
distorted.  This may cause the moving average rules predictability to diminish. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Informed investors may realise this and begin to anticipate the next day’s signal take 
advantage of the overvaluing/undervaluing of the price.  To investigate this possibility, 
perfectly anticipated and imperfectly anticipated moving average rules are proposed and 
examined. These two rules anticipate the next day’s signal and trade that signal today to take 
advantage of the overvalued/undervalued price.  The perfectly anticipated moving average 
rule perfectly predicts the signal for the following day through the moving average rule. This 
is often quite possible since the long run moving average is often not close to the current 
price and so it is fairly certain what the following days signal is going to be. The imperfectly 
anticipated moving average rule incorporates the fact that investors will not always be 100% 
confident what the next day’s signal is going to be.  This rule is the same as the perfectly 
anticipated moving average rule except when the current price is very close to the long run 
moving average, a neutral signal is created like before.  Bands of 0.25%, 0.50% and 1% are 
used, similar to before to create these neutral signals.  That is, if the short run moving average 
is within the long run moving average by 0.25%, 0.5% and 1% the investor is faced with a 
neutral signal.  Instead of not trading, when the investor is faced with a neutral signal they 
choose the current days signal and trade on that.  That is, if the investor is uncertain what the 
following days signal is going to be, instead of predicting it they use the current days signal.  
These two rules are examined in section 5.4 of this chapter. 
Figure 5.1: The effect on the value of the stock when investors 
know about the moving average rule and begin to trade on it. 
Buy Signal Sell Signal 
X
1
 
X
2
 
Time 
Value of the Stock (normalised 
to be flat before the moving 
average rule is widely known to 
investors) 
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An important question to ask when dealing with any technical rule is whether an investor can 
use them to gain returns greater than the market. Thus the degree to which investors can earn 
profits that beat the buy-and-hold strategy using two simple trading strategies are analysed.  
This chapter considers two simple trading strategies, which are also used in the previous 
chapter for calendar anomalies. 
 
This study prefers simple trading strategies to complicated strategies since calendar 
anomalies are straightforward to understand and thus it should be relatively simple to make 
profits from them.  Many studies use a trading strategy that invests in the risk-free asset if 
they are not in the market.  Even though this may give a more equivalent risk to the buy-and-
hold strategy since the investor is always in some market, investing in the risk-free rate may 
be costly and time consuming since investors may only be out of the market for one or two 
days.  Since this thesis uses data from the US since 1897, from the UK since 1935 and from 
Japan since 1951, risk-free rate data was not available for the full sample and so is ignored in 
these trading strategies.  Since the investor does not invest in risk-free assets when they are 
out of the market in either of the trading strategies examined, the overall returns for the 
trading strategy will be less than if the investor had invested in the risk-free asset, making it 
more difficult for these rules to gain returns greater than the buy-and-hold strategy than if 
investment in the risk-free asset was conducted for every sell signal, thus the figures 
generated are conservative.  Nevertheless, a “double to out” trading strategy, which has 
broadly the same risk as the buy-and-hold strategy is studied, as well as a simple trading 
strategy which does not have comparable risk.  
 
The first trading strategy adopted is similar to Fifield et al (2005; 2008) and is as follows.  
The investor is initially assumed to hold a buy position and upon the first buy signal, the 
trader buys and holds until a sell signal is generated.  Upon this sell signal, the trader sells 
and goes out of the market until the next buy signal.  Upon the last sell signal, it is assumed 
that the investor liquidates his position.  At the end of the sample period, the profit from the 
different trading rules are calculated and compared with the profit from the naïve buy-and-
hold strategy.  The profits from this strategies are calculated net of transaction costs 
(transaction costs taken from Ratner and Leal 1999 for the US and Japan, and Hudson et al 
125 
 
1996 for the UK
29
).  The trading strategy evaluated here differs from those in the majority of 
the previous papers.  For example, this rule assumes that the investor has a limited amount of 
wealth that is invested in full at each buy (sell) transaction.  That is, this rule assumes that the 
investor can only sell after a buy transaction (and buy only after a sell transaction) whereas 
other studies assume that the investor has an unlimited amount of wealth and can implement 
multiple buys or sells after each price change.  The strategy examined here can therefore be 
characterised as prudent, and as satisfying the risk-averse nature of many investors (Fifield et 
al 2005). 
 
The second trading strategy examined follows the “double or out” rule suggested by 
Bessembinder and Chan (1998).  An investor who conducts the previous simple trading 
strategy faces a lot less risk than an investor who conducted the buy-and-hold strategy.  This 
is because they are out of the market for a considerable period of time and avoid the risk 
associated with being in the market all of the time.  Acknowledging this fact, a slightly 
modified version of the “double or out” trading strategy suggested by Bessembinder and 
Chan (1998) is applied to the various moving average rules previously examined. If a neutral 
signal is generated there is an investment in the index.  If a buy day is indicated the 
investment in the index is doubled whereas, if a sell day is indicated, the funds are invested in 
cash thus giving broadly similar risk to a buy-and-hold strategy. Bessembinder and Chan 
(1998) invest in the daily risk-free rate when a sell signal is generated but since no risk-free 
rates are available for long periods of the data examined, the investor invests in cash with no 
return when a sell signal is generated.  The profits from this strategy are also calculated net of 
transaction costs (transaction costs taken from Ratner and Leal 1999 for the US and Japan, 
and Hudson et al 1996 for the UK).  These two trading strategies are conducted to determine 
if simple trading on the calendar anomalies can beat the buy-and-gold strategy for each index. 
 
One issue with this type of trading rule is that the issue of stocks indices were not easily 
tradable until the 1980s when futures on indices and exchange traded funds (ETFs) became 
available to investors. However this thesis assumes, similar to most other studies examining 
the profitability of trading rules, that investors can trade on the stock indices easily without 
any extra cost incurred. 
                                                 
29
 Although these transaction costs are accurate for the period in which they were calculated, they do not 
correspond to the costs faced in the total sample examined in this thesis.  Nevertheless with no data available for 
the full sample, these transaction costs are employed. 
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5.4. Empirical Results  
 
5.4.1. Moving Average Rules 
 
Table 5.1 reports the moving average rule results for the three markets full samples. The 
number of buy and sell signals are denoted by N(Buy) and N(Sell) and the daily mean of the 
buy and sell periods are reported in columns 4 and 5, with their t-ratios below.  The fraction 
of buy and sell returns that are greater than zero are reported in columns 6 and 7, while the 
last column lists the differences between the daily mean of the buy and sell returns, with their 
t-ratios below.  If the moving average rule does not have any power to forecast price 
movements, then the returns on days when the rules generate buy signals should not be 
statistically different from the returns on days when the rule emits sell signals.  In other 
words, if the last column is different from zero and significant, technical analysis can be used 
to forecast price movements, and thus is contrary to the EMH.  
 
Panel A of Table 5.1 presents the moving average rule results for the DJIA.  The results show 
that from 1896 to 2009 each rule produced positive buy-sell differences which were all 
significant at 1%.  The (1,50,0.01) rule produces the greatest buy-sell difference of 0.0007485 
per day, which equates to 18.71% per annum.  However these buy-sell differences are lower 
than BLL’s results, suggesting that the moving average rule is not as strong as it once was.  
Panel B documents the moving average results for the FT30 and show that five of the six 
rules produce positive buy-sell differences that are significant at 5%. The largest buy-sell 
difference of 18.06% is again associated with the (1,50,0.01) rule.  The buy-sell differences 
are lower than ones found by Hudson et al (1996), again suggesting a weakening of the rule.  
Panel C reports the TOPIX results and indicate that all rules examined produce positive buy-
sell differences that are significant at 1%.  The most successful rule is the (1,150,0) rule 
which produces a buy-sell difference of 20.93% per annum, which is higher than any buy-sell 
difference in the DJIA or FT30.  This preliminary analysis suggests that the moving rule is 
more successful in the TOPIX than the DJIA or FT30 and that the rule may have weakened in 
power in the DJIA and FT30. 
 
Table 5.2 presents the moving average results for data after the data used in the BLL paper 
(1987-2009).  Panel A presents the DJIA results and shows that all of the buy-sell differences 
are negative.  This indicates that the moving average cannot be used to gain positive returns 
127 
 
and that it actually generates negative returns.  Although none of the rules are statistically 
significant, the fact that the buy-sell differences are now negative shows a complete reversal 
in the successfulness of the moving average rule. Panel B shows that five of the six rules 
generate buy-sell differences that are still positive for the FT30, but are no longer statistically 
significant. The z-statistics are not close to being significant at 5% indicating a weakening of 
the technical rule in the FT30.  The TOPIX results in Panel C show that four of the six rules 
generate positive and significant buy-sell differences for the 1987-2009 subsample.  
However, the magnitudes of the buy-sell differences are lower than the full sample results, 
also indicating a weakening of the moving average rule.  
 
The moving average rule in the DJIA from 1987-2009 does not generate positive buy-sell 
differences, suggesting investors may have taken advantage of the rule, eroding away the 
profits.  The FT30 results suggest that although positive buy-sell differences can still be 
made, they are not of great value and none of them are statistically significant.  The TOPIX 
however, still generates significant positive buy-sell differences, indicating that the moving 
average rule is a profitable strategy to use in this market although the magnitude of the 
predictability has fallen.   Thus it is clear to see that there has been a fall in the success of the 
moving average rule since 1987. 
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Test – Moving Average Rules N(Buy) N(Sell) Buy Sell Buy > 0 Sell > 0 Buy-Sell 
Panel A: DJIA 
(1,50,0) 18116 12680 0.0004462 
(2.50919)* 
-0.0001770 
(-3.18118)* 
0.535714 0.504022 0.0006232 
(4.58764)* 
(1,50,0.01) 14861 3656 0.00053621 
(2.92692)* 
-0.0002123 
(-3.04408) 
0.537447 0.501243 0.0007485 
(4.53284)* 
(1,150,0) 18814 11679 0.0003887 
(2.06246)* 
-0.000157 
(-2.8305)* 
0.53519 0.50176 0.0005453 
(3.83592)* 
(1,150,0.01) 17163 10052 0.0004148 
(2.26383)* 
-0.000201 
(-2.8389)* 
0.53732 0.4999 0.0006158 
(3.87923)* 
(1,200,0) 19286 11157 0.0003791 
(2.03981)* 
-0.000181 
(-2.9322)* 
0.53448 0.50058 0.0005597 
(3.82862)* 
(1,200,0.01) 17890 9880 0.000397 
(2.12766)* 
-0.000222 
(-3.0494)* 
0.53628 0.49717 0.0006187 
(3.87882)* 
Panel B: FT30 
(1,50,0) 11200 7905 0.00039189 
(1.53471) 
-0.0001744* 
(-1.93551) 
0.507143 0.486781 0.0005663* 
(3.050632) 
(1,50,0.01) 9194 6172 0.0005021* 
(2.070352) 
-0.0002203* 
(-2.79613) 
0.506526 
 
0.483474 0.0007224* 
(3.72152) 
(1,150,0) 11491 7515 0.00031472 
(1.0644) 
-0.0000941 
(-1.41141) 
0.506744 0.486361 0.0004088* 
(2.15757) 
(1,150,0.01) 10355 6503 0.00031647 
(0.97204) 
-0.000090 
(-1.3266) 
0.506229 
 
0.48316 0.0004069* 
(1.93415) 
(1,200,0) 11571 7385 0.00033330 
(1.186685) 
-0.0001293 
(-1.59909) 
0.510068 0.481517 0.0004623* 
(2.42732) 
(1,200,0.01) 10768 6647 0.0003324 
(1.07566) 
-0.000108 
(-1.4672) 
0.50938 0.48157 0.0004407* 
(2.15202) 
Panel C: TOPIX 
(1,50,0) 9048 6293 0.00060316 
(2.00800)* 
-0.00024220 
(-2.55646)* 
0.527741 0.460353 0.000845 
(4.0019)* 
(1,50,0.01) 7651 4990 0.00068249 
(2.19998)* 
-0.0002610 
(-2.52581)* 
0.534179 0.458517 0.000944 
(3.7865)* 
(1,150,0) 9458 5783 0.00063601 
(2.21453)* 
-0.0003611 
(-3.06964)* 
0.529182 0.452187 0.000997 
(3.9144)* 
(1,150,0.01) 8798 5146 0.0006373 
(2.33812)* 
-0.0001579 
(-2.83454)* 
0.530916 0.448504 0.000795 
(3.9148)* 
(1,200,0) 9598 5593 0.0004664 
(1.26705) 
-0.0001196 
(-1.8127) 
0.527506 0.451636 0.000586 
(2.6955)* 
(1,200,0.01) 9063 5107 0.0004734 
(1.24061) 
-0.0001361 
(-1.8541) 
0.529847 0.445467 0.000607 
(2.6305)* 
 
Table 5.1: Test Results for the Moving Average Rules full sample. “N(Buys)” and” N(Sells)” are the 
number of buy and sell signals reported during the sample.   “Buy” and “Sell” denote the daily mean 
buy and sell returns.  The numbers in parentheses are standard t-ratios testing the difference of the 
mean buy and mean sell from the unconditional 1-day mean.  “Buy > 0” and “Sell > 0” are the 
fraction of buy and sell returns greater than zero. “Buy-Sell” denotes the difference between the daily 
mean of the buy and sell returns, with the t-ratio in parentheses testing the difference of the buy-sell 
to zero.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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5.4.2. Five-Yearly Behaviour Analysis  
The results for the moving average rules for the five yearly subsamples for the three stock 
indices are presented in Figures 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 and discussed below.  The blotted points 
indicate excess returns which are statistically significant at least at the 5% level.  The dotted 
line is the polynomial trendline.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.2: Test Results for the Moving Average Rules 1987-2009.  “N(Buys)” and” N(Sells)” are the 
number of buy and sell signals reported during the sample.   “Buy” and “Sell” denote the daily mean buy 
and sell returns.  The numbers in parentheses are standard t-ratios testing the difference of the mean buy 
and mean sell from the unconditional 1-day mean.  “Buy > 0” and “Sell > 0” are the fraction of buy and 
sell returns greater than zero. “Buy-Sell” denotes the difference between the daily mean of the buy and 
sell returns, with the t-ratio in parentheses testing the difference of the buy-sell to zero.  ***, **, * 
indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
Test – Moving Average Rules N(Buy) N(Sell) Buy Sell Buy > 0 Sell > 0 Buy-Sell 
Panel A: DJIA 
(1,50,0) 3685 2071 0.0002396 
(-0.21073) 
0.0003871 
(0.308717) 
0.519946 0.537904 -0.000148 
(-0.4441) 
(1,50,0.01) 3016 1486 0.0001135 
(-0.57766) 
0.0004852 
(0.624104) 
0.511605 0.539704 -0.000372 
(-0.7515) 
(1,150,0) 3843 1813 0.0002069 
(-0.17480) 
0.0003432 
(0.287004) 
0.520687 0.535576 -0.000136 
(-0.3208) 
(1,150,0.01) 3498 1471 0.0002416 
(0.195319) 
0.0004104 
(0.621166) 
0.521441 0.536370 -0.000169 
(-0.3368) 
(1,200,0) 3915 1691 0.0002437 
(-0.09834) 
0.0003249 
(0.171397) 
0.525160 0.528090 -0.000081 
(-0.1806) 
(1,200,0.01) 3586 1408 0.0002907 
(-0.05419) 
0.0004575 
(0.429378) 
0.523982 0.526989 -0.000167 
(-0.3207) 
Panel B: FT30 
(1,50,0) 3433 2514 0.0000291 
(-0.408192) 
0.0002727 
(0.502238) 
0.49927 0.50438 -0.000244 
(-0.7942) 
(1,50,0.01) 2850 1946 0.0000245 
(0.091329) 
-0.000029 
(-0.096506) 
0.49614 0.50771 0.000053 
(0.15197) 
(1,150,0) 3376 2471 0.0002094 
(0.437488) 
-0.0000541 
(-0.538466) 
0.50948 0.48928 0.000264 
(0.84807) 
(1,150,0.01) 3036 2164 0.0002952 
(0.711229) 
-0.0000467 
(-0.535069) 
0.50889 0.48845 0.000342 
(1.01891) 
(1,200,0) 3296 2501 0.00014166 
(0.28643) 
-0.00002741 
(-0.34421) 
0.34557 0.48381 0.000169 
(0.54678) 
(1,200,0.01) 3087 2261 0.0000687 
(0.07755) 
0.0000254 
(-0.08142) 
0.51182 0.48607 0.000043 
(0.13378) 
Panel C: TOPIX 
(1,50,0) 2776 2980 0.0003741 
(1.33187) 
-0.0004180 
(-1.2704) 
0.48451 0.45369 0.0007923** 
(2.25356) 
(1,50,0.01) 2320 2479 0.0003055 
(1.50177) 
-0.000515 
(-1.1078) 
0.49353 0.45583 0.0008200** 
(2.12314) 
(1,150,0) 2692 2964 0.000416 
(1.5703) 
-0.000510 
(-1.4727) 
0.4970 0.4406 0.0009258*** 
(2.68628) 
(1,150,0.01) 2496 2757 0.000339 
(1.2864) 
-0.000457 
(-1.2278) 
0.4956 0.4432 0.000796** 
(2.19706) 
(1,200,0) 2620 2986 0.000256 
(1.0811) 
-0.000379 
(-0.9909) 
0.4927 0.4451 0.0006352* 
(1.842448) 
(1,200,0.01) 2446 2814 0.000270 
(0.9769) 
-0.000340 
(-0.9772) 
0.4955 0.4442 0.00061038* 
(1.68856) 
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Figure 5.2: The five-yearly moving average rule plotted for the DJIA.  The end year of sub sample is on the x-axis and the buy-sell 
difference is on the y-axis.  The blotted points are buy-sell differences that are statistically significant at 5%.  
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Figure 5.3: The five-yearly moving average rule plotted for the FT30.  The end year of sub sample is on the x-axis and the buy-sell 
difference is on the y-axis.  The blotted points are buy-sell differences that are statistically significant at 5%.  
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Figure 5.4: The five-yearly moving average rule plotted for the TOPIX.  The end year of sub sample is on the x-axis and the buy-
sell difference is on the y-axis.  The blotted points are buy-sell differences that are statistically significant at 5%.  
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Figure 5.2 documents the results for the DJIA moving average rules.  Only four of the 23 sub 
samples for the buy-sell differences of the (1,50,0) rule are statistically significant.  Also, this 
trading rule has a clear downward trend in the buy-sell, with the polynomial trendline turning 
negative towards the end of the sample.  The other two rules also have a clear downward 
trend, with their trendlines going negative in the early to mid-1980s.  Thus these results 
suggest that the moving average rule for the DJIA has actually reversed over time, and is no 
longer profitable. Thus the (1,50,0) rule can be deemed adaptive (type 4) and the (1,150,0) 
and (1,200,0) rule have switched and are type 3 (switch).  Figure 5.3 shows the results of the 
various moving average rules for the FT30.  The (1,50,0) rule shows a clear downward trend 
throughout the sample, with four of the first five sub samples buy-sell differences being 
statistically significant.  However, the trendline is still positive at the end of the sample, thus 
suggesting that this rule is still profitable and thus type 5.  Nevertheless, the (1,150,0) and 
(1,200,0) rules do have a downward trend and do turn negative at the end of the sample. The 
last subsample is positive for both rules so both rule can be deemed adaptive thus type 4.  The 
results for the TOPIX moving average rules are shown in Figure 5.4. The (1,50,0) rule has a 
number of positive and significant buy-sell differences at the beginning of the sample but 
from the mid-1970s onwards, the buy-sell differences decreases in magnitude.  The 
polynomial trendline goes negative in the year 2000, and continues to the end of the sample, 
indicating that this rule is no longer profitable in the TOPIX stock index and type 3 (switch).  
However, the (1,150,0) rule appears to still be profitable.  The trendline initially falls, but 
from the 1980s onwards, the trendline increases and continues to increase to the end of the 
sample.  Thus the (1,150,0) rule has been profitable, and continues to produce positive buy-
sell differences and can be deemed type 4.  The (1-200-0) rule’s profitability varies over time, 
with the trendline fluctuating above and below the x-axis indicating it’s adaptive nature and 
type 4 behaviour.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Market Anomaly Type 
 
DJIA 
(1,50,0) 4 
(1-150-0) 3 
(1-200-0) 3 
 
FT30 
(1-50-0) 3 
(1-150-0) 4 
(1-200-0) 4 
 
TOPIX 
(1-50-0) 3 
(1-150-0) 4 
(1-200-0) 4 
 
Table 5.3: Classification of the of the moving average rules 
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Table 5.3 reports the classification of the different moving average rulea according to the 
classifications prescribed in Chapter 2.  The (1,50,0) rule for the DJIA is type 4, indicating 
the adaptive return behaviour. The (1,150,0) and (1,200,0) rules are both type 3 indicating a 
switch in the behaviour of returns.  Two of the three rules for the FT30 and TOPIX are type 
4, indicating evidence of the AMH.  The other rule for these two markets indicates evidence 
of a switch in the behaviour of returns.  These results are somewhat surprising, since one 
would expect type 4 would be more likely in the longer series (DJIA) rather than the shorter 
two. However, the fact that returns have changed from being positive to negative in the DJIA 
is an important finding, and could be evidence of an early stage adaptive market.  
Nevertheless, according to the classification, the AMH is an appropriate model and 
describing the behaviour of stock returns over time. 
 
5.4.3. Perfectly and Imperfectly Anticipated Moving Average Rules   
 
Table 5.4 presents the results for the perfectly anticipated moving average rule for the DJIA, 
FT30 and TOPIX for the sample period 1987-2009 i.e. the period after BLL studied.  Panel A 
reports that the number of buy signals for each rule for the DJIA is greater than the number of 
sell signals.  Also for each rule, the one-day buy returns are all positive and statistically 
significant, while the one-day sell returns are all negative and statistically significant.  The 
buy-sell differences are all positive and significant, suggesting that if investors had perfectly 
anticipated the following days signal, they could make significant profits from 1987-2009. 
Panel B documents the results for the perfectly anticipated moving average rule of the FT30 
for the sample period 1987-2009. The number of buy signals exceeds the number of sell 
signals for each rule and the one-day buy returns are all positive, while the one-day sell 
returns are all negative.  However, all of the one-day returns are not statistically significant.  
The buy-sell differences are all positive (except one) with only the (1,50,0) rule being 
statistically significant.  These buy-sell differences are greater than the original rules buy-sell 
differences for the same sample period, indicating that predicting the following days signal 
would increase returns.  Panel C documents the results for the perfectly anticipated moving 
average rule for the TOPIX and shows that the number of buy and sell signals are quite 
similar and vary between rules to which one is greater.  The one-day buy returns are all 
positive although none are statistically significant while one-day sell returns are all negative, 
with none of them being statistically significant.  The buy-sell differences are all positive, 
with the rules with 50- and 150-days as the long run moving average being statistically 
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significant.  Three of the rules produce buy-sell differences that are greater than the 
corresponding buy-sell differences under the original rules indicating that predicting the 
following days signal does not always produce returns greater than the original rules for the 
TOPIX.  For all three markets, the perfectly anticipated moving average rule substantially 
outperforms the original moving average rule for the 1987-2009 period. 
 
In Table 5.5 the imperfectly anticipated moving average rules are presented. If investors are 
fairly certain what tomorrows signal is going to be, the investor uses that signal.  However, if 
there is a high level of uncertainty about what tomorrows signal is going to be, the investor 
chooses the current days signal.  The uncertainty comes from the fact that the short run 
moving average may be very close to the long run moving average implying that the 
following days return could generate either a buy or sell signal. The levels of uncertainty can 
be quantified by whether the short run and long run moving average are within say 1%, 2.5% 
or 5% of each other.  Panel A presents the DJIA results for the three moving average rules 
examined.  The results indicate that using all of the uncertainty bands produce significant 
returns.  As expected, the value of returns decrease as the uncertainty bands increases as less 
true values are chosen. Although returns are less than the perfectly anticipated rules, it is 
clear that this more realistic rule produces significant returns in the DJIA.  The results in 
Panel B indicate that two of the nine rules examined produce significant returns.  The (1,50,0) 
rule with 0.25% and 0.50% bands generate returns that are significant at 5%. However, some 
of the imperfectly anticipated rules generate higher returns than the perfectly anticipated rule 
for the FT30. For instance, the (1,50,0) perfect rule generates 16.73% per annum, while the 
imperfect rule with 0.25% and 0.50% band 18.1% and 16.95% per annum respectively. This 
suggests the original FT30 moving average rule could be modified to generate higher returns. 
The TOPIX results in Panel C indicate that four of the rules examined produce significant 
returns. However, similarly to the DJIA results, the returns are less than the perfectly 
anticipated rules. This again indicates that even the imperfectly anticipated moving average 
can produce significant returns. 
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Day Before Moving Average 
Rules – Perfectly Anticipated 
N(Buy) N(Sell) Buy Sell Buy > 0 Sell > 0 Buy-Sell 
Panel A: DJIA 
(1,50,0) 3684 2071 0.00174872*** 
(5.87) 
-0.0023591*** 
(-8.60) 
0.520087 0.537904 0.0041078*** 
(10.80) 
(1,50,0.01) 3015 1486 0.00197458*** 
(6.07) 
-0.0029833*** 
(-9.61) 
0.511774 0.539704 0.0049579*** 
(10.16) 
(1,150,0) 3842 1813 0.0009994*** 
(2.99) 
-0.0013299*** 
(-4.90) 
0.520562 0.535576 0.0023293*** 
(5.47) 
(1,150,0.01) 3497 1471 0.00111548*** 
(3.58) 
-0.0016908*** 
(-5.30) 
0.521304 0.53637 0.0028062*** 
(5.56) 
(1,200,0) 3915 1690 0.00096663*** 
(2.80) 
-0.0013429*** 
(-4.87) 
0.52516 0.528402 0.00230956*** 
(5.12) 
(1,200,0.01) 3586 1408 0.0009448*** 
(2.77) 
-0.0014852*** 
(-4.81) 
0.523982 0.526989 0.00242998*** 
(4.64) 
Panel B: FT30 
(1,50,0) 3433 2514 0.0003840 
(1.12) 
-0.0002849 
(-1.38) 
0.499272 0.504375 0.000669** 
(2.01) 
(1,50,0.01) 2850 1946 0.00039845 
(1.21) 
-0.0003424 
(-0.56) 
0.49614 0.507708 -0.0007409* 
(1.85) 
(1,150,0) 3376 2471 0.00029442 
(0.86) 
-0.0002275 
(-1.06) 
0.509479 0.489276 0.000522 
(1.53) 
(1,150,0.01) 3036 2164 0.00037672 
(0.75) 
-0.0002188 
(-1.34) 
0.508893 0.488447 0.000596 
(1.57) 
(1,200,0) 3296 2501 0.00034843 
(1.06) 
-0.0002884 
(-1.28) 
0.512743 0.483806 0.000637* 
(1.87) 
(1,200,0.01) 3087 2261 0.00034944 
(1.12) 
-0.0002527 
(-1.03) 
0.511842 0.486068 0.000602* 
(1.65) 
Panel C: TOPIX 
(1,50,0) 2904 3046 0.0004891 
(1.75) 
-0.000529 
(-1.69) 
0.48554 0.45371 0.001018*** 
(3.00) 
(1,50,0.01) 2438 2537 0.0005622* 
(1.96) 
-0.000516 
(-1.47) 
0.49426 0.45605 0.0010777*** 
(2.81) 
(1,150,0) 2821 3029 0.000320 
(1.22) 
-0.000394 
(-1.17) 
0.4981 0.4407 0.000714** 
(2.10) 
(1,150,0.01) 2608 2809 0.000457 
(1.29) 
-0.000341 
(-1.30) 
0.4969 0.4439 0.000798** 
(2.25) 
(1,200,0) 2755 3045 0.0002093 
(0.89) 
-0.000307 
(-0.83) 
0.49292 0.44565 0.0005162 
(1.52) 
(1,200,0.01) 2569 2862 0.0002166 
(0.78) 
-0.0002729 
(-0.81) 
0.49513 0.44514 0.0004894 
(1.37) 
 
Table 5.4: Test Results for the perfectly anticipated moving average rule from 1987 – 2009. “N(Buys)” and” N(Sells)” are the 
number of buy and sell signals reported during the sample.   “Buy” and “Sell” denote the daily mean buy and sell returns.  The 
numbers in parentheses are standard t-ratios testing the difference of the mean buy and mean sell from the unconditional 1-day 
mean.  “Buy > 0” and “Sell > 0” are the fraction of buy and sell returns greater than zero. “Buy-Sell” denotes the difference 
between the daily mean of the buy and sell returns, with the t-ratio in parentheses testing the difference of the buy-sell to zero.  
***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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Day Before Moving 
Average Rules 
Uncertainty 
Band 
% Signs not 
Forecasted 
N(Buy) N(Sell) Buy Sell Buy > 0 Sell > 0 Buy-Sell 
Panel A: DJIA 
 
(1,50,0) 
 
0.25% 5.26% 3702 2053 0.001445*** 
(4.67) 
-0.001847*** 
(6.90) 
0.56 0.46 0.003292*** 
(8.57) 
0.5% 10.63% 3692 2063 0.001223*** 
(3.78) 
-0.001433*** 
(-5.57) 
0.55 0.48 0.002656*** 
(6.91) 
1% 21.79% 3701 2054 0.000868** 
(2.38) 
-0.000805*** 
(-3.51) 
0.54 0.51 0.001673*** 
(4.34) 
 
(1,150,0)
 
0.25% 2.85% 3835 1820 0.000878** 
(2.50) 
-0.001065*** 
(-4.09) 
0.54 0.49 0.001943*** 
(4.56) 
0.5% 6.19% 3816 1839 0.0007796** 
(2.10) 
-0.000840*** 
(-3.41) 
0.54 0.50 0.001620*** 
(3.83) 
1% 12.15% 3802 1853 0.0006175 
(1.45) 
-0.000496** 
(-2.34) 
0.53 0.51 0.001113*** 
(2.65) 
 
(1,200,0) 
 
0.25% 2.96% 3907 1698 0.000799** 
(2.12) 
-0.000946*** 
(-3.68) 
0.54 0.48 0.001746*** 
(3.88) 
0.5% 5.46% 3902 1703 0.000730* 
(1.85) 
-0.000785*** 
(-3.19) 
0.54 0.49 0.001516*** 
(3.37) 
1% 10.92% 3857 1748 0.000569 
(1.20) 
-0.000389** 
(-2.02) 
0.54 0.51 0.000958** 
(2.18) 
Panel B: FT30 
 
(1,50,0) 
 
0.25% 4.76% 3418 2529 0.000409 
(1.17) 
-0.000315 
(-1.57) 
0.50 0.50 0.000724** 
(2.19) 
0.5% 9.43% 3410 2537 0.000390 
(1.17) 
-0.000287 
(1.46) 
0.50 0.50 0.000677** 
(2.05) 
1% 18.78% 3409 2538 0.000324 
(1.10) 
-0.000199 
(-0.38) 
0.50 0.50 0.000524 
(1.59) 
 
(1,150,0)
 
0.25% 2.75% 3373 2474 0.000296 
(0.86) 
-0.000229 
(-1.10) 
0.51 0.49 0.000525 
(1.54) 
0.5% 5.49% 3366 2481 0.000307 
(0.89) 
-0.00024 
(-1.18) 
0.51 0.49 0.000550 
(1.62) 
1% 10.98% 3307 2540 0.000356 
(0.95) 
-0.000293 
(-1.55) 
0.51 0.49 0.000649* 
(1.94) 
 
(1,200,0) 
 
0.25% 1.86% 3299 2498 0.000326 
(0.99) 
-0.000260* 
(-1.19) 
0.51 0.49 0.000587* 
(1.73) 
0.5% 3.55% 3290 2507 0.000333 
(0.96) 
-0.000267 
(-1.27) 
0.51 0.49 0.000600* 
(1.77) 
1% 7.45% 3261 2536 0.000351 
(1.25) 
-0.000283 
(-1.16) 
0.51 0.49 0.000634* 
(1.89) 
Panel C: TOPIX 
 
(1,50,0) 
 
0.25% 3.95% 2894 3056 0.000384 
(1.39) 
-0.000426 
(-1.34) 
0.49 0.45 0.000810** 
(2.40) 
0.5% 7.63% 2916 3034 0.000322 
(1.19) 
-0.000373 
(-1.16) 
0.49 0.45 0.000695** 
(2.05) 
1% 16.08% 2909 3041 0.000204 
(0.79) 
-0.000258 
(-0.77) 
0.48 0.46 0.000462 
(1.36) 
 
(1,150,0) 
 
0.25% 1.32% 2807 3043 0.000345 
(1.30) 
-0.000414 
(-1.24) 
0.50 0.44 0.000759** 
(2.24) 
0.5% 3.16% 2807 3043 0.000364 
(1.37) 
-0.000431 
(-1.29) 
0.50 0.44 0.000796** 
(2.35) 
1% 6.89% 2796 3054 0.000288 
(1.11) 
-0.000359 
(-1.05) 
0.50 0.44 0.000646* 
(1.90) 
 
(1,200,0) 
 
0.25% 1.62% 2748 3052 0.000221 
(0.93) 
-0.000317 
(-0.86) 
0.49 0.45 0.000539 
(1.59) 
0.5% 3.31% 2747 3053 0.000208 
(0.88) 
-0.000305 
(-0.82) 
0.49 0.45 0.000513 
(1.51) 
1% 5.97% 2756 3044 0.000166 
(0.75) 
-0.000268 
(-0.70) 
0.49 0.45 0.000435 
(1.28) 
 
Table 5.5: Test results for the imperfectly anticipated moving average rule from 1987 – 2009. “Uncertainty Band” refers to the 
difference between the short and long run moving averages for which the previous signal was used.  “% Signs not forecasted” denotes 
the percentage of days not forecasted.  “N(Buys)” and” N(Sells)” are the number of buy and sell signals reported during the sample.   
“Buy” and “Sell” denote the daily mean buy and sell returns.  The numbers in parentheses are standard t-ratios testing the difference of 
the mean buy and mean sell from the unconditional 1-day mean.  “Buy > 0” and “Sell > 0” are the fraction of buy and sell returns 
greater than zero. “Buy-Sell” denotes the difference between the daily mean of the buy and sell returns, with the t-ratio in parentheses 
testing the difference of the buy-sell to zero.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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5.4.4. Trading Strategy Analysis 
 
The simple trading strategy and the “double-or-out” trading strategy are conducted on the 
original moving average rule, as well as the perfectly and imperfectly anticipated moving 
average rules described earlier on full sample data and the post BLL (1987-2009) data.  
Tables 5.6-5.8 present the moving average rule, perfectly anticipated moving average rule 
and imperfectly anticipated moving average rule trading strategy results for the full sample of 
each market.  Table 5.6 reports the results for the moving average rules using the simple 
trading strategy on the full sample of each market. All three markets show that the simple 
trading strategy does outperform the buy-and-hold strategy over the full sample of each 
market.  The most successful rule in each instance is the (1,50,0) rule, which is supported by 
the earlier findings.  However as expected, the risk (standard deviation) of the sample trading 
strategy is about half the risk of the buy-and-hold strategy since there are long periods when 
the investor is out of the market and invested in cash.  These results support the findings of 
BLL for the DJIA and Hudson et al (1996) for the FT30.  Table 5.7 shows that the simple 
trading rule using the perfectly anticipated moving average rule does outperform the buy-and-
hold strategy for all the rules and markets.  These returns are substantially greater than the 
returns realised from the original moving average rule indicating that the perfectly anticipated 
moving average rule is optimal to the original moving average rule. Again it is noticeable that 
the risk of the trading strategy is only around half that of the buy-and-hold strategy and again 
the most successful rule is the (1,50,0) rule.  Table 5.8 presents the results of the simple 
trading strategy when the imperfectly anticipated moving average rule is implemented.  The 
trading rule again outperforms the buy-and-hold strategy for each version of the rule 
examined, with the standard deviation again being less than that of the buy-and-hold strategy.  
The returns from this rule are substantially greater than the returns from the original moving 
average rule, but as predicted are less than the perfectly anticipated moving average rule.  
Nevertheless, this shows that even if investors are unsure what the following days signal is 
going to be, they can still make substantial returns greater than the simple buy-and-hold 
strategy. 
 
Tables 5.9–5.11 document the results from the trading strategy for the post-BLL data (1987-
2009).  This period is examined since previously this thesis found that the returns during this 
period were negative for the DJIA and returns for the FT30 and TOPIX were not as high as 
for the full sample.  Table 5.9 shows that the returns from the simple trading strategy on the 
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original moving average rules do not outperform the buy-and-hold strategy for the DJIA for 
any of the rules examined.  The buy-and-hold strategy generates returns greater than the 
trading rule using the original moving average rule.  This could be due to investors 
recognising the successful of the moving average rule and exploiting it.  However, the trading 
rule does outperform the buy-and-hold strategy for the FT30 and TOPIX, supporting the 
results found earlier. Nevertheless when the perfectly anticipated moving average rule is 
examined in Table 5.10, the trading strategy outperforms the buy-and-hold strategy for all 
three markets. The returns are substantially greater than the returns generated from the 
original rule (up to six times greater) indicating that predicting the next day’s signal 
accurately does generate substantially greater returns than the original moving average rule.  
When the imperfectly anticipated moving average rule is examined for the 1987-2009 data in 
Table 5.11, it is clear that all three markets outperform the buy-and-hold strategy. The returns 
are obviously less than the perfectly anticipated moving average rule, but all three markets 
still generate returns substantially greater than the buy-and-hold strategy.  The rule is most 
successful in the TOPIX and least successful in the DJIA, which is constant with the previous 
results and the idea that a relatively new market is likely to be less efficient than an older one 
(Lo 2012). 
 
Tables 5.12–5.14 document the results of using the “double or out” trading strategy on 
various versions of the moving average rule for the full samples.  It is clear that risk 
associated with this trading strategy is comparable to the risk faced by the buy-and-hold 
strategy.  It is clear to see from Tables 5.12-5.14 that the “double or out” trading strategy 
outperforms the buy-and-hold strategy for all of versions of the moving average rules 
examining the full samples.    The perfectly anticipated moving average rule is the most 
successful and the original moving average rule the least successful rule.  From Tables 5.15-
5.17 it is clear that the original moving average rule on post BLL data outperforms the buy-
and-hold strategy for all but one of the rules examined using the “double or out” strategy. 
Further, the trading strategy outperforms the buy-and-hold strategy substantially using the 
perfect and imperfectly anticipated rules. These results are consistent with the simple trading 
strategy used earlier.  The magnitudes of the annualized % difference are quite substantial for 
all three markets.  This can be explained by the fact that the trading strategy is investing 
double into the market when a buy signal is generated, and by the fact that the anticipated 
moving average rules are very successful.  Further, the results may be so strong given the fact 
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that the markets have been subject to a number of market crashes and recessions over the 
1987-2009 period, with the TOPIX actually falling in value from 1987-2009. 
 
This section has examined the original moving average rule, the perfectly anticipated moving 
average rule and the imperfectly anticipated moving average rule to determine whether 
returns can be generated that are greater than the buy-and-hold strategy using a simple trading 
strategy as well as the “double or out” trading strategy.  The results show that both trading 
strategies using the original moving average rule can generate returns greater than the buy-
and-hold strategy for all three markets when the full sample of each market is examined. 
Returns are substantially increased when the perfectly and imperfectly anticipated moving 
average rules are examined. The post BLL (1987-2009) data results show that the simple 
trading strategies cannot beat the buy-and-hold strategy for the DJIA, while the “double or 
out” strategy can for all but one of the rules.  Nevertheless returns greater than the buy-and-
hold strategy are generated for the FT30 and TOPIX.  The perfect and imperfectly anticipated 
moving average rules do produce returns greater than the buy-and-hold strategy for all of the 
markets using both of the trading strategies.  The “double-or-out” strategy results are very 
similar but double since the investor is double in the market when a buy signal is generated 
and still in the market when a neutral signal is generated.  The results in this section show 
that if investors can successfully predict the following days signal, the moving average rule 
does produce substantial returns in all three markets greater than the original moving average 
rule and the buy-and-hold strategy.  Even after the publication of BLL, substantial profits can 
be earned by predicting the next day’s signal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 5.6: Test results for the moving average rule using a simple trading strategy on the full sample for each market.  The number of new trades 
(No. of buy/sell) is shown with the profit from trading on the rule (Rule Profit) and the buy-and-hold strategy as well as the difference between 
the rule returns and the buy-and-hold strategy returns.  The final column is the annualised % difference in profit between the trading rules and the 
buy-and-hold strategies. All profits are the accumulation of log returns.   
Rule No. of Buy No. of Sell  Rule SD B&H SD Rule Profit B&H Profit Difference Annualised % Difference 
Panel A: DJIA 
 (1,50,0)  939 938 0.66 1.09 798.99 582.29 216.70 0.24% 
 (1,50,1)  623 851 0.60 1.09 781.33 582.29 199.29 0.22% 
(1,150,0) 492 491 0.63 1.09 688.19 582.29 105.90 0.14% 
(1,150,1) 501 470 0.61 1.09 668.56 582.29 86.27 0.11% 
(1,200,0) 405 404 0.69 1.09 737.04 582.29 154.75 0.18% 
(1,200,1) 423 369 0.67 1.09 718.69 582.29 136.40 0.17% 
Panel B: FT30 
(1,50,0) 511 509 0.70 1.06 624.76 293.46 331.30 0.71% 
(1,50,1) 529 482 0.65 1.06 565.64 293.46 272.18 0.64% 
(1,150,0) 279 278 0.64 1.06 415.86 293.46 122.40 0.39% 
(1,150,1) 274 263 0.62 1.06 435.11 293.46 141.65 0.43% 
(1,200,0) 218 217 0.70 1.06 477.11 293.46 183.65 0.51% 
(1,200,1) 226 222 0.68 1.06 450.45 293.46 156.99 0.44% 
Panel C: TOPIX 
(1,50,0) 353 352 0.62 1.02 724.47 412.84 311.63 0.77% 
(1,50,1) 354 358 0.58 1.02 692.53 412.84 279.69 0.72% 
(1,150,0) 173 173 0.61 1.02 543.78 412.84 130.94 0.43% 
(1,150,1) 183 170 0.57 1.02 558.63 412.84 145.79 0.47% 
(1,200,0) 155 154 0.72 1.02 514.15 412.84 101.31 0.35% 
(1,200,1) 156 137 0.65 1.02 516.59 412.84 103.75 0.36% 
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Rule No. of Buy No. of Sell  Rule SD B&H SD Rule Profit B&H Profit Difference Annualised % Difference 
Panel A: DJIA 
 (1,50,0)  938 938 0.65 1.09 2993.76 582.29 2411.47 0.71% 
 (1,50,1)  955 851 0.60 1.09 2860.16 582.29 2277.87 0.70% 
(1,150,0) 491 491 0.68 1.09 1892.11 582.29 1309.82 0.61% 
(1,150,1) 500 470 0.65 1.09 1879.42 582.29 1297.13 0.61% 
(1,200,0) 404 404 0.68 1.09 1709.15 582.29 1126.86 0.58% 
(1,200,1) 422 369 0.66 1.09 1711.98 582.29 1129.69 0.58% 
Panel B: FT30 
(1,50,0) 510 509 0.69 1.06 1802.55 293.46 1509.09 1.12%% 
(1,50,1) 528 482 0.64 1.06 1729.68 293.46 1436.22 1.11% 
(1,150,0) 278 278 0.62 1.18 1124.15 293.46 830.69 0.99% 
(1,150,1) 273 263 0.66 1.06 1101.99 293.46 808.53 0.78% 
(1,200,0) 217 217 0.69 1.06 975.20 293.46 681.74 0.93% 
(1,200,1) 225 222 0.68 1.06 964.82 293.46 671.36 0.93% 
Panel C: TOPIX 
(1,50,0) 352 352 0.61 1.02 1542.85 412.84 1130.01 1.31% 
(1,50,1) 353 358 0.58 1.02 1463.71 412.84 1050.87 1.28% 
(1,150,0) 172 173 0.64 1.02 991.54 412.84 578.70 1.04% 
(1,150,1) 182 170 0.62 1.02 986.21 412.84 573.37 1.04% 
(1,200,0) 154 154 0.64 1.02 912.31 412.84 499.47 0.98% 
(1,200,1) 155 137 0.63 1.02 905.88 412.84 493.04 0.97% 
 
Table 5.7: Test results for the perfectly anticipated moving average rule using a simple trading strategy on the full sample for each 
market.  The number of new trades (No. of buy/sell) is shown with the profit from trading on the rule (Rule Profit) and the buy-and-hold 
strategy as well as the difference between the rule returns and the buy-and-hold strategy returns.  The final column is the annualised % 
difference in profit between the trading rules and the buy-and-hold strategies. All profits are the accumulation of log returns.   
 
Rule No. of Buy No. of Sell  Rule SD B&H SD Rule Profit B&H Profit Difference Annualised % Difference 
 Panel A: DJIA 
 (1,50,0.25)  953 951 0.66 1.09 2571.17 582.29 1988.88 0.68% 
 (1,50,0.5)  935 908 0.66 1.09 2230.09 582.29 1647.80 0.65% 
(1,50,1) 955 851 0.66 1.09 1821.05 582.29 1238.76 0.57% 
(1,150,0.25) 653 646 0.67 1.09 1964.94 582.29 1382.65 0.62% 
(1,150,0.5) 641 651 0.67 1.09 1728.58 582.29 1146.29 0.58% 
(1,150,1) 642 607 0.67 1.09 1419.96 582.29 837.67 0.52% 
(1,200,0.25) 403 373 0.69 1.09 1527.70 582.29 945.41 0.54% 
(1,200,0.5) 420 376 0.69 1.09 1388.87 582.29 806.58 0.51% 
(1,200,1) 422 369 0.69 1.09 1198.29 582.29 646.00 0.47% 
 Panel B: FT30 
 (1,50,0.25)  499 507 0.69 1.06 1549.97 293.46 1256.51 1.08% 
 (1,50,0.5)  511 491 0.69 1.06 1368.95 293.46 1075.52 1.05% 
(1,50,1) 528 482 0.69 1.06 1112.92 293.46 819.46 0.98% 
(1,150,0.25) 378 348 0.68 1.06 1165.86 293.46 872.40 1.00% 
(1,150,0.5) 383 350 0.68 1.06 1025.70 293.46 732.24 0.95% 
(1,150,1) 397 321 0.69 1.06 860.54 293.46 567.08 0.88% 
(1,200,0.25) 209 205 0.69 1.06 879.44 293.46 585.98 0.89% 
(1,200,0.5) 202 210 0.69 1.06 793.95 293.46 500.46 0.84% 
(1,200,1) 225 222 0.69 1.06 696.43 293.46 402.97 0.77% 
 Panel C:TOPIX 
 (1,50,0.25)  356 353 0.61 1.02 1360.29 412.84 947.45 1.24% 
 (1,50,0.5)  351 349 0.61 1.02 1234.20 412.84 821.36 1.19% 
(1,50,1) 350 354 0.62 1.02 1069.82 412.84 656.98 1.10% 
(1,150,0.25) 164 179 0.64 1.02 910.50 412.84 497.66 0.98% 
(1,150,0.5) 171 177 0.64 1.02 861.31 412.84 448.47 0.93% 
(1,150,1) 182 170 0.64 1.02 777.32 412.84 364.48 0.84% 
(1,200,0.25) 151 152 0.64 1.02 832.00 412.84 419.16 0.91% 
(1,200,0.5) 155 145 0.64 1.02 786.82 412.84 373.98 0.85% 
(1,200,1) 155 137 0.65 1.02 705.69 412.84 292.85 0.74% 
 
Table 5.8: Test results for the imperfectly anticipated moving average rule using a simple trading strategy on the full sample for each market.  
The number of new trades (No. of buy/sell) is shown with the profit from trading on the rule (Rule Profit) and the buy-and-hold strategy as 
well as the difference between the rule returns and the buy-and-hold strategy returns.  The final column is the annualised % difference in 
profit between the trading rules and the buy-and-hold strategies. All profits are the accumulation of log returns.   
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Rule No. of Buy No. of Sell  Rule SD B&H SD Rule Profit B&H Profit Difference Annualised % Difference 
Panel A: DJIA 
 (1,50,0)  216 216 0.69 1.19 89.78 170.49 -80.71 -3.91% 
 (1,50,1)  246 186 0.62 1.19 40.68 170.49 -129.81 -13.87% 
(1,150,0) 121 121 0.65 1.19 97.31 170.49 -73.17 -3.27% 
(1,150,1) 127 112 0.62 1.19 101.94 170.49 -68.54 -2.92% 
(1,200,0) 113 113 0.71 1.19 114.19 170.49 -56.29 -2.14% 
(1,200,1) 98 100 0.67 1.19 121.53 170.49 -48.95 -1.75% 
Panel B: FT30 
(1,50,0) 192 192 0.69 1.18 134.41 39.42 94.99 3.07% 
(1,50,1) 193 177 0.62 1.18 118.87 39.42 79.45 2.91% 
(1,150,0) 100 100 0.58 1.18 112.47 39.42 73.05 2.82% 
(1,150,1) 91 101 0.56 1.18 127.09 39.42 87.67 3.00% 
(1,200,0) 73 73 0.62 1.18 137.59 39.42 98.17 3.10% 
(1,200,1) 60 84 0.60 1.18 131.47 39.42 92.05 3.04% 
Panel C: TOPIX 
(1,50,0) 170 170 0.71 1.32 143.18 -54.33 197.51 6.00% 
(1,50,1) 161 179 0.66 1.32 140.23 -54.33 194.56 6.03% 
(1,150,0) 74 75 0.67 1.32 120.80 -54.33 175.13 6.30% 
(1,150,1) 71 86 0.62 1.32 118.69 -54.33 173.02 6.34% 
(1,200,0) 69 69 0.71 1.32 75.28 -54.33 129.61 7.49% 
(1,200,1) 70 72 0.69 1.32 74.02 -54.33 128.35 7.54% 
 
Table 5.9: Test results for the moving average rule using a simple trading strategy on the 1987-2009 data for each market.  The number of 
new trades (No. of buy/sell) is shown with the profit from trading on the rule (Rule Profit) and the buy-and-hold strategy as well as the 
difference between the rule returns and the buy-and-hold strategy returns.  The final column is the annualised % difference in profit 
between the trading rules and the buy-and-hold strategies. All profits are the accumulation of log returns.   
 
Table 5.10: Test results for the perfectly anticipated moving average rule using a simple trading strategy on the 1987-2009 data for each 
market.  The number of new trades (No. of buy/sell) is shown with the profit from trading on the rule (Rule Profit) and the buy-and-hold 
strategy as well as the difference between the rule returns and the buy-and-hold strategy returns.  The final column is the annualised % 
difference in profit between the trading rules and the buy-and-hold strategies. All profits are the accumulation of log returns.   
 Rule No. of Buy No. of Sell  Rule SD B&H SD Rule Profit B&H Profit Difference Annualised % Difference 
Panel A: DJIA 
 (1,50,0)  216 216 0.67 1.19 658.16 170.49 487.68 3.22% 
 (1,50,1)  246 186 0.60 1.19 611.70 170.49 441.42 3.14% 
(1,150,0) 121 121 0.69 1.19 412.74 170.49 242.26 2.55% 
(1,150,1) 127 112 0.65 1.19 415.98 170.49 245.50 2.57% 
(1,200,0) 113 113 0.70 1.19 406.12 170.49 235.64 2.52% 
(1,200,1) 98 100 0.66 1.19 362.57 170.49 192.09 2.30% 
Panel B: FT30 
(1,50,0) 192 192 0.68 1.18 604.20 39.42 564.78 4.06% 
(1,50,1) 193 177 0.61 1.18 571.70 39.42 532.28 4.05% 
(1,150,0) 100 99 0.62 1.18 368.01 39.42 328.59 3.88% 
(1,150,1) 91 101 0.59 1.18 346.01 39.42 306.59 3.85% 
(1,200,0) 73 72 0.61 1.18 306.35 39.42 266.93 3.79% 
(1,200,1) 60 83 0.59 1.18 294.74 39.42 255.32 3.77% 
Panel C: TOPIX 
(1,50,0) 170 170 0.71 1.32 607.73 -54.33 662.06 4.74% 
(1,50,1) 161 179 0.66 1.32 567.50 -54.33 621.83 4.76% 
(1,150,0) 74 75 0.69 1.32 319.04 -54.33 373.37 5.09% 
(1,150,1) 71 86 0.67 1.32 323.60 -54.33 377.93 5.08% 
(1,200,0) 69 69 0.68 1.32 286.50 -54.33 340.83 5.17% 
(1,200,1) 70 72 0.66 1.32 279.08 -54.33 333.41 5.19% 
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Table 5.11: Test results for the imperfectly anticipated moving average rule using a simple trading strategy on the 1987-2009 data for each 
market.  The number of new trades (No. of buy/sell) is shown with the profit from trading on the rule (Rule Profit) and the buy-and-hold 
strategy as well as the difference between the rule returns and the buy-and-hold strategy returns.  The final column is the annualised % 
difference in profit between the trading rules and the buy-and-hold strategies. All profits are the accumulation of log returns.   
 
Rule No. of Buy No. of Sell  Rule SD B&H SD Rule Profit B&H Profit Difference Annualised % Difference 
Panel A: DJIA 
(1,50,0.25) 222 214 0.68 1.19 553.94 170.49 383.46 3.01% 
(1,50,0.50) 225 203 0.68 1.19 466.00 170.49 295.52 2.76% 
(1,50,1) 246 186 0.69 1.19 335.82 170.49 165.34 2.14% 
(1,150,0.25) 158 135 0.68 1.19 420.98 170.49 250.50 2.59% 
(1,150,0.50) 158 136 0.68 1.19 363.62 170.49 193.14 2.31% 
(1,150,1) 167 137 0.69 1.19 301.86 170.49 131.38 1.89% 
(1,200,0.25) 111 104 0.70 1.19 338.41 170.49 167.93 2.15% 
(1,200,0.50) 110 105 0.70 1.19 311.14 170.49 140.66 1.97% 
(1,200,1) 98 100 0.70 1.19 238.00 170.49 67.52 1.23% 
Panel B: FT30 
 (1,50,0.25)  178 194 0.67 1.18 499.58 39.42 460.16 4.00% 
 (1,50,0.5)  184 186 0.67 1.18 435.06 39.42 395.64 3.95% 
(1,50,1) 193 177 0.68 1.18 348.75 39.42 309.33 3.86% 
(1,150,0.25) 142 124 0.64 1.18 364.79 39.42 325.37 3.88% 
(1,150,0.5) 145 126 0.64 1.18 305.59 39.42 266.17 3.79% 
(1,150,1) 151 117 0.64 1.18 254.77 39.42 215.35 3.68% 
(1,200,0.25) 72 72 0.61 1.18 282.47 39.42 243.05 3.74% 
(1,200,0.5) 67 80 0.60 1.18 251.84 39.42 212.42 3.67% 
(1,200,1) 60 83 0.61 1.18 225.01 39.42 185.59 2.28% 
Panel C:TOPIX 
 (1,50,0.25)  164 177 0.71 1.32 505.83 -54.33 560.16 4.81% 
 (1,50,0.5)  157 174 0.71 1.32 434.66 -54.33 488.99 4.89% 
(1,50,1) 161 179 0.71 1.32 357.46 -54.33 411.79 5.01% 
(1,150,0.25) 73 75 0.70 1.32 292.82 -54.33 347.15 5.15% 
(1,150,0.5) 65 79 0.69 1.32 267.72 -54.33 322.05 5.23% 
(1,150,1) 71 86 0.69 1.32 223.34 -54.33 277.67 5.41% 
(1,200,0.25) 68 71 0.64 1.32 245.53 -54.33 299.86 5.31% 
(1,200,0.5) 71 66 0.68 1.32 222.04 -54.33 276.37 5.41% 
(1,200,1) 70 72 0.68 1.32 191.97 -54.33 246.30 5.58% 
 
Table 5.12: Test results for the moving average rule using the double or out trading strategy on the full sample for each market.  The 
number of new trades (No. of buy/sell) is shown with the profit from trading on the rule (Rule Profit) and the buy-and-hold strategy as well 
as the difference between the rule returns and the buy-and-hold strategy returns.  The final column is the annualised % difference in profit 
between the trading rules and the buy-and-hold strategies. All profits are the accumulation of log returns.   
Rule No. of Buy No. of Sell  Rule SD B&H SD Rule Profit B&H Profit Difference Annualised % Difference 
Panel A: DJIA 
 (1,50,0)  939 938 1.33 1.09 1597.98 582.29 1015.69 1.53% 
 (1,50,1)  623 851 1.27 1.09 1561.39 582.29 979.10 1.47% 
(1,150,0) 492 491 1.26 1.09 1376.38 582.29 798.93 1.21% 
(1,150,1) 501 470 1.24 1.09 1378.64 582.29 801.18 1.22% 
(1,200,0) 405 404 1.38 1.09 1474.09 582.29 915.21 1.44% 
(1,200,1) 423 369 1.36 1.09 1474.43 582.29 915.55 1.44% 
Panel B: FT30 
(1,50,0) 511 509 1.39 1.06 1285.70 293.46 992.24 4.51% 
(1,50,1) 529 482 1.34 1.06 1195.96 293.46 902.50 4.10% 
(1,150,0) 279 278 1.28 1.06 831.73 293.46 538.27 2.45% 
(1,150,1) 274 263 1.26 1.06 865.42 293.46 571.96 2.60% 
(1,200,0) 218 217 1.40 1.06 954.22 293.46 660.76 3.00% 
(1,200,1) 226 222 1.38 1.06 911.21 293.46 617.75 2.81% 
Panel C: TOPIX 
(1,50,0) 353 352 1.24 1.02 1448.94 412.84 1036.10 3.35% 
(1,50,1) 354 358 1.21 1.02 1400.73 412.84 987.89 2.92% 
(1,150,0) 173 173 1.22 1.02 1087.56 412.84 674.72 2.92% 
(1,150,1) 183 170 1.18 1.02 1078.92 412.84 666.09 2.88% 
(1,200,0) 155 154 1.33 1.02 1028.29 412.84 615.45 2.66% 
(1,200,1) 156 137 1.32 1.02 1043.86 412.84 631.02 2.73% 
 
144 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.13: Test results for the perfectly anticipated moving average rule using the double or out strategy on the full sample for each 
market. The number of new trades (No. of buy/sell) is shown with the profit from trading on the rule (Rule Profit) and the buy-and-
hold strategy as well as the difference between the rule returns and the buy-and-hold strategy returns.  The final column is the 
annualised % difference in profit between the trading rules and the buy-and-hold strategies. All profits are the accumulation of log 
returns.   
Rule No. of 
Buy 
No. of 
Sell  
Rule 
SD 
B&H 
SD 
Rule 
Profit 
B&H 
Profit 
Difference Annualised % 
Difference 
Panel A: DJIA 
 (1,50,0)  938 938 1.31 1.09 5987.53 582.29 5405.24 8.14% 
 (1,50,1)  955 851 1.26 1.09 5797.16 582.29 5214.88 7.86% 
(1,150,0) 491 491 1.35 1.09 3784.23 582.29 3201.94 4.82% 
(1,150,1) 500 470 1.33 1.09 3777.50 582.29 3195.21 4.81% 
(1,200,0) 404 404 1.37 1.09 3418.29 582.29 2836.00 4.25% 
(1,200,1) 422 369 1.34 1.09 3381.64 582.29 2799.35 4.23% 
Panel B: FT30 
(1,50,0) 510 509 1.37 1.06 3605.01 293.46 3311.55 15.05% 
(1,50,1) 528 482 1.32 1.06 3485.98 293.46 3192.52 14.51% 
(1,150,0) 278 278 1.38 1.06 2248.29 293.46 1964.08 9.24% 
(1,150,1) 273 263 1.43 1.06 2213.46 293.46 1929.25 9.05% 
(1,200,0) 217 217 1.38 1.06 1950.40 293.46 1656.94 7.53% 
(1,200,1) 225 222 1.42 1.06 1973.05 293.46 1679.59 7.63% 
Panel C: TOPIX 
(1,50,0) 352 352 1.22 1.02 3085.71 412.84 2672.87 11.56% 
(1,50,1) 353 358 1.31 1.02 3089.33 412.84 2676.49 11.58% 
(1,150,0) 172 173 1.28 1.02 1983.08 412.84 1570.24 6.79% 
(1,150,1) 182 170 1.26 1.02 1996.72 412.84 1583.20 6.84% 
(1,200,0) 154 154 1.28 1.02 1824.62 412.84 1411.78 6.11% 
(1,200,1) 155 137 1.27 1.02 1796.24 412.84 1383.40 5.98% 
 
Table 5.14: Test results for the imperfectly anticipated moving average rule using the double or out strategy on the full sample for each 
market.  The number of new trades (No. of buy/sell) is shown with the profit from trading on the rule (Rule Profit) and the buy-and-hold 
strategy as well as the difference between the rule returns and the buy-and-hold strategy returns.  The final column is the annualised % 
difference in profit between the trading rules and the buy-and-hold strategies. All profits are the accumulation of log returns.   
 
Rule No. of Buy No. of Sell  Rule SD B&H SD Rule Profit B&H Profit Difference Annualised % Difference 
 Panel A: DJIA 
 (1,50,0.25)  953 951 1.32 1.09 5142.34 582.29 4560.05 6.85% 
 (1,50,0.5)  935 908 1.32 1.09 4460.18 582.29 3877.89 5.84% 
(1,50,1) 955 851 1.32 1.09 3642.1 582.29 3059.81 4.61% 
(1,150,0.25) 653 646 1.34 1.09 3929.88 582.29 3347.59 5.04% 
(1,150,0.5) 641 651 1.34 1.09 3457.16 582.29 2874.87 4.33% 
(1,150,1) 642 607 1.34 1.09 2839.92 582.29 2257.63 3.40% 
(1,200,0.25) 403 373 1.38 1.09 3055.40 582.29 2473.11 3.73% 
(1,200,0.5) 420 376 1.38 1.09 2777.74 582.29 2195.45 3.31% 
(1,200,1) 422 369 1.38 1.09 2396.58 582.29 1814.29 2.73% 
 Panel B: FT30 
 (1,50,0.25)  499 507 1.38 1.06 3099.94 293.46 2806.48 6.43% 
 (1,50,0.5)  511 491 1.38 1.06 2737.90 293.46 2444.44 5.60% 
(1,50,1) 528 482 1.38 1.06 2225.84 293.46 1932.38 4.16% 
(1,150,0.25) 378 348 1.36 1.06 2331.72 293.46 2038.26 4.03% 
(1,150,0.5) 383 350 1.36 1.06 2051.40 293.46 1757.94 4.03% 
(1,150,1) 397 321 1.38 1.06 1721.08 293.46 1427.62 3.27% 
(1,200,0.25) 209 205 1.38 1.06 1758.88 293.46 1465.42 2.96% 
(1,200,0.5) 202 210 1.38 1.06 1587.90 293.46 1294.44 2.96% 
(1,200,1) 225 222 1.38 1.06 1392.86 293.46 1099.4 2.52% 
 Panel C:TOPIX 
 (1,50,0.25)  356 353 1.22 1.02 2720.58 412.84 2307.74 7.08% 
 (1,50,0.5)  351 349 1.22 1.02 2468.40 412.84 2055.56 6.30% 
(1,50,1) 350 354 1.24 1.02 2139.64 412.84 1726.80 5.30% 
(1,150,0.25) 164 179 1.28 1.02 1821.00 412.84 1408.16 4.32% 
(1,150,0.5) 171 177 1.28 1.02 1722.62 412.84 1309.78 4.02% 
(1,150,1) 182 170 1.28 1.02 1554.64 412.84 1141.80 3.50% 
(1,200,0.25) 151 152 1.28 1.02 1664.00 412.84 1251.16 3.84% 
(1,200,0.5) 155 145 1.28 1.02 1573.64 412.84 1160.80 3.56%% 
(1,200,1) 155 137 1.30 1.02 1411.38 412.84 998.54 3.06% 
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Table 5.15: Test results for the moving average rule using the double or out strategy on the 1987-2009 data for each market.  The number 
of new trades (No. of buy/sell) is shown with the profit from trading on the rule (Rule Profit) and the buy-and-hold strategy as well as the 
difference between the rule returns and the buy-and-hold strategy returns.  The final column is the annualised % difference in profit 
between the trading rules and the buy-and-hold strategies. All profits are the accumulation of log returns.   
 Rule No. of Buy No. of Sell  Rule SD B&H SD Rule Profit B&H Profit Difference Annualised % Difference 
Panel A: DJIA 
 (1,50,0)  216 216 1.38 1.19 179.57 170.49 9.08 0.23% 
 (1,50,1)  246 186 1.31 1.19 137.48 170.49 -33.00 -0.84% 
(1,150,0) 121 121 1.30 1.19 194.61 170.49 24.13 0.62% 
(1,150,1) 127 112 1.28 1.19 199.46 170.49 28.98 0.74% 
(1,200,0) 113 113 1.42 1.19 228.38 170.49 57.90 1.48% 
(1,200,1) 98 100 1.38 1.19 227.13 170.49 56.65 1.44% 
Panel B: FT30 
(1,50,0) 192 192 1.38 1.18 268.81 39.42 229.39 25.30% 
(1,50,1) 193 177 1.31 1.18 248.79 39.42 209.37 23.09% 
(1,150,0) 100 100 1.16 1.18 224.93 39.42 185.51 20.46% 
(1,150,1) 91 101 1.14 1.18 232.808 39.42 193.39 21.33% 
(1,200,0) 73 73 1.24 1.18 275.18 39.42 235.76 26.00% 
(1,200,1) 60 84 1.22 1.18 253.27 39.42 213.85 23.58% 
Panel C: TOPIX 
(1,50,0) 170 170 1.41 1.32 286.36 -54.33 340.68 27.26% 
(1,50,1) 161 179 1.38 1.32 249.75 -54.33 304.08 24.34% 
(1,150,0) 74 75 1.34 1.32 177.60 -54.33 231.93 18.56% 
(1,150,1) 71 86 1.27 1.32 187.37 -54.33 241.70 19.34% 
(1,200,0) 69 69 1.42 1.32 150.57 -54.33 204.99 16.40% 
(1,200,1) 70 72 1.40 1.32 133.25 -54.33 187.58 15.01% 
 
Table 5.16: Test results for the perfectly anticipated moving average rule using the double or out strategy on the 1987-2009 data for each 
market.  The number of new trades (No. of buy/sell) is shown with the profit from trading on the rule (Rule Profit) and the buy-and-hold 
strategy as well as the difference between the rule returns and the buy-and-hold strategy returns.  The final column is the annualised % 
difference in profit between the trading rules and the buy-and-hold strategies. All profits are the accumulation of log returns.   
 Rule No. of Buy No. of Sell  Rule SD B&H SD Rule Profit B&H Profit Difference Annualised %Difference 
Panel A: DJIA 
 (1,50,0)  216 216 1.34 1.19 1316.31 170.49 1145.84 29.22% 
 (1,50,1)  246 186 1.29 1.19 1227.46 170.49 1056.98 26.96% 
(1,150,0) 121 121 1.37 1.19 825.47 170.49 655.00 16.70% 
(1,150,1) 127 112 1.30 1.19 831.96 170.49 661.48 16.87% 
(1,200,0) 113 113 1.39 1.19 812.24 170.49 641.75 16.37% 
(1,200,1) 98 100 1.36 1.19 740.19 170.49 569.70 14.53% 
Panel B: FT30 
(1,50,0) 192 192 1.35 1.18 1202.40 39.42 1162.98 128.26% 
(1,50,1) 193 177 1.29 1.18 1165.80 39.42 1126.37 124.22% 
(1,150,0) 100 99 1.23 1.18 736.03 39.42 696.60 76.82% 
(1,150,1) 91 101 1.30 1.18 746.21 39.42 706.79 77.95% 
(1,200,0) 73 72 1.21 1.18 612.70 39.42 573.28 63.22% 
(1,200,1) 60 83 1.26 1.18 656.00 39.42 616.58 68.00% 
Panel C: TOPIX 
(1,50,0) 170 170 1.43 1.32 1215.46 -54.33 1269.78 101.62% 
(1,50,1) 161 179 1.54 1.32 1259.08 -54.33 1313.41 105.11% 
(1,150,0) 74 75 1.39 1.32 638.08 -54.33 692.41 55.41% 
(1,150,1) 71 86 1.36 1.32 665.01 -54.33 719.34 57.57% 
(1,200,0) 69 69 1.35 1.32 572.90 -54.33 627.23 50.20% 
(1,200,1) 70 72 1.34 1.32 561.72 -54.33 616.05 49.30% 
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Rule No. of Buy No. of Sell  Rule SD B&H SD Rule Profit B&H Profit Difference Annualised % Difference 
Panel A: DJIA 
(1,50,0.25) 222 214 1.36 1.19 1107.88 170.49 937.39 7.00% 
(1,50,0.50) 225 203 1.36 1.19 932.00 170.49 761.51 5.69% 
(1,50,1) 246 186 1.38 1.19 671.64 170.49 501.15 3.74% 
(1,150,0.25) 158 135 1.36 1.19 841.96 170.49 671.47 5.01% 
(1,150,0.50) 158 136 1.36 1.19 727.24 170.49 556.75 4.16% 
(1,150,1) 167 137 1.38 1.19 603.72 170.49 433.23 3.23% 
(1,200,0.25) 111 104 1.40 1.19 676.82 170.49 506.33 3.78% 
(1,200,0.50) 110 105 1.40 1.19 622.28 170.49 451.79 3.37% 
(1,200,1) 98 100 1.40 1.19 476.00 170.49 305.51 2.28% 
Panel B: FT30 
 (1,50,0.25)  178 194 1.34 1.18 999.16 39.42 959.74 7.17% 
 (1,50,0.5)  184 186 1.34 1.18 870.12 39.42 830.70 6.20% 
(1,50,1) 193 177 1.36 1.18 697.50 39.42 658.08 4.91% 
(1,150,0.25) 142 124 1.28 1.18 729.58 39.42 690.16 5.15% 
(1,150,0.5) 145 126 1.28 1.18 611.18 39.42 571.76 4.27% 
(1,150,1) 151 117 1.28 1.18 509.54 39.42 470.12 3.51% 
(1,200,0.25) 72 72 1.22 1.18 564.94 39.42 525.52 3.92% 
(1,200,0.5) 67 80 1.20 1.18 503.68 39.42 464.26 3.47% 
(1,200,1) 60 83 1.22 1.18 450.02 39.42 410.60 3.07% 
Panel C:TOPIX 
 (1,50,0.25)  164 177 1.42 1.32 1011.66 -54.33 1065.99 7.96% 
 (1,50,0.5)  157 174 1.42 1.32 869.32 -54.33 923.65 6.90% 
(1,50,1) 161 179 1.42 1.32 714.92 -54.33 769.25 5.74% 
(1,150,0.25) 73 75 1.40 1.32 585.64 -54.33 639.97 4.78% 
(1,150,0.5) 65 79 1.40 1.32 535.44 -54.33 589.77 4.40% 
(1,150,1) 71 86 1.38 1.32 446.68 -54.33 501.01 3.74% 
(1,200,0.25) 68 71 1.28 1.32 491.06 -54.33 545.39 4.07% 
(1,200,0.5) 71 66 1.36 1.32 444.08 -54.33 498.41 3.72% 
(1,200,1) 70 72 1.36 1.32 383.94 -54.33 438.27 3.27% 
 
Table 5.17: Test results for the imperfectly anticipated moving average rule using the double or out strategy on the 1987-2009 data for each 
market.  The number of new trades (No. of buy/sell) is shown with the profit from trading on the rule (Rule Profit) and the buy-and-hold 
strategy as well as the difference between the rule returns and the buy-and-hold strategy returns.  The final column is the annualised % 
difference in profit between the trading rules and the buy-and-hold strategies. All profits are the accumulation of log returns.   
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5.5. Conclusion   
 
Technical trading rules have been documented in many stock markets throughout the world 
and this chapter has examined one of the simplest and most popular rules, the moving 
average rule in three important stock markets. The behaviour of the moving average since 
BLL’s paper has been examined, as has the behaviour of the rule for long sample periods for 
the DJIA, FT30 and TOPIX. This chapter contributes to the literature by reporting the 
successfulness of the rule since its seminal paper, how it has behaved over time, if predicting 
tomorrows signal can gain higher returns than the normal moving average rule, and whether a 
simple trading rule can generate returns than a simple buy-and-hold strategy. 
 
They key conclusions are; 
(i) The moving average technical trading rule produces returns for each full sample 
that are positive and significant, although the magnitude of returns is lower than 
the seminal BLL paper. 
(ii) The moving average rule returns have diminished in all three markets since 1987, 
with all of the rules producing negative returns in the DJIA. 
(iii) The behaviour of the anomalies over time can be categorized into 5 types, with 
each of the three markets presenting evidence of the Adaptive Market Hypothesis. 
(iv) The perfectly and imperfectly anticipated moving average rules both produce 
returns greater than the original since 1987, indicating the rule is still successful. 
(v) Two simple trading strategies can outperform the buy-and-hold strategy for all 
markets full samples, however the post BLL data shows mixed results for the 
DJIA but positive results for the FT30 and TOPIX. 
(vi) The perfectly and imperfectly anticipated moving average rules can outperform 
the buy-and-hold strategy for all markets examined and substantially outperform 
the original moving average rules. 
 
Similarly to the calendar effect analysis in the previous chapter, the moving average returns 
have decreased over time indicating that the rule itself is not a stylized fact in the stock 
market, but could be the result of the investors’ activity. Informed investors may have 
become familiar with the rule before uninformed investors and traded on it, which may have 
eliminated the predictability from the moving average rule through overvaluing 
(undervaluing) the index. Thus to discover whether forecasting the follow days signal could 
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produce significant returns, the perfectly anticipated moving average rule is conducted.  It 
finds that significant returns can be made, although it is unlikely an investor will successfully 
predict the next day’s signal 100% of the time.  Thus an imperfectly anticipated moving 
average rule is also examined and still finds positive significant returns.  To further analyse 
these results, two simple trading strategies are examined and find that the original moving 
average rule can outperform the buy-and-hold strategy for the full samples of each market, 
but cannot for the DJIA post BLL data.  However the perfect and imperfectly anticipated 
moving average rules show that these trading strategies can substantially beat the buy-and-
hold strategy for all markets, including the DJIA.  This shows that although the moving 
average rule is not that successful since 1987, if investors can successfully predict what the 
following days signal is going to be, they can quite substantially outperform the buy-and-hold 
strategy.  Thus this chapter has shown that a modified version of the moving average rule can 
gain substantial returns in the DJIA, FT30 and TOPIX, even when the original moving 
average rule generates negative returns in the DJIA from 1987-2009.  Further, this chapter 
has demonstrated that each market provides evidence of the AMH for the moving average 
rule.  Future research could examine the perfectly and imperfectly anticipated moving 
average rule is more detail and discover when it became a successful rule.  However, this is 
beyond the scope of this chapter and thesis. 
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Chapter 6 – Investor Sentiment during World War Two Britain 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
Britain declared war on Germany
30
 on 3
rd
 September 1939 and although this was the official 
start of World War Two (WW2 hereafter), the outbreak of war had been expected for some 
time and was of no great surprise.  WW2 dominated events in Europe and the rest of the 
world until the official surrender of Germany on 7
th
 May 1945 (although Japan surrendered 
2
nd
 September 1945, Britain was not heavily involved in the conflict in the Pacific), yet the 
effects of the war were long-lasting in Britain. The war cost Britain over 450,000 lives and 
the economic impact was huge.  More than a quarter of Britain’s national wealth was spent 
during the war and Britain had mounting debts, while 55% of the labour force were employed 
in war production so after the war Britain faced huge unemployment issues (Harrison 1998). 
 
Surprisingly given the expanding literature on investor sentiment, the impact of WW2 on 
stock market returns has not been examined in great detail in the financial literature.  Further, 
the literature on investor sentiment tends to examine seemingly economically unimportant 
events and ignores major, economically significant events.  Thus the aim of this chapter is to 
examine the effect WW2 had on the main British stock market represented at the time by the 
FT30.  It examines investor sentiment in stock returns and whether the major events of the 
war had an impact on the FT30.  This is a period of the FT30 that has not been examined in 
great detail and it also provides an opportunity to examine investor sentiment in extreme 
circumstances through major events of WW2. This chapter also investigates the effect naval 
disasters had on the FT30 with an examination of British, German, US and Japanese capital 
ship sinkings and whether these unexpected sinkings caused investor sentiment on the 
FT30
31
.  Capital vessels were held in much esteem during WW2 and their loss could have 
had an effect on moral and the war effort.  Finally, this chapter studies a period likely to have 
an extreme effect on investor sentiment during the war, the Blitz.  The Blitz was the period 
when German bombers bombed major UK cities every night from 7
th
 September 1940 until 
12
th
 May 1941. Many of the biggest bombings were on London, where financial markets and 
                                                 
30
 Along with France, Australia and New Zealand. 
31
 Kaplanski and Levy (2010) examine the effect of aviation disasters on the US market and whether these 
unexpected crashes cause investor sentiment. 
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investors were situated, providing an opportunity to examine investor sentiment in the most 
extreme case when the lives of investors and market participants are at risk.   
 
The first section of this chapter provides a background of WW2, a review of the investor 
sentiment literature as well as the methodology employed throughout this chapter.  The 
second section examines investor sentiment in major events during WW2, while the third 
section examines investor sentiment due to major vessel sinkings.  Finally the fourth section 
examines the effect of the Blitz on the FT30 during WW2 and section five provides a chapter 
summary. 
 
6.1.1. The History of World War Two 
 
WW2 was a global war that began in 1939 and ended in 1945 which involved almost all of 
the world’s great powers.  With more than 100 million people serving in military units, it was 
the most widespread war in history and the deadliest conflict (Sommerville 2008).   
 
WW2 officially began for Britain with the invasion of Poland by Germany and the 
subsequent declarations of war by France and Britain on Germany on 3
rd
 September 1939. 
British troops were deployed to the Continent but neither side launched major operations 
against the other until April 1940 (Weinberg 1995). An Axis alliance was formed between 
Germany, Japan (after Pearl Harbour) and Italy, with only Britain and other Commonwealth 
nations (called the Allied forces) fighting the Axis. Germany invaded France, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg on 10
th
 May 1940, with the Netherlands and Belgium overrun 
in a few days. British troops evacuated the continent at Dunkirk on 27
th
 May 1940 and on 10
th
 
June 1940 Italy invaded France, declaring war on France and Britain.  France was now under 
the control of the Axis, and Germany began the aerial bombardment of Britain to prepare for 
the invasion.  The campaign failed and the invasion was cancelled however this marked the 
beginning of the Blitz (more information is provided in section 6.3).  Nevertheless, the Axis 
expanded in November 1940 when Hungary, Slovakia and Romania joined after the takeover 
of the Balkans on 7
th
 December 1941 and Japan attacked British and American Navy 
holdings at Pearl Harbour to prevent American intervention.  This led to the Allied nations 
declaring war on Japan and the US formally entering the war. Initially there was great 
Japanese success against the US in the naval battles as they took over much of Asia and the 
Pacific, as well as Malaysia, Singapore, Burma, Philippines and Java. However this was 
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halted at the Battle of Midway, where the US sunk 4 carriers, one cruiser and 248 carrier 
aircrafts, killing 3057 Japanese soldiers.   
 
The Allies gained momentum in 1943 and in September of that year, invaded and seized Italy 
following an armistice with Italian leaders. With German defeats in Eastern Europe, the 
Allied invasion of Italy and American victories in the Pacific, the Axis was in strategic retreat 
on all fronts in 1943.  The Allies advance continued in Asia and on the Atlantic Ocean and on 
6
th
 June 1944 (known as D-Day), the Allies invaded France which led to the defeat of 
German forces in France.  Paris was liberated on 25
th
 August 1944 and the German forces 
were pushed back and although an attempt to advance into northern Germany ended in 
failure, German forces were continually retreating.  Meanwhile in the Pacific, the US 
defeated the Japanese Navy and captured key Western Pacific islands during 1944 and 1945.  
The war in Europe concluded with the capture of Berlin by Soviet and Polish troops and the 
German unconditional surrender on 8
th
 May 1945.  Japan officially surrendered on 15
th
 
August 1945 after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings on the 6
th
 and 9
th
 August 1945 
respectively.  Estimates of total casualties of the war vary, but most suggest some 60 million 
people died, with 20 million soldiers and 40 million civilians
32
.  WW2 altered the social 
structure and political alignment of the world and the United Nations (UN) was a direct result 
of the war to prevent future conflicts and foster international cooperation. 
 
6.1.2. Investor Sentiment Literature Review 
 
The existence of investor sentiment has been well documented in the literature, with many 
routine and seemingly economically unimportant events having a significant effect on stock 
returns, such as cloud cover, (Saunders 1993) daylight (Kamstra et al 2000; 2003), sunshine 
(Hirshleifer and Shumway 2003), temperature (Cao and Wei 2005) and even sports results 
(Edmans et al 2007). Saunders (1993) showed that less cloud cover is associated with higher 
returns and the returns difference between the most cloudy days and the least is statistically 
significant for the NYSE. Kamstra et al (2000) find that daylight saving time changes cause 
desynchronosis and anxiety, which in turn negatively impacts stock markets. Further Kamstra 
et al (2003) show evidence of a link between seasonal variations of daylight and seasonal 
variations in stock returns. Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) show that sunshine is strongly 
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 Beevor (2012). 
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significantly correlated with stock returns while Cao and Wei (2005) show a negative 
correlation between temperature and stock returns in twenty international markets. Also 
Edmans et al (2007) show that soccer matches have a significant impact on stock returns, 
with negative results have a stronger negative effect on returns than positive results.  
 
With such strong and varied evidence of investor sentiment for small and economically 
unimportant events, it is quite surprising that major events have not received the same level 
of attention in the academic literature. However, some major events have been explored such 
as airplane crashes (Barrett et al 1987; Davidson et al 1987; Kaplanski and Levy 2010), 
hurricanes (Lamb 1995, 1998; Angbazo and Narayanan 1996; Huerta and Perez-Liston 2010) 
and earthquakes (Shan and Gong 2012) which have all found that these unexpected disasters 
have a significant negative impact on stock returns across the market.  Barrett et al (1987) 
show that fatal commercial airline crashes have an immediate negative market reaction in the 
US market for one day, even if the crash occurs in a remote geographic location. Davidson et 
al (1987) employ a sample of 57 crashes from 1965-1984 and observe a significant price 
decline for airlines on the day of the crash with the negative returns reversing in the days 
following a crash. Further, Kaplanski and Levy (2010) examine 228 aviation disasters from 
January 1950 to December 2007 and find evidence of a significant negative effect. They 
document a greater effect in small and riskier stocks and in firms belonging to less stable 
industries. With regard to hurricanes, Lamb (1995) examines the impact of the 1992 
hurricane Andrew and its impact on property liability insurers. The study reports that 
hurricane Andrew produced a significant negative stock price reaction on property-liability 
insurers with direct premiums written in the affected areas (Florida and Louisiana) while an 
unexposed firm sustained no significant price response. Angazo and Narayanan (1996) 
examine the impact of hurricane Andrew on insurance firms and find that it had a large 
negative effect on insurance stocks that were ameliorated to some extent by a smaller positive 
effect, while that Andrew also had an industry-wide effect with firms not exposed to Andrew 
also affected.  Lamb (1998) examined the effect of hurricanes Andrew and Hugo and find 
that the property industry was generally unaffected by Hugo but Andrew generated a 
significant negative impact on property firms.  The study concludes by stating that the market 
is able to discriminate by the magnitude of the hurricane and by the property firm’s degree of 
loss exposure. More recently, Huerta and Perez-Liston (2010) examine 66 hurricanes in the 
US from 1966 to 2008 and find that there is a significant decrease in stock returns on the day 
the hurricane hits the US and one day prior. Further, they show that not all industries are 
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significantly impacted and an increase in investor fear on the day of the hurricane hitting the 
US.  Shan and Gong (2012) examine the Wenchuan earthquake in China and find that during 
the 12 months following the earthquake, stock returns are significantly lower for firms 
located nearer the epicentre than for firms further away.  Further, they show that this pattern 
in stock returns does not exist before or long after the earthquake, thus it must be a temporal 
shock to stock returns.  
 
Recently, there has been a growing attention in the financial literature to the influence of 
terrorist attacks on capital markets.  Abadie and Gardeazabel (2003) study the case of the 
Basque region in Spain and find evidence that terrorism related news has a significant impact 
on equity prices. They use three event study methods to estimate Basque firms’ abnormal 
return following new announcements related to peace talks during the cease-fire around 1998.  
They find that following the release of good news the Basque portfolio outperformed the non-
Basque portfolio and following the release of bad news the Basque portfolio underperformed 
the non-Basque portfolio.  Carter and Simkins (2004) examine the effect of the September 
11
th
 attacks on New York in 2001 and find large significant negative abnormal returns for 
airfreight firms and international airlines. Further Chen and Siems (2004) examine the US 
capital markets response to various terrorism attacks dating back to 1915 and up to the 
September 11
th
 attacks in 2001. They show that these attacks had a significant negative 
impact on the US capital markets but that they are more resilient than in the past and recover 
sooner from terrorist attacks than other global markets. Charles and Darné (2006) perform a 
study on the impact of the September 11
th
 attacks in 2001 on international stock markets by 
estimating abnormal price changes using an outlier detection method based on an ARIMA 
model.  This model has the ability to identify whether the changes in the market are 
endogenous, exogenous, permanent or temporary. The results show that the September 11
th
 
bombings produced outliers in all indices examined with the US markets less affected by the 
attack than other international markets.  Further, Nikkinen and Vahamaa (2010) examine the 
behaviour of the FTSE100 index around the terrorist attacks of September 11
th
 2001, the 
2004 attacks in Madrid and the July 7
th
 attacks in London in 2005. They show that terrorism 
had a strong adverse effect on stock market sentiment with a pronounced downward shift in 
the expected value of the FTSE 100 and that these attacks caused 3 of the 5 largest daily 
increases in implied volatility from January 2000 through to December 2005.  Further Kollias 
et al (2011) examine the effect of the bomb attacks in Madrid on 11
th
 March 2004 and in 
London on 7
th
 July 2005 on the equity sectors.  They find significant negative abnormal 
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returns across the majority of sectors in the Spanish markets but not so for London.  Further 
they find that the market rebound was much quicker in London compared to the Spanish 
markets and that the bombings had only a transitory impact on returns and volatility that did 
not last for a long period. 
 
Give the recent literature on terrorist attacks, it is surprising the literature on financial 
markets and wars is limited, with very little written on WW2.  Choudhry (2010) investigates 
the DJIA to determine endogenously the structural breaks during WW2 by examining price 
changes and volatility through an exponentially weight moving average. The paper 
distinguishes between two possible types of breaks; turning points and blips. Turning points 
are breaks that cause a price change in the same direction for at least five days, while blips 
are breaks that cause a price change in the same direction for less than five days.  The results 
show that many events deemed by historians as important are reflected in the data as turning 
points. However, some major events are only blips (German invasion of Poland), or fail to 
generate a break point (Battle of Britain, Invasion of France, Operation Market Garden
33
 etc). 
The paper concludes by stating that news seen as good by the investors tends to increase the 
price the next day after the event and for the next five working days and leads to a fall in 
volatility. Frey and Kucher (2000) examine government bond prices of five European 
countries traded on the Swiss bourse during WW2.  They find that the loss and gain of 
national sovereignty during WW2 influenced the bond prices of the European countries 
involved. Further, Frey and Kucher (2001) analyse government bond prices of Germany and 
Austria traded on the Swiss bourse during WW2. They show that war events considered 
crucial by historians are clearly reflected in government bond prices; however some events, 
such as Germany’s capitulation in 1945 is not reflected in bond prices. Schneider and Troeger 
(2006) examine the effect of political developments within three war regions from 1990 to 
2000 in the CAC, DJIA and FTSE.  They show that the conflicts caused a negative reaction 
in the three markets, with the notable exception of the DJIA and the Gulf war.  Given the lack 
of studies examining investor sentiment in WW2, this chapter will significantly contribute to 
the literature on investor sentiment during wars. 
 
 
 
                                                 
33
 An airborne attempt to the seize the Rhine bridges by the allies from 17
th
-25
th
 September 1944. 
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6.2. Methodology 
 
This chapter examines the effect of the WW2 on stock returns and whether investor sentiment 
in present in extreme circumstances.  Given the previous literature on routine and 
economically unimportant factors having a significant impact on stock returns as well as 
terrorist attacks generating negative investor sentiment, the null hypothesis is that the events 
of WW2 should have a strong degree of investor sentiment on returns since investors lives 
were at risk.  Major events of the war, major naval disasters as well as the Blitz period are 
examined to provide a detailed analysis of the effect of WW2 on British stock returns. 
 
6.2.1. Major Events 
 
Initially the major events of the war are examined, followed by naval disasters and then the 
Blitz period.  Abnormal returns (ARs) and the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are 
initially examined.  Daily excess returns are measured by the mean-adjusted-returns approach 
discussed by Brown and Warner (1985).  An AR is the deviation of returns on day t from an 
expected return generated by a mean of returns calculated on a pre-event period.  The mean is 
estimated over a 20-day estimation period starting 30-days prior to the event day t and 
closing 11 days before the event. That is, ARs are computed following; 
 
            ̅ (6.1) 
 
Where ARt is the abnormal return for the stock index at time t, Rjt is the actual observed rate 
of returns for this index, and   ̅ is the mean of this index daily returns in the (-30,-11) 
estimation period.   ̅ is computed as follows; 
 
   ̅  
 
  
∑    
   
     
 (6.2) 
 
The date of the event is t = 0, the mean adjusted returns model is estimated over 20 days from 
t = -30 to t = -11 relative to the event date.    The t-test also follows Brown and Warner 
(1985) to obtain a level of statistical significance of the portfolio abnormal returns such that; 
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Where to is the t-value indicating significance of the FT30, AR is the abnormal return on day 
t, and SDAR is the standard deviation of all of the abnormal returns.  The SDAR is computed as 
follows; 
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∑ (     ̅̅ ̅̅ )    
 
(   )
 (6.4) 
Where   ̅̅ ̅̅  is the mean of the abnormal returns and n is the total number of ARs calculated. 
 
Additionally, two longer event windows are examined by computing the CARs six (t = 6) and 
eleven (t = 11) days following the event.  The CARs were estimated using the following 
equation; 
 
      ∑    
  
    
 (6.5) 
 
Where T1 is the event day and T2 is consequently 5 and 10 days after the event.  The same t-
statistic for the ARs is calculated for the CARs only that; 
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Where to is the t-value indicating significance of the FT30, CAR is the cumulative abnormal 
return on day t, and SDCAR is the standard deviation of all of the cumulative abnormal returns.  
The SDCAR is computed as follows; 
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Where    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is the mean cumulative abnormal returns and n is the total number of CARs 
calculated.   
 
Also, the cumulative mean rate of return (CMR) is calculated to explore whether there is a 
time delay in investors reacting to the major events studied. The CMR shows the total return 
of major events after various days in order to document whether the major events affects the 
next day or other days after the event.  Thus the mean rate of return for each of the first 10 
days following major positive and negative events is plotted.  Following Kaplanski and Levy 
(2010), the ten largest increases and decreases in the FT30 during the war are identified to 
determine whether the major events studied are the associated with the largest price changes 
in the FT30.   
 
To further examine the major events of WW2, an OLS regression is run similar to that of 
Kaplanski and Levy (2010).  However unlike Kaplanski and Levy (2010), this chapter pre-
examines whether the seasonality’s are evident in the data before the regression analysis.  If 
the seasonality’s are found to be significant, they are included in the regression analysis but if 
they are not found they are excluded from the analysis.  The seasonality’s are examined over 
the period from the beginning of the FT30 to the end of the war.  The seasonality’s examined 
are the well-known Monday effect, January effect, turn-of-the-month effect, tax year effect, 
as well as serial correlation in the returns.  Thus the main seasonality’s are examined through 
a simple regression analysis such that; 
 
                 (6.8) 
 
Where rt is the daily rate of return on the FT30, γ0 is the regression intercept, and D1it is a 
dummy variable for the seasonality’s examined.  β1 is the parameter to measure whether the 
dummy variable examined is significant.  For instance, in the investigation of the January 
effect, the dummy equals one for January returns and zero otherwise, hence alpha measures 
the average daily return in months other than January, and beta measures the difference 
between January and non-January returns.  Thus a positive and significant beta would 
indicate the existence of the January effect, i.e., the average daily return in January being 
statistically higher than in other months, on average.  An analogous interpretation holds for 
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other seasonality’s.   If all of the seasonality’s are found in the data, the following regression 
is run; 
 
 
       ∑   
 
   
                                    ∑       
 
   
∑       
 
   
    
(6.9) 
 
Where rt is the daily rate of return on the FT30, γ0 is the regression intercept, rt-1 is the i
th
 
previous day rate of return. Monit is a dummy variable for the Monday effect.  Jit is the 
dummy variable for the January effect where i = 1 for the first 15 days in January. TOTMit is 
a dummy variable for the turn-of-the-month days and Tit is a dummy variable for the first five 
days of the taxation year.  NEit is the dummy variable for a negative event while PEit is the 
dummy variable for a positive event. However, if any of the seasonality’s are not found to be 
significant from equation 6.4, they are excluded from the subsequent regression analysis.  
 
Nevertheless, the OLS regression estimated above may be affected by a few extreme values.  
These extreme values may bias the regression results and since the war period was quite a 
volatile period for the FT30, this is a distinct possibility. Acknowledging this fact, a quantile 
regression (QR) which was introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978) is estimated.  A major 
benefit of quantile regressions are that they not as sensitive to extreme observations as the 
typical OLS regressions (Koenker and Hallock 2001). The QR method is employed to 
estimate the conditional median, rather than the conditional mean via the OLS method.  The 
linear regression takes the form; 
 
           (6.10) 
 
Where xt is a row vector of the explanatory variables with the first element equal to 1; εt is an 
error term independent of xt and β is a vector of the parameters.  The conditional quartile 
function can be written as; 
  ( )     ( ) (6.11) 
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Where β(ψ) is a vector of parameters dependent on ψ.  In our case the ψ equals 0.50.  
Koenker and Basset (1978) define the ψth regression quartile (0< ψ<1) as any solution β(ψ), 
to the quartile regression minimization problem; 
 
    
 
[ ∑           ∑ (   )        
                
] (6.12) 
 
A further issue with the original OLS regression is its constant-volatility assumption.  
Bollerslev, Engle and Nelson (1994) show that stock index returns have time-varying 
volatility properties and if any of the major events examined occurs during periods of high 
volatility, the magnitude of the standard errors could be biased.  Therefore a Generalised 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model is estimated.  The GARCH 
model allows for time-varying volatility and adds robustness to the results.  Specially, the 
model estimated is; 
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Where all variables are described in equation 6.5 and εt is the error term with conditional 
mean zero and conditional variance ht. The estimation of equation 6.5 using quartile 
regression and GARCH modelling for volatility, are done to add power to the results. 
 
The above analysis examines the impact of pre-determined major events on the FT30.  
However, these events are only deemed important with regards to the outcome of the war by 
historians.  They may not have been important to investors in Britain and even more 
importantly, there may be a number of events that were hugely important for investors in 
Britain that the previous analysis has ignored.  Thus this chapter examines structural breaks 
during the war period similar to Choudhry (2010), to pick up any events that the previous 
analysis has ignored.  Breaks in a time-series are shocks that permanently affect the series, 
and that they do not occur each period.  That is, while some shocks permanently shift the 
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trend function of a series, the majority of shocks have only a temporary effect.  Thus events 
during the course of WW2 that have produced permanent and temporary effects on the 
British stock market are examined.  Zivot and Andrews (1992) provide a test that takes into 
account possible structural shifts in a series, and its intercept.  The test can be formalised by; 
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        (   
 ) 
(6.14) 
 
Where InPt is the log of the FT30, if Tb is the break point, DTBt = 1 if t = Tb + 1 (otherwise it 
is equal to zero), DUt = 1 if t > Tb, zero otherwise, and Dtt = (t – Tb) if t > Tb, zero otherwise.  
Thus this test allows a change in both the intercept and the slope of the trend function.  
Dummies DTBt, DUt, and DTt allow for a break in the level of the trend function, in the slope, 
and for breaks in both the level and the slope respectively.  Thus this test is more powerful 
than a number of other structural break tests (for example the Chow test).  The Zivot 
Andrews test also includes lags of  InPt to eliminate potential serial correlations.  
Application of zero lags implies no serial correlation. 
 
According to Willard et al (1996), one of the main problems of finding a break in a series is 
determining the length of the break.  This test only assumes a single break point in the series, 
thus if two breaks happen within a short space of time there may be difficulty in finding both, 
or it may locate one with an inflated effect.  This problem can be addressed by investigating 
potential breaks that last for periods shorter than the rest of the remaining sample period.  As 
the period gets shorter, it becomes easier for a break to be labelled as long lasting.  Thus there 
is a trade off in choosing between a short time period and a long period for analysis; as the 
period gets shorter breaks may falsely be deemed long lasting and as the period gets longer 
important breaks may be missed.  In this investigation the search for potential breaks in the 
FT30 is based on one sample size but with different rolling windows.  A three-month sample 
size with a rolling window of two weeks and one month are used similar to Choudhry (2010). 
 
There are two types of break possible in the stock prices according to Choudhry (2010), 
turning points and blips. Blips are shocks that last for only a day or so, while turning points 
persist for much longer.  Turning points may induce a change in the prices without any 
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further change in the near future.  On the other hand, blips may reflect reaction to earlier 
news that later turned out to be false, or market reaction over events on which there is little 
information.  Thus this chapter uses this identification with investors considering turning 
points much more important and impact the market much more than blips. 
 
6.2.2. Naval Disasters 
 
Naval disasters are also examined in this chapter to determine whether key sinkings during 
WW2 caused any investor sentiment in stock returns.  Naval ships during the war were held 
with great prestige, and an unexpected sinking caused thousands of deaths and huge financial 
losses.  British ships, German ships and Japanese ships are all examined to understand the 
impact of these sinkings.  Similar to the major event analysis, ARs and CARs are estimated, 
as well as an OLS regression, QR and GARCH regression similar to regression 6.5.  Again 
the seasonality’s are pre-examined over the same period as the major events, so the same 
seasonality’s used in the major events section are used again in this section. 
 
6.2.3. The Blitz 
 
Finally, the continual bombings of British Isles, the period known as the Blitz, is examined in 
this chapter to examine the level of investor sentiment when the war came to British shores 
and investors lives were at risk.  Initially the Blitz period itself is examined, and then the 
major London and non-London bombings are examined to determine whether the location of 
the bombings had a significant impact on the level of investor sentiment in stock returns.  
Firstly ARs and CARs are estimated, and then an OLS regression, QR and GARCH 
regression are examined, similar to the major events and naval analysis.  However unlike 
previously, the seasonality’s are pre-examined from the start of the FT30 to the end of the 
Blitz to find only the seasonality’s relative to the Blitz period.  Thus the seasonality’s are 
examined from 1
st
 July 1935 to 12
th
 May 1941. 
 
6.3. Major Events 
 
6.3.1. Data 
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The empirical tests employ closing FT30 data from 3
rd
 January 1939 to 31
st
 December 1945 
which represents the WW2 period. Although the war did not officially begin until 3
rd
 
September 1939, many of the leading players had been planning for the outbreak of war for 
some time and saw it as only a matter of time.  Further, this is the period of WW2 used in the 
previous literature.  To gauge an overview of how the returns during the war compare to non-
war returns, descriptive statistic during WW2 with periods before and after it are compared in 
Table 6.1. Figure 6.1 and 6.2 present the log prices and log returns over the war period. 
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Figure 6.1: FT30 during WW2. 
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Figure 6.2: Log returns of the FT30 during WW2. 
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Summary statistics for the FT30 before the war, during the war period and after the war are 
presented in Table 6.1.  The war period is from 1939 to 1945 and is compared to the 
following seven years, the previous four years and the full data period 1935-2009.  This study 
does not have access to data pre-1935 so the pre-war sample period is just four years.  Table 
6.1 shows that the mean returns during the war period are greater than the mean returns after 
the war period and for the full sample, while the mean returns before the war were negative.  
The reason why the mean returns during the war are greater than the returns after the war 
may be explained by the fact that Britain in the post-war years were days of austerity and of 
fuel shortages, which strangled production and dragged the market lower than it had been 
during WW2 (Harrison 1998).  The skewness and kurtosis statistics for each subsample show 
that the frequency distribution of the returns is not normal.  Table 6.1 shows that the war 
period, as well as the post-war period, has significant left skewed data which is what is 
generally found in stock markets (see for example Premaratne and Bera 2001).  Kurtosis is a 
measure of whether the data is peaked or flat relative to a normal distribution. All of the 
subsamples have kurtosis coefficients that are greater than three and significant, indicating a 
leptokurtic distribution. Thus the skewness and kurtosis coefficients for each subsample 
indicate that the returns series deviates from the normal distribution at 1% significance, 
indicating the non-normal nature of the data. Further, the Jarque-Bera statistic is commuted to 
further assess the extent of non-normality in the distributions of the returns series.  The 
probabilities of the JB statistic for each subsample are all less 0.01 which is statistically 
significant at 1% and confirms that the distribution of the returns of each subsample is not 
normal.  Thus the WW2 period for the FT30 generated higher returns than periods before and 
after it and the full sample, but as with most time series data, the returns series is not normal. 
 
Table 6.2 documents the major positive and negative events examined, along with the 
rationale for choosing them as major events and are taken from Beevor (2012). The main 
criteria for the chosen events are that they are believed by historians to significantly 
Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics of daily returns during World War Two.  Significance tests are only applied to the skewness, 
kurtosis and Jarque-Bera statistics.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
Period Mean Max Min Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Obs 
1935 - 1938 -0.000245 0.080773 -0.055534 0.008006 0.470900*** 21.44520*** 12649.58*** 890 
World War Two 0.000195 0.039688 -0.0484122 0.005881 -1.215714*** 17.9953*** 17173.25*** 1786 
1946 - 1952 0.000009 0.041925 -0.037166 0.005407 -0.739001*** 11.02905*** 4946.223*** 1780 
1935-2009 0.000154 0.107810 -0.124000 0.010581 -0.19629*** 12.69284*** 75169.29*** 19155 
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contribute to the outcome of the war to Britain.  For example, the Nazi invasion of Poland 
which led to the declaration of war from the allies is generally deemed to be the official 
beginning of the war and so is an important event.  However the Battle of Midway is not 
chosen as even though it was important for victory in the Pacific, it was fought by the US and 
Japan far away from Britain and is not deemed important to British investors at the time. 
 
 
Date Event Rationale 
Panel A: Negative Events 
23rd Aug 
1939 
Nazis and Soviets sign Pact Russia and Germany sign a non-aggression Pact to ensure Germany would not have to fight a war on two 
fronts. 
1st Sep 
1939 
Germany invades Poland The Nazis invade Poland which leads to the declaration of war from the Allies. 
3rd Sep 
1939 
Britain, France, Australia and 
New Zealand declare war on 
Germany 
British Ambassador in Germany Neville Henderson delivered the British declaration of war to German 
Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop, effective at 1100 hours.  British Commonwealth nations of 
New Zealand and Australia followed suit and France also declared war later on this day.  
27th Sep 
1939 
Warsaw falls to Germany Warsaw, Poland fell to the Germans after two weeks of siege. The Polish government in exile was 
established in Paris, France. 
10th May 
1940 
Germany invades France, 
Belgium, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands 
Germany invaded France as well as Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
15th May 
1940 
Surrender of Holland The Netherlands surrendered to Germany at 1015 hours; Dutch General Winkelman signed the surrender 
document. 
10th June 
1940 
Italy declares war on Britain 
and France 
Italy declared war on France and Britain, to be effective on the following day. 
14th June 
1940 
Fall of Paris In France, German troops captured the open city of Paris without any opposition. To the north, the coastal 
city of Le Havre fell under German control. To the east, the German 1st Army broke through the Maginot 
Line near Saarbrücken. Also on this date, all remaining British troops in France were ordered to return. 
10th July 
1940 
Start of the Battle of Britain A large German aerial formation attacked one of the eight British convoys in the English Channel. Upon 
detecting the incoming aircraft, four squadrons of British fighters were launched to counter the attack. At 
the end of the battle, seven British aircraft were destroyed and one of the Bread ships was sunk. The 
Germans lost 13 aircraft and this surprising victory led to the British announcing that 10th July was the start 
of the Battle of Britain. 
7th Sep 
1940 
Start of the Blitz German bombers attacked London as the new Operation Loge commenced. During the day, 53 German 
bombers were shot down, as was 21 BF 109 fighters; the British lost 27 fighters. Overnight, German 
bombers continued to attack the East End, which saw 490 killed and 1,200 wounded on this day. This 
would mark the first of 57 consecutive nights of German bombings on the British capital. 
7th Dec 
1941 
Pearl Harbour 360 Japanese carrier aircrafts attack Pearl Harbour sinking or damaging 8 battleships, 3 cruisers, 3 
destroyers, 1 anti-aircraft training ship, 1 minelayer.  In total 2,459 were killed of which 57 were civilians.   
Panel B: Positive Events 
31st Oct 
1940 
Battle of Britain won According to a British Air Ministry pamphlet published in 1941, this date was the official end of the Battle 
of Britain, but bombings in London would continue. 
8th Dec 
1941 
US joins Allied forces United States declared war on Japan after Franklin Roosevelt's "a date which will live in infamy" speech. 
United Kingdom, Canada, Costa Rica, Dominica, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Free France, and the Dutch 
government-in-exile also declared war on Japan. Meanwhile, China declared war on both Germany and 
Italy; China had been fighting with Japan since July 1937. 
2nd Feb 
1943 
Germans surrender to 
Stalingrad in the first big defeat 
of Hitler’s armies 
The last of the German Sixth Army surrendered in Stalingrad, Russia.   
25th July 
1943 
Moussolini’s government 
overthrown 
The Fascist Grand Council in Rome voted 19 to 7 for King Vittorio Emanuele III to retake command of 
the Italian military from Mussolini.  Mussolini was arrested immediately. 
8th Sep 
1943 
Badoglio signs armistice with 
the Allies made public 
Italy sign a treaty with the Allies to support them against Germany. 
12th Aug 
1944 
Battle of Normandy won The German failure to successfully defend the Normandy area from the Allied liberation forces in essence 
doomed Hitler's dream of a Nazi controlled "Fortress Europe" and marked the beginning of the end for 
Germany. 
25th Aug 
1944 
Liberalisation of Paris The French 2nd Armoured Division entered Paris, France. De Gaulle moved his headquarters into the War 
Ministry in Paris on the same day with the approval of Eisenhower. 
21st Oct 
1944 
Massive German surrender at 
Aachen, Germany 
German troops surrender at Aachen, Germany. 
30th Apr 
1945 
Hitler commits suicide The recently married Hitler and Braun committed suicide in Berlin, Germany.  
2nd May 
1945 
German troops in Italy 
surrender 
German troops in Italy surrendered in accordance with secret negotiations, followed by an announcement 
for the cessation of hostilities. 
Table 6.2: The major war events studied in this chapter and a brief note about each event. Panel A documents the negative 
events while Panel B shows the positive events from a British viewpoint during WW2. 
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7th May 
1945 
Unconditional surrender of 
Germany 
General Jodl signed the unconditional surrender of all German forces to the Allies, to take effect the 
following day at Eisenhower’s headquarters near Rheims, France. 
 
 
6.3.3. Empirical Results 
 
Table 6.3 documents the abnormal returns (ARs) and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
for the major positive and negative events during WW2 in FT30.  Some of the CARs are 
overlapping such as the German invasion of Poland and the declaration of war on Germany 
by the Allies and so may affect the results.  The results show that of the 11 negative events 
studied, 8 events experienced negative abnormal returns on the day after the event. The only 
negative events with positive ARs are the fall of Warsaw to Germany, the German invasion 
of France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Holland, and the start of the Battle of Britain.  The 
signing of the Nazi Soviet Pact generated significant negative abnormal returns, as did the 
fall of Paris and the attack on Pearl Harbour. Regarding the positive events, only 3 of the 11 
events produce positive ARs the day following the positive event. This suggests that many of 
these positive events may not have been deemed that positive at the time by investors or it 
took some time for the event to be incorporated in stock returns. None of the positive events 
produced significant positive abnormal returns. 
 
While the ARs are interesting in that they show immediate investor reaction to these major 
events, the CARs (6- and 11-day) provide a stronger indication of the stock market’s 
resilience and ability (or inability) to bounce back from these events. Only the attack on Pearl 
Harbour generates significant negative CARs for both the two windows examined.  However, 
the fall of Paris produces significant negative CARs for 5-days after the event indicating its 
lasting impact. A number of negative events produce little or no significant evidence 
regarding their ARs but the 10-day CARs are significant.  This indicates that the actual event 
studied had little or no impact on the FT30 and that some other factor may be driving the 
result.  None of the positive events produce CARs that are statistically significant suggesting 
the limited and short impact of these positive events on the FT30. The final column to Table 
6.3 shows that the number of days it took the market to return to its pre-event value.  The 
FT30 remained down for 169 days after the invasion of Germany into France, Belgium, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands.  After the surprise attack on Pearl Harbour the FT30 did 
not recover for another 174 trading days., however the other negative events recovered quite 
quickly.  Positive events to have a strong impact on the FT30 were the Allies declaration of 
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war on Japan when the FT30 did not fully rebound for 164
34
, while after the Battle of 
Normandy, the FT30 recovered in 160 days, nearly 8 months.  The other positive events 
rebounded quite quickly but the suicide of Hitler and the German surrender in Italy still took 
over 50 trading days to recover. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 However, this could be due to it being the day after the surprise attack at Pearl Harbour. 
Date Event Return AR 5-day CAR 10-day CAR Days to 
rebounda 
Panel A: Negative Events 
23rd Aug 
1939 
Nazis and Soviets sign Pact -2.63% -2.77%*** 
(-4.73) 
3.06% 
(1.44) 
1.15% 
(0.33) 
4 
1st Sep 
1939 
Germany invades Poland -0.65% -0.63% 
(-1.03) 
-1.90% 
(-0.90) 
10.92%*** 
(-3.14) 
3 
3rd Sep 
1939 
Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand declare 
war on Germany 
-0.65% -0.63% 
(-1.03) 
-1.90% 
(-0.90) 
10.92%*** 
(-3.14) 
3 
27th Sep 
1939 
Warsaw falls to Germany -0.30% 0.15% 
(0.25) 
3.87%* 
(1.83) 
9.72%*** 
(2.80) 
3 
10th May 
1940 
Germany invades France, Belgium, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands 
-0.27% 0.38% 
(0.62) 
-2.91% 
(1.37) 
-6.85%** 
(1.97) 
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15th May 
1940 
Surrender of Holland -0.85% -0.67% 
(-1.10) 
-4.04%* 
(1.91) 
-7.58%** 
(2.18) 
1 
10th June 
1940 
Italy declares war on Britain and France -0.65% -0.01% 
(-0.02) 
-3.59%* 
(-1.69) 
-11.64%*** 
(-3.35) 
2 
14th June 
1940 
Fall of Paris -4.66% -3.77%*** 
(-3.17) 
-7.89%*** 
(3.72) 
-3.12% 
(-0.90) 
13 
10th July 
1940 
Start of the Battle of Britain 0.52% 1.82%*** 
(2.99) 
3.97%* 
(1.87) 
5.90%* 
(5.90) 
0 
7th Sep 
1940 
Start of the Blitz -0.31% -0.53% 
(-0.87) 
-2.32% 
(-1.10) 
-3.72% 
(-1.07) 
18 
7th Dec 
1941 
Pearl Harbour -0.96% -1.21%** 
(-1.99) 
-5.16%** 
(-2.44) 
-6.91%** 
(-1.99) 
174 
Panel B: Positive Events 
31st Oct 
1940 
Battle of Britain won 0.15% -0.11% 
(-0.19) 
1.96% 
(0.92) 
4.83% 
(1.39) 
0 
8th Dec 
1941 
US join the Allied forces/ Allies declare war on 
Japan. 
-0.85% -1.11%* 
(1.82) 
-3.93%* 
(1.85) 
-6.31%* 
(1.82) 
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2nd Feb 
1943 
Germans surrender to Stalingrad in the first big 
defeat of Hitler’s armies 
0.21% -0.01% 
(0.01) 
-1.21% 
(-0.57) 
-2.29% 
(-0.66) 
0 
25th July 
1943 
Moussolini’s government overthrown 0.88% 0.87% 
(1.43) 
2.51% 
(1.18) 
2.08% 
(0.60) 
0 
8th Sep 
1943 
Badoglio signs armistice with the Allies made public 0.57% 0.55% 
(0.90) 
0.43% 
(0.20) 
0.73% 
(0.22) 
0 
12th Aug 
1944 
Battle of Normandy won -0.43% -0.58% 
(-0.96) 
-3.52%* 
(-1.66) 
-5.05% 
(-1.45) 
160 
25th Aug 
1944 
Liberalisation of Paris 0.27% 0.17% 
(0.27) 
-0.34% 
(-0.16) 
-1.76% 
(-0.51) 
0 
21st Oct 
1944 
Massive German surrender at Aachen, Germany -0.09% -0.10% 
(-0.17) 
0.81% 
(0.38) 
1.92% 
(0.55) 
1 
30th Apr 
1945 
Hitler commits suicide -0.25% -0.30% 
(-0.49) 
-2.40% 
(-1.13) 
-3.52% 
(-1.01) 
56 
2nd May 
1945 
German troops in Italy surrender -0.51% -0.55% 
(-0.90) 
-2.54% 
(-1.20) 
-3.21% 
(-0.92) 
53 
7th May 
1945 
Unconditional surrender of Germany -0.43% -0.49% 
(-0.80) 
-1.13% 
(-0.53) 
-5.68% 
(-1.63) 
38 
 
Table 6.3: ARs and CARs for the FT30 after major events of WW2.   
a
 Number of trading days for the market index to return to the 
pre-event level. 
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Following Kaplanski and Levy (2010), the ten largest increases and decreases in the FT30 
during the war are identified to determine whether the major events studied in this section are 
the associated with the largest price changes in the FT30.  Table 6.4 reveals that only one of 
the largest changes in the FT30 during WW2 can be explained by a major event.  The large 
negative return experienced on the 24
th
 June 1940 is the next trading day after the fall of 
France to Germany.  In the next section naval disasters are examined but the 18
th
 September 
1939 is the next trading day after the Courageous Carrier ship was sunk, while the 3.02% 
increase on the 4
th
 July 1940 could be attributed to the Royal Navy’s sinking of the Provence 
and Bretagne Battleships which occurred the previous day.  The fall in returns of 2.45% on 
30
th
 July 1945 is the first trading day after the Amagi CV was sunk, however this fall in 
returns is likely to be the effect of the surprise election result on the 26
th
 July 1945 in which 
Winston Churchill lost office and Clement Attlee won power.   Thus the fall of France had a 
huge bearing on the FT30 as the threat of invasion of Britain was quite real, while some naval 
sinkings that are examined in the next section also could have caused a large change in the 
FT30 stock price. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date Largest Positive Returns Largest Negative Returns Possible War Event Explanation Major Event Day? 
30/01/1939 2.58% - - No 
31/01/1939 3.17% - - No 
20/03/1939 - -3.12% - No 
21/03/1939 2.35% - - No 
24/08/1939 - -2.63% - No 
29/08/1939 2.92% - - No 
18/09/1939 - -4.65% First trading day after the Carrier 
Courageous was sunk 
No 
28/05/1940 - -3.01% - No 
30/05/1940 - -2.80% - No 
17/06/1940 - -4.66% - No 
21/06/1940 - -2.76% - No 
24/06/1940 - -4.73% France surrendered on 22
nd
 June 
(Saturday) and this was the next 
trading day. 
Yes 
27/06/1940 4.05% - - No 
28/06/1940 3.70% - - No 
01/07/1940 2.06% - - No 
04/07/1940 3.02% - Day after British sinkings of the 
Provence and Bretagne Battleships 
No 
26/07/1940 2.72% - - No 
26/07/1945 - -3.97% General Election No 
30/07/1945 - -2.45% First trading day after Churchill 
leaves office 
Carrier Amagi sunk on 28
th
 July 
(Saturday) 
No 
08/08/1945 2.04% - - No 
 
Table 6.4: Rates of return on the best and worst trading days.  Reported are the ten highest rate of return and the ten lowest rates of 
return on the FT30 from 3
rd
 January 1939 to 31
st
 January 1945.  The fourth column provides the common explanation for the market 
movement.  The fifth column reports if these days coincided with an event corresponding to a major event covered in this study.  
168 
 
To explore whether there was a time delay in investors reflecting the major event in stock 
returns, the cumulative mean rate of return (CMR) is plotted for days following a major 
positive and major negative event.  Figure 6.3 shows that the first day following a major 
negative event (t = 1), the mean rate of return falls but not by much.  However, there is sharp 
decline in returns two days following a major negative event. This could be due to either the 
time it takes investors to find out about the negative event taking palce, or the time it takes 
for the severity of the event to be realised by investors.  There does not appear to be a 
reversal effect following a negative event.  This could either suggest that the negative event 
had a lasting impact on the market or the market was affected by other events days after the 
negative events studied and thus affected by high volatility. Figure 6.3 also presents the 
cumulative rates of return for days following a positive event.  The first day after a positive 
event (t = 1) shows an increase in the mean rate of return.  Even though this is still negative, 
it does show a positive reaction in stock returns.  However, the following day exhibits a 
reversal effect where there is a decrease in the mean rate of return lower than the original 
mean rate of return (t = 0).  This suggests that the positive event had a short-term (one day) 
effect on the rate of return of the FT30.  The remaining days appear to behave in a random 
nature, fluctuating below zero indicating that any event (positive or negative) causes future 
days returns to be negative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.5 presents the results from regression 6.4. to determine which seasonality’s are 
evident in the FT30 from the beginning of the sample to the end of the war.  The results show 
 
Figure 6.3: Test results for the mean cumulative rate of return (CMR).  The figure depicts the cumulative 
mean return around the event date (t=0).  The CMR is calculated as the average rate of return on day t. 
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that there is a positive and significant serial correlation at lags 1 and lags 2, while there is also 
a positive and significant turn-of-the-month effect.  Further, there is a negative and 
significant serial correlation at lag 3, thus the regression to be estimated will be; 
 
                                     ∑       
 
   
∑       
 
   
    (6.15) 
 
Where rt-1 is the serial correlation at lag 1, rt-2 is the serial correlation at lag 2, rt-3 is the serial 
correlation at lag 3 and TOTM is the turn-of-the-month anomaly. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.6 documents the results from regression 6.11 for the day after a major event during 
WW2.  The OLS regression results show that although positive events had a negative effect 
on the FT30, the first three days after the event day did not produce significant coefficients.  
This suggests that the positive events examined had little or no impact on the FT30.  The 
negative events however produce negative and significant coefficients for the first and third 
day after a negative event indicating the markets adverse reaction to the negative events 
examined.  The coefficients are significant at 1% and 5% respectively indicating that the 
impact of negative events may be immediate and last up to three days, however the second 
day after the negative event generates a positive coefficient.  The results for the QR in Table 
6.6 show that the first three days following a major positive event again produce negative 
coefficients, although now the third day is statistically significant at 5%.  The QR generates a 
highly significant coefficient the first day after a major event, suggesting that the previous 
OLS regression results were affected by extreme values and the impact of negative events is 
stronger than first thought.  However in the QR, the 2
nd
 day after a major negative event now 
generates a negative coefficient while the 3
rd
 day generates a positive coefficient. These two 
results are again different to the results generated from the OLS regression, suggesting that 
extreme values have had an effect on the OLS results.  To account for possible time-varying 
Table 6.5: Pre-regression results for the known market anomalies during the war period.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% respectively. 
Monday Effect January Effect TOTM Effect Tax Effect Returns
-1
 Returns
-2
 Returns
-3
 Returns
-4
 Returns
-5
 
0.034621 
(0.66) 
0.017784 
(0.24) 
0.145401*** 
(2.72) 
0.062413 
(0.42) 
0.269675*** 
(10.39) 
0.083316*** 
(3.10) 
-0.054181** 
(-2.01) 
-0.018264 
(-0.68) 
0.018672 
(0.72) 
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volatility in the stock returns, an ARCH(1)
35
 model is estimated. Table 6.6 shows that the 
first three days after a major positive event all generate insignificant coefficients, with the 
first day coefficient being positive and the second and third day being negative.  However, all 
of the first three days following a major negative event generate negative significant 
coefficients indicating the substantial level of negative investor sentiment in stock returns 
after major negative events of WW2.  The fact that negative events have a stronger impact on 
stock returns than positive events is consistent with some literature, which finds asymmetric 
effects.  For example, Brown and Hartzell (2001) and Edmans et al (2007) find that stock 
price changes following sporting losses are substantially larger in magnitude than those 
following wins. Thus the results from Table 6.6 show that negative vents had a significant 
negative impact on FT30 returns while positive events had little impact. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 A GARCH(1,1) model was estimated first (as in line with the literature) however the sum of the coefficients 
were greater than unity indicating inappropriateness.  The only model that fits is an ARCH(1) model. 
Table 6.6: The OLS, Quantile and ARCH regression results from equation 6.4.  Positive 1
st
 day denotes the 
1
st
 day following a positive event, positive 2
nd
 day denotes the 2
nd
 day following a positive events and so on.   
***, ** and * indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
 
 OLS Regression QR ARCH(1) 
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γ0 0.00005 
(0.32) 
0.00025*** 
(3.94) 
0.00031*** 
(4.50) 
Rt-1 0.29339*** 
(12.36) 
0.32393*** 
(30.39) 
0.30602*** 
(29.93) 
Rt-2 0.21157*** 
(8.75) 
0.17284*** 
(15.78) 
0.10914*** 
(11.57) 
Rt-3 -0.05058** 
(-2.15) 
-0.01458 
(-1.37) 
-0.02454*** 
(-3.57) 
TOTM 0.00070** 
(2.16) 
0.00020 
(1.34) 
0.00015 
(0.63) 
Positive 1st day -0.00050 
(-0.31) 
-0.00128* 
(-1.82) 
0.00088 
(1.05) 
Positive 2nd day -0.00096 
(-0.59) 
-0.00133* 
(-1.91) 
-0.00025 
(-0.19) 
Positive 3rd day -0.00010 
(-0.06) 
-0.00153** 
(2.19) 
-0.00172 
(-1.36) 
Negative 1st day -0.00799*** 
(-4.72) 
-0.00599*** 
(-8.21) 
-0.01307*** 
(-21.87) 
Negative 2nd day 0.00011 
(0.07) 
-0.00074 
(-1.01) 
-0.00164** 
(-2.35) 
Negative 3rd day -0.00340** 
(-1.99) 
0.00035 
(0.48) 
-0.00388*** 
(-4.89) 
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Constant - - 9.58e-6*** 
(6.85) 
ARCH(1) - - 0.87915*** 
(19.78) 
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Date Minimum 
t-statistic 
One day 
percent 
change in 
price 
Percentage 
change in price 
over the next 5 
working days 
Possible Explanations for breaks Important 
Event? 
11/04/1939 -5.510*** -2.10 -0.76% Adolf Hitler issues a Directive for the Armed Forces regarding the invasion of Poland No 
09/10/1939 -5.483*** 
-0.58% 5.86% 
 Adolf Hitler issues a memorandum to senior commanders justifying a policy of full-scale attack on Britain and France, if 
possible, that autumn. 
 Adolf Hitler issues Directive No. 6 "for the Conduct of the War", ordering an offensive planned through Luxembourg, Belgium, 
and Holland, as soon as armoured units are ready and favourable weather conditions allow. The purpose of the offensive is to 
defeat the French Army, gain territory in Holland, Belgium, and Northern France to serve as a base against England and protect 
the Ruhr area. Adolf Hitler fears a delay would lead to an invasion of Belgium and possibly Holland by Western forces. 
 No 
20/02/1940 -4.891** -1.18% 3.88 - No 
14/06/1940 -4.978** -2.12% -13.6% Germany enters Paris Yes 
03/07/1940 -7.111*** 1.63% 2.27% The last of the British Expedition Force is evacuated from Dunkirk, France No 
13/09/1940 -5.004** 
-0.16% -0.16% 
The Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka and German aide to Ribbentrop Heinrich Stahmer reach a general agreement 
for a joint alliance. 
No 
08/12/1941 -5.603*** -0.96% -2.75% Allies declare war on Japan and on the 7th December, Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour No 
03/07/1942 -4.919** 0.77% 1.65% Off Georges' Bank, Nova Scotia, Canada, British warship HMS Le Tigre sinks German submarine U-215. No 
30/09/1942 -5.870*** 0.50% 1.93% 29th September  - For the second time, Japanese submarine I-25 launches a floatplane off the coast of Oregon, bombing the coast No 
04/01/1943 -4.972** 0.43% 1.91% General Hideki Tojo, Prime Minister of Japan, ordered Japan's forces to evacuate Guadalcanal, No 
12/08/1943 -4.910** -0.48% -0.38% 10th August - British bombers attack Nuremberg, Germany. Great damage is achieved at little cost. No 
18/11/1943 -6.800*** 
-0.10% 0.70% 
395 British bombers attack Mannheim and Ludwigshafen, Germany, as a diversion from the main attack on Berlin. 
 444 British heavy bombers attack Berlin, Germany, in the first attack of the Battle of Berlin. Nine British planes are lost. Little 
damage is done, mainly due to much cloud cover. 
No 
24/02/1944 -5.267** 
-0.29% -0.48% 
 Over the day, the US 8th Air Force launches bomber attacks on Gotha, Rostock, and Schweinfurt. In the North Atlantic, Royal 
Canadian Navy frigate Waskesiu sinks German submarine U-257. 
(evening) 734 British bombers attack Schweinfurt, Germany 
 No 
26/04/1944 -5.356** 
0.47% 1.70% 
 German destroyer T-29 sinks in the English Channel, after shelling from Royal Canadian Navy destroyer Haida, and three other 
British and Canadian ships. 
(evening) 493 British bombers attack targets in Essen, Germany. Enormous damage is inflicted. Seven planes are shot down. 
(evening) 225 British bombers attack the ball-bearing industry centre at Schweinfurt, Germany. About 21 planes are shot down 
 No 
24/10/1944 -5.247** 0.36% 1.36% Allied forces seal off the South Beveland isthmus near the port of Antwerp, Belgium No 
19/01/1945 -5.579*** -0.71% -0.88% Soviet forces reach the German frontier in Silesia No 
12/02/1945 -5.873*** 0.27% 0.80% Poland issues ten postage stamps noting the dates of liberation of various Polish cities No 
27/07/1945 -7.467*** 0.44% -7.09% Winston Churchill leaves office Yes 
30/07/1945 -5.253** -2.45% -3.05% Monday after Churchill leaves office Yes 
14/08/1945 -5.789*** 
-0.45% 0.81% 
The US receives the Japanese acceptance of unconditional surrender. 
(evening) US President Harry Truman announces the end of the Second World War 
Yes 
 
Table 6.7: Test results for the Zivot-Andrews (1992) structural break test.  The data used is a 3-month weekly rolling subsample, similar to Choudhry (2010). The final column denotes 
whether the break point is associated with an important event.   *** and ** indicate significance at 1% and 5%. 
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Table 6.7 presents the structural break dates, the major event(s) associated with the date, the 
change in the stock price between the day of the event and the day after, and the sum of the 
change in price over the next five working days.  Five working days
36
 are applied because of 
the high intensity of the war since many battles and conflicts were fought very close to each 
other so in order to avoid over lapping, and to also capture the potential long-run effect of 
each major battle or event. 
 
The results show a total of 23 breaks found it the data.  Some of the breaks found have 
obvious explanations, such as the entry of Paris by Germany on 14
th
 June 1940, or 8
th
 
December 1940 which is the day after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour.  However, there 
are a number of breaks found on days when no event took place.  For example the analysis 
shows a break on 19
th
 January 1945 when the only event was the Soviet forces reaching the 
German frontier in Silesia.  It is very unlikely that this is a major event for British investors 
and there may have been other factors that caused this break to be found. Further, it is quite 
surprising that not more well-known events have not been picked up as breaks.  In the 
previous analysis 22 of the most important event during the WW2 were examined, but 
through this exogenous test, only two of them are found. This could suggest that the previous 
events studied were not the real major events of WW2 as far as the investors were concerned 
or that the major events that determined the outcome of WW2 did not have a bearing on the 
behaviour of British investors.  These results are quite different to the ones found by 
Choudhry (2010), who used the same testing procedure to find that major events during 
WW2 for DJIA data.  They found that the majority of events deemed as important by 
historians were picked up in the structural break test. This could be due to the DJIA being 
more efficient than the FT30 and the market reacting to major events of the war in a timelier 
manner.  Another possible explanation is that the volume of trading in the FT30 during the 
war was relatively low since investors were either at war themselves or trading didn’t seem 
very important at the time.  Blips are breaks that persist for only a day or so, thus the five-day 
change in price should be of an opposite sign to the one day price change.  Blips reflect 
reaction to early news that later turned out to be false, or market reaction over events on 
which there is little information. Turning points however induce a persistent change in prices 
in a certain direction and can be viewed as important events during the war.  The results from 
Table 6.7 show that 15 of the 23 break points found were turning points, with the price 
                                                 
36
 Similar to Choudhry (2010). 
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change continuing in the same direct for five-days. None of the blips were major events in the 
previous analysis and there is little rationale to deem them as important. 
 
6.3.4. Major Events Conclusion 
 
This section examined major events during WW2 through exogenous and endogenous tests.  
The first section examined whether investor sentiment was present in the FT30 during WW2 
through an examination of major positive and negative events.  The next day returns analysis 
shows that major negative events had a strong negative effect on the FT30 while major 
positive events had a small negative effect. This is not surprising since the majority of the 
literature on investor sentiment reveals that negative events seem to have a stronger impact 
on stock returns than positive events (for example Edmans et al 2007).  To examine whether 
there is a time-delay in investors reacting to these events, the cumulative mean rate of return 
is plotted for the first 10 days following the event.  The figure shows that negative events 
seem to produce larger than normal returns for all the days following the events, while 
positive events seem to produce a smaller than normal rate of return.  Further, the OLS, QR 
and ARCH regressions are conducted to examine the effect of these events when accounting 
for known anomalies in market returns.  The results from the OLS regression, quantile 
regression and the ARCH model show that major negative events during WW2, have a 
significant negative impact on FT30 stock market returns. This is not that surprising given the 
negative events chosen were key events that must have caused anxiety among investors due 
to the threat of losing the war. Thus major positive events of WW2 had a small effect on the 
FT30 while major negative events had a strong significant effect on the FT30.  Overall our 
results are consistent with the majority of literature on investor sentiment in that negative 
events tend to have a stronger effect on the FT30 than positive events.  However, there is 
limited evidence of strong investor sentiment during WW2, which is contrary to the literature 
that finds strong investor sentiment for economically unimportant events.  The results from 
the break analysis shows that only two events examined in the previous section are found 
using the break analysis; namely the German entry into Paris and Pearl Harbour.  This 
suggests that many events deemed as important by historians in regards to the war effort were 
not that important for British investors.  Thus the break analysis shows that only the very 
biggest WW2 event had an impact on the FT30. Overall, the major events examined had a 
negative impact on the FT30, however given the break analysis fails to pick up the majority 
of them, they may not be the cause of the biggest effect on the FT30 during the WW2 period. 
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6.4. Naval Disasters 
 
The previous section examined the major events of WW2 and whether they had an impact on 
stock returns in the FT30. These major events were selected due to their impact on the war as 
whole and included major victories, losses as well as declarations of war and surrenders. 
Nevertheless the battles at sea had an important impact on the outcome of WW2 with 
thousands of crew being killed instantly at sea and the sinkings being as unpredictable as 
airline crashes today. Churchill demonstrates the importance of naval ships during WW2 by 
stating ‘In all the war I never received a more direct shock’37, which was his response to 
hearing the sinking of the battleships Prince of Wales and Repulse on 10
th
 December 1941. A 
loss of a large ship not only was a huge loss financially and strategically in the war effort, but 
some ships had a huge prestige value.   For example, the Battleship HMS Hood was the pride 
of the British fleet and its loss was felt deeply.  ‘The destruction of the battle-cruiser Hood is 
a heavy calamity.  With her 42,000 tons displacement she was the largest and most powerful 
warship afloat… the loss of this mighty unit makes an acknowledged gap in a fighting line 
that, especially since the defection of our French ally, has had to be stretched round the 
globe to the utmost limit of its elasticity
38.’ 
 
This section examines the impact of major naval sinkings during WW2 had on the FT30. The 
null hypothesis is that these unexpected sinkings have a negative sentiment on stock returns.  
The major sinkings of British, German, US and Japanese vessels are examined to determine 
what impact (if any) they had on investor decision making.  The next day return, ARs, CARs, 
and regression analysis are used to understand major vessel sinkings impact on the FT30. 
Table 6.8 documents the ships sunk during WW2 that are examined and it is a comprehensive 
list of major ships sunk during WW2 which are taken from Stephens (1983) and Heden 
(2006). Also included is the date the sinking was published in the Times to examine whether 
there is a time delay between the sinking and the public being made aware the sinking.  
British ships (Battleships and Aircraft Carriers) are examined as well as enemy ships and 
allied ships sunk to determine whether the nationality of the ships is significant.   Enemy 
ships include German, Italian and Japanese ships, while allied ships consist of British and US 
vessels. 
                                                 
37
 Churchill, W.S. , 1948-55, The Second World War (6 Vols), London. 
38
 The Times, 26
th
 May 1941. 
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6.4.1. Background on Naval Warfare 
 
Naval power had been assessed primarily by the number of battleships possessed by a nation 
since the British admiralty authorised the construction of the revolutionary HMS 
Dreadnaught in 1905.  This warship was far larger and more advanced than existing ships and 
rendered all existing battleships obsolete (Lambert, 1995).  These ships were also hugely 
expensive and demanding to construct and maintain.  Even the largest economies struggled to 
build substantial forces of post dreadnaught battleships. Before the First World War there was 
a huge and enormously emotive naval arms race between Britain and Germany to construct 
the largest possible battleship fleet.  This naval rivalry is often considered a major 
contributory factor to the war.  The cost of producing the ships can be gauged by the fact that 
after almost a decade of extreme rivalry and all-out construction by two of the greatest 
industrial powers Britain possessed approximately a couple of dozen dreadnaughts and 
Germany somewhat less.  Given the small number of ships involved and their enormous 
power and expense the loss of any ship was of considerable strategic, economic and moral 
importance. 
 
Although the battleship played a less than decisive role in the First World War it emerged as 
still the overwhelming determinant of naval power.  After the war all the major powers put in 
hand major programs for the construction of even larger battleships.  These promised to be so 
ruinously expensive that at the Washington naval treaty of 1922 the powers agreed to severe 
limits on the size of their fleets.  Although there was a flurry of construction just before the 
Second World War as war appeared inevitable (the UK for example laying down five King 
George V-class battleships) the major powers entered the war with relatively small fleets of 
battleships with each ship representing a substantial proportion of its naval might.  At the 
start of the war in Europe in 1939 the British Navy possessed about 12 operational 
Battleships with the 5 mentioned above under construction, three battle cruisers and eight 
aircraft carriers (Konstam 2009) while the Germans 5 (including 3 of the relative small 
pocket battleships) with 2 under construction.  At the start of the war in the Pacific in 1941 
the US possessed 17 battleships and Japan 10 (Ellis, 1990, Statistical Appendix, Table 56)  
 
Between the wars the aircraft carrier started to emerge as a rival to the battleship.  Normally 
of similar size and expense to battleships their offensive power was provided by aircraft as 
opposed to huge guns.  The issue of whether aircraft were of more value than big guns and 
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indeed whether aircraft could sink battleships, which were enormously armoured and 
bristling with anti-aircraft guns, was hugely controversial between the wars (see, for example, 
Hough, 1979).  This dispute was certainly not resolved by the start of the Second World War 
and the largest navies of the UK, US and Japan hedged their bets with substantial forces of 
aircraft carriers as well as battleships.  During the war the battleship was shown to be 
vulnerable to air attack on many occasions and was considered of secondary importance to 
the aircraft carrier by the end of the war.  The aircraft carrier can be considered to have taken 
over as the modern capital ship but is so expensive that it is only operated in significant 
numbers by the US navy.   In our analysis of war events we look at both battleships and 
aircraft carriers both because both classes of ship were important and in an effort to 
determine whether the market was informed about the greater military value of aircraft 
carriers. 
 
6.4.2. Empirical Results  
 
The ARs and CARs of the naval sinking days when capital ships were sunk are documented 
in Table 6.9.  Allied ships sinking include all British and US ships, while enemy ships 
sinking include all German, Italian and Japanese ships. All abnormal returns are not 
significant, indicating that none of the sinkings had a strong impact on the FT30.  However, it 
is obvious that British, allied and Japanese ships sinking had a detrimental effect on the FT30 
since the next day abnormal returns are negative.  This is surprising for the Japanese ships 
sinking but the likelihood is that other factors are driving the negative result.  The day after 
British ships sinking has the largest negative abnormal return which is expected but the next 
two days are positive indicating that it only had a temporary effect on the FT30. German 
ships sinking produce a next day abnormal returns which is positive, but the following day is 
negative possibly indicating again the temporary impact on the FT30. When British 
battleships and carrierships are separated it is clear that carrierships had a much stronger 
negative impact than battleships, with the abnormal return at -0.58% for carrierships and only 
-0.04% for battleships.  The 5-day and 10-day cumulative abnormal returns are all 
insignificant again suggesting the limited impact of naval disasters on the FT30. The results 
are quite similar to the abnormal return results except that the first day after a German sinking 
now produces a negative return, further suggesting the temporal impact on FT30 returns.  
Further, battleships sinkings appear to have a positive effect on the FT30, again suggesting 
the temporal impact on FT30 returns.  Nevertheless, carrierships continue to produce a 
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negative return for the 5-day and 10-day cumulative abnormal return indicating the negative 
effect they appear to have on FT30 returns.  None of the ARs or CARs are statistically 
significant, which is not that surprising since the t-statistics are calculated by comparing the 
abnormal return to the standard deviation of the abnormal return, thus the probability of a 
significant result is not that high. 
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Ship 
BB – Battleship 
CV Carrier 
 
Nationality Sunk Date Date Sinking 
was 
Published in 
the Times  
Comments Next 
Day 
Return 
Courageous 
CV 
British 17 Sept 1939 19 Sep 1939 Sunk by U-29 boat near UK, 519 deaths. -0.0477 
Royal Oak 
BB 
British 14 Oct 1939 16 Oct 1939 Sunk at anchor in Scapa Flow by U-47 with the loss of 833 lives. 0.0167 
Graf Spee 
Pocket BB (approx 15,000 tons) 
German 17 Dec 1939 18 Dec 1939 Scuttled after Battle of  River Plate in South America 0.0013 
Glorious 
CV 
British 8 June 1940 10 June 1940 Sunk by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau off Norway over 1,200 dead -0.0065 
Provence BB, Bretagne BB French 3 July 1940 5 July 1940 British attacks on Oran et Mers-el-Kebir in North Africa to stop French ships falling into German 
hands.  1,300 lives lost. 
0.0103 
Conte di Cavour BB, Caio Duilio 
BB, Andrea Doria, BB, Littorio BB 
Italian 11 Nov 1940 14 Nov 1940 Conte di Cavour BB  was sunk by Royal Navy aircraft in Taranto Harbour in Italy  The other ships 
did not fully sink in the shallow harbour and some were repaired 
0.0043 
Hood BB British 24 May 1941 26 May 1941 Sunk by Bismark in North Atlantic with only 3 men escaped from crew of 1,419. 0.0000 
Bismarck BB German 27 May 1941 28 May 1941 Sunk by Royal Navy in North Atlantic with only 110 survivors out of acrew of over 2,200. 0.0043 
Ark Royal CV British 14 Nov 1941 15 Nov 1941 Sunk by U-81 boat near Gibraltar 0.0025 
Barham BB British 25 Nov 1941 28 Jan 1941 Sunk by U-331 boat in Med. With 862 deaths.  The Germans didn’t initially realise they had sunk it.  
Sinking kept secret until 27 January 1942 when admiralty informed the press. 
0.0012 
Arizona BB, Oklahoma BB, West 
Virginia BB, California BB, Nevada 
BB, Tennessee BB, Maryland BB 
US 7 Dec 1941 8 Dec 1941 Pearl Harbour. All the ships except Arizona and Oklahoma were later repaired and brought back into 
service. About 2,400 US deaths 
-0.0097 
Prince of Wales BB, Repulse BB British 10 Dec 1941 11 Dec 1941 Sunk by Japanese aircraft off Malaya, with 327 deaths on Prince of Wales and 508 deaths on 
Repulse 
0.0038 
Valiant BB, Queen Elizabeth BB British 19 Dec 1941 9 Jan 1942 Sunk in Alexandria harbour in Egypt by Italian divers on manned torpedoes. Sank in shallow water 
and repaired within a few months although it was kept secret from the press. 
0.0012 
Hermes CV Britain 9 April 1942 11 April 1942 Japanese planes sunk the Hermes in Indian Ocean 0.00 
Shoho CV Japan 7 May 1942 - Sunk at the Battle of Coral Sea -0.0013 
Lexington CV US 8 May 1942 
 
- Sunk at the Battle of Coral Sea 0.0026 
Kaga CV, Soryu CV Japan 4 June 1942 
 
- Battle of Midway 0.0050 
Akagi CV, Hiryu CV Japan 5 June 1942 - Battle of Midway - over 2000 casualties on Japanese carriers. 0.0050 
Yorktown CV US 7 June 1942 
 
- Battle of Midway 0.0037 
Eagle CV Britain 11 Aug1942 13 Aug 1942 Sunk by U-73 boat 0.0037 
Ryuyi CV Japan 24 Aug 1942 - Battle of Eastern Solomans 0.00 
Wasp CV US 15 Sept 1942 - Hit by submarine torpedo 
Sunk by US forces 
0.0024 
Hornet CV US 27 Oct 1942 - Dive bombers, torpedo bombers and destroyer torpedos 0.0033 
Hiei BB Japan 13 Nov 1942 - Aircraft and submarine attacks Guadalcanal 0.00 
Kishima BB Japan 15 Nov 1942 - Naval gunfire Guadalcanal 0.00 
Table 6.8:  The major naval disasters studied in this chapter. 
Table 6.7: The major naval disasters studied in this chapter.  The first column documents the ships studied in this paper, the second column their nationality and the third and 
fourth columns then date sunk and the date reported in the Times. The fifth column gives some comments about the sinking, while the last column gives the price movements 
in the FT30 for the first three days after the sinking. 
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Mutsu BB Japan 8 June 1943 - Accidental explosion – over 1,000 deaths – survivors dispersed to remote outposts to suppress the 
news. 
-0.0010 
Roma BB Italy 9 Sept 1943 - Sunk by German guided bombs while proceeding to join allies after Italian surrender 0.0009 
Chuyo 
Escort Carrier (approx 20,000 tons) 
Japan 4 Dec 1943 - Sunk by submarine Sailfish of southeast of Honshu, Japan. 0.0020 
Scharnhorst BB German 26 Dec 1943 28 Dec 1943 Sunk by British surface forces in battle of North Cape. 
Only 36 men were pulled from the icy seas, out of a crew of 1,968 
0.0010 
Shokaku CV, Taiho CV, Hitaka CV 
 
Japan 19 June 1944 
 
- Two submarines and carriership sunk in the  Battle of Philippine Sea 0.0018 
Hiyo CV Japan 20 June 1944 
 
- Carrier Aircraft sunk in the Battle of Philippine Sea 0.00 
Otaka Escort Carrier 
 
Japan 18 Aug 1944 - Sunk  by submarine Rasher off the Philippine Islands, -0.0071 
Princeton Light Carrier US 24 Oct 1944 - Aircraft but sunk by own forces 
Battle of Leyte Gulf 
0.0036 
Musahi BB  Japan 24 Oct 1944 
 
- Aircraft sunk in the Battle of Leyte Gulf with approximately 1,000 deaths 
 
 
0.0036 
Zuikaku CV, Chitose 
Light CV, Chiyoda Light  CV, 
Zuiho Light CV, Fuso BB, 
Yamashiro BB 
Japan 25 Oct 1944 
 
- Sunk in the Battle of Leyte Gulf 0.0009 
Tirpitz BB German 12 Nov 1944 14 Nov 1944 Sunk by RAF Lancaster bomber Approx. 1,000 deaths. 0.0009 
Kongo BB Japan 21 Nov 1944 - Submarine 0.00 
Unryu CV Japan 19 Dec 1944 - Submarine 0.0027 
Yamato BB Japan 7 Apr 1945 - 
 
 
The world’s biggest battleship sinks with the loss of nearly 2,500 lives.  0.0017 
Admiral Scheer, Pocket BB  Germany 10 Apr1945 12 Apr 1945 Sunk by RAF -0.0009 
Lutzow Pocket BB  Germany 16 Apr 1945 21 Apr 1945 Made unfit for sea by RAF attack - later scuttled 0.0017 
Hyuga BB, Ise BB Haruna BB, 
Kaiyo, Escort Carrier  
Japan 24 July 1945 - Sunk by carrier aircraft 0.00 
Amagi CV Japan 28 July 1945 - Sunk by carrier aircraft -0.0248 
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Table 6.10 documents the results from regression 6.5 on naval ships sinking on the FT30.  
The seasonality’s are examined in the previous section and are the serial correlation up to lag 
3 and the turn-of-the-month effect are found to be significant. The results for British ships 
sinking reveals that the first day coefficient is negative (-0.00107) but the next two days have 
positive coefficients.  The results for the Allied ships sinking (this includes British and US 
 
Data Day post sinking AR 5-day CAR 10-day CAR 
FT30 - -0.0003% 
 
-0.003% 0.01% 
 
British Ships Sunk 
1st -0.31% 
(0.51) 
-0.09% 
(0.05) 
-0.07% 
(-0.02) 
2nd 0.05% 
(0.07) 
0.07% 
(0.04) 
0.30% 
(0.10) 
3rd 0.37% 
(0.61) 
0.28% 
(0.14) 
0.62% 
(0.21) 
Allied Ships Sunk 1
st -0.19% 
(-0.31) 
0.04% 
(0.02) 
0.14% 
(0.04) 
2nd -0.06% 
(-0.10) 
0.00% 
(0.00) 
0.31% 
(0.10) 
3rd 0.02% 
(0.04) 
0.18% 
(0.09) 
0.34% 
(0.11) 
German Ships Sunk 1
st 0.04% 
(0.06) 
-0.06% 
(-0.03) 
-0.63% 
(-0.21) 
2nd -0.16% 
(-0.26) 
-0.28% 
(-0.14) 
-0.89% 
(-0.29) 
3rd 0.09% 
(0.15) 
-0.57% 
(-0.28) 
-1.04% 
(-0.34) 
 
Japanese Ships Sunk 
1st -0.17% 
(-0.28) 
-0.93% 
(-0.46) 
0.15% 
(0.05) 
2nd -0.38% 
(-0.63) 
-0.93% 
(-0.46) 
-0.32% 
(-0.11) 
3rd -0.10% 
(-0.16) 
-0.99% 
(-0.49) 
-0.47% 
(-0.16) 
 
Enemy Ships Sunk 
1st 0.05% 
(0.07) 
0.39% 
(0.19) 
0.77% 
(0.25) 
2nd -0.23% 
(-0.37) 
-0.07% 
(-0.03) 
0.52% 
(0.17) 
3rd 0.06% 
(0.10) 
-0.22% 
(-0.11) 
0.64% 
(0.21) 
 
British Battleships 
Sunk 
1st -0.04% 
(-0.06) 
0.52% 
(0.26) 
1.38% 
(0.45) 
2nd 0.03% 
(0.05) 
0.57% 
(0.28) 
1.51% 
(0.50) 
3rd 0.14% 
(0.23) 
0.57% 
(0.28) 
1.75% 
(0.58) 
 
British Carrier Ships 
Sunk 
1st -0.58% 
(-0.95) 
-0.70% 
(-0.35) 
-1.52% 
(-0.50) 
2nd 0.06% 
(0.10) 
-0.42% 
(0.21) 
-0.92% 
(-0.30) 
3rd 0.61% 
(1.00) 
-0.01% 
(-0.01) 
-0.50% 
(-0.17) 
 
Table 6.9: ARs and CARs for the FT30 after major naval disasters. The second column denotes the abnormal 
returns while the fourth and fifth columns document the 5-day and 10-day cumulative abnormal returns.  
***, **, * indicate significant at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Allied ships sinking includes British and US 
ships as well as the Italian ship the Roma BB which was sunk on 9
th
 September 1943 when on its way to join 
the allied forces. Finally Enemy sinkings include German and Japanese ships as well as the French ships 
sunk on 3
rd
 July 1940 and the Italian ships sunk on 11
th
 November 1940. 
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ships) are nearly identical due to the small number of US ships sunk during WW2
39
.  This 
suggests that British and Allied ships sinking did not have lasting impact on the stock market 
and only caused a temporary shock.  The German ships sinking during WW2 appear to have 
little impact on the British stock market as the first day after the sinking generates a 
coefficient that is positive and very small 0.00073).  But the second day after a German 
sinking produces a negative coefficient, while the third day after produces a positive 
coefficient again.  This suggests that German ships sinking had little immediate impact upon 
FT30 prices and any effect they did have was only temporary. However, when Japanese ships 
sunk, the first day after a sinking produces a positive coefficient (0.00051), which is 
expected.  However, the second day after the sinking produces a negative (-0.00400) 
coefficient which is significant at 1%, suggesting that Japanese ships must have had a 
temporary effect on the market for one day, with the market going negative in the second day.  
Also the first three days after a Battleship is sunk produces positive coefficients, with the first 
day being significant at 10%.  Conversely, when just carrier ships are examined, the 1
st
 day 
after the sinking produces a negative coefficient (-0.00676) which is significant at 1%, 
suggesting that carrier ships sinking during WW2 had a detrimental effect on the British 
market.   The 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 day after the sinkings are positive, with the 3
rd
 day being significant 
at 1% signifying that impact of carrier ships sinking did not have a long lasting impact on the 
FT30. This also suggests that the carrier ship results were driving the result for all British 
ships sinking and that battleship sinkings had little or no effect on the market as a whole. This 
shows the possible importance of Carrier ships during WW2 to Britain and the relative 
importance of Battleships to the FT30 during WW2.   
                                                 
39
 See Table 6.10 for details. 
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  OLS Regression 
  British Ships Allied Ships German Ships Japanese Ships Enemy Ships British Battle Ships British Carrier Ships 
 
T
h
e 
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
a
l 
M
ea
n
 E
q
u
a
ti
o
n
 γ0 0.00032 
(1.09) 
0.00034 
(1.14) 
0.00033 
(1.12) 
0.00033 
(1.12) 
0.00033 
(1.11) 
0.00033 
(1.12) 
0.00034 
(1.16) 
Rt-1 0.30579*** 
(12.60) 
0.3039*** 
(12.62) 
0.30666*** 
(12.63) 
0.30739*** 
(12.66) 
0.30916*** 
(12.74) 
0.30650*** 
(12.61) 
0.30849*** 
(12.72) 
Rt-2 0.23335*** 
(9.21) 
0.23271*** 
(9.18) 
0.23259*** 
(9.18) 
0.23500*** 
(9.29) 
0.23390*** 
(9.25) 
0.23365*** 
(9.22) 
0.23235*** 
(9.16) 
Rt-3 -0.05855** 
(-2.26) 
-0.05946** 
(-2.29) 
-0.05927** 
(-2.29) 
-0.06457** 
(-2.49) 
-0.06368** 
(-2.46) 
-0.06031** 
(-2.33) 
0.06068** 
(-2.35) 
TOTM 0.00082** 
(2.17) 
0.00071** 
(2.15) 
0.00215** 
(2.01) 
0.00004 
(1.19) 
0.00004 
(1.20) 
0.00089*** 
(2.22) 
0.00079 
(2.11) 
Returns Post Events 1
st
 Day -0.00107 
(-0.56) 
-0.00059 
(-0.44) 
0.00073 
(0.33) 
0.00051 
(0.38) 
0.00132 
(1.20) 
0.00458* 
(1.88) 
-0.00676*** 
(-2.77) 
Returns Post Events 2
nd
 Day 0.00128 
(0.74) 
0.00036 
(0.27) 
-0.00161 
(-0.72) 
-0.00400** 
(-2.93) 
-0.00319*** 
(-2.88) 
0.00237 
(0.97) 
0.00012 
(0.05) 
 Returns Post Events 3
rd
 Day 0.00307* 
(1.78) 
0.00042 
(0.32) 
0.00160 
(0.72) 
0.00129 
(0.96) 
0.00149 
(1.36) 
0.00039 
(0.16) 
0.00572** 
(2.35) 
 R
2 
F
 
0.19 
26.18 
0.19 
25.88 
0.19 
25.94 
0.19 
26.57 
0.19 
26.69 
0.19 
26.22 
0.19 
26.94 
  
Table 6.10: The OLS regression results from equation 6.11 on naval ship disasters.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Table 6.11 further examines the level of investor sentiment by examining the QR and 
GARCH regressions
40
.  The QR regression results show that the sinking of British ships had 
no impact on stock returns, since all three post event days produce positive coefficients when 
negative coefficient should be associated with British sinkings.  German ships sinking 
produce very similar results to the OLS regression in Table 6.10, although now the 3
rd
 day 
after the sinking is statistically significant at 5%.  Further, British battle ship sinkings 
generate positive coefficients for the first three days, with the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 day statistically 
significant at 1% and 5% respectively.  This result is a lot stronger than the OLS regression 
results for battle ships, indicating that the OLS regression may have been affected by extreme 
values.  The British carrier ship QR regression results are similar to the OLS regression 
results except the magnitude of the coefficients are less and no longer statistically significant, 
indicating the strong negative sentiment associated with the carrier ship sinkings in Table 
6.10 may be due to extreme values.  Table 6.11 also presents the GARCH regression results, 
which allow for varying volatility in stock returns.  Again, British sinkings appear to have no 
impact on stock returns, since each of the first three days after the sinking are all associated 
with positive coefficients.  Further the days following German sinkings produce negative 
coefficients, contradicting the null hypothesis that British sinkings should have a negative 
impact on stock returns and German sinkings a positive impact.  British battle ships and 
carrier ships both generate positive coefficients, again contradicting the null hypothesis. 
 
In Section 6.2 in this chapter, the 10 largest positive and negative returns of the FT30 during 
the war period are examined.  It is found that the day following the Courageous carrier ship’s 
sinking is associated with a strong negative returns.  To ensure that the British ships results 
are not driven by just one value, the regressions are run again but with the Courageous carrier 
ships excluded from the data.  Table 6.12 reveals the results for the British ships excluding 
the Courageous carrier ship.  The results show that British ships sinking without the 
Courageous CV included produces a positive next day coefficient, which is significant at 
10%.  The results are confirmed when carrier ships are examined, indicating that this one 
observation may have been driving the negative coefficient.  Further, the British carrier ships 
data excluding the Courageous carrier ships are examined and find that the next day 
coefficient is positive but not significant, indicating that the Courageous CV was also driving 
the results for the Carrier ships analysis.  To investigate the sentiment of investors in more 
                                                 
40
 Allied ships results are not presented since the results are very similar to the British ship results.  Japanese 
ships and enemy ships are also not reported since they showed no evidence of sentiment in Table 6.10. 
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detail, the OLS regression is run again for war data but when each individual British sinking 
was announced in the Times newspaper.  Some of the sinkings were not reported until a 
couple of days after their sinking and so the majority of investors would not have been aware 
of the sinking until it was reported in the Times.  There was a lot of propaganda from both 
sides during the war and many losses were not published for public consumption to avoid a 
fall in moral. The information for the Times was retrieved from the Times online archive. 
The results in Table 6.12 reveal that the day a British sinking was announced in the Times 
produces a coefficient of 0.00373, which is significant at 5%.  This suggests that the 
announcement of the sinkings in the Times had no effect on the investor sentiment since one 
would suspect the coefficient to be negative.  
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  Quantile Regression GARCH Regression 
  British 
Ships 
German 
Ships 
British Battle 
Ships 
British Carrier 
Ships 
British 
Ships 
German 
Ships 
British Battle 
Ships 
British Carrier 
Ships 
 
T
h
e 
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
a
l 
M
ea
n
 E
q
u
a
ti
o
n
 γ0 0.00039*** 
(2.63) 
0.00042*** 
(2.99) 
0.00042*** 
(2.92) 
0.00042*** 
(2.75) 
0.00029* 
(1.68) 
0.00029* 
(1.71) 
0.00030* 
(1.72) 
0.00029* 
(1.69) 
Rt-1 0.30461*** 
(25.02) 
0.30677*** 
(26.79) 
0.30537*** 
(25.94) 
0.30507*** 
(24.33) 
0.29391*** 
(10.51) 
0.29423*** 
(10.30) 
0.29535*** 
(10.57) 
0.29475*** 
(10.53) 
Rt-2 0.20687*** 
(16.25) 
0.20381*** 
(17.08) 
0.20335*** 
(16.57) 
0.20672*** 
(15.73) 
0.11966*** 
(3.71) 
0.11722*** 
(3.50) 
0.12042*** 
(3.75) 
0.11944*** 
(3.69) 
Rt-3 -0.04003*** 
(-3.08) 
-0.03011** 
(-2.46) 
-0.02164* 
(.73) 
-0.03571*** 
(-2.65) 
0.002635 
(0.08) 
0.00610 
(0.19) 
0.00091 
(0.03) 
0.00156 
(0.05) 
TOTM 0.03214** 
(2.11) 
0.03482** 
(2.22) 
0.05498** 
(2.00) 
0.07159** 
(2.14) 
0.02804** 
(1.98) 
0.02084** 
(2.07) 
0.04896** 
(1.99) 
0.03879** 
(2.28) 
Returns Post 
Events 1
st
 Day 
0.00019 
(0.22) 
0.00035 
(0.40) 
0.00072 
(0.68) 
-0.00004 
(-0.03) 
0.00070 
(0.42) 
-0.00070 
(-0.52) 
0.00073 
(0.23) 
0.00065 
(0.33) 
Returns Post 
Events 2
nd
 Day 
0.00151* 
(1.82) 
-0.00097 
(-1.01) 
0.00374*** 
(3.53) 
0.00039 
(0.34) 
0.00166 
(1.55) 
-0.00216** 
(-2.28) 
0.00290 
(0.77) 
0.00123 
(1.06) 
 Returns Post 
Events 3
rd
 Day 
0.00242*** 
(2.93) 
0.00223** 
(2.33) 
0.00267** 
(2.52) 
0.00209* 
(1.85) 
0.00187 
(0.94) 
0.00006 
(0.11) 
0.00205 
(0.78) 
0.00179 
(0.39) 
T
h
e 
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
a
l 
V
a
r
ia
n
c
e
 
E
q
u
a
ti
o
n
 
Constant - - - - 0.0000003** 
(1.99) 
0.0000003*** 
(2.58) 
0.0000003** 
(2.02) 
0.000004** 
(1.97) 
ARCH(1,1) - - - - 0.13001*** 
(2.55) 
0.13664* 
(1.80) 
0.13011* 
(1.81) 
0.17912** 
(2.12) 
GARCH(1,1) - - - - 0.80013*** 
(3.41) 
0.79700*** 
(2.95) 
0.72494*** 
(3.20) 
0.80111*** 
(3.21) 
  
Table 6.11: The QR and GARCH regression results from equation 6.11 on naval ship disasters.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
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Table 6.12: The OLS regression results from equation 6.11 on naval ship disasters.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10%. 
   OLS Regression 
  British Ships excluding the Courageous CV 
(17/09/1939) 
British Carrier Ships excluding the Courageous CV 
(17/09/1939) 
British Ships with the Times 
dates 
 
T
h
e 
C
o
n
d
it
io
n
a
l 
M
ea
n
 E
q
u
a
ti
o
n
 γ0 0.00032 
(1.08) 
0.00033 
(1.11) 
0.00031 
(1.05) 
Rt-1 0.30484*** 
(12.55) 
0.60597*** 
(12.58) 
0.30559*** 
(12.59) 
Rt-2 0.23400*** 
(9.24) 
0.23414*** 
(9.22) 
0.23475*** 
(9.27) 
Rt-3 -0.06092** 
(-2.35) 
-0.06277** 
(-2.41) 
-0.05905** 
(-2.28) 
TOTM 0.07549** 
(2.44) 
0.05978** 
(2.22) 
0.06879** 
(2.33) 
Returns Post 
Events 1
st
 Day 
0.00326* 
(1.79) 
0.00154 
(0.56) 
0.00373** 
(2.17) 
Returns Post 
Events 2
nd
 Day 
0.00081 
(0.45) 
-0.00121 
(-0.44) 
0.00207 
(1.20) 
 Returns Post 
Events 3
rd
 Day 
0.00171 
(0.94) 
0.00335 
(1.23) 
0.00185 
(1.07) 
 R
2 
F 
0.19 
26.20 
0.19 
26.01 
0.19 
26.44 
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6.4.3. Naval Disaster Conclusion 
 
The aim of this section was to examine the effect major naval sinkings had on British and US 
markets.  The initial analysis on the AR and CARs show that British ships sinking had a 
negative impact on the next day return of the FT30 and German sinkings had a positive 
effect, although neither are statistically significant.  When British carrier and battle ships are 
separated it is clear to see that carrier ships generate a larger negative next day return than 
battle ships.  The OLS regression results in Table 6.10 support the findings from the AR and 
CARs, however the day following a British carrier ships sinking does generate a significant 
negative coefficient.  To test the robustness of our results, the regressions are re-estimated 
through a QR and GARCH regression to account for extreme values and varying volatility in 
stock returns.  The QR results in Table 6.11 show that the coefficient the day after a British 
sinking changes from negative to positive, while the day after a carrier ship sinking 
coefficient changes from being significant to insignificant and very small. This suggests that 
the results found in Table 6.9 could be due to extreme values.  The GARCH results in Table 
6.11 support this finding, with the coefficient the day after a carrier ships sinking now turning 
positive.  Previous analysis in section 6.2 showed that the Courageous carrier ships was 
preceded by one of the largest negative returns of the war period.  Thus after excluded the 
sinking of the Courageous CV, the next day’s coefficients for British sinkings indicating that 
these two observations were driving our results.  Further, the announcement of the sinkings in 
the Times had no investor sentiment on the FT30 since one would suspect the coefficient to 
be negative.  All of these results show that ships sinking during WW2 produced little or no 
sentiment in stock returns.   
 
This chapter can conclude that the unexpected sinkings of naval ships during WW2 are not 
associated with much investor sentiment.  This is contrary to the much of the literature that 
finds disaster events have a negative impact on stock returns, and especially with the study by 
Kaplanski and Levy (2010) who found a strong degree of investor sentiment associated with 
unpredictable airplane crashes. This is puzzle in that these naval sinkings damaged national 
pride and caused many deaths, and the recent literature on investor sentiment indicates that 
bad moods and anxiety can be expected to have a substantial negative influence on stock 
prices. 
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6.5. The Blitz 
 
The previous two sections have examined the effect major events and naval disasters had on 
the FT30.  Nearly all of these events and sinkings took place outside of the British Isles and 
had no direct impact on investors and civilians in Britain.  The Blitz, from 7
th
 September 
1940 to 12
th
 May 1941, was a period of almost continual air attack by German forces on 
Britain during WW2. The bombings caused many causalities and great damage with over 
40,000 civilians killed and 46,000 injured, and more than one million houses were destroyed 
or damaged.  This was accomplished with the loss of about 600 German aircrafts (Richards, 
1952). The majority of the bombings were on London
41
, with other major cities heavily 
bombed due to their significance in the war effort. The period of the Blitz is very interesting 
in terms of finance theory in that one of the world’s major financial centres was under 
prolonged and serious attack.  Given that London is the hugely pre-eminent finance centre in 
the UK it is no exaggeration to say that most market participants were directly exposed to 
serious danger for a substantial period of time.   Given the extensive recent literature on the 
effect of sentiment and particularly anxiety and fear on stock returns the conditions of the 
Blitz gives a unique opportunity to contribute to the literature by examining investor 
sentiment in extreme circumstances. The period also provides an excellent natural experiment 
to explore the local bias hypothesis in a natural experiment by investigating whether the Blitz 
bombings in London had a stronger adverse effect on the London Stock Exchange than 
bombings outside of London.  This section examines the effect of the major bombings of the 
Blitz on the British stock market.  ARs and CARs are calculated as in the previous two 
sections, as well as regressions similar to the previous sections including OLS regression, QR 
and GARCH regression. 
 
6.5.1. The History of the Blitz 
 
The London Stock Exchange (LSE) stayed open during the Blitz, although fear of destruction 
caused 514 of its 784 members to establish an emergency address (Michie 1999).  Damage 
only closed the LSE from 16
th
 to 24
th
 September 1940, although trading was switched to the 
settlement room on the 17
th, so only one day’s business was lost. Consequently, the LSE 
stayed open virtually throughout the war although with slightly reduced hours. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
41
 London was bombed every night bar one, for eleven weeks. 
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the LSE turnover was affected with it falling to half its pre-war level by 1941. By 1942 
however, business began to increase and the LSE was recovering back to its pre-war state 
(Michie, 1999). 
 
London was not the only major city to be bombed by German forces.  One of the biggest and 
most damaging attacks during the Blitz was on the manufacturing city of Coventry on the 14
th
 
November 1940 where twelve important aircraft plants and nine other major industrial works 
were targeted with some 437 German aircrafts dropping bombs repeatedly for 10 hours,  
There was a loss of some 500 retail shops, as well as the blocking of railway lines, causing 
great disruption to the war effort (Richards, 1952). Other major cities were targeted due to 
their importance to the war effort, including Birmingham, Bristol, Clydebank, Manchester, 
Merseyside, Plymouth and Sheffield.  For example Merseyside suffered sixty raids and was 
Hitler’s number one target outside of London due to its granaries, power stations, dry docks, 
gasworks and its port which brought food and materiel across the Atlantic (Gardner p201). 
 
6.5.2. Data 
 
The data used is from the FT30 from 1
st
 July 1935 to 31
st
 December 2009 for the full sample, 
from 1
st
 January 1939 to 31
st
 December 1945 for WW2 period and from 7
th
 September 1940 
to 12
th
 May 1941 for the Blitz period.  Figures 6.4 and 6.5 show the index and the daily 
returns on the index.  Descriptive statistics shown in Table 6.13 reveal the mean return during 
the Blitz is positive and higher than the mean during both the rest of the war and the full 
sample. The standard deviation of returns during the Blitz is lower than during the rest of war 
and during the whole sample period.  It appears that there is no evidence of the Blitz period 
as a whole having a negative effect on stock prices. However further analysis on the major 
bombings on London and outside of London will provide a clearer picture. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Obs Max Min Mean Standard Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Blitz 174 0.0138506 -0.0138506 0.0003225 0.0042991 0.20164 1.12256 
Rest of War 1610 0.0590633 -0.0484122 0.0002139 0.0062050 -0.63744 18.10595 
Full Sample 19155 0.1078119 -0.1240017 0.0001538 0.0105848 -0.19631 9.69967 
 
Table 6.13: Descriptive statistics for daily returns of the Blitz period.   
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As well as looking at the Blitz period as a whole, individual major bombings are also 
examined.  Specifically, 8 air raids that caused the most deaths in London and outside of 
London studied.  Thus this section analyses bombings that caused the most damage to human 
life rather than bombings that caused financial or infrastructural damage. For instance, the 
bombings on Belfast on 4
th
 May 1941 destroyed two-thirds of the Harland and Wolff 
shipyards but only caused just over 100 deaths.  The bombings selected are documented in 
Table 6.14 with a note describing the severity of the attack. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5: FT30 returns during the Blitz 
 
Figure 6.4: FT30 price index during the Blitz. 
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6.5.3. Empirical Results  
 
Table 6.15 reveals that the returns on the day after a major air raid in London are all negative, 
indicating that the bombings had a negative effect on the British stock market.  However, the 
returns after the major air raids outside of London are all positive.  The mean return the day 
following a major London bombings is -0.00264 while the return the day following a major 
non-London bombing is 0.00286.  The t-test for the two samples is highly significant at 1%, 
indicating there is a significant difference in the return the day after a London and a non-
London bombing, supporting the local bias hypothesis. Table 6.16 reveals that four of the 
 
City Date Notes 
London 7
th
 Sep First real raid of the Blitz, with 300 bombers and more than 600 fighter planes 
over the city. 430 were killed, with 1600 seriously injured. 
London 8
th
 Sep 200 German planes pounded the City, with every railway line out of London to 
the south out of action.  412 Londoners were killed, and 747 seriously injured. 
London 9
th
 Sep The raid lasted nearly 10 hours, killing 370 people and injuring 1400. 
Coventry 14
th
 Nov 500 tons of high-explosive bombs and 30,000 incendiaries fell, with 568 people 
killed and 1256 injured. 
Birmingham 22
nd
+23
rd
 Nov 682 dead, 1057 injured and 2000 houses damaged 
Bristol 25
th
 Nov 1540 tons of high explosives, 47 tons of oil bombs and 12500 incendiaries 
dropped, 207 dead and 187 seriously injured and 703 slightly hurt. 
Sheffield 12
th
 Dec 300 bombers, 750 dead and 500 injured 
Merseyside 22
nd
 Dec 119 fatalities and Wallasey suffered badly.  The previous 3 nights caused 702 
deaths and the same again injured. 
Manchester 22
nd
 +23
rd
 Dec On the first night, 272 tons of high explosive bombs and 100 incendiary, while 
on the second 195 tons of high explosive bombs dropped and 900 incendiaries.  
In total, 684 died 2364 wounded and 8000 houses uninhabitable. 
London 27
th
 Dec 48 German aircraft bombed the city from Chelsea to Dalston.  Parachute mines 
caused many fires, killings 141 people and injuring 455. 
London 29
th
 Dec 120 tons of high explosives and 22000 incendiaries were dropped on the city, 
with 160 dead and 500 injured. 
Clydebank 13
th
+14
th
 Mar 268 tons of bombs and 1630 incendiaries were dropped on the first night and 227 
tons of high explosive bombs and 781 incendiaries dropped on the second night, 
with a total of 1083 dead. 
London 16
th
 Apr 66 of the 101 London boroughs reported bomb damage and over 2250 fires 
burning, killing 1180 and seriously injuring 2230. 
London 19
th
 Apr More than 1000 tons of high explosives were dropped plus 153,096 incendiaries, 
the most ever in a single night raid.  146 people died, with 46 missing.  This was 
the biggest single raid on London during the war. 
Plymouth 21
st
 Apr 10000 incendiary dropped killing 750 civilians. 
London 10
th
 May 1436 people killed, 1800 seriously injured with 11000 houses damaged beyond 
repair. 
 
Table 6.14: The major bombings and cities studied in this chapter along with the date they took place as well as a 
brief description of the impact of the bombings, taken from Gardiner (2011). 
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eight London bombings studied generate a negative next day AR, all of which are not 
statistically significant.  Non-London bombings generate five positive next day ARs, of 
which one is significant at 1%.  The mean AR from London bombings is negative, while the 
mean of a non-London bombings is positive, indicating that London bombings in general had 
a negative effect on the FT30, while the non-London bombings had a positive effect. The 
CARs for the London bombings reveal that the bombings that produced a negative AR also 
produce a negative 10-day CAR indicating that the negative effect may be long lasting. 
However, the market after two of the four negative AR bombings rebounded in one day, 
indicating that other events or factors have caused the negative 10-day CARs. The non-
London bombing CARs show that the Bristol bombing generated negative and significant at 
10% CARs for 5- and 10-days. However, the FT30 rebounded 1-day after the bombing itself, 
so other factors may have caused this result.  The Coventry bombing produces a negative AR 
and negative CARs, with the market taking 40 trading days to recover, which suggests that 
this bombing had a long lasting effect on the FT30. Panel C reports the two sample t-test and 
shows that there is a clear difference between London bombings and non-London bombings, 
although the difference is not statistically significance.  Results from Table 6.15 show that 
London bombings had more of a negative impact on stock returns than non-London 
bombings supporting the local bias hypothesis.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
City Date Next Day Return City Date Next day Return 
 
 
 
London 
7th Sep -0.003125 Coventry 14th Nov 0.006998 
8th Sep -0.003125 Bristol 25th Nov 0.004277 
9th Sep -0.00470589 Birmingham 22nd+23rd Nov 0.004295 
27th Dec -0.00284495 Sheffield 12th Dec 0.00 
29th Dec -0.00284495 Merseyside 22nd Dec 0.001430 
16th Apr 0.00 Manchester 22nd +23rd Dec 0.001428 
19th Apr -0.00149589 Clydebank 13th+14th Mar 0.004461 
10th May -0.00294551 Plymouth 21st Apr 0.00 
 Mean return -0.00263590  Mean return 0.002861 
 t-test for two sample = 5.43*** 
 
Table 6.15: The next day return for Blitz bombings on London and outside of London with the t-test 
for the returns the day after a major bombing in London against the returns the day after a major  
bombings outside of London.  ***, **, *indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
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Like the previous two sections, the seasonality’s are examined before the regression analysis 
to determine which of them are actually evident in the data.  The seasonality’s are examined 
from the beginning of the sample (1/7/1035) to the end of the Blitz period (12/5/1941).  The 
results are documented in Table 6.17 and show that only the serial correlation up to lag 3 and 
Table 6.16: ARs and CARs for the FT30 after major Blitz bombings. Panel A reports the 
London bombings while Panel B reports the non-London bombings.   ***, **, * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
City Date AR 5-day CAR 10-day CAR Days to rebound 
Panel A: London Bombings 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
London 
7
th
 Sep 0.42% 
(0.99) 
-0.88% 
(-0.69) 
0.24% 
(0.14) 
18 
8
th
 Sep 0.42% 
(0.99) 
-0.88% 
(-0.69) 
0.24% 
(0.14) 
18 
9
th
 Sep -0.10% 
(-0.23) 
-1.83% 
(-1.43) 
-0.97% 
(-0.55) 
10 
27
th
 Dec -0.69% 
(-1.60) 
0.17% 
(0.14) 
-0.25% 
(-0.14) 
1 
29
th
 Dec -0.69% 
(-1.60) 
0.17% 
(0.14) 
-0.25% 
(-0.14) 
1 
16
th
 Apr -0.43% 
(-1.01) 
-1.27% 
(-0.99) 
-0.62% 
(-0.35% 
10 
19
th
 Apr 0.03% 
(0.07) 
0.78% 
(0.61) 
0.10% 
(0.05) 
0 
10
th
 May 0.39% 
(0.91) 
0.39% 
(0.30) 
0.39% 
(0.22) 
0 
Means -0.08% -0.42% -0.14% - 
Panel B: Non-London Bombings 
Coventry 14
th
 Nov -0.43% 
(-1.00) 
-0.22% 
(-0.17) 
-2.68% 
(-1.51) 
40 
Bristol 25
th
 Nov -0.67% 
(1.56) 
-2.34%* 
(1.82) 
-3.03%* 
(1.71) 
1 
Birmingham 22
nd
+23
rd
 Nov -0.21% 
(-0.50) 
-2.36%* 
(-1.84) 
-3.12* 
(-1.75) 
1 
Sheffield 12
th
 Dec 0.32% 
(0.74) 
2.04% 
(1.59) 
3.50%** 
(1.97) 
0 
Merseyside 22
nd
 Dec 1.28%*** 
(2.97) 
-0.34% 
(-0.26) 
0.79% 
(0.45) 
0 
Manchester 22
nd
 +23
rd
 Dec 0.71%* 
(1.64) 
-1.53% 
(*1.19) 
-0.77% 
(-0.43) 
0 
Clydebank 13
th
+14
th
 Mar 0.23% 
(0.53) 
0.07% 
(0.05) 
-1.61% 
(-0.91) 
0 
Plymouth 21
st
 Apr -0.07% 
(-0.16) 
-1.68% 
(-1.31) 
-1.76% 
(-0.99) 
4 
Means 0.15% -0.80% -1.09% - 
Panel C: Two sample t-test 
- - -0.60 0.88 1.13 - 
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the turn-of-the-month effect are evident in the data, thus these are the only seasonality’s 
accounted for in the OLS regression, QR and GARCH(1,1) regression. 
 
 
 
 
 
The results of the regression analysis presented in Table 6.18 indicate that the London 
bombings have a negative impact on the FT30.  The day after a London bombings generate a 
negative coefficient which is quite high and significant at 5%.  Further, the day after a non-
London bombing produces a positive coefficient which is insignificant.  It is clear to see from 
the OLS regressions that the London bombings had a detrimental effect on the FT30, while 
the non-London bombings seem to have little or no impact on the FT30. By examining the 
confidence intervals it is clear that the London bombings coefficient does not fall within the 
non-London bombings confidence interval and vice-versa, indicating that the London and 
non-London bombings are different with 95% confidence and supporting the local bias 
hypothesis. The QR analysis shows that the day after a London bombing also generates a 
negative coefficient which is significant at 1%, whilst the day after a non-London bombing 
generates a positive coefficient. Thus high volatility and extreme values during the Blitz may 
have been skewing the London bombings coefficient and making the coefficients not as 
strong as they actually are. Again both London and non-London bombing coefficients are not 
within each other 95% confidence intervals, indicating they are significantly different.  The 
QR results again support the idea of local bias and negative investor sentiment in extreme 
circumstances.  A GARCH (1,1) model is also estimated to account for the possible time-
varying volatility in stock returns.  The results confirm the previous OLS regression and QR 
results with the London bombings generating a negative coefficient and non-London 
bombings generating a positive coefficient.  However the London bombings coefficient are 
no longer significant at any level indicating that the previous OLS regression and QR results 
may have been significantly affected by the time-varying volatility property of returns.  The 
results from Table 7 suggest that London bombings generated negative investor sentiment on 
stock returns while non-London bombings produced no negative investor sentiment although 
the results are not as strong when the GARCH(1,1) regression is estimated.  Further, the 
coefficients of London and non-London bombings are not within the 95% confidence interval 
of the other indicating that the coefficients are significantly different.  Thus although the 
Table 6.17: Pre-regression results for the known market anomalies during the Blitz period.  ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% respectively. 
Monday Effect January Effect TOTM Effect Tax Effect Returns-1 Returns-2 Returns-3 Returns-4 Returns-5 
0.0346212 
(0.66) 
0.0177841 
(0.24) 
0.1454008*** 
(2.72) 
0.0624134 
(0.42) 
0.2696754*** 
(10.39) 
0.0833163*** 
(3.10) 
-0.0541809** 
(-2.01) 
-0.0182641 
(-0.68) 
0.0186721 
(0.72) 
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GARCH(1,1) regression supports the idea of local bias, the results are not as strong as with 
the OLS regression and QR. 
Table 6.18: The OLS, Quantile and GARCH regression results from the major Blitz bombings.  The value in parentheses is 
the corresponding t-statistic, while the column beside present the 95% confidence intervals. ***, **, * indicate significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
 OLS Regression Quantile Regression GARCH(1,1) 
Blitz Major Bombings Estimate 95% Conf. Interval Estimate 95% Conf. Interval Estimate 95% Conf. Interval 
γ0 0.00011 
(0.33) 
-0.00056 0.00078 0.00020 
(0.66) 
-0.00039 0.00078 -0.00014 
(-0.46) 
-0.00075 0.00047 
Rt-1 0.38812*** 
(5.15) 
0.23935 0.53687 0.35044*** 
(5.43) 
0.22304 0.47784 0.27223*** 
(2.69) 
0.07412 0.47033 
Rt-2 0.15362* 
(1.91) 
-0.00505 0.31229 0.18730*** 
(2.67) 
0.04861 0.32599 0.11283 
(1.23) 
-0.06657 0.29222 
Rt-3 -0.07861 
(-1.05) 
-0.22697 0.06976 -0.00205 
(-0.03) 
-0.13291 0.12881 -0.06328 
(-0.71) 
-0.23694 0.11037 
TOTM 0.00039 
(0.52) 
-0.00110 0.00189 0.00025 
(0.38) 
-0.00104 0.00154 0.000519 
(0.83) 
-0.00071 0.00175 
London Bombing -0.00350** 
(-2.18) 
-0.00667 -0.00033 -0.00407*** 
(-3.11) 
-0.00665 -0.00148 -0.00280 
(-1.25) 
-0.00717 0.00157 
Non-London Bombing 0.00181 
(1.28) 
-0.00097 0.00460 0.00021 
(0.18) 
-0.00213 0.00255 0.00192 
(0.76) 
-0.00302 0.00687 
Constant - - - - - - 3.78e-6* 
(1.83) 
-2.64e-7 7.83e-6 
ARCH(1) - - - - - - 0.25599** 
(2.01) 
0.00698 0.50500 
GARCH(1) - - - - - - 0.49841** 
(2.53) 
0.11243 0.88439 
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6.5.4. Blitz Conclusion  
 
This section examines the period known as ‘the Blitz’ during WW2 in Britain and to 
determine the level of investor sentiment in the FT30.  The Blitz period as a whole is found to 
not have a negative impact on stock returns as a whole when compared to samples before and 
after the event.  Although even from a purely rational viewpoint the Blitz would have been 
expected to have had a substantial negative effect on stock prices, it is not evident at all in the 
data. However, when individual bombings were examined, the mean ARs and CARs for 
major bombings in London are negative while major bombings outside of London generate 
positive ARs and CARs.  This suggests the local bias hypothesis, that is, the closer to the 
event the more the market in affected.  The regression analysis further supports the local bias 
hypothesis and when extreme values are accounted for through a QR, the London bombings 
negative return is statistically significant.  A further GARCH-regression is also estimated to 
account for the varying volatility in stock returns, which also supports the local bias 
hypothesis, although the strength of the negative effect of London bombings is reduced.  This 
section can conclude that the Blitz period has a whole had no impact on the FT30, while the 
largest London bombings had a negative impact and non-London bombings had little or no 
impact. 
 
 
6.6. Chapter Conclusion 
 
Investor sentiment has been examined extensively in the literature although the majority of 
studies have examined seemingly insignificant and economically unimportant events.  
However, extreme events have not received the same level of attention and this chapter 
investigates one of the most extreme events in history, WW2.  The WW2 period has not been 
examined in great detail in the literature and provides an opportunity to examine investor 
sentiment in stock returns during the most extreme of all circumstances, when investor’s lives 
are at risk. Major positive and negative events, naval disasters and the period known as ‘the 
Blitz’, are studied to determine the level of investment sentiment during WW2. 
 
The key conclusions from this chapter are; 
(i) Negative events had a significant negative effect on next day returns in the FT30 for 
one day, while positive events had no significant impact on the FT30. 
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(ii) Break analysis reveals a number of significant break points in the data however the 
only major events found are the German entry into Paris and the attack on Pearl 
Harbour suggesting that these two events had the largest impact on the FT30. 
(iii) Naval disaster results show that British ships sinking had a negative impact on the 
FT30 with carrier ships having a larger impact than battleships, although only carrier 
ships are significant.  However, when the Courageous CV in excluded from our data, 
none of the results are significant suggesting that this one observation is driving the 
results.  
(iv) The analysis of the Blitz shows that London bombings had a negative impact on the 
FT30 while non-London bombings had a positive impact, supporting the local bias 
hypothesis that closer to the stock market the event is, the more impact it has on the 
market itself. 
 
It is important to note that the level of investor sentiment created by WW2 events is less than 
the sentiment found for many less important events.  For example, Kamstra et al (2000) find 
strong evidence that daylight saving changes cause negative returns on stock markets, while 
Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) find strong significant evidence that sunshine strongly 
effects stock returns. Further, Kaplanski and Levy (2010) find a transitory decline in the stock 
market is more than 60 times larger than the direct economic loss of the aircraft crashes.  This 
could be due to the fact that trading was so low during the war period, or that investors did 
not realise the significance of the events.  Either way, it is quite surprising to find little 
evidence of investor sentiment in such an extreme circumstance of lives being in danger.  
 
Overall, this chapter shows that major negative events of WW2 had a significant impact on 
the FT30, while major positive events had no impact.  This is in line with the literature which 
states that negative events have a stronger and more significant impact on stock returns than a 
corresponding positive event.  Further, this chapter supports the local bias hypothesis.  Only 
negative events that brought about a real threat of war coming to British shores were found 
using the exogenous break test while the fact that naval disasters had little impact on the 
FT30 could also be due to the fact that most of these sinkings occurred far away from Britain 
and had no direct impact to investors. Additionally, only London bombings during the Blitz 
generated a negative next day return while non-London bombings produced a positive next 
day return.  Thus this chapter contributes to and extends the literature on investor sentiment 
in extreme circumstances while also supporting the local bias hypothesis. 
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion  
 
7.1. Summary and Main Findings 
 
This thesis examines whether the Adaptive Market Hypothesis (AMH) can explain the 
behaviour of stock returns over time better than the traditional Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH) using long run data from the US, UK and Japanese markets represented by the DJIA, 
FT30 and TOPIX.  Further, this thesis also examines the level of investor sentiment in the 
FT30 during the extreme period of World War Two. 
 
Apart from the Introduction and Conclusion chapters, this thesis is structured around five 
main chapters, with four empirical chapters.  Chapter Two begins by defining the EMH, its 
development over time, the main assumptions it relies on, as well as the various versions of it 
such as the martingales and random walk hypothesis. The main procedures to test for the 
EMH are also introduced, although each subsequent chapter provides a more detailed 
literature review of each procedure.  The main stock market anomalies and technical analysis 
rules found in the literature are also presented, highlighting the conflict between the recent 
literature and the classical EMH.  One model that aims to solve the conflict between 
inefficiencies in the market and the classic EMH, is the AMH.  The AMH, suggested by 
Andrew Lo (2004), proposes that inefficiencies and the EMH can co-exist together in an 
intellectually consistent manner.  A literature review in support of the AMH is conducted but 
due to the recent formulation of the hypothesis, is quite limited.  Further, this chapter explains 
the classification of stock return behaviour which is proposed in this thesis. This 
classification allows the behaviour of stock returns to be categorized into five different types.  
The first type is market efficiency, where returns behave in a perfectly efficient manner 
throughout.  The second type is moving towards market efficiency, where the returns have 
been behaving inefficiently but have moved to efficiency over time.  The third type is a 
switch to efficiency/inefficiency, where returns have behaved inefficiently/efficiently but 
have reversed in behaviour rover time.  The fourth type is the AMH, where returns have gone 
through at least three stages of efficiency/inefficiency over time.  The fifth and final type is 
market inefficiency, where returns have behaved in an inefficiency manner throughout.  This 
classification is applied in each of the three empirical chapters that examine the behaviour of 
returns over time.  The last part of chapter two describes the stock markets examined in the 
thesis, with the calculation of the index of each also illustrated. 
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Chapter three examines the behaviour of stock returns over time using a battery of tests for 
independence incorporating conventional linear tests, as well as nonlinear tests.  The first part 
of this chapter discusses the prior empirical studies conducted using these tests, showing that 
independence of stock returns was initially found but recently, more and more studies have 
found that stock returns are not independent.  The data section shows that for each market the 
full sample and subsample returns do not conform to normality which is not surprising since 
this is a well known stylised fact for most financial time series data.  The empirical results 
obtained in this chapter suggest the AMH is a more appropriate model for describing the 
behaviour of stock returns over time for all three markets according to the linear tests.  The 
finding that the three unit root tests all suggest market efficiency is constant over time is not 
surprising since most stock market returns are stationary.  When returns are filtered through 
an AR-model to remove all linear correlations, the three markets show evidence of constant 
and significant dependence over time, suggesting type 5 and market inefficiency.  Returns are 
also filtered through an AR-GARCH filter to account for the heteroskedasticity in returns and 
strong evidence of the AMH is found.  Thus this chapter shows strong evidence of the AMH 
for all three markets through linear and nonlinear tests for the independence of stock returns 
indicating that this model may a better description of the behaviour of stock returns than the 
classic EMH. 
 
In chapter four, three of the most celebrated and successful calendar anomalies are examined 
to determine whether the AMH can describe their behaviour over time.  The Monday effect, 
January effect and turn-of-the-month effect are all examined and the literature shows that the 
behaviour of these calendar anomalies may be changing over time since a number of recent 
studies find that their returns are decreasing. The empirical results from this chapter suggest 
that the Monday effect is not present in the FT30 at all, while the other anomalies in the three 
markets all decrease in magnitude after the publication of the seminal paper publicising that 
calendar anomaly. An analysis examining five-yearly subsamples analysis is conducted, 
showing that only three of the anomalies can be described by the AMH, with the switch-type 
describing two of the anomalies and constant market inefficiency describing four of the 
anomalies. Furthermore, using a simple trading strategy only the Monday effect in the DJIA, 
and the TOTM effect in the DJIA and FT30 can outperform the buy-and-hold strategy over 
the full sample.  Studying the data after the seminal publication of each anomaly, only the 
Monday anomaly in the TOPIX as well as the TOTM anomaly in the FT30 and TOPIX can 
outperform the buy-and-hold strategy. All of the other anomalies cannot beat the buy-and-
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hold strategy. A “double or out” and “quadruple or out” trading strategies are also conducted 
so the trading strategy has a corresponding risk to that of the buy-and-hold strategy, with 
results being very similar but double in magnitude.  Finally this chapter shows that when the 
TOTM days are eliminated from the January anomaly, the returns from the January anomaly 
turn from positive to negative, or from significant to insignificant, suggesting that the TOTM 
days are driving the success of the January anomaly. This chapter shows that the AMH is a 
more appropriate model for describing the behaviour of calendar anomalies over time than 
the EMH.   
 
To further examine whether the AMH is a more appropriate model for describing the 
behaviour of stock returns than the EMH, the most popular technical analysis rule is 
examined in chapter five.  A large number of prior studies indicate that the moving average 
rule does produce significant returns over time however the majority of the studies show that 
the rule does not generate superior returns to the buy-and-hold strategy after allowing for 
trading costs. The moving average rule is examined in this chapter to determine whether the 
seminal paper by BLL had a detrimental effect on the success of the rule and whether the 
AMH can describe the behaviour of the returns from this rule over time. The examination of 
the post BLL data for each market shows that the returns generated from the moving average 
rule have decreased since the publication of the paper, with DJIA returns turning negative, 
FT30 returns just remaining positive but no longer significant, and TOPIX returns magnitude 
falling although still significant. The five-yearly subsample analysis shows that the AMH can 
describe the behaviour of the moving average rule for five of the nine rules examined, with 
the remaining four suggesting a switch to inefficiency (which could be early stage AMH). 
The perfectly and imperfectly anticipated moving average rules are proposed in which the 
investor predicts the following days signal and trades on it today. The results show that these 
two predicting rules do produce positive and significant returns for the majority of moving 
average rules examined, thus suggesting that if investors can predict the following days signal 
the moving average rule does continue to be successful.  Finally two simple trading strategies 
show that the moving average rule can outperform the buy-and-hold strategy for all the full 
samples of all the markets, however the results for post BLL data show mixed results for the 
DJIA and positive results for the FT30 and TOPIX.  Further, when the simple trading 
strategies are implemented on the perfectly and imperfectly anticipated moving average rule, 
the two rules outperform the buy-and-hold strategy quite considerably, as well as the original 
moving average rule.  This chapter shows that the moving average rule has decreased in 
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power over time in its ability to create positive returns, however if investors can predict the 
signal on the following day, significant profits can be realised. This chapter also shows that 
the AMH can be used to describe the behaviour of the moving average rule in a number of 
markets better than the traditional EMH. 
 
Chapter six is the final empirical chapter of this thesis and investigates the growing topic of 
investor sentiment.  This chapter examines investor sentiment in extreme circumstances, 
World War Two in Britain through FT30 data.  The literature on investor sentiment is vast, 
although the majority of studies examine sentiment for seemingly trivial and economically 
unimportant factors such as the amount of sunshine, the temperature and even sports results. 
Major positive and negative events, naval disasters as well as the largest bombings of the 
Blitz are examined.  The empirical findings show that negative events had a significant 
negative effect on the FT30, however positive events did not have the corresponding effect. 
Further, although break analysis finds a number of significant break points, only two of the 
major events studied are found suggesting that the market did not react to these events. The 
naval disaster analysis shows that British sinkings had a negative impact on the FT30, with 
aircraft carrier ships sinking creating a lot more sentiment than battleship sinkings.  However, 
when the Courageous carrier ship is taken out of the data, there is no sentiment, indicating 
that one outlier was driving the results.  Finally the Blitz analysis shows that major London 
bombings had a negative impact on the FT30 while non-London bombings had a positive 
impact on the FT30, supporting the local bias hypothesis prescribed in the literature.  Overall, 
this chapter shows there is some investor sentiment after major negative events of WW2 but 
little sentiment for major positive events. However there is little investor sentiment for major 
naval disasters although there is strong evidence of local bias from the bombings of the Blitz. 
 
This thesis has investigated the AMH in some depth and whether it can explain the behaviour 
of stock returns through tests for independence, returns from calendar anomalies and returns 
from technical rules.  Further it has examined investor sentiment in an extreme circumstance 
that have not been studied in great detail previously.  The overall findings are that the AMH 
can describe the behaviour of stock returns in the DJIA, FT30 and TOPIX better than the 
traditional EMH through the previous testing procedures and that there is some evidence of 
investor sentiment in the FT30 during World War Two.  This thesis represents a large 
extension of the knowledge of the AMH and investor sentiment in extreme circumstances.  
This thesis also provides a much more systematic and comprehensive study of the AMH than 
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the previous literature.  Significant limitations in the existing literature have been addressed 
and whilst the findings have important implications in terms of financial theory, they have 
wider significance.  Specifically, to the large number of market practitioners who actively 
employ trading strategies to take advantage of the dependence between stock returns, 
calendar anomalies and technical rules on a day-to-day basis.  It may well be that trading 
rules and calendar anomalies are likely to evolve over time and profits from them depend on 
market conditions, as stated by Andrew Lo (2004) for the AMH. 
 
7.2. Limitations and Future Research 
 
This thesis, like any other, has a number of limitations.   
 
(i) The choice of five-yearly subsamples in the first three empirical chapters.  
Different sizes of subsamples could have been chosen, which could have produced 
different results. However with the data sets available and given the aim of this 
thesis to examine the AMH over time, the choice of five-yearly subsamples gave 
enough results to examine the behaviour over time while providing enough 
observations for the tests to produce reliable results. Many of the papers studying 
the AMH have used rolling sample windows, which have their own problems that 
are discussed in chapter two. Thus this thesis studies the AMH from a new 
perspective. 
 
(ii) The length of the full sample periods.  The sample periods for the different 
markets are not of the same length due to data availability.  Each data period was 
chosen as the longest possible so as to gain an accurate description of how returns 
have behaved over time.  If the data for all three markets data began in 1951 
(when the TOPIX started), it would not give us any information about the DJIA 
and FT30 pre-1951 which would be less insightful than using the full sample 
periods available. 
 
(iii) The lack of investor sentiment effects found during the WW2 period may be due 
to the market conditions that we are not able to observe such as low trading 
volume during.  This is possibly the reason why there is very little investor 
sentiment in stock returns during this period, since many people were drafted to 
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join the war effort, and those that were not probably had ‘more important’ things 
to do than trade on the stock market.  However, this thesis has no access to the 
trading volume during World War Two so it is only with speculation that one can 
say that the results are due to the low volume of trading. 
 
Future potential research on the AMH is potentially plentiful since it is a recently formed 
model and a number of testing procedures can be used to investigate it.  The analysis of the 
markets through different sample periods, or the use of a rolling sample window could give 
further insights into the behaviour of stock market returns, but this relies on the availability of 
data.  As more and more data becomes available, longer subsamples may be more fruitful to 
examine the AMH of these markets, although this may take a number of years.  The AMH 
could also be examined through other markets, individual stocks, exchange rate markets, and 
bond markets.  Further, comparing the evidence of the AMH in developed markets and 
developing markets (given data availability) may enable investors to predict when certain 
anomalies may increase/decline in power.  One exciting area of future research is to examine 
during which market conditions certain market anomalies produce significant returns.  For 
example if a period of time produces significantly strong returns in a market, is it 
characterised by high/low interest rates, bull/bear markets, high/low inflation etc. It then may 
be possible to predict in the future when certain anomalies will and will not be successful.  
Another interesting area for future research would be to study whether there were any 
linkages between the three markets studied in this thesis in regards to the calendar anomalies 
or any technical analysis rule.  Does the rule in one country drive the results in another? This 
could be the case with the DJIA driving other markets.  Also, a full examination of all known 
technical analysis rules and whether it is possible to predict the following days signal would 
be very worthwhile to examine whether investors have been doing this and gaining high 
returns when the original rule is declining in power.  Furthermore, a full examination of all 
known calendar anomalies, technical analysis rules and their behaviour over time could 
reveal how anomalies and trading rules behave over time, and possibly give an indication 
about the behaviour of future anomalies. 
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